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ABSTRACT
Occupational safety is gaining a higher profile across all sectors of the United
Kingdom's economy. This is largely a result of developments in legislation, increased
indemnity insurance and the successful promotion of safety practice through the work
of the Health and Safety Executive and the writings of health and safety professionals.
This thesis has been undertaken to develop a dynamic simulation model of occupational
safety strategy using system dynamics and empirically test it in an industrial setting.
The work also seeks to capture a measure of the suitability of the occupational safety
model as a pedagogic and decision-making aid. The results show that the occupational
safety model was successfully developed, tested and evaluated within a firm. A range of
alternative scenarios which suggested reductions in accidents at work and the costs of
running a safety management system were predicted by the model. The relevant
managers of the industrial enterprise were able to appreciate the model's capability for
acting as an instruction tool to improve safety in the workplace. They were also able to
judge the usefulness of the model for reducing occupational accidents and their related
costs.
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CHAPTER ONE
An Introduction to Modelling Occupational Safety
1.1 Introduction to the Occupational Safety
The standards of occupational safety enjoyed by the current labour force in the United
Kingdom are largely a combination of developments in criminal and common law
dating back over two centuries (Stranks, 1994a). Important statutes have included the
Health and Morals of Apprentices Act 1802, Factories and 'Workshop Acts 1878 and
1901, and the Factories Acts of 1937 and 1961.
Contemporary United Kingdom health and safety legislation stems from the Health and
Safety at Work Act 1974, which arose from the Government Committee of Inquiry into
health and safety law of 1970-72 (Waring, 1996). The prescriptive legislation of the
previous 150 years was largely consolidated and the legislation of the period from 1974
to date encourages more self-regulation and active management of health and safety at
work. Employers are responsible for managing the risks in the workplace that they
create, rather than simply seeking to comply with specific health and safety regulations.
Self-regulation requires proactive management, employee participation in decision-
making and a generally positive culture. It was not until 1993 that any new significant
health and safety management legislation was introduced in the United Kingdom. These
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arose from six European Directives resulting from the Single European Act of 1987.
These were translated into United Kingdom law (HSE, 1993a). They required
employers to take additional measures to manage health and safety. In particular,
develop and document their occupational safety management systems. Since these
Regulations were passed there has not been any more substantial changes to legislation.
Occupational accident and ill-health statistics, published up to 1992 by the Department
of Employment, and thereafter by the Health and Safety Executive show a gradual
downward trend over a long period in reported accidents and ill-health. The figures also
show that there has been an increase in prosecutions brought against employers for
contraventions of health and safety legislation. In addition, magistrates have increased
fines for breaches of statutes. Indeed, a number of manslaughter prosecutions have also
been brought against employers for negligence of duty (RoSPA, 1993).
A number of studies have indicated that successful business and good health and safety
practice are closely associated (HSE, 1991a, 1994b; Everley, 1995a; 1995b; Knutton,
1995). Employers should regard health and safety actions not as cost centres but as
contributions to profit. Practical concern for health and safety can contribute to
financial performance through the prevention of avoidable loss (Waring, 1996). All
accidents, occupational diseases and dangerous occurrences result in loss to firms.
These incidents can be regarded as measures of failure (HSE, 1991a). These costs may
be considered as direct or indirect. Many firms managers understand some of the direct
financial costs such as increased insurance premiums, but fail to appreciate that it is the
indirect costs often hidden in other costs that are the highest.
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The background offered in the previous paragraphs all point to the legal, moral and
financial benefits of maintaining thorough safety management systems. Although,
statistics such as one fatality per 100,000 employed in the United Kingdom is the
lowest in the world, there is not too much scope for self-congratulation (Davies, 1998).
There are still unacceptably high incidences of occupational accidents and ill-health,
and the costs to business of the average accident are now estimated to be as high as
£3,500. Waring (1996) suggests that a major problem may lie with the content of many
health and safety management publications. Often they are narrow and prescriptive and
can give the impression that success can be delivered if a particular systematic
'formula' is acted upon. If health and safety management systems are to exploited to
good effect then both systematic and systemic aspects of health and safety need to be
understood. The use of models to explore and understand the consequences of decisions
before action is taken may prove to be valuable in the evaluation by firms of alternative
occupational safety strategies.
1.2 Modelling and the Methodological Approach to the Occupational Safety Study
A model may be regarded as a simple representation of reality (Pidd, 1996). It can be
physical or abstract in nature. Physical models are usually scale models. They are three-
dimensional representations of the problem under study. Common applications include
architecture, civil engineering and water management. A scale model is concrete in
form and highly specific (Pidd, 1988). To experiment with a scale model always
requires physical alterations to the model. As such they are rather inflexible and
certainly not appropriate for tackling management issues which are more subtle and
open to greater interpretation.
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Abstract models have uses well beyond those of physical models. They can be static or
dynamic, mathematical or mental, and explicit or implicit. These models offer the
opportunity to explore the possible consequences of alternative decisions before taking
any action. It is beyond the scope of this work to offer a critique of alternative
modelling approaches. This has been done already by a number of authors (Ackoff,
1979; Jackson and Keys, 1984; Lane, 1994; Pidd, 1996).
There are a number of advantages to experimentation with a model rather than reality.
Thus the cost of experimentation with a model is usually much less than using reality.
Further to, the time it takes to explore options in a model is much lower than in the real
world. A model can be used as a vehicle to facilitate debate and discussion amongst
decision-makers, which can lead to new insights into their problems, and finally the
danger of experimentation in the real world may be avoided using a model.
Given the diversity of models and their advantages over real world experimentation,
they are more than mere simplifications of reality. Pidd described them as tools for
thinking, and thus defines a model as:
...an external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use
that model to understand, to change, to manage and to control that part of reality (Pidd, 1996,
p.15).
The modelling process determines the nature of a model. This process can be regarded
as the method of study or methodology. Many modelling methodologies may be used to
examine occupational safety strategies. Before they are introduced, the term
methodology should be understood. Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggested that a
methodology refers to the approach one takes to the process of research, from its
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theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of data. More specifically,
Harvey, a geographical modeller, argues that methodology is concerned primarily with:
...the logic of explanation, with ensuring that arguments are rigorous, that inferences are
reasonable, that method is internally coherent (Harvey, 1969, p.6).
Operational research and management science models using linear programming and
decision theory (fault tree analysis) are methodologies which have been successfully
applied to the evaluation of safety decisions where uncertain outcomes exist. The
domains include systems reliability and process control (Amendola, 1988; Jazwinsld
and Wazynska-Fiok, 1990; Carpienano, 1994). These methodologies are well suited to
tackling problems where the ability of a system to change over time is unimportant to
the study. Forecasting models which use time-series data have been used to make
temporal predictions of accident rates (Frievalds and Johnson, 1990; Haastrup and
Funtowicz, 1992; Bhattacherjee et al., 1994). The main limitation of these time-series
models lies in the inability of the models to include causal influence and the need for
variables to remain fixed, when it is evident that they are not in the real world.
It appears that the established modelling methodologies may not be suitable for
exploring high level decisions about safety at work. This thesis will apply and further
develop the methodology of system dynamics to construct an operational model of
safety in an industrial setting.
System dynamics was created by Forrester (1961, 1968, 1971), and originally called
industrial dynamics. It was developed as a response to a situation in which many
problem solving techniques were failing to provide adequate insights into and
understanding of strategic problems in complex systems (Wolstenholme, 1990). It is an
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approach that can be applied to evaluate decisions in any managed system. The system
dynamics process involves building models to represent and to study the behaviour of
real world systems. The purpose of the modelling effort is to understand and control
problematic system behaviour. Its strength lies in its ability to facilitate understanding
of the relationship between a system's behaviour over time and its underlying structure,
strategy and policies. The structure of a model is contained within interrelated causal
feedback loops and based on difference equations. Dynamic model behaviour is
achieved using computer simulation. Through repeated experimentation with the
simulation model, the design of improved system behaviour can be achieved.
A criticism of system dynamics modelling is the absence of real world data from many
models. The belief that policies embedded in an untested model are appropriate is a
problem, and this has been considered unacceptable in' the past by other more
quantitatively orientated modellers (Nordhaus, 1973). However it may not be the
methodology that deserves criticism but its use. Concern has also been raised within the
system dynamics community about an absence of empirical evidence in many
operational models to support their predictions (Maloney, 1993; Homer, 1996, 1997;
Lyneis, 1999). Logic dictates that the best way to verify the accuracy and use of a
system dynamics model which purports to be representative of reality is to accurately
calibrate it with real data, and to measure its simulated behaviour against a real system.
Moffatt (1991) partially agrees with Forrester and Senge's (1980) argument that the
plausibility of a model lies in its structure, but he argues that this should not allow
statistical tests to be abandoned. Fortunately, some system dynamics model builders
have proposed a number of formal tests (Graham, 1980; Sterman, 1984; Eberlein and
Wang, 1985; Kleijnen, 1995; Barlas, 1989, 1996; Clemson eta!., 1995).
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Unlike some earlier system dynamics models of industrial systems which were built for
specific host firms (Risch et al., 1995; Ford and Sterman, 1998; Zahn et al., 1998) the
present study will involve the development of a generic model of occupational safety to
be applied to an industrial concern. The host firm is located in central Scotland and
engaged in timber and wood processing.
1.3 The Purpose of the Study
A review of relevant literature did not reveal any published work detailing the
application of system dynamics modelling to occupational safety in specific firms. The
opportunity to make a unique contribution to the body of safety and modelling
knowledge exists. The purpose of the work is to explore the feasibility and plausibility
of a simulation model of safety at work.
(a) Aim
The aim of this study is to develop a dynamic simulation model of occupational safety
using system dynamics and apply the model to a real world manufacturing setting.
(b) Objectives
A total of five objectives need to be met in order to fulfil the aim of the study. These are
to:
> Give a critical exposition of the system dynamics method.
> Develop a generic system dynamics model of occupational safety.
> Apply the generic workplace safety model to a real world industrial setting.
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> Simulate different occupational safety policies in order to reduce the numbers of
accidents and safety costs in the workplace.
> Examine the use of the model as a pedagogic tool to investigate the causal links
which lead to accidents and other safety performance in the workplace.
The work focuses on the examination of injury accidents in the workplace. Safety at
work is the overall theme of the research, although on many occasions, particularly in
discussing literature it is necessary and appropriate to study both health and safety
together. Occupational health and hygiene lie within the domain of the medical
profession, and often due to the long gestation periods for ill-health and disease it is
difficult and sometimes impossible to trace causes back to work, and more specifically
to certain workplaces. This does not necessarily preclude the study from being of use to
those interested in improving health at work, as there are generally strong correlation's
between the control of hazards, accidents and ill-health.
1.4 The Structure of the Thesis
The material presented in this study is divided into eight chapters. The thesis clearly
falls into two halves. The first half (Chapters Two to Four) concentrates on a discussion
of occupational safety and of systems modelling, and with the latter (Chapter Five to
Eight) emphasising the development and use of the system dynamics model of
workplace safety.
Chapter Two outlines occupational safety at the macro level. The principal legislation
which relate to the management of health and safety at work are described. In addition,
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data on levels of occupational accidents and health and safety enforcement activity in
recent years across the United Kingdom are presented and discussed. The chapter
finishes with an analysis of the fmancial costs of accidents at work to both employers
and to the national economy. A description of the legislation, enforcement activity and
financial costs associated with health and in particular safety is useful as they underpin
the safety management systems which are in operation in many places of employment.
The components of an occupational safety management system are examined in
Chapter Three, which looks at the development of a systematic approach to safety
through a sequential framework developed by the Health and Safety Executive (1991a).
The chapter also attempts to show the systemic nature of safety management. The
principal components of a safety management system are shown to be policy
development, risk assessment and control, staff recruitment and training, and safety
monitoring and review.
In Chapter Four the background to systems thinking, the theory and methodological
framework of system dynamics, and a discussion of occupational safety models is
presented. As well as the principles and method of study in system dynamics, the
importance of validation and confidence building is emphasised.
The process by which the generic model of occupational safety is constructed and
validated is described in Chapter Five. The chapter contains the results of a number of
validation tests of the structure and behaviour of the model.
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Chapter Six describes the background to safety in the host firm. The system of
collecting and analysing the firm's data, and calibrating the model to fit the firms past
safety behaviour is detailed. The chapter finishes by showing the results of behaviour
replication tests.
The result of a semi-structured interview conducted with a number of managers in the
firm is discussed in Chapter Seven. In the interview it was sought to ascertain the
potential of the model as both a policy making and as a learning tool. Following this
discussion, the implications of alternative policies adopted by the firm are reviewed by
exploring a number of alternative scenarios.
Chapter Eight is the conclusion. The modelling process, its overall usefulness in
industrial settings, and implications for further research are presented.
Due to the ongoing debate by modellers on the methodology of system dynamics
methodological rigour will be applied to develop a plausible, robust, internally coherent
and empirically testable model. If such a model can be developed it should have a
policy relevance to be applied in a real world context to reduce accidents at work and to
improve the cost effectiveness of occupational safety management systems. This is
introduced in Chapter Four, and emphasised throughout Chapters Five and Six.
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CHAPTER TWO
United Kingdom Occupational Health and Safety Legislation,
Enforcement Activity and Financial Costs
2.1 Introduction to Health and Safety in the United Kingdom
Many employers understand the need for good health and safety practice in the
workplace. In recent years the reductions in rates of occupational accidents and illness
have been principally driven by the enforcement of the law, although employers have
clearly begun to see the financial benefits of good safety management. This has resulted
in an increase in health and safety activity.
The purpose of this chapter is to review the principal health and safety statutes and
legislation that have helped to raise the effectiveness and profile of health and safety
management, and examine the general character of health and safety across the United
Kingdom. Section 2.2 introduces the statutes under which health and safety legislation
is passed in the United Kingdom. The legal developments in occupational health and
safety since the Heath and Safety at Work Act of 1974 are described in Section 2.3.
Next, in Section 2.4 recent national accident statistics are presented and the extent of
regulatory enforcement activity is discussed. The costs to employers of workplace
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accidents and ill-health are described in Section 2.5. Finally, in Section 2.6, the contents
of the chapter are summarised.
2.2 The Background to Health and Safety Legislation
Since 1974 there has been substantial changes in both the law and practice of
occupational health and safety (Stranks, 1994a). Previously, prescriptive standards were
thought to suffice. A management-orientated approach with more emphasis on human
factors, risk assessment and with employers appointing competent persons to deal with
health and safety is now required. This need has been set out in statute (Health and
Safety at Work Act, 1974). In order to appreciate how these changes affect health and
safety in the workplace a review of the main legislation, past, and particularly present,
has been conducted. Table 2.1 is a summary of the main United Kingdom health and
safety statutes.
Principal Statutes Year
Factories Act 1961
Office, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963
Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act • 1969
Fire Precautions Act 1971
Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
Table 2.1
	
Summary of the main United Kingdom health and safety statutes
(a) The Legal Situation with Health and Safety Prior to 1974
The law relating to health and safety at work has its foundations in statute and common
law dating back to the early nineteenth century (Stranks and Dewis, 1986). Until the
Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAWA) was passed in 1974, protective
employment legislation consisted of a number of statutes passed on an ad hoc basis
(Stranks, 1992). The developments in laws and regulations up to the HASAWA had
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sought to protect health and safety, and to impose exact safety standards in respect of
specific types of factory and the use of certain machines, processes and substances.
Attempts had been made to gain uniformity of health and safety across industry but
these became ineffective as new hazards were recognised. A total of four Acts passed
before the HASAWA are still on the statute book and still relevant to health and safety
at work, although parts of these Acts were repealed when the HASAWA came into
being. These are the Factories Act, 1961; the Office, Shops and Railway Premises Act,
1963; the Employer's Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act, 1969; and the Fire
Precautions Act, 1971. The contents of these four Acts need to be briefly outlined in
order to understand their relevance to current occupational health and safety.
(b) The Factories Act 1961 
The Factories Act is a consolidation Act which was consolidated for the last time in
1961 (Simpson, 1990). Most of its major provisions concerning health, safety and
welfare continue in force, although parts of the Act have been repealed and replaced
with the set of Health and Safety Regulations of 1992 (Stranks, 1994a). The Factories
Act solely deals with health and welfare provisions (Factories Act, 1961). It allows the
Minister responsible for health and safety at work to make regulations for providing
medical supervision when illness appears to have developed through work, or when
there may be a risk to health resulting from a change in working conditions. Provisions
are also made in the Act to ensure that moving parts of machinery are adequately
fenced (Stranks, 1992).
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(c) The Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963 
This Act makes provision for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons
employed in offices, shop premises and certain railway premises (Offices, Shops and
Railway Premises Act, 1963). It superseded parts of the general safety, health and
welfare provisions of the Factories Act (Simpson, 1990).
(d) The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969
This Act places a duty on employers to take out and maintain approved insurance
policies with authorised insurers against injury or ill-health sustained by employees
during their employment (Association of British Insurers, 1995). An employer must be
insured for at least £2 million in respect to claims arising out of any one occurrence
(Bamber, 1993). Employees made ill or injured at work are entitled to sue their
employers for compensation in the civil courts (HSC, 19921));
(e) The Fire Precautions Act 1971 
If any premises is used as a place of work, a certificate is required from the fire
authority (Simpson, 1990). The fire authority must be satisfied with the means of
escape in case of fire, the means of fire fighting and the means of giving persons in the
premises warning in case of fire.
(f) The Robens Committee
The Robens Committee was set up in 1970 in response to criticisms made by many
organisations such as trade unions that existing legislation was inadequate (Simpson,
1990). Its remit was to examine the frequency of accidents and dangerous occurrences
in places of employment (Jackson, 1979). The investigation encompassed all
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workplaces. Accidents, health hazards and safety standards were assessed and
compared to those overseas.
The recommendations of the Robens Committee were far-reaching. The proposed
changes were centred on a movement away from a system of prescriptive health and
safety legislation to one of 'self-regulation' (Waring, 1996). The report called for
legislation to extend the minimum legal requirements of existing statute (Howells and
Barrett, 1975). The recommendations involved granting wider powers for inspectors,
and burdened employers with more responsibility. It was expected that those who
created risk should manage it in a competent way, as they would be expected to do for
any other aspect of running an organisation (Waring, 1996). The legal framework of the
Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAWA) of 1974 was based on the
recommendations of the Robens Report (Howells and Barrett, .1975; Carthy, 1992).
(g) The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
The HASAWA did not repeal or replace existing legislation relating to specific
workplaces (Carthy, 1992). Instead it is an enabling Act which gives powers to the
Secretary of State for Employment to make regulations to replace current legislation
(Simpson, 1990). It established a co-ordinating enforcement authority, the Health and
Safety Commission (HSC), and provided it with the power to propose health and safety
regulations and Approved Codes Of Practice (ACOP) (Simpson, 1990; Dewis, 1985). It
set up the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), with the responsibility for enforcing the
health and safety laws. Substantive enforcement powers were given to health and safety
inspectors, and it made provision for the appointment of safety representatives on
behalf of the workforce to monitor health and safety in the workplace, and also for the
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appointment of safety committees. The regulations and ACOPs were intended to unify
all legislation covering health, safety and welfare.
Anyone in breach of the regulations can be prosecuted under the Act (Carthy, 1992). An
ACOP provides guidance on health and safety, but does not have legal force. It is an
interpretation of an Act or regulations, and is frequently complemented by Guidance
Notes. In the event of a prosecution, and when it has been established that the relevant
provisions of the Code have not been adhered to, the defendant has to show that the law
has been complied with in some other way.
The Act imposes duties on all concerned with work activities (HSC, 1992a). The duties
are imposed on individuals through to corporations. These are expressed in general
terms so as to apply to all types of work. The principles of Safety responsibility and safe
working are explained in the general duties sections. Specific legal requirements are
also laid down in earlier legislation, which is still in force. A number of duties set out in
the Act are 'absolute' and have to be complied with, but many are written as 'so far as
is reasonably practicable' (HSE, 1993a). 'Reasonably practicable' means that the
degree of risk can be compared for a particular activity against the time, cost, effort and
difficulty in avoiding the risk.
All employers must take measures which are reasonably practicable to 'ensure the
health, safety and welfare of their employees at work. This includes measures such as
the provision of safe plant, systems of work, safety information, training and
supervision. Employees are required to take care for their own health and safety, and
also that of others who may be affected by their acts or omissions at work, and to co-
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operate with their employers to enable statutory provisions to be complied with (Dewis,
1985; Stranks, 1992). Designers, manufacturers, importers and suppliers of articles and
substances used at work also have duties under the Act. As far as is reasonably
practical, substances supplied must be safe, and must be accompanied by information
which makes users aware of the risks to health and safety.
The enforcement of the Act is the responsibility of the HSE via its inspectorate, with
certain premises overseen by local authorities and the Fire Authority (Simpson, 1990).
An inspector has a wide range of powers, including the right to inspect premises, to
conduct interviews with employees and to seize articles, substances or documentation
as evidence. If an inspector considers that a breach has occurred, or is likely to occur
they may serve an Improvement Notice which requires that a contravention be rectified
within a set period (Stranks, 1992). Where an inspector decides that an activity involves
immediate risk of serious personal injury, he or she may serve a Prohibition Notice
which requires that certain activities are not to be carried out unless the necessary
corrective measures have been taken. Failure to comply with an Improvement or a
Prohibition Notice can lead to prosecution. If a corporate body is found to have
breached statute with the approval of a responsible employee, both the individual and
the corporate body are guilty of that offence and are liable under the Act.
Safety representatives can be appointed by recognised trade unions to represent
employees in consultations with their employers concerning health and safety, and in
particular accident investigations (HSC, 1992a). The safety representatives also attend
meetings of safety committees.
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The Act imposes a duty on every employer of five or more persons to prepare a written
statement of their safety policy and to make it available to employees (Stranks, 1992;
HSC, 1992a). This may also be subject to revision (Stranks, 1992). The Policy should
set out the employer's aims and objectives for improving health and safety at work
(HSC, 1992a). The arrangements for ensuring that adequate levels of safety, health and
welfare exist should also be set out, along with the procedures for their implementation.
2.3 Legislation passed through the Heath and Safety at Work Act 1974
There are more than a hundred health and safety regulations currently in existence.
These have all been passed using the HASAWA. The principal regulations which relate
to the management of workplace health and safety will be reviewed. Most of the
regulations relate to specific work practices, and do not necessitate discussion in this
study. Hence this section describes the main health and safety regulations passed under
the HASAWA to date. These are summarised in Table 2.2:
Principal Regulations Year
Health and Safety (First Aid) Regulations 1981
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health 	 . 1988
Health and Safety (Information for Employees) Regulations 1989
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992
Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992
Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992
Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992
Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992
Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992
Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging) Regulations 1993
Table 2.2
	
Principal United Kingdom legislation concerned with health and safety at work
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(a) The Health and Safety (First Aid) Regulations 1981 
There is a duty for the employer to provide first aid arrangements, to inform his or her
employees of these arrangements, and for the self-employed person to provide first aid
equipment (Stranks, 1992). A suitable number of persons must be available to provide
first aid. They must hold an appropriate first aid qualification and be trained adequately.
(b) The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985 
The reporting of accidents, occupational diseases and dangerous occurrences has been a
legal requirement for a long time (Stranks, 1992). The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases
and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985 (RIDDOR) came into effect in April
1986 (Carthy, 1992). Reporting accidents, diseases and dangerous occurrences allows
the HSE to monitor accident trends and occupational diseases, to help it improve
legislation. Failure to comply with the regulations is a criminal offence. Written reports
for accidents involving fatalities, major injuries or illnesses requiring medical attention
must be made under the regulation (Simpson, 1990). There is also a requirement to
report certain diseases contracted through work. In addition dangerous occurrences
must be reported to the enforcing authority, whether an injury has resulted or not
(Stranks, 1992). They are specified as the types of incident where there is potential for
fatal or major injury or for extensive property damage.
(c) The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988 
The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) provides one set of
regulations to extend over occupational health risks, to set out principles to be followed
in occupational health, and to make provision for future alterations to standards of
control necessary to meet any new hazards. COSHH does not set out requirements for
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specific circumstances. It sets out a basic system for the management of risk to health
(HSE, 1993b). The legal requirement is for a suitable and sufficient assessment.
Employers must consider the properties of substances used at work, and have a duty to
make health risk assessments, control exposures, carry out monitoring, and arrange for
health surveillance (Stranks, 1992). The employer, manufacturer or supplier of
substances must know about the potential for harm to employees or others of any
substance used or supplied as part of their undertaking.
(d) The Health and Safety Information for Employees Regulations 1989 
Information about health, safety and welfare matters has to be made available to
employees through posters or leaflets in the form approved and published for the
purposes of the regulations by the HSE (Stranks, 1992).
(e) Health and Safety at Work across the European Union
Under the Single European Act (1987), Article 118A was added to the Treaty of Rome.
It was concerned with health and safety at work (Stranks, 1992). In the Article the
European Union's (EU) member states resolved that health and safety legislation should
become harmonised across the Union. Framework Directive 89/391/EEC allowed
member states to ensure that their laws achieved the standards required by the EU
(Carthy, 1992). In 1993 the UK Government issued six regulations through the
HASAWA to comply with the framework directive (HSE, 1993a). The regulations
implemented six EC directives on health and safety at work. They clarified the existing
health and safety law, but there were some new aspects, particularly concerning health
and safety management, manual handling and display screens. Some law was repealed
by the new regulations.
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(f) The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR) of 1992 require
employers to assess the risks to health and safety of employees and other people
affected by their work activities through the identification of workplace hazards and the
evaluation of the extent of the risks involved (HSC, 1992c). This allows preventative
and protective measures to be identified. A risk assessment must be documented,
periodically reviewed, and if necessary modified. Arrangements are needed to put the
health and safety measures that follow the risk assessment into place (HSC, 1992c;
HSC, 1992d). This includes planning, organisation, control, monitoring and review, i.e.
the elements which are common to any management function.
(g) The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992
The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (PUWER) 1992 pulled
together the fragmented laws governing specific types of equipment. The main
objective of PUWER is to ensure the provision of safe work equipment and its safe use
(HSC, 1992d). The general duties require that equipment is used only for operations for
which it was intended, that sufficient information, instruction and training is
administered, and that equipment complies with EU product safety directives.
(h) The Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992
The Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992 replaced fragmented and out of
date legislation with a more ergonomic approach (HSC, 1992e). They apply to manual
handling operations which may risk injury at work. These activities require
identification through a risk assessment carried out under the MHSWR.
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(i) The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992
The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 replaced 38 pieces of
law (HSC, 1992f). The regulations cover many aspects of health, safety and welfare in
the workplace, many of which are only implied in the HASAWA. There is a
requirement to assess the risks to health and safety associated with the general working
environment and the provision of rest areas and hygiene, as well as housekeeping.
(j) The Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1992 
The Personal Protective Equipment at Work (PPE) Regulations 1992 laid out principles
for selecting, providing, maintaining and using personal protective equipment (PPE).
PPE is equipment designed to be worn or held to protect against a risk to health or
safety (HSC, 1992g). This included most types of protective clothing, and equipment
such as safety harnesses and head protection.
(k) The Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992
The Health and Safety (Display Screen Equipment) Regulations did not replace existing
legislation but cover a new area of work activity. Employers are required to assess the
layout and work tasks associated with display screen equipment (HSC, 1992h).
(1) The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging) Regulations 1993 
The objective of the Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging) Regulations
(CHIP) is to assist in the protection of people and the environment from the ill effects of
chemicals (HSE, 1994a). CHIP requires that chemicals be classified before any other
action is taken, and requires safety data sheets for dangerous chemicals. CHIP obliges
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suppliers to identify the hazards, supply information, and to package the chemicals they
supply safely.
2.4 Accident Statistics, Dangerous Occurrences and Enforcement Activity
(a) Accident and Dangerous Occurrence Figures
The HSC (1994) published accident and dangerous occurrence statistics based on the
RIDDOR 1985. These figures can be used as one indicator of occupational health and
safety performance in the United Kingdom. Table 2.3 shows injuries by severity
reported to the HSE in recent years. The figures all result from work activities and
include injuries to employees, the self-employed and members of the public.
Year Fatal Major Over-3-day
absence
Total
1986-87 499 35960 160040 196499
1987-88 558 33084 161011 194653
1988-89 730 33710 164622 199062
1989-90 681 33084 167109 200874
1990-91 572 31203 162888 194663
1991-92 473 29707 154338 184518
1992-93 452 28722 143283 172457
1993-94 379 28924 134841 164144
Table 2.3
	
Injuries by severity 1986-87 to 1993-94 (HSC, 1994, p.6)
The total number of injuries reported in 1993-94 fell for the fourth successive year and
was the lowest number reported since the introduction of RIDDOR in 1986-87. The
number of fatalities has fallen in each successive year in the 1990s. In 1993-94 there
were 379 fatalities, 7% down from the previous year. Similar patterns can be seen for
major injuries and injuries causing an employee to be absent from work for over three-
days. The fatal injury rate fell from 1.3 per 100,000 employees in 1992-93 to 1.2 in
1993-94. The downward trend continues. Part of the decrease in the fatal injury rate has
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been due to changes in patterns of employment since the mid-1980s, with a growth in
employment in services, and decline in the number of employees in the more hazardous
sectors of energy, manufacturing and agriculture. The rate for fatal and major injuries
combined fell slightly in 1992-93 from 82 per 100,000 employees to 79 in 1993-94. The
1993-94 rate is substantially below the average for the seven years from 1986-87.
Figure 2.1. reflects the trend across several industrial sectors:
Figure 2.1	 Fatal and major injury rate per 100,000 employees, 1986-87 to 1993-94 by sector
(HSC, 1994,p.9)
Figures showing numbers of dangerous occurrences should be treated with caution, as
not all reportable dangerous occurrences are reported. Figure 2.2 summarises the
available statistics:
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Figure 2.2
	
Dangerous occurrences reported to the HSE Inspectorates, 1989-90 to 1993-94
In 1993-94, just over 2,950 dangerous occurrences were reported to the HSE, the lowest
number reported since RIDDOR came into force in 1986-87, more than 400 fewer than
the average for the previous seven years.
(b) Health and Safety Enforcement Activity
As discussed in Section 2.2, under the HASAWA Act, the HSE was set up to ensure
that employers complied with legislation relating to health and safety at work. In
addition, local authorities were given the power to prosecute for contravention of the
law. This section discusses the trends in occupational health and safety enforcement
activity in recent years.
Just under 39,000 notices were issued by all enforcement authorities in 1992-93. This
compares with 34,100 in 1991-92 and 14 529 in 1985-86. Figure 2.3 shows that there is
an upward trend in the number of Enforcement Notices issued by the authorities. Just
over 80% of all notices issued in 1992-93 were Improvement Notices and the other
almost 20% were Prohibition Notices.
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Figure 2.3	 Enforcement notices issued by enforcement authorities, 1985-86 to 1993-94 (HSC
1994, p.107)
(c) Prosecutions Brought about by the Enforcement Authorities
Prosecution statistics are based on the informations which is evidence laid by inspectors
before the courts. Each information laid relates to a breach of an individual legal
requirement, and a case may involve more than one of these breaches. Figure 2.4 shows
the number of informations laid by HSE inspectorates and HSC agencies compared to
successful convictions for contravention of health and safety legislation from 1985 to
1994. The number laid in 1993-94 was 1,793, of which 1,507 were successful
convictions. This represents a conviction rate of 84%. The trend shows a gradual
decline in informations brought before the courts and subsequent convictions.
Figure 2.4	 Successful proceedings instituted by enforcement authorities, 1985-86 to 1993-94
(HSE, 1994c, p.109)
26
1985/116	 1986/17	 1987/88	 1988/89
	
1989/90
	
1990/91	 1991/92	 1992/93	 1993194
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
(d) Fines Levied for Contravention of Health and Safety Legislation
Trends in average fines for contravention of health and safety legislation are
complicated. This pattern is reflected in Figure 2.5 over the period from 1985 to 1994.
The statistics are complicated by a small number of fines awarded against some
companies in the higher courts. However, fines continue to rise with a marked increase
from £1,390 in 1992-93 to £3,061 in 1993-94.
Figure 2.5
	 Average penalty fines per successful conviction, 1985-86 to 1993-94 (HSE, 1994b,
p.109)
(e) Manslaughter Prosecutions
One could consider the denial of one's liberties as the potential cost of an accident
(Dewis, 1992). There is scope in Section 37 of the HASAWA, which foreshadows
prosecutions against corporate bodies for the offences of directors and the company
board. The corporate body and individual directors can be charged under the Act. A
company could be found guilty of manslaughter of an involuntary sort, and receive a
fine or even imprisonment of directors.
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2.5 The Costs of Occupational Accidents
All accidents, occupational diseases and dangerous occurrences result in losses to
employers. The costs may be considered as direct or indirect (insured or uninsured). In
the next chapter a fuller description of these types of cost will be given. The results of a
study by the HSE (1993c) on the costs of accidents in five large companies revealed
high financial losses. The accidents and work-related ill-health were calculated and
applied to the national picture, and it was estimated that they were costing the United
Kingdom up to £15 billion per annum, almost 3% of Gross Domestic Product.
The cost to employers of personal injury work accidents and work-related ill-health is
estimated to be £1.5 billion per annum at 1990 prices, £900 million for injuries and
£600 million for illness (HSE, 1994b). The loss caused by avoidable non-injury events
is estimated to be in the range of £4 billion to over £9 billion per annum. This is
equivalent to around 5% to 10% of all UK industrial companies' gross trading profits,
averaging between £170 to £360 per person employed. The cost to the UK economy of
work accidents including the avoidable non-injury accidental events and work-related
ill-health is estimated to be between £6 billion and £.12 billion per annum. This is
equivalent to between 1% to 2% of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This includes
the costs associated with property damage, loss of production, medical treatment and
administration incurred by firms, along with expense for insurance companies and the
taxpayer through the Department of Social Security.
Table 2.4 presents a summary of the costs incurred by employers from accidents and
work-related illness. The total costs, excluding insurance and compensation to
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employers is estimated to be between £700 and £1000 million. The table shows that
injuries cost more than illness, because of the larger number of workers affected and of
days lost. Some of the costs associated with ill-health are due to the long-term effects of
accidents in previous years. Adding a further £2.5 to £7.2 billion for non-injury events
makes a total uninsured cost of between £3.2 and £8.1 billion. This shows that great
costs come from accidents that frequently go unrecorded, and uninsured. This suggests
that employers need health and safety systems which go beyond simply reducing the
cost of injuries.
Cost Injury Accidents Non-Injury Accidents Illness
(£m) (£m) (£m)
Damage 15-140 2152-6499 -
Extra Production Costs 336 - 230
Administration 54 .	 307-712 35
Recruitment 4-15 - 44-177
Total 409-545 2459-7211 309-442
Table 2.4
	
Total uninsured costs to employers of workplace accidents and work-related illness
(HSE, 1994b).
In addition to the uninsured costs, the amounts that employers have to pay in insurance
to cover compensation claims; both the compensation payments and legal costs should
be added. During the 1970s employers liability (EL) and public liability (PL) was a
very small part of most general insurance business (Waring, 1996). Since then,
however, claims and payouts have risen dramatically to the extent that from 1987 to
1992 UK insurers made an underwriting loss of £588 million in EL. According to the
HSE (1990) in 1986 over £300 million was paid out in employers' liability insurance
claims for injury and ill-health. The number and size of claims has been rising sharply
over the more recent years, and this trend for increasing claims and payouts is set to
continue. This seems to reflect a social change in attitudes towards civil litigation
claims concerning workplace accidents and ill-health. The factors include sharp
29
increases in injury awards, long-term disease claims, a greater willingness for plaintiffs
to take legal action, and improved diagnosis of work-related injuries and diseases
(Waring, 1996).
At 1990 levels the average cost of EL insurance is around 1.7 pence per hour, making
about £700 to £750 million in total (HSE, 1994b). Also, between 1989 and 1993,
employers' liability insurers paid out £2.8 billion in claims for accidents and ill-health
and dealt with about 690,000 claims (Association of British Insurers, 1995). In the light
of these EL losses, indemnity capping has arrived (Waxing, 1996). For example, the
new limit in the UK for claims arising from any one occurrence is £10 million. The
mechanisms of the insurance market have not provided sufficient incentives in the past
for insurers to settle claims as economically as possible. Underwriters have been
prepared to provide cover on the basis of minimal information. Now underwriters are
placing policyholders under scrutiny and looking for evidence of risk assessments and
clear safety management system documentation before deciding on their premium
calculations.
The HSE (1994b) estimates the total cost to employers of workplace accidents and
work-related illness is between £4.5 billion and £9.5 billion at 1990 prices, equating to
between 5% and 10% of gross trading profits. This is shown in Table 2.5:
Type of Loss Damage Production Admin. Insurance Total
(£m) Costs (£m) (£m) (fm)
(£m)
Injury 15-140 336 58-69 450 859-995
Illness - 230 79-212 300 609-742
Non-injury 2152-6499 307-712 •	 505 2964-7716
Total 2167-6639 556 444-993 1255 4432-9453
Table 2.5
	
Total costs to employers of workplace accidents and work-related illness including
insurance (USE, 1994b, p.46).
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These figures can be looked at in another way, to show the cost per worker per accident.
The total cost of work accidents and ill-health to employers equates to between £170
and £360 per worker employed. Each accident costs on average £90 to £200 and the
average cost of an injury is £550 to £630. Also, each of the 1.5 million employees with
work-related illness costs employers' £400 to £500 per year. Table 2.6 shows the typical
costs of different types of accidents:
Cost All
Injuries
(I)
—	 Serious or
Major
(f)
Other
Reportable
(£)
Other Lost
Time
(i)
Non Injury
(I)
Damage 45 45 45 45 104
Extra Production Costs 215 520 445 29 -
Administration 40 155 75 3 12
Insurance and Compensation 287 3782 .- - 12
Total 587 4502 565 77 128
Table 2.6
	
Typical costs of different accident types (HSE, 1994b, p.47).
The figures show that employers could minimise costs by reducing the number of
workplace accidents. With better information on the costs of accidents at work there is a
strong incentive for employers to introduce systems that will reduce the likelihood of
accidents. In the case of ill-health there may be less incentive for employers to invest in
preventative measures because of delays between cause and effect, making
identification of the links more difficult.
2.6 Summary of Health and Safety Law, Accident Statistics, Enforcement Activity
and Economic Costs
It can be seen from the review of the literature on health and safety that substantial legal
changes to health and safety at work have occurred since 1974. There has been a move
away from prescriptive health and safety legislation towards self-regulation within the
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boundaries of law enforcement. As a result of the HASAWA of 1974 and the six pieces
of legislation of 1992, the onus now is on the employer to take practicable action to
secure safe and healthy workplaces, along with systems to ensure their continuation.
From the mid-1980s to mid-1990s figures outlining trends in law enforcement activity
show that enforcement notices issued have risen, that prosecutions for contravention of
health and safety legislation have generally remained stable, and that there has been an
upward trend in fines levied by the courts. Numbers of injuries and reported dangerous
occurrences have also declined. These figures show that workplace health and safety
has experienced continuous improvement. What can be concluded from the statistics
presented is that there is still an important role for the enforcing authorities to ensure
that accident rates are reduced further and act as a warning to employers who try to
ignore their health and safety obligations.
The high costs associated with occupational accidents have been emphasised in this
chapter. The changing nature of accident and ill-health costs must be noted. It has been
shown that they have continued to rise upwards in recent years, mainly due to changes
in attitudes to employers liability and partially through increased fines. Also the
unanticipated gap between uninsured and insured costs appears to suggest why
employers have invested less in occupational safety and prevention of ill-health than
they should have.
It is clear from a review of health and safety legislation that in order to meet the 'duty
of care' to provide a safe workplace, employers need to have thorough safety
management systems in place. The national picture showing accident statistics and their
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associated costs further add to the justification for effective safety management. The
next chapter seeks to identify the components of a workplace safety system which
should help legislation to be adhered to and also benefit companies financially.
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CHAPTER THREE
Occupational Safety Management Systems
3.1 Introduction to Safety Management Systems
This chapter reviews the systematic elements that are necessary for a safety
management system (SMS) to operate. It aims to spell out the principles which
successful occupational safety systems should be based upon. It starts by outlining the
more recent changes in the way people work, and how these have necessitated a move
away from the safety management approaches of direct supervision and control. It seeks
to set out a framework for initialising, implementing, measuring the performance of and
reviewing a continuous SMS. Where appropriate, additional background theory has
been integrated into the work, particularly where human factors are discussed. The
chapter illustrates that safety management is very diverse, and that synergistic benefits
result from the integration of management, technological, psychological, ergonomic and
medical principles. In this sense health and safety management is no different from
other forms of management.
The use of wider management principles in the safety arena becomes all the more
important when taking changes that have occurred in workplaces into account. Due to
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competitive pressures, more workplaces appear to be in a state of continuous change
(Killimett, 1991). Killimett recommends that the answer to continuous change is
continuous improvement in safety performance. This can be achieved by employing a
safety approach that operates as a system or process, not a temporary programme. He
also suggests that employee involvement is critical to this process, no matter what
changes are brought about in products and equipment. Topf and Preston (1991) use a
similar argument. They note that trends in industry have placed greater levels of
responsibility on individual employees. A higher degree of unsupervised and
independent working situations have led employers to seek innovative approaches to
self-management, as well as the management of others. Topf and Preston point to the
limitations of traditional behaviour modification strategies that often rely on third-party
observation and correction of others behaviour. Often there is a brief change in
behaviour and safety performance improves, but results can diminish when direct
supervision or constant reinforcement is no longer present.
Chapter Three consists of eight sections. Section 3.2 of this chapter sets out the
requirement of an overall safety policy. A description will ensue of the activities
required to build and maintain a sound SMS. The principles of risk assessment and risk
control are discussed in Section 3.3. Appropriate safety information, staff selection and
training policies are reviewed in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 the analysis of accident
costs is then outlined. The chapter moves on in Section 3.6 to looking at how to conduct
effective accident investigations. Section 3.7 examines a variety of measures of safety
performance. Finally, in Section 3.8 the chapter is completed with a discussion of how
to audit and review the SMS.
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(a) A Description of Safety Management Systems
Many employers use the approach outlined in the HSE Guidance Document HS(G)65
Successful Health and Safety Management (1991) to assist them in setting up their
SMS. The key elements of successful health and safety management are set out in
Figure 3.1. In order for the SMS to be in a state of continuous improvement it should be
moving continually between the various stages of the safety management model shown
below:
Planning and4_
implementing
Measuring di
'performance'
1,46" Reviewing
performance
Feedback loop
to improve performance.
Figure 3.1	 Key elements of successful health and safety management (HSE, 1991a, p.3)
An employer's Health and Safety Policy sets out its top management's beliefs,
intentions, priorities and what they require from all employees. It states the objectives
of the company, key responsibilities and wider practical arrangements for safety and
health. Safety strategy emerges from the policy and its objectives (Waring, 1996).
Obviously a firm must comply with the legal requirements set out in Sections 2.2 and
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2.3 of Chapter Two, and this part of the SMS has to be suitably developed, else the
whole system is likely to fail.
Good organisation is important for putting health and safety policies into practice (HSE,
1991a). A positive culture allows involvement and participation at all levels. Effective
communication and the promotion of competence allows all employees to make
contributions to the health and safety effort. Senior managers must be visible and active
in order to develop and maintain a culture supportive of health and safety.
A planned and systematic approach to policy implementation is essential for any SMS.
A range of different activities requires planning and resourcing. These include risk
assessments, hierarchies of objectives, allocating responsibilities and accountabilities,
establishing effective communication, and identifying information and training needs
(Waring, 1996).
Health and safety performance can be measured. Failures of control are assessed
through reactive monitoring which requires the investigation of any accidents, ill-health
or incidents with the potential to do harm or cause loss (HSE, 1991a). More proactive
measures can monitor safety before an accident has happened, through the use of safety
inspections or training evaluation for example.
Learning from relevant experience and applying the lessons learned are important
elements of health and safety management. Commitment to continuous improvement
involves the continual development of policies, approaches to implementation and
techniques of risk control. Periodic reviews can allow the results of monitoring and
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auditing activities to be assessed and remedial changes at the appropriate levels of the
SMS to be made.
3.2 Safety Policy and Strategy
What actually happens in an organisation on a day-to-day basis underpins its safety
policy and strategy, as it represents the actual beliefs and values of the management and
workforce, as distinct from the beliefs and values which may be enshrined in the
organisation's official documents (Waring, 1996). Organisations with a strong safety
culture or climate have a close fit between the formal policy statements and what
actually happens. Ford and Fisher (1994) regard a safety climate as consisting of
employees' shared perceptions about the work environment that guide behaviour. Zohar
(1980) suggests that safety climate varies greatly across companies. He describes a
strong, positive safety climate as consisting of: strong management commitment, high
priority given to safety matters, high status afforded to safety officers, emphasis on
safety training, communication between management and workers, orderly plant
operations, and strong safety promotion.
The safety policy statement should show the intentions of senior management towards
health and safety (Waring, 1996). The policy should indicate recognition of issues and
priorities for the organisation so that all employees understand clearly what is expected
of them (Stranks, 1993). The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 requires employers to
prepare and revise their health and safety policy (Stranks, 1994a). Stranlcs suggested
that a policy statement should start with a 'Statement of Intent', outlining the
organisation's overall health and safety philosophy. Next, the organisation of people
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and their duties needs to be stated. It is necessary to outline the chain of command and
responsibilities for health and safety management. In particular the policy statement
should outline individual accountabilities, the system for monitoring implementation of
the policy, and how safety committees and safety representatives are to function
(Stranks, 1994a). Finally it is necessary to detail the arrangements for policy
implementation.
Waring (1996) suggested that the presentation and dissemination of the safety policy is
crucial to its practice. If it is to be acted on by all, it has to be communicated properly.
This may be achieved through training, display on notice boards and in safety manuals
for example (Waring, 1996; Stranks, 1994a). Some indication of long-term safety goals
and broad objectives ought to be present in the safety policy statement (Waring, 1996).
Waring suggests that long-term goals might include continuous improvement of the
safety effort, reduction in risks through improved technology and a reduction in
avoidable loss. The policy statement objectives should be used to help set the strategy
to achieve safety. According to Veltri (1991) it was no longer acceptable for the safety
function simply to control hazardous exposure and comply with mandates from
governmental agencies and insurers. It should offer added strategic value and operating
leverage to the firm's business performance through promoting a better understanding
of the costs of accidents, and how these costs impact on profit.
Strategy may be seen as an overall framework or 'plan of plans' (Waring, 1996). To
implement the safety strategy, it is necessary to go through a process of planning, which
involves organising and resourcing. The safety objectives need translating into a
systematically structured series of identifiable activities. It is necessary to resource the
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identified activities efficiently, and also to ensure that appropriate monitoring and
control arrangements are carried out to the required standard set out in the plan.
Performance standards for the measurement and control of hazards and risks are
necessary in any SMS (HSE, 1991a). In order for this to be achieved the difference
between a hazard and the risk attached, and their relation to accident causation should
be understood. This leads on to an examination of risk assessment and control.
3.3 Risk Management Approaches
Waring (1996) warns that the focus of the safety strategy must be realistic and the
stated objectives achievable. Strategies aimed at reducing accidents should be geared
first to reducing the physical danger in the workplace, and second to increasing
awareness of the risks at work (Boylston, 1990; Stranks, 1992). These two areas should
feature strongly in an accident prevention programme. Waring (1996) suggests that as
the strategy should ideally run over a long-term horizon, a balance has to be struck
between a 'safe place' strategy and a 'safe person' strategy. These two complementary
approaches will be reviewed in the following section.
(a) Accident Definitions
Several definitions of an accident have been suggested. Stranks offers a comprehensive
definition of an accident as:
An unexpected, unplanned event in a sequence of events that occurs through a combination of
causes; it results in physical harm (injury or disease) to an individual, damage to property, a near
miss, a loss, business interruption or any combination of these effects (Stranks, 1992, p.46).
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A number of significant factors emerge from this definition. Generally, accidents are
unforeseeable as far as the victim is concerned; unplanned, unintended, and unexpected.
An analysis of accidents and their causes requires consideration of the events leading up
to the accident. It is vital to know what to do after the accident, first to minimise the
effects of the injuries, and second, to prevent a recurrence. The use of risk assessment
can contribute to identifying these causes, and identify the remedial action required to
prevent or reduce repetition.
(b) Risk Assessments
The risk assessment should enable an employer to check and improve the validity of
their judgements about risks and the effectiveness of control measures (Mackmurdo,
1993). The risk assessment helps to ensure that health and safety policy is always
effective, and provides easily updateable records which clearly show justification for
the health and safety arrangements.
Before making a risk assessment the employer should know the difference between
hazards and risks. A hazard is something with the potential to cause harm. This can
include substances or machines, methods of work and other aspects of work
organisation (HSC, 1992c). A hazard is associated with a degree of danger and is
quantifiable (Bamber, 1990a). The risk expresses the likelihood that the harm from a
particular hazard is realised, and also its severity. Risk can be conceptualised in terms
of 'chance taking', or the probability of an accident occurring (Bamber, 1990a; HSC,
1992c). The extent of the risk covers the population which may be affected by a risk;
that is the number of people who might be exposed and the consequences for them
(HSC, 1992c). The relationship between hazard and risk must be understood (Bamber,
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1990a). Inadequate control can create substantial risk, even from a substance with a low
hazard; but with proper controls, the risk of coming to harm even from a very hazardous
substance is reduced significantly.
Stranks (1994a) outlined the universally accepted stages of a risk assessment as the
identification of all the hazards, evaluation of the risks, and implementation of measures
to eliminate or control the risks. It is necessary to know the risk priorities in order to
address safety and to plan. This may take the form of an initial risk assessment to
identify the main risk categories and make some estimation of their level of risk, so as
to help with strategic planning. Second, when planning or addressing particular parts of
a safety programme, there may be a need for more detailed risk assessments. Thirdly,
day-to-day circumstances are likely to warrant ad hoc risk assessments as a permanent
part of the safety tools of managers, supervisors and the workforce.
Thinking solely of a risk as a likelihood that a hazard will cause harm does not allow
for different degrees of harm or severity, or the fact that hazard exposures may differ
significantly (Waring, 1996; Stranks, 1994a). Risk assessment approaches have been
put forward by different safety writers (Waring, 1996; Stranks, 1994a; Mackmurdo,
1993; HSE, 1991a). Their methods of assessment vary in complexity. In order to
account for consequences and exposure, formulas are commonly used throughout
industry for risk estimation (Mackmurdo, 1993; Waring, 1996). Risk scores are
obtained and can be ranked as a means of prioritising actions needed to reduce and
control risks (Macicmurdo, 1993). This approach is especially useful where there are
many identified hazards which are competing for limited resources. Once a risk score
has been obtained, it can be transferred to a higher or lower priority category,
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Unacceptable region
Risk can only be justified in
exceptional circumstances
depending on overriding factors. After a risk score is evaluated and categorised, for
example high, medium or low, a decision is needed as to whether the risk is acceptable
or not. Many companies use the 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP) principle.
As much effort as is reasonably practicable should be used to reduce the risks as far as
possible down the inverted triangle. This will meet the requirements for risk assessment
and control measures set out in the MHSWR, 1992. Figure 3.2 outlines the ALARP
principle:
Risk assumptions 	  Cost-risk interpretations
Tolerable only if risk reduction
is impracticable or if its cost is
grossly disproportionate to the
improvement gained
The ALARP or
tolerability region
Tolerable if cost of reduction
would exceed the improvement
gained
•
Broadly acceptable region	 Need assurance that risk stays
at this level
Negligible risk
Figure 3.2	 The 'as low as reasonably practicable' principle (Waring, 1996, p.96)
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Once the risks have been assessed and the controls installed or implemented, then a
number of additional safety practices or policies should be used (Waring, 1996). These
include safety monitoring activities, preventative maintenance procedures and health
surveillance. Once the risks have been identified and measured it is important to
emphasise methods of risk control.
(c) A Safe Workplace
Safe place strategies are required under Section 2 of the HASAWA, 1974. A 'safe
place' strategy seeks to reduce or eliminate objective dangers in the workplace through
designing out hazards and any residual risks (Stranks, 1992; Waring, 1996). This can be
controlled by engineering, organisational and procedural means. This strategy seeks to
mitigate the effects of human error. This may be achieved through measures such as
machinery guarding, improvements in the working environment or the design of 'safe
systems of work' (Stranks, 1994a). Some examples of safe workplace strategies are to
maintain safe premises, plant processes and materials, and safe systems of work.
There are general structural requirements for working premises, such as stability of
buildings, soundness of floors and the load-bearing capacity of beams. Poor standards
in the working environment are major contributing factors to many accidents (Stranlcs,
1992). A sound working environment will contain adequate lighting, ventilation and
temperature control, in addition to the mitigation of environmental stressors such as
noise, vibration and dust which can all be injurious to health. Risks can be combated at
source by engineering controls (HSE, 1991a). If a hazard cannot be eliminated then
control at source is the best approach, followed by control in the pathway between
source and individuals at risk (Waring, 1996). Both these approaches emphasise
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attention to design, use of materials, construction, operation and maintenance.
Assessing plant and machinery for hazards prior to acquisition or to make modifications
can allow many hazards to be 'designed out' of the workplace (Stranks, 1994a).
Maintenance and safety have much in common (Parmeggiani, 1983). Maintenance and
cleaning systems should take into account the safety requirements of staff engaged in
such operations. To keep machines, tools and equipment safe, a schedule of
preventative maintenance can be set up which offers both a reduced accident rate, and
efficient use of plant and equipment (Antion, 1979). All factors contributing to the
operation of a specific process must be considered during process design and be subject
to regular monitoring (Stranks, 1994a). Materials or substances used at work may be
potentially hazardous. Adequate documentation on their correct use storage and
disposal should be provided (Stranks, 1992).
The design and implementation of safe systems of work should feature highly in any
'safe place' strategy (Stranks, 1994a). Under the MHSWR 1992, safe methods of work
should be in place to ensure that hazards are eliminated or risks minimised (HSE,
1992a). A safe system of work incorporates planning, training and designing out of
hazards. It should set out a correct sequence of operations, a safe work layout,
specification of safe practices and procedures, and ,reviews of systems of work and
feedback to all concerned (Stranks, 1992; Bamber, 1990b). Safe systems of work are
commonly designed through the use of a job safety analysis, which is based on task
analysis (Stranks and Dewis, 1986). This requires assessment of specific job operations,
hazards and risks associated with these operations, and the skills required to perform the
task (Stranks, 1992). A permit to work (PTW) system is a formal safety control system,
designed to prevent accidents; particularly when work with foreseeable high hazards is
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undertaken (Stranks and Dewis, 1986). The PTW is a document which lays out the
work to be done and the precautions to be taken.
(d) Safe Person Strategies
'Safe person' strategies are used to protect the individual in situations where a 'safe
place' strategy may not be appropriate or possible to implement. They rely on
individuals conforming to certain prescribed standards. Some 'safe person' strategies
include the use of PPE, care for the vulnerable, encouraging personal hygiene and
maintaining awareness of danger.
The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) should only be considered as a last
resort when all other prevention strategies have failed, or as an interim measure until an
appropriate 'safe place' strategy can be implemented (Stranks, 1992). Accident
prevention is reliant on the employee wearing the personal protection all the time that
they are exposed to the hazard. It may be necessary to maintain a high level of
supervision and control to ensure constant use of this equipment. Special consideration
has to be afforded to certain groups of workers who may be regarded as vulnerable.
Such groups include young people, whose experience of hazards may be limited,
pregnant women, older and disabled people whose physical capability to perform
certain tasks may be reduced, and 'accident repeaters' who have the same type of
accident regularly. There may be the potential for occupational skin conditions or
ingestion resulting from contact with certain substances (Stranks, 1994a). Facilities for
maintaining good standards of hygiene should be provided. All employees should be
aware of the risks in the workplace. These risks should be identified clearly in the
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Statement of Health and Safety Policy along with appropriate precautions to be taken
by workers to protect themselves from such risks.
3.4 Safety Information, Staff Selection and Training
(a) Provision and Communication of Safety Information
The employer's Statement of Health and Safety Policy should set good standards of
safety supervision from the top downwards (Stranks, 1992). Duties relating to health
and safety at all levels of management and workers should be identified clearly in the
job description. The HASAWA, 1974 sets a legal duty on employers to provide
information, instruction, training and supervision for all staff levels. Every employee is
required to participate in some form of health and safety training. This requirement can
be met through the application of induction training, on-the-job training and through
specialised training. Training approaches will be reviewed extensively in subsequent
sections.
It is important that information enters organisations from outside (HSE, 1991a). It is
necessary to monitor new or proposed changes in public policy or legislation directed
towards safety, and information about advances in knowledge about hazards and risks
(Waring, 1996; HSE, 1991a). In addition, to learn lessons from accidents in other
organisations, changes in design or operating specifications of plant and processes
which have safety implications and developments in professional health and safety
practice may be necessary. This information is particularly important for those engaged
in policy making, planning, setting performance standards, measuring, auditing and
reviewing performance (HSE, 1991a). The sources of information are extremely broad,
47
ranging from law and engineering to sociology and psychology (Stranks, 1994a).
Specific sources include Acts of Parliament (Statutes), regulations and codes of
practice, HSE guidance notes, European Directives, British Standards, textbooks,
periodicals and computer programs.
Key information needs to be communicated throughout organisations. Sources of
internally generated information are also abundant. Existing written information may
take the form of Statements of Health and Safety Policy, specific policies, regulations
and codes of practice or job safety instructions. Other sources of information may be
suppliers' product information; accident, illness and absence statistics; interviews and
discussions, or direct observation. Internally generated safety information should be
designed and distributed according to the needs of the recipients (Waring, 1996).
Account should be taken of a number of factors: the processes and activities in which
they are engaged, their responsibilities, hazards encountered and skill level. The most
suitable media for communication should be considered, for example text, pictorial, or
audio.
(b) Staff Selection and Safe Behaviour
The acts and omissions of every employee will affect safety. The demands of
employees' jobs should not exceed their ability to carry it out without risk to themselves
or other people (Stranks, 1993). Waring (1996) suggests that competence for a job
require three main components: cognitive skills (adequate knowledge, behaviour and
experience), good personality attributes (motivation and attitude to risks); and
emotional stability (ability to cope under pressure and emergencies, and social style).
Some physical attributes may also be essential for certain jobs. All the listed personal
48
factors can interact with health and safety issues. For each job, the competence mix is
likely to be different. This makes it important to ensure that the right kinds of
employees are recruited, selected and trained to match the particular work that requires
to be done. The use of techniques such as a job safety analysis can assist with
identification of the particular safety needs of a job (Stranks, 1993). A job or task
analysis may be able to assist with the developing and planning of training and resign of
jobs in addition to hazard assessment (Waring, 1996). Petersen (1988) suggested that
reducing accidents by staff selection assumes that those who will have accidents will be
predicted, and that they as people are different in some identifiable way from those who
do not have accidents. There are a number of recruitment approaches which some argue
can help screen out potentially accident-prone staff.
'Accident proneness' describes a person who has significantly more accidents than
others. Petersen (1988) and Sculzinger (1956) suggested that people who are
consistently susceptible to accidents are small in number, and their contribution to the
total accident problem is slight. The proneness theory indicates that these people can be
identified and either appropriately trained in safety, or placed in low risk jobs (Minter,
1990). Some companies use personality tests for hiring staff. The tests are supposed to
be predictive of whether a person would have a higher than average frequency of
injuries. The concern with this approach is that it can result in labelling an employee as
accident prone, when the root cause of the accidents lies in organisational and
environmental arrangements. Petersen (1988) suggested that the cost of screening out
such a small number of accident repeaters would have a very small impact upon
accident rates and that it was not economically viable. Hansen (1988) argued
differently, suggesting that by identifying and screening out job applicants with these
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'high risk' personality characteristics, organisations should be able to reduce losses.
Employees without these undesirable traits should also be more productive and easier to
work with.
Personal factors of many kinds have been identified as having a bearing on accidents
(Petersen, 1988). These may include factors such as age, physique, skill, qualifications
and experience, aptitude, knowledge, intelligence and personality. Personnel selection
policies and procedures should ensure that specifications are matched by the individuals
(HSE, 1993d). Depending on the situation and the needs of the job, selection tests have
been devised for many of these. There are a number of tests which can help to measure
the functions and limits of the senses (Petersen, 1988; Stranks, 1994a). These may
measure visual acuity, hearing, muscular co-ordination and reaction times. It is
important to consider the appropriateness of the test in relation to the job requirement.
Psychological tests can also help as predictors of accidents. Petersen (1988) suggested
that intelligence might play a significant part in accident susceptibility, although except
at extremes, intelligence is not associated with accidents to any significant degree. He
concludes that using intelligence tests will not help predict accidents.
Personality and attitude may shape the way that an individual behaves based on generic
factors, environmental or learned characteristics and situational factors (Hale, 1990).
Petersen (1988) found evidence of a relationship between certain aspects of
emotionality and accident frequency. Although personality questionnaires have been
found inadequate for detecting accident susceptibility, some believe that accidents and
poor adjustment are related (Dwyer, 1991; Cattell, 1965). Petersen (1988) stated that
although poor adjustment is related to accident causation, it is difficult to use this
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knowledge well to predict or select since in the lion's share of cases it is not
economically feasible to obtain a psychoanalytic evaluation for each applicant. There is
no agreement on the usefulness of many of the psychological and sensorimotor tests'
ability to predict accident-producing behaviour. The job to be filled will influence the
job knowledge tools and skills tests that will be of value.
Background information and interviews have the potential to screen out unsafe
applicants (Kamp, 1991). Interviewing is a universal staff selection device. It seems to
be the most commonly used selection technique apart from initial shortlisting. Petersen
(1988) argues that the interview selection process can often only be of limited value
when trying to select safe working recruits. This is because the interview will often not
furnish the type of information needed to make this type of decision, and particularly as
the interviewer often makes their mind up about the candidate at the onset of the
encounter.
(c) Health and Safety Training
A number of safety writers suggest that 60 to 95 percent of safety incidents are a result
of unsafe behaviour (Perrow, 1984; Killimett, 1991; Krause et al., 1990; Stranks,
1994b). For example, most of the major accidents that have occurred within process
plants have been attributed to failures in human performance caused by problems in
understanding, expectations, judgement, and decision-making (McGeorge et al., 1994).
Recognition of the role that human behaviour plays in the safe operation of work
systems has led to the assessment of methods to improve human performance. One way
of addressing this problem is to expand training programmes. Success depends on
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appropriate interventions and the subsequent assessment of their effectiveness. The
Department of Employment defines training as:
The systematic development of attitude, knowledge and skill patterns required by the individual to
perform adequately a given task or job. It is often integrated with further education (Department of
Employment, 1973, p.2).
Training has become a large budget item in occupational health and safety programmes
(Everett, 1989). It is no surprise to learn that training typically accounts for more than
60 percent of an average safety management budget (Stegner, 1992). As partly a
consequence of this it is becoming increasingly important to make sure that training
gets results. The potential liabilities for ineffective training can be enormous. Lindell
(1994) suggests that the purpose of safety training is to ensure that employees learn
appropriate actions to take and how to perform them correctly. Training or education
will help people to attain the skills, knowledge and attitudes to improve their
competence in the health and safety aspects of their work (HSE, 1991a). This is
achieved through the development of positive attitudes which encourages safe
behaviour (Everett, 1989). This end can be reached through formal off-the-job training,
instruction to individuals and groups, and on-the-job coaching and counselling (HSE,
1991a).
Topf and Preston (1991) warn that safety programmes which focus only on changing
behaviour without addressing attitude and awareness often provide short-term results
and little return on investment. Searle et al. (1994) take a different line and argue that
knowledge is the focal point of health and safety training, especially its retention over
time.
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(d) The Training Process
Before any training process can begin, a decision should be made as to whether it is
needed, as training should not be used to compensate either for inadequacies in other
aspects of the safety system, such as systems of work or engineering (Everett, 1989;
HSE, 1991a). However, it may be appropriate to use training as a temporary means of
control, pending improvements. The remaining portion of this section will outline a
systematic approach to attaining better workplace safety through training.
(e) Identification and Assessment of Training Needs
For training to be successful, it must be compatible with relevant selection and
placement policies. The selection procedures must be capable of allowing the trainees
to learn what is to be taught. A training needs analysis should take account of any
relevant job analyses, hazard analyses and risk assessments (Waring, 1996). Wallerstein
and Baker (1994) agree that needs assessment forms the foundation for the entire
planning process. This should profile the target population, and should allow a broad set
of questions to be answered. For example who would benefit from the training? What
training has the target group already received? What knowledge and experience will the
trainees bring to the process? The needs assessment can be based on a number of
information sources such as questionnaires, review of documents, workplace
observations, and interviews with employees.
Not only is a training needs analysis prudent, but it is also required by the MHSWR of
1992, which demand that training needs should be identified to cover three elements.
The first is induction training for new recruits. The second requires orientation training
of existing employees in instances such as changes of job, their exposure to new or
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increased risks, and prior to the introduction of safe systems of work. Third, refresher
training directed at maintaining competence (HSC, 1992c).
(f) Gaining Support for Training
Wallerstein and Baker (1994) suggested that if participative training is to be successful,
it is necessary to gain support from the target population before the educational
objectives and course content can be set. This will require employee involvement in the
planning process. Other key actors might be trade union representatives or even the
HSE in an advisory capacity. The context of the job will be critical to transfer, either
supporting or inhibiting training transfer. This includes factors such as managerial and
co-worker support, workplace climate, and the constraints or opportunities for transfer
of trained knowledge, skills and attitude to the job. Where there is a supportive climate
for the training of skills, new knowledge is more likely to be applied to the job.
(g) The Development of a Training Plan and Programme
In the development of training plans, clear objectives need to be defmed to suit current
personnel needs (Stranks, 1994b). These can be derived from information gathered
from the needs assessment or through job specifications or task analysis (Wallerstein
and Baker, 1994; Stranks, 1994b). Such analysis helps to identify the specific training
relevant to each job position.
Wallerstein and Baker (1994) suggested that an individual's knowledge, behaviour and
attitude towards workplace health and safety needs to be based around a number of
objectives. They proposed that there was a hierarchy to these objectives. The hierarchy
of is outlined in Figure 3.3:
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Social Action
i
Individual Behaviour
Attitudes
Skills
Information
Figure 3.3	 Hierarchy of training objectives (Wallerstein and Baker, 1994, p.313)
Knowledge objectives are the easiest to achieve; and skill objectives require more
hands-on training to ensure that the necessary skills have been accomplished; but
attitude objectives are more difficult because they may involve challenging ingrained
beliefs. Individual behaviour objectives are achievable only if attitude barriers are
addressed and if performance, practice, and on-the-job follow-up are built into the
training. Social action objectives are most difficult to achieve, as education must
prepare participants for collective action so that synergistic benefits can be obtained.
(h) The Selection of Education and Training Methods
The level of intensity and learning methods of health and safety training depend on how
ambitious the objectives are, and the way that it is wished that people should learn
(Wallerstein and Baker, 1994; Stranks, 1994b). Whatever methods are selected, the
literacy and language profiles of employees must be considered. It is important to
provide a good mix of methods to promote learning. A number of different learning
mediums can be used to deliver safety training. They tend to split training into two
broad types: active and passive (Petersen, 1988; Stranks, 1994b).
Everett (1989) suggested trainees tend to remember more when learning and experience
occur through actual performance, simulating actual performance, participation in a
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task, viewing demonstrations of a task and the use of visual and audio material. The
more active the trainee is, the more likely the retention of knowledge or skills. This is
outlined in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4	 The cone of learning (Everett, 1989, p.36)
Table 3.1 shows the teaching methods available to the trainer, their pros and cons and
the objectives that they achieve.
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Teaching Method
Lecture
Strengths
Presents factual material in
direct/logical manner. Can
introduce a general survey or scope
of a subject, set the scene for a
demonstration, discussion or
presentation, and illustrate the
application of rules, policies and
regulations. Contains experiences
which inspire. Can set the scene for
a demonstration, discussion or
presentation. Suitable for large
audiences.
Limitations	 Objectives
Experts may not always be good
teachers. Generally consists of one-
way communication, with the
instructor presenting information to a
group of passive listeners. Little
chance to clarify meanings, obtain any
feedback, or account for individual
differences. Group participation may
only extend as far as questions at the
conclusion. Learning difficult to
gauge. Needs clear introduction and
summary. Needs time and content
limits to be effective.
Information skills
Demonstration Instructor shows the trainees what
to do and how to do it.
Similar limitations to lecturing.
Usually needs to be combined with
some other form of training.
Information skills
Worksheets and
questionnaires
Information skills
Attitudes/emotions
Allows people to think for
themselves without being
influenced by others in discussion.
Individual thoughts can then be
shared in small or large groups.
Can be used only for short period of
time. Handout requires preparation
time.
Brainstorming and
discussion
Information skills
Attitudes/emotions
Listening exercise that allows
creative thinking for new ideas.
Encourages full participation
because all ideas equally recorded.
Can become unfocused.
Brainstorming needs to be limited to
10-15 minutes. No best known or
correct solution.
Audio-visual materials
(films, slide shows,
etc.)
Information skillsEntertaining way of teaching
content and raising issues. Keeps
audience's attention. Effective for
large groups.
Too many issues often presented at
one time to have a focused discussion.
Discussion will not have full
participation.
Audiovisuals as
triggers
Develops analytical skills. Allows
for exploration of solutions.
Discussion may not have full
participation.
Social action skills
Attitudes/emotions
Case studies (trigger) Social action skills
Attitudes/emotions
Develops analytical and problem-
solving skills. Allows for
exploration of solutions. Allows
students to apply new knowledge
and skills. Active participation is
encouraged. Trainees seek to find
the best solution.
People may not see relevance to own
situation as it lacks real-life pressures.
Often regarded as being unable to
teach general principles. Case and
tasks for small group must be clearly
defined to be effective.
Role play session
(trigger)
Attempts to simulate actual
situations. Introduces problem-
solving situation dramatically.
Increase trainee involvement by
introducing realism. Develops
analytical skills and attitudinal
change. Provides opportunity for
people to assume roles of others.
Allows for exploration of solutions.
People may be too self-conscious.
Can be regarded as artificial situation
where results do not count. Can be
time consuming and expensive. Not
appropriate for large groups.
Social action skills
Attitudes/emotions
.
..
Report-back session	 Allows for large group discussion
of role-plays, case studies, and
small group exercise,
Can be repetitive if each small group
says the same thing. Instructors
should prepare questions to focus
discussion so not repetitive.
Social action skills
Information skills
Prioritising/planning	 Ensures participation by students.
activity	 Provides experience in analysing
and prioritising problems. Allows
for active discussion and debate.
Requires a large area for posting.
Posting activity should proceed at a
lively pace to be effective.
Social action skills
.	 ,
Hands-on practice	 Provides classroom practice of
learned behaviour. Employees learn
skills well by practising them.
Requires sufficient time, appropriate
physical space, and equipment.
Behavioural skills
Table 3.1 Training methods chart (Wallerstein and Baker, 1994, p.316-317; Scherer et al.,
1993; Stranks, 1994b; Petersen, 1988)
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This framework was built up from a number of literature sources, but it draws primarily
on Wallerstein and Baker (1994). Passive learning systems use lecturers and visual
materials. The basic objective is to impart knowledge. It can provide useful frameworks
that can be used where large numbers of trainees are involved (Petersen, 1988). Active
learning involves techniques such as group discussion, role-play or programmed field
exercises such as safety inspections. Active learning methods reinforce what has
already been taught on a passive basis and help to achieve attitudinal and social action
objectives. Active learning systems are the most effective form of training once the
basic framework is established and when there is plenty of time available in the training
programme.
(i) The Implementation of the Training Plan
Decisions need to be made as to the extent of both active and passive learning systems
to be incorporated into a programme (Stranks, 1994b). Once the plan is decided upon,
the trainer simply needs to follow the plan. Safety training must affect the learning and
transfer outcomes (Ford and Fisher, 1994).
(j) Evaluation and Follow Up
Evaluation of health and safety training is essential for several of reasons (Wallerstein
and Baker, 1994). It allows the learner to judge their progress towards new knowledge,
skills, attitudes or actions. It allows the trainer to judge the effectiveness of the training
and to decide what has been accomplished, and whether this could have been achieved
more effectively (Stranks, 1994b; HSE, 1991a). A further objective is to bring about a
long-term change in attitude amongst the trainees leading to improved job performance
(Stranks, 1994b). A decision as to whether training objectives have been met
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concerning attitudes or social action cannot be taken immediately or after a short time
(Stranks, 1994b; Wallerstein and Baker, 1994). It may take several months before a
valid evaluation can be made after continuous assessment of the trainees. In order to
minimise the risk of providing inadequate training it is necessary to audit ongoing
training programmes at their inception and on a regular basis thereafter, and, decide on
the level of retraining required (Stegner, 1992; Everett, 1989).
It must be noted that evaluations of workplace outcomes, particularly those of injury
and illness incidence rates can be deceptive (Wallerstein and Baker, 1994). For example
promotional efforts linked to incentives for keeping accidents low can result in under-
reporting of accidents. Conversely empowerment-orientated training encourages staff to
recognise and report health and safety problems, and may result, at first, in an increase
in reported injuries and illnesses even when health and safety conditions are improving.
3.5 Costing of Accidents
It is generally accepted that accidents at work cost money. This point was emphasised
for employers as a whole across the United Kingdom in Section 2.5 of Chapter Two. To
develop understanding of these costs the adoption of a total loss control approach to
safety can ensure that underlying failures of management control are identified and
eliminated irrespective of whether they lead to personal injury or not.
In Section 2.4 of Chapter Two the difference between direct and indirect accident costs
was outlined. Heinrich as far back as 1931 distinguished between the costs of accidents
covered by insurance, which he referred to as direct costs and all other associated
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Visible direct cost of accidents
Invisible indirect cost of accidents
accident costs which he termed as indirect. The iceberg in Figure 3.8 represents the total
cost of accidents, but only the top fifth are visible or direct (HSE, 1994b). The other
four-fifths require more detailed examination.
Figure 3.8	 Heinrich's Iceberg (HSE, 1994b, p.5)
Direct costs are concerned mainly with the employer's insurance liabilities for staff and
premises. Insurance premiums are calculated by underwriters who take account of the
nature of the undertakings, previous claims histories, wage rates, safety culture and
management commitment (Bamber, 1993). Other direct costs may be product liability
claims or specific injury claims, which may be settled out of court (Stranks, 1992).
Litigation costs and fines imposed by courts for breaches of legislation can also be
included.
Indirect costs may be concealed in other costs, and not fully appreciated. These costs
may be for the treatment of injured employees, lost time of employees, managers and
first aid staff, lost output and damage. The cost of a fatality can run into hundreds of
thousands of pounds. The costs associated with accident loss can be divided into a
matrix as presented in Figure 3.9:
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Figure 3.9
	
Insured and uninsured costs (HSE, 1994b, p.6)
The HSE (1991a) published in HS(G)96 an extensive accident costing methodology. A
project management approach is recommended. To summarise, it suggested that the
kinds of accidents to be costed are all incidents causing injury, ill-health, damage or
loss to the business. The period chosen for the study should allow for a representative
picture of the accident situation to emerge. The organising, planning and resourcing of
the accident costing project team, data collection system, method of analysis, and
presentation of the results needs to be set out. The implications of the results for the
employer will also need consideration. These procedures account for the financial and
opportunity costs arising from accidents. Examples of the costs which may be included
where the accident occurred may consist of time costs of the injured person's absence
from work, replacement labour costs, idle time costs and loss of raw materials or
products (HSE, 1991a; Waring, 1996; Knutton, 1995).
Opportunity costs to employers which need consideration may be the time cost of the
accident investigator(s) meeting with injured person(s) and other interested parties, re-
engineering safety procedures or reorganising work programmes; and time spent on
dealing with damage to material, and managing the replacement of plant and
equipment.
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There are a number of ways in which costs can be presented (Waring, 1996). These
include mean cost per employee, mean cost per shift, week or month, or percentage of
operating costs, gross profits or turnover. Being able to present the costs associated with
specific accidents, accident types or accidents in general can provide a valuable
measure of the performance of the safety system. Failures in management control can
be identified and remedied through the channelling of resources to parts of the safety
system in ways which should induce the most financial savings.
3.6 Accident Investigation
There are two main objectives for investigating accidents. The first is to ascertain their
causes, and second to prevent a recurrence through the application of accident
prevention principles (Saunders, 1992). There may be a need for immediate or planned
remedial action so that legal compliance can be secured and to prevent further accidents
of the same types. Adrian (1990) presented a useful plan to be used in the event of an
accident. This is outlined in Figure 3.10 below (please refer to RIDDOR, 1985 for a full
description of reporting requirements):
[ACCIDENT]
Investigate, record details
write report
Figure 3.10
	 Diagram of action to be taken on learning of an accident (Adrian, 1990, p.205)
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Investigative
skills and
techniques
Analytical
skills and
techniques
3. Establish
Causes
Construct
hypotheses
Test
hypotheses
It should be recognised that it is not always practicable to investigate all accidents, with
action limited to simple documentation of an incident. Stranks (1994a) recommended
consideration of a number of factors when deciding which accidents should be
investigated as a priority: accident type, injury type and severity, whether an accident
falls into a trend of accidents, and the possibility of a breach of the law.
It is important to conduct an accident investigation as soon as possible after an accident
(Adrian, 1990). Waring (1996) recommended a four-stage approach to accident
investigation: establishing facts, analysing facts, establishing causes, and
recommendations to prevent recurrence. These stages are summarised in Figure 3.11:
Collect data
Interview Visit Examine
relevant
person(s)
4-- scene —I° records
1. Establishing facts
Iteration
Inductive/
deductive
skills
2. Analyse facts 1
Synthesis and
communication 
	
•
skills
4. Recommendations
to prevent recurrence
5. Implementation and
monitoring of
recommendations
Figure 3.11	 Flow diagram of accident investigation procedure (Waring, 1996, p.162)
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Data is normally collected from accident record forms and other appropriate records;
visiting the accident scene and through interviews. The investigator must decide how
the accident arose. The wider factors such as organisational failures, safety culture or
the decision-making process may need consideration. Once the cause(s) of an accident
have been identified it is necessary to produce recommendations designed to help to
prevent a recurrence (Stranks, 1994a). This should take the form of a written report,
outlining the relevant shortcomings and appropriate remedial action (Waring, 1996).
3.6 Measuring Safety Performance
The control processes identified earlier in Section 3.4 of this chapter would be difficult
to achieve without sufficient monitoring of safety performance. Measuring the extent of
control against predetermined objectives forms an essential part of the safety
monitoring process. Monitoring requires the detection of permanence or change in one
or more parameters of the safety system. This may entail a casual consideration of day-
to-day changes or regular systematic monitoring of safety parameters where results and
actions are recorded. In order that safety performance can be monitored and measured,
two types of system are needed. Reactive systems monitor accidents, ill-health,
incidents and other evidence of problems in health and safety performance; and active
systems monitor the achievement of objectives and the extent of compliance with
standards (HSE, 1991a).
(a) Reactive Monitoring Systems
Reactive measures of safety performance are measures of past events (Waring, 1996).
They require the recognition and reporting of injuries and ill-health, and other losses
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such as property damage, incidents which were potential loss events, hazards, or
omissions in performance standards. This information should be evaluated, promptly in
certain cases.
The most common examples of safety performance measurement are accident rates.
Waxing mentions that these are a negative measure of performance because they
measure the failure of risk control, not its effectiveness. The HSE (1991a) agrees,
warning that a low accident rate over a period of several years is no guarantee that risks
are being effectively controlled and will not result in injuries, ill-health or loss in the
future. Also the historical incidence of reported accidents could be an unreliable and
misleading indicator of safety performance. Despite these points, Stranks (1994a)
recommended that accident statistics are best used to measure safety performance in
conjunction with other more positive indicators such as safety audits. However suitably
analysed accident rates can be useful for comparing different time periods and
employee groups. This can identify good and bad performers, assess risks, identify
trends, predict future accident rates, and make comparison with similar companies
(Waring, 1996). The HSE (1991b) describes how injury incidence and frequency rates
are calculated in order to help with accident rate assessment.
The HSE's formula for calculating an annual injury incidence rate is:
Number of reportable injuries in financial year 
x100 ,000
Average number employed during year
This gives the rate per 100,000 employees and can be used for comparison against the
national picture for a particular employment sector as published annually by the HSC.
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An alternative measure of injuries is to calculate the injury frequency rates, usually per
million hours worked. This method, by counting hours worked rather than the number
of employees avoids distortions which may be caused in the incidence rate calculations
by part and full-time employees and by overtime working. Frequency rates can be
calculated for any period using:
Number of injuries in the period 
x 1,000,000
Total hours worked during the period
Measures of injury rates can provide some indicators as to whether the safety
performance of a firm is improving or deteriorating (USE, 1991b). The simplest way to
monitor accident trends is by plotting the measured data on a graph. Targets such as
national industry averages may be plotted for comparative purposes.
(b) Proactive Monitoring Systems
Proactive measures of safety performance address present activities and are designed to
prevent accidents and ill-health (Waring, 1996). Proactive measures should be more
prominent than reactive measures because of their preventative nature. Their primary
purpose is to measure success (USE, 1991a). The various forms of proactive monitoring
are broad, encompassing all the engineering, organisational, procedural, behavioural,
and personal protective equipment (PPE) controls. The uses of safety inspections and
safety tours will be considered in this sub-section.
Scheduled inspections of premises and working areas are used to assess the levels of
legal compliance and observation of employers safety procedures (Stranks, 1992). The
inspection may examine maintenance standards, employee involvement, working
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practices and housekeeping levels, and check whether work practices are followed
according to employers procedures (Stranks, 1994a).
Safety tours are unscheduled examinations of work areas, often undertaken as group
exercises involving line managers, safety specialists, safety representatives and safety
committee members. They seek to assess compliance with safety requirements to ensure
that, for instance, housekeeping is sufficient, fire protection measures are being
observed and maintained, or PPE is being used correctly. For these tours to be effective,
it is essential that any deficiencies be followed up immediately.
(c) Safety Audits
All control systems tend to deteriorate over time or become obsolete due to change
(USE, 1991a). This requires management systems to be audited intermittently. Safety
auditing complements the planning and control cycle and is partly similar to financial
auditing. It is an assessment of the reliability of the management planning and control
system. It also measures the reliability, efficiency and effectiveness of policies,
procedures, practices and programmes (HSE, 1991a; Saunders and Wheeler, 1991). All
areas of an organisation's activities are examined critically with the aims of reducing
accident potential and of increasing productivity (Stranks, 1993).
Present safety monitoring systems may only be measuring parameters relevant to an old
situation (Waring, 1996). Safety auditing is a type of monitoring which can take a more
holistic view of the SMS than the other approaches mentioned. Safety audits usually
occur several years apart. They may require several days or weeks of site work, plus
similar periods for analysis. A full safety audit should be able to examine three parts of
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the SMS. The first is the validity of the SMS design, for example whether it is capable
of delivering the desired level of safety. The second is the extent to which the employer
complies with its own safety policies, procedures and standards. Finally, the third is the
level of compliance with external legislation and standards.
In order to maximise the benefit of an audit, a team approach should be taken, involving
managers, safety representatives and employees (HSE, 1991a). Staff independent of the
activities being examined should carry out auditing. External consultants or staff from
outside the department or site under consideration may be used. Waring (1996)
• recommended that a safety audit report should be produced listing recommendations to
build on the company's strengths and tackle any health and safety defects, whether in
the SMS itself or its operation.
3.7 The Process of Revising Safety
There is much in common between auditing and reviewing, but some principal
differences exist. Those who carry out the SMS reviews are not usually the same people
who carry out safety audits. Auditors should always be independent of the company or
part of the company being audited, whereas those conducting the review are responsible
for the health and safety within the company. Auditing requires representative
sampling, interviewing and data collection. Reviewing considers the implications of
pre-existing information from within and without the company, including the audit
report.
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It is necessary to set suitable performance standards to identify the responsibilities,
timing and systems of reviewing. Reviewing performance is based on information from
measuring activities using both reactive and proactive monitoring, and from the
auditing activities based around the whole SMS. Employers should decide on how often
to review their SMS's and at what levels. Key performance indicators should be used to
measure the performance and the management of improvements. These may include
assessing the degree of compliance with performance standards, identifying areas where
performance standards are inadequate, assessing the achievement of objectives; and
analysing accident, ill-health and incident data. This process of reviewing is usually
essential, not only for understanding the historical and current performance of the SMS,
but the future adequacy of the SMS's design and operation (Waring, 1996).
3.8 Summary of Safety Management Systems
The need for a clear policy statement, its dissemination and practice across firms has
been stressed. It is evident that the safety function has a much wider role in firms than
merely controlling hazards and ensuring compliance with regulations. Safety has been
shown to have strategic value.
Accident prevention through the strategies of a 'safe workplace' and 'safe person' have
been considered. 'Safe workplace' approaches have shown to be more desirable,
although given sufficient levels of supervision and control 'safe person' strategies can
be effective. It is clear that if risk control is to be successful there is a need for adequate
inspection, maintenance and monitoring procedures to be in place.
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The safety training literature seems to suggest that employees should be treated as more
than recipients of information. Rather, their role in preventing injury and ill-health in
the workplace is enlarged through the use of participative education. A step-by-step
approach to achieving the goal of occupational safety has been outlined. Training has
been shown to be part of a proactive approach to safety. Success appears to stem from
developing the knowledge, skills and attitudes of employees, so that there is a
behavioural change towards safer working. It is clear that it is not a panacea for solving
all safety problems. However it has shown to be an effective process for helping to
achieve an employer's safety goals.
The importance of breaking down both the direct and indirect, insured and uninsured
costs of accidents has been outlined. The reasons for and approaches to accident
investigation have been described, with an emphasis on employers understanding how
to identify the direct and indirect causes of accidents. The measurement of safety
monitoring has been described. Reactive safety monitoring approaches based on the
analysis of accident statistics were described first, followed by more proactive
evaluation approaches. Auditing as a measure of a safety management systems
performance has been presented as an important monitoring activity. Finally, the
process of reviewing safety management systems was then outlined. It was important to
identify as it allows performance standards to be set for further measurement of safety
systems.
This chapter has shown that safety management is like other management functions
particularly the management of quality. Safety management was shown to be much
broader than simply supervising safe working and measuring accident rates as the sole
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indicator of success. The concept of the SMS was introduced, along with a stepwise
method to assist with its development. The knowledge of SMS introduced in this
chapter should help with understanding the nature of safety in the case study to be
considered in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Systems Thinking and System Dynamics and its Use in
Occupational Safety
4.1 Introduction to Systems Thinking
The concept of a system has developed into a powerful intellectual device over the last
half century (Checkland and Haynes, 1994). Systems thinking has been used in many
different fields including engineering, ecology and management science (Checkland,
1981; Senge, 1990; Lane, 1994). Systems thinldng contains a number of frameworks
and methodologies which deal with the capture of insights and problem solving in both
static and dynamic systems.
This chapter has six sections. Section 4.2 offers a brief discussion of the theory
underpinning systems thinking, with emphasis on the work of Bertalanffy (1950). In
Section 4.3 a systems taxonomy is introduced as a framework for differentiating
between soft and hard systems thinking and its application to real world problem-
solving. The work of soft systems theorists such as Checkland (1981) is examined along
with harder operational research. The system dynamics methodology is discussed in
Section 4.4 using a modelling framework suggested by Roberts et al. (1983, p.8) which
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listed the phases involved in building, testing and applying system dynamics models.
The ideas of a number of prominent system dynamics modellers are used to help build
up a picture of the modelling process (Forrester, 1961; Richardson and Pugh, 1981;
Moffatt, 1991; Wolstenholme, 1990, 1993; Coyle, 1996). Despite the absence of
literature integrating systems thinking and occupational safety, Section 4.5 outlines
examples of the use of causality and more importantly systems thinking in occupational
safety (Heinrich, 1959; Waring, 1990a, 1990b; Andersen et al., 1986; Crawford, 1991).
The chapter is completed in Section 4.6 with a summary of the broad field of systems
thinking, and more specifically the use of system dynamics as a suitable methodology
with which to use to evaluate occupational safety strategies.
4.2 The Origins of Systems Thinking
(a) General Systems Theory
About 50 years ago a school of thought emerged in the biological sciences that argued
against a reductionist approach (Checkland and Haynes, 1994). It advocated developing
ideas relevant to what it took to be the unit of concern: the organism as a whole
(Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Haynes, 1994). This group became known as the
organismic biologists. One of them, Bertalanffy (1950, 1968) suggested that the theory
could be related both to living organisms and social organisation. This led him to
develop General Systems Theory (GST). A concept was developed around a system as a
whole, built from requisite parts or sub-systems. It was also proposed that living
organismic systems and social systems were similar in their emergent properties as a
result of the central notions of open systems, feedback processes, and causality. One-
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way causality has been shown from Bertalanffy's work to be insufficient thinking hence
the appearance across a number of fields of science the notions of wholeness and
holism. Most importantly, GST promoted thinking in terms of systems of elements in
mutual interaction, rather than separate elements.
A major criticism that can be levelled at GST concerns its generality and lack of
content. Researchers in diverse fields have been reluctant to acknowledge GST as
relevant to their particular problems (Checkland and Haynes, 1994). This overarching
theory has ensured that it has little to do with solving any problem area in particular
(Checkland, 1981). Despite or in spite of this, virtually all modern systems thinking
appears to have stemmed from the principles of GST. In particular it was developed
further by Churchman in the late 1960s.
(b) The Systems Approach
Churchman (1968) developed the Systems Approach to problem solving in
organisational settings. His approach aimed to improve the performance of systems as a
whole through setting the boundaries of the systems, determining the sub-systems
which exist within them and measuring the resources they contain. Management control
of the system is achieved through information feedback. The work is built on the ideas
of the organismic biologists such as Bertalanffy, and strictly applies the open system
rules to organisational problems. Emphasis is placed on the interdependence of systems,
and on how they achieve dynamic behaviour through changes to components.
Churchman wrote about measurement of system components and the whole system, but
it is not clear how these dynamic changes can be traced (Checkland and Haynes, 1994).
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Churchman, as with Bertalanffy, offered a philosophical analysis of enquiry systems.
Despite this practical limitation, Mason and Mitroff (1981) developed the Systems
Approach as a soft operational research (OR) tool called Strategic Assumption
Surfacing and Testing, designed to encourage group debate where common values and
goals are not evident. Systems thinking has become more prominent through its
application to real world problems. This is evident in the following taxonomy of
approaches.
4.3 The Boundary of Systems Thinking
(a) A Systems Thinking Taxonomy
Checkland (1981) presented a taxonomy to classify the strands of systems thinking. In
particular, he wanted to show the systems approaches used to address real world issues.
Figure 4.1 maps out what he call the 'Systems Movement':
Work in the 'Systems
Movement'
Study of systems
	
Application of Systems Thinking
ideas as such (1) 	 in other disciplines (2)
Theoretical development
	
Problem solving in Real-world
of systems ideas (1.1)	 situations (1.2)
Work in 'soft'
	
Aid to decision	 Work in 'hard'
systems (1.21)	 making (1.22)	 systems (1.23)
Figure 4.1	 Varieties of systems thinking in the systems movement (Checkland, 1981, p.95)
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Checkland's map consists of a layered structure, where (1) is the study of systems ideas
as such; and (2) the application of systems thinking in other disciplines, such as
geographical information systems. Category (1) is split into (1.1), that is theoretical
developments such as cybernetics and GST, and (1.2) problem solving in real world
situations. Category (1.2) is further divided into (1.21) work in 'soft' systems, (1.22)
aids to decision making, and (1.23) work in 'hard' systems. Soft Operational Research
(OR) and in particular soft systems methodology (SSM) can be categorised in (1.21)
and are concerned with tackling ill-structured and messy problems or issues. Category
(1.22) consists of RAND systems analysis, management science and classical
operations research, which are systematic in their outlook rather than systemic.
Category (1.23) contains systems engineering, computer systems analysis and it could
be argued the original industrial dynamics, (Checkland and Haynes, 1994). It has
emerged that there are three sub-sets of applied systems thinking. Given the above
classification of applied systems thinking, it is no surprise that a number of formal
definitions of systems thinking exist.
(b) Definitions of Systems Thinking 
As one would expect, in a broad methodological area such as systems thinking, a
variety of definitions have emerged. Forrester, coming from a simulation background,
suggested that:
...systems thinking has no clear defmition or usage ...some use systems thinking to mean the
same as system dynamics (Forrester, 1994, p.251).
Richmond defined systems thinking in a much broader way as:
76
...the art and science of making reliable inferences about behaviour by developing an
increasingly deep understanding of underlying structure (Richmond, 1994, p.139).
Checkland and Haynes offered a definition which focuses on the human interaction:
Systems thinking encompasses any use of the core idea of an adaptive whole to understand or
intervene in the complexities of human affairs (Checkland and Haynes, 1994, p.189).
Senge suggested that systems thinking is dynamic:
...systems thinking is a discipline for seeing wholes. It is a framework for seeing
interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static 'snapshots'
(Senge, 1990, p.68).
A number of key words emerge from the various definitions of systems thinking offered
by the authors: complex(ities), emergent properties, 'whole, interrelationships, and
understanding. Regarding systems thinking as looking at complex problems within the
context of the adaptive whole should form a general definition. Checkland and Haynes
may have been correct, and certainly diplomatic, when they simply suggested that:
The different uses of the notion 'system' collectively constitute systems thinking (Checkland
and Haynes, 1994, p.189).
Checkland's (1981) systems thinking taxonomy appeared to be extremely broad even
where problem solving in the real world is concerned. Fortunately, an examination of
the above definitions of systems thinking offered by prominent writers narrows down
considerably the methodologies which can fit the label.
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(c) Systems Thinking Methodologies and their Use in Solving Real World Problems
Using both Checkland's (1981) taxonomy and the above definitions of systems
thinking, classical operational research (OR), soft OR, in particular soft systems
methodology, and system dynamics will be examined to determine how suitable
problem solving methodologies they might be.
(d) Traditional Operational Research
Traditional OR is concerned with the identification of problems, their objective,
accurate descriptions, and then optimal solutions (Pidd, 1996). Problem formulation is
in terms of a single objective and optimisation. There are often overwhelming data
demands with the consequent problems of distortion, data availability, and data
credibility (Ackoff, 1979). Models are opaque, frequently large and the stakeholders are
assumed to be passive. Ackoff criticised this approach correctly by stating that
managers did not have independent problems but were confronted with dynamic
situations that consist of complex problems. Senge (1990) also noted that traditional OR
was unable to deal effectively with dynamic complexity, prevalent in situations where
cause and effect are subtle and where the effects over time of interventions are not
obvious. OR models have a predictive function, whereas alternative systems thinking
approaches allow the design of a system that is desired. Despite the argument by
Churchman et al., (1957) that OR concerns itself with as much of the whole system as it
can given constraints of time and resources it clearly is not a systems thinking approach
to problem solving (Checkland, 1981).
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(e) Soft Systems Models
A number of soft systems (often referred to as soft OR) issue-structuring techniques
have been developed. The principle ones are: Strategic Choice (Friend and Hickling,
1987), Critical Systems Heuristics (Ulrich, 1989; Flood and Jackson, 1991), Strategic
Options Development and Analysis or SODA (Eden, 1990), Qualitative System
Dynamics (Wolstenholme, 1990), and Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981).
The last two will be reviewed in this section, as they tend to transcend more
methodological boundaries than the others do. Before discussing soft systems
methodology (SSM), another softer kind of methodology known as Qualitative System
Dynamics (QSD) should be noted. It is a methodology which concerns itself with the
front and back ends of the system dynamics modelling approach. The methodology
follows the same sequence as that of the fuller quantitative models, with the exception
of the actual simulation modelling and of its subsequent testing. It has been used by a
number of modellers as a distinct and separate approach to problem solving (Senge,
1990; Wolstenholme, 1990), and acknowledged by others to be sufficient in instances
where sufficient insight into a problem has been gained without the aid of simulation
(Coyle, 1996).
SSM is an approach developed by Checkland (1981) to tackling complex problems.
Checkland noted that in many management situations it is difficult to define the system
or the area of concern thought to be problematic. He observed that in most management
problem situations, the crucial need was to find accommodation between conflicting
viewpoints and interests, rather than a consensus on goal seeking. SSM subjectively
allows an enquiring process for expressing, challenging, and comparing the world views
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of various actors in their understanding of a problem situation through the building of a
'rich picture'. This allows a deep insight into a problem to be achieved (Lane, 1994). A
comparison between 'ideal type' models and the 'real world' leads to accommodation
amongst the relevant actors to change the problem situation in a way that is both
desirable and feasible. Through the process of debate, knowledge can be captured and
action can be taken (Checkland and Haynes, 1994). The systemicity lies in the process
of inquiry rather than in the world, as distinct from harder systems thinking, which
attempts to model the real world.
Soft OR techniques, are strongly interpretative in nature (Lane, 1994). SODA and SSM
are based on subjective understanding and the use of cognitive maps and root problem
definitions to express individual meaning and to negotiate world views. Strategic
Choice also strongly emphasises the importance of the world views held by participants.
The motivation for the methodologies is based on a subjective rather than objective
view. QSD allows an appreciation to be built up of the feedback structure and delays
contained within systems, and how these control behaviour. The advantage of soft
systems models is that they are available to both the problem owners and professional
practitioners (Checldand, 1985). Soft OR accepts the need to work with a plurality of
world views, to pay attention to changes in perception which alter during the process of
intervention, and to build consensus for change through discussion and debate (Jackson,
1994).
A major disadvantage of soft systems models is that they do not produce final answers
and one has to accept that the inquiry is unending (Checkland, 1985). Another criticism
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of soft OR is that it seeks to elicit subjective viewpoints without considering the
distortions they contain (Lane, 1994). Soft OR lacks a tool for examining the time-
evolutionary behaviour of systems. Forrester (1994) and Sterman (1994) saw the need
for simulation of systems due to this shortcoming. Sterman suggested that a mental
model could not identify sufficiently well the elements of complexity which arise from
feedback, time delays, accumulations and nonlinearities. Forrester was concerned that
in lacking the identification of system accumulations or level variables, the causal loops
of QSD fail to identify in full the systems elements which actually cause the dynamic
behaviour. Another major problem of QSD is that there are many models explaining a
specific problem, but without simulating the models with real data it is impossible to
select the best model. Only when non-operational models of policy-making or strategic
management are being discussed can QSD be of real use.
(f) Industrial Dynamics
According to Checkland and Haynes (1994), system dynamics in the form it was
originally developed fell into the hard category. This could be disputed by a number of
system dynamics modellers who might argue that certainly in today's form, system
dynamics crosses all three types of systems approaches to real world problem solving
(Forrester, 1961; Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Lane, 1994). In order to clarify this point,
system dynamics needs to be described fully, as this is the chosen methodology for this
work.
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4.4 System Dynamics Modelling Methodology
System dynamics is a methodology used to assist in the understanding of complex
problems (Forrester, 1961; Coyle 1977, 1996; Richardson and Pugh, 1981,
Wolstenholme, 1990). System dynamics should be regarded as a rigorous approach to
solving problems in complex systems, using the help of a computer simulation to
identify equitable policy decisions that can be applied to control a dynamic problem or
to alter undesired behaviour. An understanding of dynamic behaviour is achieved by
focusing on the actual dynamic interrelationships in the complex system that causes the
change.
(a) The Development of System Dynamics
Forrester (1961) first applied the principles of cybernetics and GST to industrial
systems in Industrial Dynamics. He knew that control systems used in central heating
systems relied on the feedback of information to regulate temperature through the use of
policies or rules. He recognised a parallel in social systems. He noted that the ability to
apply control theory concepts to business problems could be of great value if applied to
business. The idea of designing policies to control the behaviour of a business
temporally was developed (Coyle, 1996).
Forrester (1961) set out the concepts and methodology of a modelling technique which
he termed industrial dynamics. He based industrial dynamics on the concept of
information feedback control theory or servomechanisms. All systems whether they are
biological, engineering or social, contain information feedback control loops. These
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systems are continuous and are driven by an adaptive process which leads to new
decisions, keeping the system in continuous motion. He argued that the behaviour of
these systems is governed by three characteristics: structure, delays and amplification.
The structure describes how the parts of the system are related to one another. Delays
exist between the availability of information and the taking of decisions based on the
information. Amplification is common in many social systems, and he suggested that
this is the most important characteristic determining the behaviour of information
feedback systems. In a system with positive feedback loops a small change in an
information input or policy often results in greater than anticipated amplification
throughout that system.
Forrester took these three principles and was able to build a simulation model which
integrated the functional areas of management within an 'industrial setting, and which
demonstrated, through computer simulation modelling how policies could be designed
to control a dynamic commercial system. Industrial dynamics was developed because
many problem-solving methods, particularly those using management science
approaches, were not providing useful insights into and a full understanding of strategic
problems in complex systems (Wolstenholme, 1990; Coyle, 1996).
Later he began to apply his modelling approach to the problems of ageing urban areas
and to the complex social issues surrounding them (Forrester, 1969), and population
change and its effect on crowding, food, pollution and natural resource depletion in the
context of world dynamics (Forrester, 1971). The term industrial dynamics was
replaced by the more general one system dynamics (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). By
83
the late 1970s and early 1980s the scope of system dynamics modelling had widened
substantially to cover many social-economic issues, including evaluating policy in areas
such as military planning, social policy, corporate strategy and environmental planning
(Wolstenholme, 1990).
(b) Definitions of System Dynamics
A good number of definitions of system dynamics have been put forward. Forrester had
defined industrial dynamics as:
...the investigation of the information-feedback character of industrial systems and the use of
models for the design of improved organizational form and guiding policy (Forrester, 1961,
p.13).
Coyle noticed that Forrester's definition did not state what type of models are involved,
nor incorporate time or feedback. In order to retain the core concept of system dynamics
and allow for the widening of the approach Coyle suggested that:
System dynamics deals with the time-dependent behaviour of managed systems with the aim of
describing the system and understanding, through qualitative and quantitative models, how
information feedback governs its behaviour, and designing robust information feedback
structures and control policies through simulation and optimisation (Coyle, 1996, p.10).
Although Coyle's definition is long it captures all the essential components of the
system dynamics method. System dynamics is a suitable modelling approach where the
problem under consideration is dynamic, i.e. its quantities change over time, and
information feedback determines a system's behaviour. Wolstenholme (1990) suggested
that system dynamics is concerned with controlling such undesirable behaviour through
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tModel Be aviour
/tMode Evaluation
Policty An1alysis and
Model Use
observing and identifying the problematic behaviour of a system over time and to create
a valid representation of the system in a model form. This system must be capable of
reproducing through computer simulation the existing system behaviour, and allowing
the design of improved system behaviour through repeated experimentation using
simulation.
(c) The Stages of System Dynamics Modelling 
A number of authors have put forward frameworks for the use of system dynamics to
solve problems (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Roberts et al., 1983; Coyle 1996). All
three systems modellers offer a similar approach to the model building process. They all
share the importance of problem identification, system conceptualisation, formulating
the model both qualitatively and quantitatively, and policy testing and recommendation.
The iterative process of model building is also common to all. Roberts et al. (1983, p.8)
produced a detailed and rigorous overview of system dynamics modelling. They offer
six stages to the building and use of system dynamics models. Following Roberts et
al's. framework, the phases required for building a successful system dynamics model
will be examined in a sequential order. Roberts et al's. approach is outlined in Figure
4.2.
Problem Definition
CONCEPTUAL	 System Conceptualisation . 	
Model Representation	 Refin ment
TECHNICAL
Figure 4.2	 Phases in the model building process (Roberts et al., p.8)
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Validation of the model is a continuous process, and through a number of structural,
behavioural and policy tests, a model can be built which is a good representation of
reality. The principal tests will be raised when appropriate throughout the stages of the
modelling framework. The iterative cycles between the various model stages of the
above framework are significant. In reality a typical system dynamics model is built
from looping through adjoining stages several times, gradually progressing to the last
stage of the model building process.
(d) Problem Definition
The first step in the model building process involves identifying the relevant problem.
There are a number of criteria that the problem must meet in order for it to be
successfully addressed using system dynamics. It needs to be capable of being analysed
using a system. It has to be dynamic, that is to vary over lime. Also, the forces causing
this variability must be able to be described causally, and these causal influences must
be able to be contained with a closed system of feedback loops. A model is regarded as
valid if it fits a purpose of the study (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Richardson and Pugh,
1981). Defining a clear purpose serves to focus a study sufficiently and it assists in
judging the validity of the results (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
A number of variables can be pictured changing over time (Randers, 1980; Richardson
and Pugh, 1981). Producing temporal graphs of principal model variables can assist
with defining the problem and will lead to the formulation of structured, quantitative
feedback models. These are often referred to as reference modes of behaviour. These
can illustrate the actual or expected behaviour of the model against the desired
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behaviour. Doing so clarifies which variables must appear in the model. Two types
exist: a historically observed reference mode, or if no empirical data exist, a
hypothesised reference mode. The idea is that once the simulation model is built and
calibrated, the model should be capable of reproducing the major dynamics of the
reference mode. The validity of the system dynamics model is closely tied in with its
ability to reproduce the reference modes (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). Moffatt (1991)
showed how population dynamics can be modelled using system dynamics. He started
the process with a simple reference mode of demographic behaviour as presented
graphically in Figure 4.3:
Population
Time
Figure 4.3	 Exponential population growth (adapted from Moffatt, 1991, p.18)
The patterns depicted in the population growth curve may lead to the identification of a
causal diagram as the modeller seeks to identify possible variables which explain the
behaviour represented in the reference mode. For example, the causes of the exponential
population change (see Figure 4.3) such as births, deaths and migration can be
identified and modelled. From the reference mode of behaviour showing population
dynamics a whole series of possible causal links can be drawn showing this behaviour.
This helps to identify the principal variables surrounding the problem. Once these
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graphs are established, one can start to search for feedback structure between them, thus
developing the models structure (Richardson and Pugh 1981).
(e) System Conceptualisation
Once the purpose of the study has been set, the problem identified, principal variables
determined and reference modes defined; the interconnections between those variables
should be explored. This involves both seeking out the cause-and-effect between the
variables and forming them into feedback loops. The result is one or more causal-loop
or influence diagrams. These are used to convey a picture of the system at the model
conceptualisation stage, and often in final descriptions of model structure where it is
necessary to give a simple overview of the model (Coyle, 1996). To build a valid
representation of how the system functions, the model's structure needs to be compared
to that of the real system (Forrester and Senge, 1980): Knowledge of the real system
may be empirically based or purely hypothetical. It may be elicited from a number of
sources such as the assumptions of the modeller, or from persons with a good
knowledge of the real system, or through causal relationships found in appropriate
literature.
Cause and effect can be displayed as either positive or negative according to the polarity
of the relationship. A positive sign represents the variable at the opposite end of the
arrow moving in the same direction, while a negative sign represents an inverse
relationship. It is simple to convey a relationship using simple cause and effect. Figures
4.4(a) and 4.4(b) show positive and negative relationships respectively. It must be
emphasised that a causal link between A and B assumes all the influences are equal. In
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a simple connection only A influences B, but when several factors influence an element
the ceritus paribus clause applies. This assumption is very important when positive and
negative loops are involved.
A	 B A	 B
Positive causal	 Negative
link (a)	 causal link (b)
Figure 4.4	 Causal link polarities (Richardson and Pugh, 1981, p.26)
As system dynamics is based on causality contained within feedback loops, these
feedback loops need to be clearly understood. Feedback systems form loops of
interconnections. These loops contain variables linked together through causes and
effects. The causal feedback loops allow the changes which occur dynamically in the
real world to be modelled. Two types of loop exist: goal-seeking or negative loops, and
growth producing or positive loops (Coyle, 1996; Richardson and Pugh, 1981). The
overall polarity of these feedback loops is determined from the sum of the individual
polarities of the cause-effect links.
Figure 4.5(a) represents a positive feedback loop (Moffatt, 1991). Tracing around the
loop it is evident that the greater the population; the more births there will be; the more
births there are, the greater the population will become. The positive sign at each
arrowhead defines the whole loop as being positive. It is also possible to read the loop
as the smaller the population the fewer births there will be the fewer births there are, the
fewer people will be added to the population. The positive sign in the parentheses
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(a)	 (b)
(+) (-)Number ofBirths Number ofDeathsTotalPopulationTotalPopulation
indicates that the whole feedback loop is positive. Positive loops amplify disturbances
around a loop (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). They are often associated with
destabilising, disequilibrating, growth promoting or self-reinforcing behaviour.
The negative loop shown in Figure 4.5(b) shows that as the number of deaths increase,
the population may decline. If this continued, the population would eventually die out.
The polarities on the arrows show that there are both positive and negative influences
working within the feedback loop. The negative sign in the parentheses shows that the
overall structure of the feedback loop is negative. Negative feedback involves target-
seeking behaviour. Where a disturbance is introduced the loop seeks a state of
equilibrium. They are often used in control systems (Moffatt, 1991). All managed
systems must contain at least one negative loop (Coyle, 1996).
Figure 4.5	 Causal diagrams illustrating positive and negative feedback loops (Moffatt, 1991, p.16)
System dynamics models invariably consist of several positive and negative feedback
loops that integrate to form multi-loop systems. This is demonstrated in Figure 4.6
where the positive and negative loops shown in Figures 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) are
interconnected to form a simple multiple feedback model of population dynamics.
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TotalBirth Rate
	
Death Rate
(BR)	 (+)	 Population	 (—)	 (DR)(POP)
Figure 4.6	 A population dynamics model (Moffatt, 1991, p.17)
Although only two feedback loops are connected in Figure 4.6, this may represent the
full causal structure which would allow the reference mode of behaviour shown in
Figure 4.3 to be replicated. The associated reference mode indicates exponential
population growth. Under these circumstances the number of births will exceed deaths
per unit of time. These two rates of change represent a positive and a negative feedback
loop respectively. Total population (POP) is an accumulation in the system. It is a state
variable or level which changes according to the two respective rates it interacts with.
Where several loops exist, the behaviour of systems of interconnected feedback loops
often works counter to intuition and expectation, in spite of the fact that the dynamic
behaviour of individual loops may be fully understood. The complex behaviour that
emerges from a system containing feedback structure of a real problem can invariably
only be traced using simulation (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). It is a relatively simple
exercise to translate a causal diagram into a quantitative system dynamics model which
can be simulated using computer modelling (Moffatt, 1991).
(f) Model Representation
In the development of the quantitative model, two phases are passed through. These
consist of converting the causal diagram into a flow diagram, then transcribing this flow
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DR
BRN DRN
diagram into a suitable system dynamics computer language. The principles
surrounding flow diagramming need to be understood.
(g) Flow Diagrams
A flow diagram allows the causal structure of the model to be translated into system
dynamics equations. A number of commercial system dynamics packages exist, the
pioneer was DYNAMO in 1960 (Coyle, 1996). Others include Stella/IThink, Vensim
and Powersim. They all work to the same fundamental rules, but differ slightly in their
representation of model constituents.
Moffatt (1991) offers a good example of how to arrive at a flow diagram from his
model of population dynamics. Figure 4.7 shows Moffatt's causal loop diagram
converted into a flow diagram. The diagram is built using Stella/IThink, which is the
software package of choice for this thesis.
Key
Levels
Rate of change
Outside the system of interest
Constant parameter
Material flows
Information flows
Figure 4.7	 Flow chart of population dynamics, showing symbols for levels, rates and constant
parameters (adapted from Moffatt, 1991, p.19)
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The flow diagram has a key containing the symbols which are used to construct the
diagram. Levels represent accumulations in a system, as with POP. The level may be
compared to a liquid accumulation in a container. The feedback process involves a
continuous fluid like movement within the system or model. In order for that to
fimction, flows are introduced which increase and decrease a level. These are called
rates, and BR and DR represent these. The circular symbols labelled BRN, birth rate
normal and DRN, death rate normal represent constant parameters. In this instance the
proportion of a population giving birth or dying over a period. The cloud symbols in
Figure 4.7 represent sources and sinks for the material flowing into and out of the level
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981). Their presence indicates that the real-world
accumulations they represent lie outside the boundary of the system being modelled.
Material flowing out of a level will diminish that level, but information about it passing
to other parts of the system will leave the level unaltered. Information feedback links
are substantially different from physical or resource flows. Causal diagrams represent
both types of links with the same sort of arrow, but flow diagrams differentiate between
physical or material flows and information links. In the preceding figure, material flows
are shown as the thicker transparent lines. They represent the rate of addition to the
population through the birth rate and concurrently, the subtraction from the population
through the death rate. The thin solid lines represent information flows. These can be
thought of as decision variables, as they dictate the behaviour of the rates. In larger
more complex systems these allow information feedback about the rate of change of the
levels to occur.
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Causal loop diagrams are invariably an aggregation of detail, used to picture the
principal components and boundaries of the model. Flow diagrams allow the
representation of the structural detail. There is a need, as with causal loop diagramming
to ensure that the structure is representative of the real world. Additional confidence in
a model's validity can be gained through comparing the form of the equations of the
model with the relationships that exist in the real system (Barlas, 1996). This leads on
to actually quantifying the model structure.
(h) Quantifying Flow Diagrams 
A quantitative system dynamics model contains a set of equations (Coyle, 1996). It is
created to represent the system and allowed to run forward in simulated time in an
attempt to mimic the behaviour of the real system as it runs forward in real time.
System dynamics simulation uses time step simulation.' The model takes a number of
steps along the time axis. A sufficient number of steps are taken in order to simulate to
an acceptable level of accuracy the time period under consideration.
System dynamics uses numerical simulation based on difference equations to represent
the process of accumulation (Wolstenholme, 1990). Using DYNAMO programming
notation, the dynamics of the simulation can be explained using three points in time.
These are conventionally labelled J, K and L, where K is defined as the current point in
time, J as the past point in time and L as a future point in time. These are separated by
DT which is the length of time or solution time elapsing between J and K, or K and L
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981). The simulation moves one DT at a time. This concept is
represented in Figure 4.8:
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STEP N
DT	 DT
TIME
STEP N+1
I-411 --- DT	
I "4111-- DT "•-.10" I
Figure 4.8	 Time shift and re-labelling in simulation (Wolstenholme, 1990, p.49)
(i) Simulation Equations
DYNAMO is probably the clearest system dynamics programming language to
understand from first principles, and will be used throughout the remainder of this
chapter to demonstrate equation representation. There are several types of DYNAMO
equation (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). Each equation is labelled on the left with a
single letter to indicate its type. An L represents a level; R a rate, C a constant, N an
initial value, A an auxiliary, and T a table function. All these equation types will be
described in the remainder of this section.
Figure 4.7 contains one level, two rates, and two constants. In order to simulate,
equations need to be specified for each of these variables. Moffatt's (1991) population
dynamic flow chart can be written using the DYNAMO programming language. The
level equation can be specified as follows:
L POP.K = POP.J + (DT) (BR.JK - DR.JK)
where L is a level equation, POP is the Population, BR is the Birth Rate, DR is the
Death Rate, and DT is the Solution Time.
Levels are simply the integration of rates over a period of time (Coyle, 1996). They are
calculated at the current time, and have the time subscript K (Wolstenholme, 1990).
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They are based on the size of the level at the previous point in time, J, plus what has
flowed into the level, less what has flowed out during the period JK. DT, the size of the
time interval for the simulation, governs this period. Error is introduced when making
discrete approximations of a continuous process. The smaller the DT, the closer the
simulation to the actual. If DT is set too small then running the model may be time-
consuming, whereas if it is too large, numerical instability may occur (Coyle, 1996). A
number of authors have suggested loose rules for the selection of DT (Forrester, 1961;
Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Wolstenholme, 1990, Coyle, 1996).
The level (POP) in Figure 4.7 is directly influenced by two rates, birth rate (BR) and
death rate (DR). A rate equation sets the rate of flow into or out of a level (Moffatt,
1991). All levels are controlled by rate equations. A rate equation can be denoted by JK
or KL. JK represents the previous time interval J to the present K, and KL the next time
interval from K to L.
In Moffatt's demographic model the birth and death rates have the same structure. The
birth rate can be written as:
R BR.KL = POP.K x BRN
where R is a rate equation, POP is the Population level at time K, and BRN is the Birth
Rate Normal (a constant).
The death rate can be written as:
R DR.KL = POP.K x DRN
where DRN is the Death Rate Normal (a constant).
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It is common to find three types of parameter in system dynamics models: constants,
initial values of levels, and table functions (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Moffatt, 1991).
A table function is the only type of parameter to possess a time suffix, therefore it
doubles as an auxiliary function and thus, will be introduced later in the section. It is
important when setting up all constants and initial levels that these are based on the
most accurate data or estimates of data possible. There are three alternatives available,
either to match a historical situation, initialise the model in equilibrium, or for a set
pattern of growth or decline (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
The constant is normally fixed over the simulation period, hence they do not contain
any time suffix (Moffatt, 1991). Constants can take many forms including conversion
factors, information delays, adjustment times or proportions (Richardson and Pugh,
1981). Incidentally, BRN and DRN are proportions. BRN Is a numerical value and is set
in the program as:
C BRN = 0.001
where C is a constant equation, Birth Rate Normal (set in this instance at 1 birth per
1,000 people).
Moffatt (1991) suggests that initial value equations set for levels at the beginning of a
simulation are also constants. The equation is written as the name of the level without
the time suffix. The population level is set as:
N POP = 3,000,000
where POP is the numerical value of the level representing the population (set in this
instance at 3 million people).
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Auxiliaries are commonly used where the formulation of a level's influence on a rate
involves one or more intermediate calculations (Roberts et al., 1983). Auxiliaries are
computations used to create the information feedback structures within the flow
diagram and are more prevalent in complex models (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
Auxiliaries are always computed in the present, from the present values of other
variables, be they levels, rates or other auxiliaries. The associated time-script is a K.
Auxiliaries also allow the introduction of information delays into the feedback structure
of a model, thus adding greater realism to the behaviour of the simulated model.
Models are refined and improved as a result of iterating through several of the model
building stages. This is shown in Figure 4.2, Roberts et al's (1983, p.8) model building
framework. New insights are often gathered at each stage of a model. A greatly
increased understanding of the system problem can be' developed even before any
formal simulations have been run. In fact Wolstenholme (1990) and Coyle (1996)
suggest that a problem may well become sufficiently understood simply through the
process of describing the system. Moffatt (1991) shows in Figure 4.9(a) how a new
population dynamics model could evolve from his basic model through the introduction
of a further feedback loop containing two auxiliary variables. The new negative
feedback loop assumes that as the carrying capacity of an area is approached, there is a
substantial fall in the birth rate. In effect the model structure now represents a classic
'limits to growth' archetype as developed by Senge (1990). This causes a re-think about
the reference mode, which may now take the logistical shape as outlined in Figure
4.9(b). Figure 4.10 shows a flow chart modified through the introduction of the new
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(a)
feedback loop. Two auxiliaries are introduced into the new loop: carrying capacity (CC)
and a table function named infant survival multiplier (ISM).
Population
Figure 4.9
	
New causal loop model of population dynamics and associated reference mode
(adapted from Moffatt, 1991, p.24; p.18)
POP
ISM	 CC
	 POPMAX
Figure 4.10	 Flow diagram of the new model of population dynamics (adapted from Moffatt, 1991,
24)
The new flow chart shows that as POP increases, then the CC of the area is approached.
This impacts on the ISM, which in turn reduces the BR. CC represents the total number
of people that can be supported at a given level of material welfare. The limit of CC is
constrained by the constant parameter (POPMAX). The equations for CC and
POPMAX could be set up as:
A CC.K = (POPMAX - POP.K)/POPMAX
C POPMAX = 5000000
where A is an auxiliary equation, CC is the carrying capacity, POPMAX is a constant
(set at 5 million people), and POP is the total population in the level.
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A table function can represent either a linear or non-linear relationship between an
independent and dependent variable plotted in a graph form. Coyle (1996) suggests the
importance of these causal non-linear relationships in the modelling of managed
systems. Table functions are constructed from either empirical data, particularly when
injecting a historical pattern of data into a model, or purely from hypothetical
relationships (Graham, 1980; Moffatt, 1991; Coyle, 1996). Most of these parameters are
arrived at through the use of descriptive information.
In Moffatt's (1991) new model, the relationship between the ISM and CC can be set for
a range of values:
A ISM.K = TABLE(ISM,CC.K,0,1,.25)
T ISM =1.00/0.95/0.88/0.78/0.00
More recent system dynamics packages have the advantage over DYNAMO in that
table functions can be drawn and modified with the use of a computer mouse, and are
visible to the modeller as a simple cause-effect graph, rather than simply sets of co-
ordinates. Moffatt's table function can be shown graphically in Figure 4.11:
Figure 4.11
	 Graphical representation of simple table function
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Coyle (1996) warns about the limitations of table functions, where the instance arises
when the independent variable goes above or below the declared range. This can lead to
a fatal error occurring. In addition, the accuracy of the table often depends on the use of
small step sizes.
(j) Delays in Systems
Delays occur in most social and economic systems, and a system's behaviour over time
is often strongly influenced by delays. (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Roberts et al.,
1983). Delays can be divided into two types, those resulting from the time involved in
processing physical materials, and those resulting from the time involved in perceiving
and acting upon information (Roberts et al., 1983). These are called material delays and
information delays respectively. Both are represented as exponential delays. Two
characteristics of a delay are important, the first being . the delay time, and the second
the transient response of the outflow to the inflow (Forrester, 1961).
In material delays outflow rates are simply calculated by dividing the level by the
average delay. Higher order delays are represented by cascading a number of levels
together, and dividing the delay by the number of levels used. The higher the order, the
closer the output mimics the shape of the input. The delays represent the overall flow in
the system, and not individual entities. This must be taken into account when choosing
suitable delays. Lower order delays may be appropriate to use to model simple flows,
and higher order delays for representing more complex flows (Richardson and Pugh,
1981).
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Smoothing or averaging of information over time allows real trends in data to be
detected (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). Often the smoothing out of randomness is
required to obtain an accurate picture of behaviour. Where delays are applied to
information flows, the idea of a level within an information flow is created
(Wolstenholme, 1990). Delaying of information effectively represents smoothing of
information. As with material delays, the order of the delay or averaging can be
determined through the cascading of a number of levels together.
Although levels are used to represent both types of delay, it is vital to ensure that levels
used in material delays are conserved, as they represent real material (Coyle, 1996). The
levels used in information delays are not conserved, as it is not possible to contain real
levels within an information flow.
(k) Parameter Verification and Dimensional Consistency
Model parameters can be compared against observations from the real system in order
to determine whether they correspond conceptually and numerically to real life.
(Forrester and Senge, 1980; Barlas, 1996). Numerical confirmation requires the
numerical values of the parameters to be estimated with sufficient accuracy (Barlas,
1996). In addition, Hamilton (1980) sets out estimation techniques for lengths and
orders of delays in system dynamics models. A dimensional analysis of a model's rate
equations (Forrester and Senge, 1980) is important for building confidence in a model.
The dimensions of the state variables and parameters must be consistent (Moffatt, 1991;
Coyle, 1977)
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(1) Model Behaviour
Once the structure of the flow diagram has been set, a model is ready for computer
simulation (Roberts et al., 1983). The fourth stage of the modelling process can begin.
The computer simulation is run to determine how all the variables within the system
will behave over time. At the qualitative level, the model may be verified through
comparing the correspondence of the reference mode of behaviour or state variables(s)
with the behaviour or hypothesised behaviour of the real system (Moffatt, 1991).
(m) Model Evaluation
In stage five, parameter sensitivity tests and calibrations are performed on the model.
These are often accompanied by statistical validation tests of behaviour replication
(Roberts eta!., 1983; Moffatt, 1991).
The behaviour sensitivity tests focus on the sensitivity of model behaviour to changes in
parameter values. The test can indicate whether shifts in model parameters can cause
plausible model behaviour. They can also help the modeller to identify where the
sensitive model parameters might lie (Moffatt, 1991). Tank-Neilsen (1980)
recommended that sensitivity testing can help determine if a model's sensitivity accords
with the real world or the anticipated real world, and if the model is sensitive to the
same changes as the real system.
If the simulation output is able to replicate the actual behaviour of the system under
study, be it a historical or a hypothetical pattern, then this is a strong contribution to the
overall validity of the model. A number of behaviour reproduction tests can be used to
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evaluate system dynamics models. They are used to determine the closeness of the
match between model-generated behaviour and the real system. The behaviour
reproduction attempts to replicate the magnitude, turning points and periodicity of state
variables in the system under study (Moffatt, 1991). Tests include replication of
reference modes, frequency generation, relative phasing, multiple mode, behaviour
characteristic and the application of an overall summary statistic (Forrester and Senge,
1980; Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Sterman, 1984).
(n) Policy Analysis and Model Use
Finally, the sixth phase of the modelling process involves testing alternative policies
that might be implemented in the system under study. Sudden policy changes can be
made, and their effects upon the system behaviour examined. An invaluable insight into
the reasons for the behaviour of a real system can be derived from building a system
dynamics model. Often the purpose of modelling a system is to not only to evaluate
system behaviour but also actually to suggest the implementation of policies which will
mitigate undesirable behaviour and improve its operation (Forrester, 1961; Richardson
and Pugh, 1981; Wolstenholme, 1990; Coyle, 1996).
Alternative policies can be tested through either parameter and/or structural analysis
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Coyle, 1996). Both involve changing the ways in which
decisions are made. Testing policies through the modification of parameter values
simply consists of changing the value of a parameter in rerun mode, running the model
and then comparing the resulting behaviour to that of the base or original simulation
run. Policy parameters can be classified as those whose values are to some extent within
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the control of the real system owners (Wolstenholme, 1990). Testing a model's
sensitivity to the value of a policy parameter may also test the sensitivity of the real
system to the corresponding policy change (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). A sensitive
policy parameter may be able to identify for the modeller a leverage point in the real
system. It is not sufficient to know that a policy improves model behaviour. The reason
why the model behaviour improved must be understood. The understanding should be
compared to what is known or expected about the real system. Only at that point can a
model based policy analysis contribute fully towards decisions about policy
implementation in a real system.
Structural changes are usually greater determinants of system behaviour over time
(Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Coyle, 1996). Policy improvements in system dynamics
studies often involve the addition of new feedback links that represent new ways of
using information. Additional model equations can be used to represent new policy
options that alter the feedback structure of a system. The addition of new parameters
can assist in experimentation with policies. To decide on an alternative structure,
guidance must come from familiarity with both the real system and the model. The
addition of a link that creates a positive loop may have the potential to destabilise model
behaviour, while a new link, which creates a negative loop, has the potential to add
stability. For example, if instability is a problem in the system, a way to address the
problem is to introduce one or more new minor negative feedback loops in order to
dampen behaviour.
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System dynamics has traditionally relied on the use of intuition and experience by the
system modellers and users to test policies for better system behaviour over time
(Wolstenholme, 1990). To make this more objective, simulation by optimisation using
system dynamics has been developed in recent years (Coyle, 1985, 1996; Mohapatra
and Sharma, 1985; Wolstenholme and Al-Alusi, 1987; Dangerfield and Vapenikova,
1987; Kleijnen, 1995). The approach uses computer software in its model analysis. An
examination of this approach to policy testing is beyond the scope of this study,
particularly as only three commercial system dynamics packages support optimisation
(DYSMAP, COSMIC and Vensim).
According to Richardson and Pugh (1981), the modeller must consider the validity of
the recommendations, and whether they can actually be implemented. A system
dynamics model may be able to indicate trade offs between alternatives. It is used as a
tool to test different management policies, and the policy recommendations which
result. A policy remains robust if it remains a good choice despite variations in
parameters, different exogenous conditions and reasonable alternatives. It must also be
realised that the real system will always contain aspects, which are not captured by the
model. Finally, when considering implementation of the set of policy recommendations,
the users of the model must be convinced as to the value of the recommendations, and
consideration must be given as to how the real system would respond to the process of
implementation.
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4.5 The Literature on the Causes of Accidents and on the Application of Systems
Thinking to Occupational Safety
(a) Simple Accident Causation Models 
In order to investigate accidents, an understanding of the mechanism by which
accidents occur is a prerequisite. A number of theories of accident causation have been
put forward. Heinrich (1959) developed the 'Domino Theory'. It is based on the theory
that a chain or sequence of events can be given in a chronological order up to the
accident event (Bamber, 1990b). The theory is shown in Figure 4.12:
Ancestry and social 	 Fault of	 Unsafe act and/or	 Accident —÷ Injury
environment	 person	 mechanical or
physical hazard
Figure 4.12	 The five factors in the accident sequence (Heinrich, 1959, p.14)
Heinrich likens these five stages to five dominoes standing on edge in a line next to
each other, so as the first domino falls it knocks down its neighbour and so on. Removal
of any of the first four factors will break the sequence, thus preventing the injury. The
injury is caused by an accident, and the accident is in turn always the result of the factor
that immediately precedes it. Heinrich recommends that the key to accident prevention
is to remove the middle of the sequence: an unsafe act of a person, or a mechanical or
physical hazard.
Bird and Germain (1987) extended the 'Domino Theory' to include the influence of
management in the cause of accidents and the effect of wastage of assets. They
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emphasised loss control. Their model is presented in Figure 4.13. This modified
sequence can be applied to all accidents, whether they are injury or non-injury.
Lack of
control
Basic
Causes
Immediate
Causes
Incident Loss
...0 .0. ....0. .10
•inadequate
programme Personal Substandard Contact
-inadequate
programme
.10. factors ..
and
Hopi. with
energy
..10. People
property
standards Job conditions or process
-inadequate .0. factors .0. .10. substance .0.
compliance
to standards
Figure 4.13	 The loss causation model (Bird and Germain, 1987, p.22)
Multi-causality refers to the fact that there may be more than one cause to any accident
(Bamber, 1990b). Figure 4.14 represents several accident causes:
Cause A
Cause B ••••n•n01111, Accident
Cause C
Figure 4.14	 Multiple causation theory (Bamber, 1990b, p.154)
Bamber suggested that each of these multi-causes was equivalent to the third domino in
the 'Domino Theory' and could represent an unsafe act, condition or situation. Each of
these can itself have multi-causes and the process of following each branch back to its
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root is called a fault tree analysis. The theory of multi-causation consists of the
contributing causes combining together to result in an accident.
Petersen (1988) suggested that often in accident investigations one unsafe act and/or
unsafe condition is sought out. This seems very logical when applying the principles
expressed by the 'Domino Theory'. However, he warned that interpretation of the
theory could be too narrow. It may not be enough to look for a single act and/or
condition as the factors affecting the sequence may be multi-causal. When looking only
at the act and the condition only symptoms are identified, not root causes. This can
result in the root causes remaining to cause another accident. Root causes often relate to
the management systems policies and procedures, supervision, and training. He
concludes that Heinrich's theory fails to deal sufficiently with situational variables and
complexities.
(b) The Search for Strategic Models of Occupational Safety
A review of the occupational safety literature indicated that studies concerned with
forecasting or modelling safety strategy or policy-making were almost non-existent.
The literature search consisted of a number of strands. Library bookshelves were
examined (health and safety, management science, and operational research books).
Manual searches of abstracts were conducted (Health and Safety Science Abstracts,
Computer and Control Abstracts, Management Science Abstracts). On-line and CD-
ROM search engines were used (Bath's Information and Data Services, ABI-INFORM,
Occupational Safety and Health CD-ROM, INSPEC Electronics and Computing CD-
ROM). A total of thirteen literature sources were identified.
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The search indicated that safety decision-making models have been developed that
looked at operational or process based problems in specific industries, particularly those
which involved high-risk technologies (Perrow, 1984). Most of the safety literature
discussed the application of probabilistic models in the diagnosis of occupational safety
systems (Amendola, 1988; Heino et al., 1992; Lehto and Salvendy, 1991; Bamber,
1990a, 1990b). These were diagnostic rather than interpretative, and were neither
dynamic nor strategic in nature. Veltri (1991) elicited opinion from safety experts using
the Delphi inquiry system on the maximisation of the safety function. Although Veltri's
study was enlightening it failed to suggest what types of outcome could be achieved.
Bhattacherjee et al. (1994) conducted a time-series analysis of mining accident rate
behaviour. They suggested that mine accidents occur as a result of both natural
conditions and management decisions, and that an analysis of injury experiences would
reveal the underlying trends that are the results of these Complex interactions. Reading
on, it is evident that this may not be a suitable approach for basing safety policy on.
This may stem from four factors. First, the need in time-series modelling to assume that
system variables remain fixed when clearly in reality they do not, second basing future
outcomes purely on past events. Third, the blindness of the model to causal influences,
and finally, a single variable output, such as the accident rate is only a downstream
measure of safety.
No suitable harder operational research models were found in the literature search. This
may be because OR models are essentially concerned with optimisation and exact
prediction, rather than the design of a system that is desired.
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The field of occupational health and safety appears not to have been a subject of interest
for system dynamics modellers and systems thinkers. Very little work appears to be in
the public domain. There were only two instances of the discussion of softer systems
and safety (Waring, 1990a, 1990b), and only two publications evidencing the
application of system dynamics modelling applied to occupational safety (Andersen et
al., 1986; Crawford, 1991).
(c) Systems Thinking and Occupational Safety
Waring (1990a) argued that systems thinking and practice are essential tools for better
safety management. The difficulty arises in the variation in perception of what
constitutes a system and how reductionist the content should be. He warns that an
accident is often attributed to human error and/or technical failure. The fact that
accidents have more than one cause is well established, and although human error and
technical failure may form part of the explanation, they are essentially symptoms of
more fundamental causes. He suggested that human error and technical failures, along
with the accident are emergent properties of a system that has failed. Some errors are
due to the inadvertent behaviour of humans, although many may be a result of receiving
inadequate information, instructions or training. Functions such as selection, training,
design engineering and maintenance need to be examined. A systems approach to
failures probes not only the technical and individual human aspects but also the
organisational precursors of signs and symptoms of failure. Waring suggested that
systemic approaches to safety systems involve anticipation and prevention of failures. It
requires understanding of the system concerned and of how it works. He criticises the
hard systems view towards safety strategy of writers such as Veltri (1989), who espouse
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the link between investment and safety performance. He questions Veltri's isolation of
the causality between the effects of safety investments from other variables (Waring
1990b). He argued that accidents alone cannot be taken as a reliable measure of safety
performance, because there is no direct cause and effect relationship between
investment and safety. He acknowledged that there is a relationship, but it is very hard
to predict what the relevant returns will be.
Waring made a case for an interpretative systemic approach to tackling the safety
function using SSM. He was forceful in his premise that there were both direct and
indirect causes of accidents. These causes could be examined from a systems viewpoint
to allow an understanding of the systems properties which lead to failure. He suggested
that both soft and hard factors should be accounted for when examining safety issues,
but he did not offer a unified systems thinking approach for integrating the measurable
hard objective factors and the more subjective soft factors into one safety model. From
Waring's description of occupational safety as being holistic with direct and indirect
causality, and his acknowledgement that safety performance should be measured
beyond accident rates in the management functions, a mental picture emerges as to the
possible structure of a system dynamics model of occupational safety. Waring proves to
be a useful aid when it comes to conceptualising a safety system.
(d) A System Dynamics Model of Regulation and Safety in Industrial Firms
Andersen et al. (1986) developed a system dynamics model to determine whether safety
inspections by the United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) had an effect on occupational accident rates. OSHA has a similar remit of
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responsibility and structure to that of the HSE in the United Kingdom. Designers of
regression-based evaluations of health and safety had concluded that OSHA's
regulation had failed to increase either the level of safety, or safety-related investment
by firms. However, case studies and analyses of other less aggregated data had
suggested that regulation did increase both. Andersen et al. developed a system
dynamics model as an approach that could bridge both the qualitative and quantitative
research elements associated with the regulation of safety. Their model simulates
accident generation within firms, generates synthetic data from variations in the model
and evaluates the sensitivity of regression methods to variations in the model. This was
achieved through the introduction of a Monte Carlo type simulation of synthetic data.
Crawford (1991), one of Andersen's original co-authors, later developed a more
extensive set of results based on additional sensitivity test runs.
Andersen et al. (1986) suggested that the discrepancy between the case study and
regression analysis results may have been a result of the limitations of regression
models. Such models can fail to incorporate a credible theory of how such regulatory
systems work. Crawford (1991) suggested that the evidence from less aggregated
studies and from case studies indicated that negative feedback processes were at work to
regulate safety, regardless of OSHA inspections. She pointed to the presence of
endogenous feedback loops that could be influencing the effects, or measurement of the
effects of OSHA's actions.
The principal causal structure within the model is displayed in Figure 4.15. Two
negative feedback loops operate between the level of accidents within a firm, and the
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safety equipment and safety programme levels of that firm. This facilitates the operation
of a negative feedback system, with the endogenous effects between accidents, safety
programmes and safety equipment, thus regulating the total number of accidents that
occur within the system. Therefore, an increase in the level of accidents within a firm
will raise the levels of safety equipment and safety programmes. This leads to a
reduction in accidents within the firm, producing a self-regulated system.
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Figure 4.15	 Principal causal structure within the simulation model (Andersen eta!., 1986, p.228)
The results of the simulations suggest that OSHA inspections do have an effect upon
the safety effort, increasing the safety programmes and safety equipment levels.
Andersen et al. (1986) argue that the results differ from those of the regression analyses
because much of the theoretical richness of the case study has been retained in the
model through the integration of hard and soft effects. In addition, the simulation
model, unlike in the case studies or regression analysis, contains a mathematically
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explicit causal structure which forces the analyst to define explicitly the causal
hypotheses on which the policy system operates.
The safety regulation model contains some useful ideas about the high level causal
structure of an occupational safety model and the idea that the negative feedback loops
serve to self-regulate the safety system. This model offers a useful insight into where to
start looking for appropriate structural relationships and system behaviour.
4.6 Summary of Systems Thinking and System Dynamics
The origins of systems thinking have been discussed in this chapter, and Checkland's
(1981, p.95) taxonomy of systems thinking has been examined in relation to its
application to tackling real world problems. There appears to be a broad spectrum of
ideas about the boundaries of systems thinking. The diversity and commonality of a
number of systems thinking approaches have been considered. System dynamics
appears to transcend all three of Checkland's systems approaches to problem solving in
the real world. This indicates that its potential application to problem solving is very
broad. The review of prominent authors in the system dynamics field has revealed that
system dynamics has emerged as a successful problem solving methodology over the
last four decades. It is evident that system dynamics is appropriate to use where the
problem is dynamic and complex and where the forces causing the behaviour can be
contained within a closed loop feedback structure. The building and testing of system
dynamics models is shown to be robust, as validation is carried out at every stage of the
model building process. The case for applying system dynamics successfully to the
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complex problem of occupational safety appears from the survey of literature to be
strong. The stepwise approach to system dynamics modelling discussed in Section 4.4
of this chapter will be used over the next three chapters to build a model of occupational
safety, validate it with real world data from a firm, and evaluate its use to aid policy
decision-making and learning.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Generic System Dynamics Model of Occupational Safety
5.1 Introduction to the Generic Occupational Safety Model
It is evident from the health and safety literature that occupational safety is a complex
phenomenon. It has been examined by a number of model builders, but only Andersen
et al. (1986) and Crawford (1991) have noted that a realistic strategic model of
occupational safety must contain causal feedback loops, be non-linear in its behaviour,
and be likely to contain material and information delays. This is sufficient reason for
evaluating occupational safety decisions using system dynamics modelling.
The first three chapters have been concerned with the literature on occupational safety
and systems modelling. This chapter is the first of three which outline the development,
testing and evaluation of a quantitative system dynamics model of occupational safety.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an abstract or generic system dynamics model
of occupational safety containing the structure which will allow replication of safety
system behaviour in typical employing organisations. Once the plausibility of the
generic occupational safety model is established, Chapter Six will reveal how the model
is calibrated with information derived from the records, experiences and opinions of a
participating manufacturing firm. Chapter Seven will elicit opinion on the model's
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suitability as a policy-making and learning aid. The continuous validation of the
occupational safety model as a good structural and behavioural representation of real
world occupational safety dynamics is important if users are to have confidence in its
outputs. The stages involved in building a system dynamics model as identified by
Roberts et al. (1983, p.8) and outlined in Section 4.4 of Chapter Four is broadly
followed throughout Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The contents of Chapter Five equate
to the model representation and model behaviour stages of Roberts et al.'s framework.
A model of occupational safety is only useful for learning or for aiding decision-making
if it is representative of the real world domain. Chapter Five is sub-divided into seven
sections. The issues surrounding the validation of a model built to evaluate occupational
safety is discussed in Section 5.2. The importance of validating the model at every
phase of the model building process is highlighted. Section 5.3 outlines the application
of Roberts et al's. 'problem definition' phase. The problem of occupational safety is
explained through identifying the principal actors in the wider occupational safety
system, setting an adequate system boundary for the safety model, and identifying
appropriate reference modes of behaviour for accidents. In Section 5.4 the important
influences believed to be operating in an occupational safety system are conceptualised
with the aid of a causal loop diagram. The structural validity of the diagram is justified
using evidence from literature sources, and through logical deduction. This section ties
in with Roberts et al's. 'system conceptualisation' phase. Next, in Section 5.5, a
detailed influence diagram of the occupational safety model is constructed and
translated into a flow diagram. This section relates to Roberts et al's. 'model
representation' phase of their modelling framework. The model structure is broken
down into more manageable model sectors. For all sectors the levels, rates, auxiliary
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equations and constants are validated. Each equation and parameter is analysed to
ensure that it is both dimensionally consistent and structurally representative of a real
occupational safety system. The levels and constants are initialised so as to set the 'base
run' of the simulation model in a state of equilibrium. Attention is paid to parameter
sensitivity testing in Section 5.6 of the chapter. The need to identify sensitive model
parameters is justified. A number of behavioural tests are performed in order to assess
the robustness and internal consistency of the model to parameter modifications.
Finally, in Section 5.7 the process of building the generic occupational safety model is
summarised. The plausibility of the model as representative of a firm's safety
performance, based on all the validation tests is thus determined.
5.2 The Problem of Validation and the Approaches Taken to Resolve It
There is an ongoing debate amongst systems modellers as to what constitutes the
validation of a model and what constitutes its verification (Pidd, 1996; Brooks, 1999).
For the purpose of this study, verification is associated with corroborating the
consistency and internal logical structure of a model, whilst validation seeks to prove
the correctness of a model's behaviour against that of the real world.
Roberts et al. identified the 'model evaluation' phase in their framework as model
validation testing. Examination of other system dynamics literature and the logic of the
model building process dictate that validation is necessary at every phase of the model.
In Section 4.4 of Chapter Four the importance of a number of tests of model structure,
behaviour and policy implication was emphasised. Despite these three clear categories,
prominent system dynamics modellers accept that there are no universally agreed set of
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tests that can fully validate a model (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Richardson and Pugh,
1981; Sterman, 1984). Indeed Barlas (1996) noted that no single definition of model
validity even existed.
System dynamics has had criticism levelled at it because of its more informal,
subjective and qualitative validation procedures. The criticisms have been levelled by
people more familiar with hard input-output models where statistical measurement of
model output is the principal determinant of model confidence (Sterman, 1984; Eberlein
and Wang, 1985; Moffatt, 1991; Eberlein and Peterson, 1994). Forrester and Senge
simply describe validation of system dynamics models as:
...the process of establishing confidence in the soundness and usefulness of a model ...the
ultimate objective of validation in system dynamics is transferred confidence in a model's
soundness and usefulness as a policy tool (Forrester and Senge, 1980, p.210, 211).
Whether the ultimate objective of validation may be to inspire confidence in a model's
use as a policy tool it can be argued that tests of model validation are also equally
important. Tests of validation are strongly emphasised in all the subsequent sections of
this chapter, and throughout Chapters Six and Seven. Bearing this in mind, the success
of the occupational safety simulation will be judged on the extent to which the model
passes a number of formal and informal validation tests, and also the level of
confidence the managers of the host firm have in the model. At the structural level, any
model validation tests should be able to justify the causes and effects present in the
safety model. The chosen parameters and structural equations should confidently
represent the strategic issues surrounding workplace accidents and the financial costs of
safety management. The Generic Occupational Safety Model's (GOSM's) behaviour is
to be examined through extensive simulation testing. This will involve exploring
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parameter changes to determine which ones the model exhibits sensitivity to. It will also
be necessary to determine whether the conditions generated by these changes are
plausible in a real workplace. Calibrating the GOSM with real world data and
replicating the historical behaviour of the host firm's safety further adds to the
plausibility of the model. The final aspects of model validity are the opinions of the host
firm's managers and the policy implication tests, which will involve examining
alternative policy scenarios.
5.3 Problem Definition and the Focus of the Modelling Study
Problem definition was the first phase of Robert's et al's. modelling framework. They
suggested that the problem under study must vary over time, the forces causing the
variability need to be described causally, and the important causal influences can be
contained within a closed system of feedback loops. Randers (1980) suggested that
conceptualisation of a model starts by establishing the focus of the study through
developing its general perspective and time horizon. In addition to this, a number of
authors suggest a boundary adequacy test to consider the relationships between
attributes necessary to satisfy a model's purpose (Forrester and Senge, 1980;
Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Moffatt, 1991). The boundary is set when the important
interactions within the feedback structure of the model reflect the behaviour of the real
world system. It should be noted that there is a danger of overextending the boundary of
the model to include structure from the real system not necessary to fulfil the model's
purpose (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). It is also important to set the model's structural
boundary to inhibit seeing the behavioural outputs only as a consequence of external
factors, and thus to ensure that model behaviour is generated endogenously.
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Addressing two questions can help to fix the purpose of the study and to set an adequate
model boundary. First, who cares about occupational safety (Coyle, 1996)? Second,
why do they care? In the literature review of Chapter Two the need for robust health
and safety policies within companies was introduced from both a legal, financial and
moral perspective. Chapter Three described many of the policies that are necessary to
operate a successful occupational SMS. Occupational safety is broad and contains many
groups with vested interests. This immediately raises the danger of overextending the
structure of the safety model. If this is to be averted it is necessary to identify who has
an influence over workplace safety and how strong their impact is. Table 5.1 offers a
summary of the types of groups who participate in the broad field of occupational safety
and their vested interests. These groups or stakeholders listed have a mixture of
altruistic and economic motives for being involved in health and safety. All would wish
the achievement of zero accident workplaces. In reality, this will not be possible, so
they act to ensure that reasonable and practicable measures are taken to make
workplaces safer.
As the onus for safe workplaces appears to be on employers, they may be seen as the
'gatekeepers' to successful health and safety at work. Only the employees in most
industries will be at the receiving end of accidents. Managers have a vested interest in
health and safety from moral, financial and legal viewpoints. It is ethically unacceptable
to allow people to work in dangerous environments without allowing employees
adequate protection from danger (Petersen 1988). Managers can be prosecuted in cases
where there is gross failure to maintain a safe workplace, and empirical evidence
strongly links successful occupational safety to good business sense (HASAWA 1974;
HSC, 1992c; HSE, 1991a, 1994b). It would appear that employers and employees are
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the strongest stakeholders in occupational safety as they have the greatest control over
accidents. Limiting the boundary of the GOSM to the workplace will make it easier to
generate safety behaviour endogenously.
Group Vested Interest
European Union Setting of appropriate Directives concerned with Health and Safety at work in
order to allow the maintenance of social welfare and a single European market
(HSE, 1993a).
United Kingdom
Government
Setting of legislation which will seek to improve and maintain health and safety at
work practice (HSE, 1993a; HSC, 1992b).
HSC Responsible for proposing health and safety law and standards to ministers of
Government, and developing Codes of Practice to assist employers with legal
compliance (HSC, 1992b).
HSE Responsible for advising the HSC on policy, research and publication of material
to assist employers with safety practice, and enforcing health and safety law and
standards (HSC, 1992b).
Trade Unions Protecting the welfare at work of its members through lobbying politicians for
improved legislation and enforcement activity, and encouraging employers to
comply with legislation and maintain safe workplaces (Waring, 1996).
Insurance
Companies
Through underwriting PL/EL for employers they seek to encourage employers to
maintain safe workplaces, so that indemnity insurance claims are minimised
(Bamber, 1993).
Employers Seek to comply with health and safety regulations to avoid prosecution, and
minimise accidents to employees from moral and financial perspectives through
the maintenance of safe workplaces (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring, 1996).
Employees Seek to preserve their own health and the health of others through safe work
practice (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring, 1996).
Table 5.1
	
The vested interests in the broad occupational safety system
The focus of this thesis consists of occupational accidents and the costs of maintaining
safety management. The GOSM should be able to reflect variable occupational accident
rates based on repeated policy experimentation. It should also reflect the potential
differences in safety management costs associated with alternative safety strategies.
Randers (1980) recommended that in conceptualising a system dynamics model one
should identify and describe developments over time, and then proceed to identification
and description of the underlying causes. It was decided to plot a chart showing the
dynamic behaviour of a temporal accident pattern. The health and safety statistics
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published by the HSC show the national accident picture in the United Kingdom. This
was a good source of data to set a general reference mode to focus the model building
around. It was only possible to obtain figures based on 'all reported accidents', that is
those which were classified under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations, 1985 as 'over three-day injuries' upwards to 'fatalities'. The
chart was used as the initial reference mode of behaviour for the study. It would be
necessary at a later stage for a quantitative simulation model to be able to reproduce this
and other reference modes. In Figure 5.1 recent accident reference modes across United
Kingdom industry is compared. This sets out the problem or symptom for study.
—
160
140
120
100
80
60
1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91	 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94
All industries...Manufacturing _e_.
Figure 5.1	 Fatal and major injury rate per 100,000 employees, 1986-87 to 1993-94 by industrial
sector (HSC, 1994, p.9)
The accident pattern observed in the national statistics (1986-87 to 1993-94) showed a
downward trend across industries, specifically manufacturing. Despite this movement,
serious workplace injuries were still unacceptably high. In manufacturing there was a
temporary upturn in accidents which is of some concern. The range of occupational
accident and ill health statistics published by the HSC show that there is still a great
need for employers to improve their management of occupational health and safety.
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The principal variables that explained the accident reference mode in manufacturing
needed to be identified so that causal links could be made. If any of these variables lay
outside of the typical organisation then this would result in a re-evaluation of the initial
model boundary. In order to maintain a crisp and clear view of the problem, only three
were nominally noted: hazards, accident reporting and safety knowledge, skills and
attitude. Simple sketches of these dynamic safety variables are made in Figure 5.2.
These outputs are derived by simple logical deduction. Lower accidents result in less
accident reports being processed. Accidents are determined by the risks associated with
workplace hazards, and the less active the hazards, the lower the accidents. Good safety
knowledge, skills and attitude do prevent the likelihood of accidents. These three
attributes may have improved across workplaces in recent years. These suggestions are
hypothetical causes of the accident reference mode. The extent of their contribution to
the national accident picture would be very hard to determine. Despite this limitation
they are useful in clarifying some of the important structure which will need to be
included in a model which seeks to generate plausible safety behaviour.
Figure 5.2	 Hypothesised modes of behaviour for likely safety model variables
Next it was necessary to consider the time horizon over which the safety simulation
would run. The statistics presented in Figure 5.1 show the need to be careful when
selecting the time span for the simulation. Depending on the chosen time slice, the trend
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identified for both sets of accident data can be different. It was decided that a model
containing a time horizon of three years would be adequate for examining the dynamics
of safety system behaviour, as it would not be unduly influenced by any short-term
fluctuations. Evaluating safety performance over any longer period may cause the
model user to raise questions about the accuracy or suitability of the model for
predicting behaviour over such a time frame. At the level of the firm, it is evident that
some safety policy decisions made, particularly those related to training will not have
immediate effects. In fact it can take several months before the overall effects of
changes are realised (Stranks, 1994b; Wallerstein and Baker, 1994).
The problem based on the historical reference mode for accidents in the United
Kingdom had been plotted in a chart (Figure 5.1), and a three-year time frame for the
model selected. The downward accident trend in manufacturing would not necessarily
be representative of the host organisation's accident picture. As a result, a successful
GOSM will need to be able to replicate the mode of behaviour of accidents in a host
organisation when calibrated.
The next stage of the modelling process was to construct a causal feedback loop
diagram which drew in other important safety variables. This helped to set more of the
additional system attributes necessary to generate possible alternative modes of model
behaviour.
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5.4 Conceptualising the Structure of the Safety Model
The second phase of Robert's et al's. (1981, p.8) modelling framework involves
identifying the important influences working within a system. The main route by which
a system dynamics model is conceptualised is via the construction of causal loop
diagrams. A causal loop diagram was developed to represent the occupational safety
system for two reasons. First, it would help with understanding the complex safety
behaviour emerging from the feedback structure in organisations. Second, at a later date
it could be used as a suitable medium to communicate the system dynamics model to
clients in the host organisation. The causal loop diagram needs to represent the problem
of safety, rather than the whole safety system. If the quantitative simulation model was
to be useful as a learning and strategic decision-making tool then it had to contain
sufficient detail, whilst at the same time capture the complexity of the dynamics of an
organisation's safety.
(a) The Causal Feedback Loops of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
Forrester and Senge (1980) suggest that verifying the structure of a system dynamics
model involves comparing the structure of the model to that of the real system. To build
a model reflective of the real world one or more of the following sources of information
need be consulted: safety literature, opinions of persons familiar with occupational
safety, and the personal assumptions of the model builder. A simple causal loop
diagram was constructed, primarily from safety literature to represent the underlying
structure of the safety problem. Safety KSA is a pneumonic for safety knowledge, skills
and attitude. This is outlined in Figure 5.3:
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Figure 5.3	 The basic causal feedback loop structure of the generic occupational safety model
Three feedback loops exist, one reinforcing and two balancing. A total of five potential
policy areas are also identified as change parameters (P 1 -P5). Three of the five policies
appear to be embedded within the feedback structure of the model. This is because the
causal model has been built with the intention of distilling and communicating ideas
about initial high-level model structure and feedback. All the policies can be regarded
as aggregations of potential system parameters and variables. The policies and other
attributes of the causal feedback loops will be structurally verified with the assistance of
literature sources and logical deduction.
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(b) Descriptions of the Causal Feedback Loops 
Each feedback loop contained in the GOSM needs to be traced through to verify its
causal relationships and to describe its operation.
(c) The Reactive Safety Loop
A good place to start may be with a description of a hazard and its relationship to
accidents. A hazard may be regarded as something which has the potential to do harm
(HSC, 1992c; Bamber, 1990a). In order to put a workplace hazard in context the term
risk must be understood. The risk is the likelihood that a particular hazard can cause
harm. It can be thought of as the probability that an accident will occur. Inadequate
control of a hazard can create substantial risk, even with a low hazard; but with proper
controls even the risk of coming to harm from a very hazardous substance, for example,
can be greatly reduced (B amber, 1990a).
An accident can be regarded as an unexpected and unplanned event which results in
harm to a person(s), damage to property, a near miss, or some kind of loss. For an
accident to occur a hazard has to be present, with some form of risk attached. This
results in a positive causal relationship between hazards and accidents, as the more
active hazards are present, the more accidents occur.
Accidents need following up to consider their causes and prevent recurrence. The
Accident Reporting and Investigation Policy has been discussed in the previous section.
The causal relationship between accidents and the accident reporting and investigation
policy is positive, as the more accidents that occur, the more accident reports have to be
made, and thus accident causes are identified.
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Once the causes of accidents have been established, and/or the risks responsible for
creating active hazards have been identified, then control measures can be taken to
minimise the risk of hazards causing harm. There is a positive causal relationship
between accident reporting and investigation and risk control, as the more accident
reports made; the more risk controls are taken.
The causal relationship between risk control and hazards is negative, as the more risk
control measures taken, the fewer active hazards are present in the workplace. This
description completes the trace around the Reactive Safety Loop. The overall polarity
of the loop is negative. This is not surprising, as balancing loops are invariably target
seeking or regulatory. In this instance the loop is reacting to accidents occurring.
(d) The Safety Knowledge Skills and Attitude (KSA) Loop
Working around the loop from the hazard, this causes the accident. It is well known that
workplace accidents have a detrimental effect on employee morale (Stranks, 1994a;
Waring, 1996; HSE, 1991a). The causal relationship between accidents and employee
morale is negative, as more accidents contribute towards lower morale.
Safety morale may be regarded as a very important contributor to staff turnover.
Maslow studied the factors significant in the motivation of successful people and what
gave them satisfaction in their work (Stranks, 1994b). Maslow proposed that people
wish to satisfy needs. He categorised these needs and ranked them in order of
importance, producing a hierarchy of needs. Referring to Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of
needs, safety and security needs are very near the bottom of his hierarchy, that is they
should be satisfied before higher needs can be addressed. On this basis, the causal
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relationship between morale and staff turnover is negative, as the higher the morale,
that is satisfaction with safety and security, the lower the staff turnover will be. Staff
turnover will also be affected by staffing policies such as recruitment and layoffs of
staff. The causal relationship between staff size and staff turnover is regarded as
positive, as the greater the size of the workforce, the higher staff turnover will be.
Staff turnover will have direct impact upon safety knowledge, skills and attitude (KSA).
Schulzinger (1956) postulated that there is a direct link between accident risk, and age
and experience of employees. His research found that industrial accidents reduce from a
peak at the age of 21 and continue to decline through to ages over 60. This indicates
that the causal relationship between staff turnover, that is losing older and more
experienced staff and safety KSA is negative.
The link between safety training and KSA has been made in Chapter Three. The causal
relationship between these attributes is a positive one, as engaging in effective training
for sufficient durations improves KSA.
Hazards can either be active or inactive depending upon the measures taken to mitigate
risk. As already discussed in the Section 3.4 of Chapter Three on risk control, if it is not
possible to remove the hazard at source or enclose it, then safe systems of work can be
followed or hazards can de dealt with through the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE). These latter two measures will only be successful if employees have a sufficient
level of KSA about safety. This suggests that the causal relationship between KSA and
hazards is a negative one, as hazards need not become active dangers provided that they
are worked with properly.
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(e) The Proactive Safety Loop 
The causal link between workplace hazards and safety monitoring activity is positive.
Whether this link should be built directly into the quantitative model needs
consideration. If the contribution to the overall mode of behaviour of the safety model
was to be understood then a direct causal link between hazards and safety monitoring
would not be suitable. The user would not be able under those circumstances to explore
the effect that safety monitoring has on safety performance. In the flow diagram it was
decided to set safety monitoring as a policy parameter rather than a variable.
Richardson and Pugh can justify this when they suggested that:
...the modeler must to some extent become part of the system to simulate accurately a policy
change ...the modeler acts as the missing feedback links, changing other parameters manually,
as it were, to simulate whatever far-reaching effects the policy change involves (Richardson and
Pugh, 1981, p.326).
The modeller may be involved in observing the resulting behaviour and taking action to
change the test inputs in order to bridge the link between information and consequences
(Coyle, 1996). There is also a positive causal relationship between safety monitoring
activities and risk control, as the more active hazards that are identified; the more risk
control measures are taken.
(f) Other Causal Structure Considerations
Costs are shown to be an output of the structure. As discussed in Section 3.6 of Chapter
Three there are direct and indirect financial costs associated with accidents (HSE,
1994b; HSE, 1993c; Stranks, 1994a; Waring, 1996). A fuller representation of the
financial costs resulting from safety is not shown in this simple causal diagram. Any
safety activity, such as training or risk control, will be a separate cost centre. These
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causal links are not included, as doing so would add to the visual complexity of the
causal loop diagram. The fact that a link is shown between accidents and costs merely
highlights the cost centre most likely to be the highest.
The causal loop diagram of the GOSM has been structurally justified. The overall
polarity of the model is negative. This is essential if the behaviour of the subsequent
quantitative GOSM is to be stable enough to be managed or controlled.
(g) Accident Reporting and Investigation Policy
Accident reporting and investigation has two objectives. The first is to determine the
cause(s) of the accident, and the second is then to prevent recurrence through the
gathering and documentation of sufficient information in order that the accident
prevention principles related to risk control can be implemented (Stranks, 1996). This
policy represents the process of reporting accidents to the appropriate authority within
the workplace, invariably the safety manager or officer. Under the Reporting of
Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations of 1985, all injury accidents,
no matter how minor, have to be logged in accident reports. Whether the injury is of a
serious nature or not, details of the accident type, injury type and severity, how it
occurred, and whether there was the possibility that it breached the law must as a
minimum be documented (Stranks, 1994a). An accident investigation must be
conducted at least at some nominal level. Obviously the level of activity is proportional
to the seriousness of the accident. When an accident is of a serious nature, or had the
potential to be more serious, or if it fell into an identified trend then a full investigation
would be needed.
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(h) The Safety Monitoring Policy
This policy can be considered to be an aggregation of any measures of safety
performance, both reactive and active. Risk control is difficult to achieve without
sufficient monitoring of safety performance (Waring, 1996). Monitoring seeks to detect
either permanence or change in the safety system.
The principal measure of reactive safety performance is accident rates. These can
certainly be good measures of whether safety performance in a firm is improving or
deteriorating (HSE, 1991b). More proactive measures of safety address the present
activities designed to prevent accidents (Waring, 1996). The following measures may
be regarded for the purpose of the model as active monitoring actions: risk assessments
of all work activities, safety inspections and safety tours, safety audits and safety
committee meetings.
(i) Risk Control
Safety monitoring and accident reporting and investigation are policies which can be
used to analyse and assess risks and accident causes. Once the facts about risks have
been established then risk control measures are taken. The HSE (1991a) recommended
a preferred hierarchy of control principles. First eliminate the risk by using a less
hazardous substance, either through substituting machinery and/or by avoiding the use
of certain processes. Second combating the risk at source by engineering controls
through separating the operator from exposure to the hazard, by protecting the
dangerous parts of the machine, and/or by designing machinery that is remotely
operated. Third minimising risk by the design of suitable systems of working; and
finally minimising the risk through the use of PPE as a last resort.
134
The first two points are related to safe workplace strategies and the third and fourth are
safe person strategies. In dealing with many hazards often one or more of the above
controls are concurrently in use, therefore, the model should treat all risk control in an
aggregated way.
(j) Safety Training
Safety training and education of employees can be one of the most proactive safety
measures an employer can take. It is well known that somewhere between 60% and
95% of safety incidents result from unsafe behaviour (Killimett, 1991; Krause et al.,
1990; Stranks, 1994b). That is not to say that employees are wholly responsible, as the
underlying causes invariably lie at the hands of the managers. Successful safety training
is achieved through improving the KSA relevant to safety. This was discussed in
Section 3.5 of Chapter Three. Training will only be successful if all three are improved
(HSE, 1991a; Everett, 1989).
Training can take three forms: formal off-the-job training, instruction to individuals and
groups, or on-the-job coaching (HSE, 1991a). Stranks (1994b) suggests that training
should occur at three various stages of people's employment in an organisation. The
first experience is through induction training of new staff. The second may be
orientation training following promotion or where changes to work are introduced. The
third instance is refresher training which should be repeated periodically to ensure
continued competence.
Any training whether it is off or on-the-job, used as induction, orientation, or in
refreshing skills is to be aggregated in the model, with the intention of showing the
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effects of training as one attribute of safety. Any training that enhances the safety KSA
of employees is useful in reducing the likelihood of accidents.
(k) Staff Size
Staffing policies are associated with maintaining a target number of staff. They
principally concern staff recruitment and wastage. A number of authors have offered
evidence that using careful criteria for staff selection based on physical and mental job
requirements, personality tests and interview checks can result in less accident prone
staff being recruited (Petersen, 1988; Minter, 1990; Hansen, 1988; HSE, 1993d;
Stranks, 1994a; Kamp, 1991). It is beyond the feasibility of the model to measure this
array of factors, but there is the potential to emphasise the effects of better staff
recruitment.
(1) Bridging the Gap between the Causal Loop Structure of the Problem and
Constructing the Full Flow Diagram
The basic causal feedback loop structure of the generic occupational safety model was
useful for illustrating the aggregated structure thought to be the cause of accidents.
Instead of building a causal loop diagram, many system dynamics modellers start to
conceptualise the structure which contributes to a dynamic problem by identifying
immediately what they believe to be the most important levels and rates. Forrester
(1994) states that he never starts to build a flow diagram from a causal loop diagram.
He warns that a causal loop diagram lacks the identification of level variables, resulting
in a failure to identify the systems elements which actually cause the dynamic
behaviour. Another problem with causal loop diagrams is that they ignore the difference
between information and resource flows. Coyle (1996) on the other hand recommends
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developing flow diagrams not from causal loop diagrams, but influence diagrams as in
this diagrammatic form, level variables, information flows and resource flows can be
differentiated.
Choosing to develop the full structure of the system dynamics model using levels and
rates was the personal choice of the modeller due to the above reasons mentioned by
Forrester (1994). A jump between the basic causal loop structure to an influence/full
flow diagram was obviously not feasible. The full flow diagram was built up
incrementally. This process was of an iterative nature. From the causal loop diagram,
many of the important levels, rates and policy parameters needed to build the flow
diagram could be determined. The important levels and rates for the model were first
identified. These were the bones of the flow diagram.
The next stage was to introduce the information links which carried information about
changes in levels around the model. This involved the gradual introduction of
auxiliaries, constants and delays. Concurrently, as the structure of the model grew, it
became necessary to introduce equations to the rates and auxiliaries and select
numerical values for the parameters. This allowed the model to be simulated, and
through simulation the structure of the model could be more readily developed to
represent real world occupational safety. The model's validity was also tested
throughout its development through using two methods. The first was to verify each of
the equation's structure and the plausibility of every parameter. The second was to
determine whether the model's behavioural outputs were representative of the real
world. The full approaches to these structural and behavioural tests will be discussed in
Sections 5.5 and 5.6 of this chapter respectfully.
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As the model grew in size, examining its structure became more cumbersome. A
number of distinct modules or sectors began to emerge within the model. These were
used to group together functionally related portions of structure such as for example, the
constants and variables representing staff recruitment and turnover. This made the task
of refining the functional structure far easier.
In summary, moving from the causal loop diagram to the full flow diagram was an
incremental process. The increase in model complexity continued through the addition,
subtraction and modification of structure. This was based on the goal of introducing a
sufficient level of structure which would not only facilitate the simulation of the right
behaviour, but for the right reasons. The process of structural modification could be
never ending, but one has to be pragmatic and stop its refinement when a sufficient
amount of rigour has been expended on verifying the internal consistency of the system
dynamics model. The full methods by which the GOSM was developed and tested will
be detailed in the remainder of this chapter.
5.5 Representing the Structure of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
The third stage of Roberts et al's. (1981, p.8) framework is model representation. If a
successful qualitative GOSM were to be constructed, three tests of structural validity
would need to be passed before any simulation experiments be conducted. These
involve structure verification, dimensional consistency and parameter verification. The
backgrounds to each of these tests are briefly explained.
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The structural verification would continue. To pass the structural verification test the
assumptions contained within the feedback structure of the model must be consistent
with the structure of the real world (Moffatt, 1991). Barlas (1996) suggested that using
empirical information means comparing the form of the equations of the model with the
relationships that exist in the real world system. As well as verifying the realism of
these structural equations, they have to be checked to ensure that the dimensions of the
rate equations, parameters and state variables are consistent. Moffatt (1991) suggested
that failure to pass the dimensional consistency test would indicate the inclusion of
parameters with little or no real world meaning. These, he noted should be weeded out
at the parameter verification stage. Parameter verification involves comparing model
constants against real world observations to determine whether they correspond
conceptually and numerically to real life (Forrester and Senge, 1980; Barlas, 1996).
Conceptual parameter consistency is important in the GOSM.
In the model representation phase, the causal diagram was disaggregated, and converted
into a full influence diagram. The full detail of the GOSM' s influence diagram is
revealed in Figure 5.4. The diagram is rich in detail and clearly shows the state
variables, rates and auxiliaries, resource and information flows, and system delays. The
influence diagram was easily translated into a flow diagram, as shown in Figure 5.5.
The flow diagram shows the integration of the model parameters and variables clearly.
In order for the simulation to operate and for meaningful insights about workplace
safety to be gathered, the structural equations for the model had to be set. Translating
the causal loop diagram into a detailed flow diagram in one step is difficult. Hence it
was decided to construct the diagram piecemeal. A total of six model sectors were
chosen.
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Figure 5.4
	 The generic occupational safety model's influence diagram
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Within each one of these sectors the detail of the influence diagram was set out, then
translated into a flow diagram. The sectors were then linked together to allow the
subsequent simulation of the quantitative GOSM.
A total of 51 parameters are present in the occupational safety model; of which 29 are
constants, 16 are levels, and 6 are table functions. Thirty-one variables are also
contained in the model, of which 19 are rates and 12 are auxiliaries. All the model
components are endogenous to the system under study. Thirty-nine feedback loops are
present in the full system dynamics model. This is broken down into 13 reinforcing
loops and 26 balancing loops. The dominance of balancing feedback loops in line with
the causal loop diagram is shown by these statistics. This suggests that controlling the
behaviour of the GOSM through policy parameter modification will be possible. The
solution interval or DT was set at 0.25. The full Ithink model run time and initialisation
equations are listed below and also in Appendix L. Detailed equation descriptions will
follow in Section 5.5(a) to (h).
A Full Listing of the Generic Occupational Safety Model Equations (Written in Ithink
CHigh Performance Systems Inc.)
Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t) = Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_In - Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Accident_Reports_Being_Processed = 2.06
Accident_Reports_In = Accident_Rate*Proportion_of Accidents_Reported
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident Reporting_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost = Accident Reporting_Policy*Accident_Reporting_Cost
Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_Completed)* dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Reports = 0
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Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Accident_Reporting_Cost = 100
Accident_Reporting_Policy = 25
Accident_Reporting_Time = 10
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Cumulative_Accidents(t) = Cumulative_Accidents(t - dt) + (Accident_Rate) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accidents = 0
Accident_Rate = Accident_Incidence*Labour
Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Accident_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Cost =0
Monthly_Accident_Cost = Accident_Rate*Cost_per_Accident
Accident_Incidence =
((Unregulated_Hazards/Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)±(Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Re
gulation/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Full_Hazard_
Regulation_Weighting))*Risk
Cost_per_Accident = 100
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1.5
Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1
Risk = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.05), (0.5, 0.049), (1.00, 0.0473), (1.50, 0.0383), (2.00, 0.021), (2.50, 0.017), (3.00, 0.0138),
(3.50, 0.0105), (4.00, 0.007), (4.50, 0.003), (5.00, 0.00)
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Intennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulative_Intennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthlyintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Intennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost = Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost
Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation - Hazards_Become_Regulated) * dt
1NIT Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation = 1.36
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intennediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulatio
n,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Become_Regulated = MIN(Hazards Under Full_Regulation/
Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation,Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Full_Ha7ard_Regulati
on_Time)
Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Interinediate_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Identification_Rate - Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation = 1.36
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Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_to_Identify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident_Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation/Time to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulatio
n_Backlog,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Regulated_Hazards(t) = Regulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazards_Become_Regulated -
Hazard_Generation_Rate) * dt
[NIT Regulated_Hazards = 85
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Time to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog,Full_
Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Unregulated_Hazards(t) = Unregulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazard_Generation_Rate -
Identification_Rate) * dt
INIT Unregulated_Hazards -= 1.36
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_to_Identify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident_Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 10
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 15
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 10
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 10
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 5
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time =2
RBAAIH =
(Unregulated_Hazards+Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation+Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation)/Reg
ulated_Hazards
Safety_Monitoring_Cost = 10
Safety_Monitoring_Policy =20
Accident_Repeater = GRAPH(Accident Reports_Completed)
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.01), (3.00, 0.02), (4.00, 0.03), (5.00, 0.04), (6.00, 0.055), (7.00, 0.07), (8.00, 0.085),
(9.00, 0.1), (10.0, 0.125), (11.0, 0.165), (12.0, 0.215), (13.0, 0.265), (14.0, 0.32), (15.0, 0.365), (16.0,
0.425), (17.0, 0.49), (18.0, 0.545), (19.0, 0.6), (20.0, 0.68)
Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring = GRAPH(Safety_Monitoring_Policy)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.125), (20.0, 0.325), (30.0, 0.575), (40.0, 0.925), (50.0, 1.53), (60.0, 3.15), (70.0,
4.35), (80.0, 4.73), (90.0, 4.93), (100, 5.00)
Unsafe_Acts = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.1), (0.5, 0.099), (1.00, 0.098), (1.50, 0.096), (2.00, 0.089), (2.50, 0.074), (3.00, 0.038), (3.50,
0.022), (4.00, 0.016), (4.50, 0.012), (5.00, 0.009)
Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t) = Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t - dt) + (Quits) * dt
[NIT Cumulative_Labour_Quits =0
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Labour(t) = Labour(t - dt) + (Hires - Quits) * dt
INIT Labour = Target_Labour_Force
Hires — ((Target_Labour_Force-Labour)/Staff Adjustment Time)+Replacing_Attrition
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Actual_Length_of Employment = Base_Length_of Employment*(1-Quit_Likelihood)
Base_Length_of Employment = 120
Perceived_AccidentIncidence = SMTH3(Accidentincidence,3)
Replacing_Attrition = Quits
Staff Adjustment_Time =4
Target_Labour_Force = 100
Quit_Likelihood = GRAPH(Perceived_Accident_Incidence)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.001), (0.2, 0.003), (0.3, 0.006), (0.4, 0.014), (0.5, 0.028), (0.6, 0.08), (0.7, 0.0915),
(0.8, 0.096), (0.9, 0.098), (1, 0.1)
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Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Safety_Cost) * dt
IN1T Cumulative_Safety_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Cost =
Monthly Accident_Cost+(Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost)+(Full_Hazard_Regulati
on_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost)±(Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate_Haz
ard_Regulation_Cost)+(Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident_Reporting_Cost)+(Training_Policy*Safet
y_Training_Cost)
Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost = Training_Policy*Safety_Training_Cost
Safety_KSA(t) = Safety_KSA(t - dt) + (Learning + Gain_in_KSA - Loss_of KSA -
Dissipation_of KSA) * dt
INIT Safety_KSA = 400
Learning = DELAY(Multiplier*Discrepancy,3)
Gain_in_KSA = Hires*KSA_per New_Employee
Loss_of KSA = Quits*Loss_per Exit
Dissipation_of KSA = Safety_KSA*Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost
Average_KSA = Safety_KSA/Labour
Discrepancy = 1-(Safety_KSA/Target_Safety_KSA)
Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost = 0.01
KSA_per New_Employee = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA
Loss_per_Exit = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA
Maximum_KSA_per Employee = 5
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA = 0.7
Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA = 1.3
Safety_Training_Cost = 10
Target_Safety_KSA = Labour*Maximum_KSA_per_Employee
Time_to_Clear Accident_Report Backlog = 1
Time to_Clear Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Identify_Unregulated_Hazards = 1
Training_Effectiveness = 0.75
Training_Policy = 200
Multiplier =
GRAPH((Training_Effectiveness*Training_Policy)*(IF(Safety_KSA<Target_Safety_KSA)THEN(1)EL
SE(0)))
80.0), (450, 90.0), (500, 100)
(0.00, 0.00), (50.0, 10.0), (100, 20.0), (150, 30.0), (200, 40.0), (250, 50.0), (300, 60.0), (350, 70.0), (400,
(a) The Sectors of the Occupational Safety Model
The six chosen sectors are Accident Reporting, Accidents, Hazard Processing, Labour,
Safety Costs and Safety KSA. An influence diagram and flow diagram represent the
structure of each model sector. The influence diagram can be scrutinised to assess
causal links and their polarity, and also to distinguish between the units, time and
dimensions of the attributes. The flow diagram allows the parameter and equation
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structure to be examined. Both diagrams also show the important causal linkages to and
from other model sectors. A full description of the function and workings of each model
sector is offered.
The model is parameterised to run in equilibrium as a 'base run'. The parameter values
selected are partly chosen to minimise the transient start-up period of the simulation.
This is necessary for subsequent assessment of parameter sensitivity, as described in
Section 5.6 of this chapter. As a result, for every sector, a list of all Ithink equations and
parameters is set out in an appendix. The Ithink equations and parameters are converted
from Ithink notation into DYNAMO. DYNAMO modelling is a simulation language
developed in the 1960's to describe the difference equations used in system dynamics.
In Ithink, symbolic icons are used to draw the diagrams, from which some of the
equations are written automatically, whereas in DYNAMO, equations are written using
a text editor. In this form it is easier to analyse the time suffixes and dimensions of the
equations and parameters.
Two structural measures of validation were necessary. Detailed structure and parameter
verification tests were performed. The structure of each equation and parameter is
verified with empirical evidence, or more commonly, against the assumptions about
relationships thought by experts to be present in real world occupational safety.
The results of a detailed dimensional consistency test are also contained in each
appendix. The units in which a variable or parameter is measured are called its
dimensions (Coyle, 1977). Each model equation must be able to transform the
numerical values for the quantities on the right hand side into a numerical outcome on
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Accident Reports
Accident
Cost
Employee (Labour)
Hazard
Knowledge, Skills and Attitude (KSA)
Time
[AR]
[A]
[C]
[E]
[H]
[K]
[T]
the left hand side; and to transform the individual dimensions on the right hand side into
a resultant dimension for the left hand side quantity. If this is not possible then the
equation is dimensionally inconsistent. The convention for showing dimensions is to
place them in square brackets and use abbreviations. Also negative exponents are used
to represent division by another dimension. These are called compound dimensions. A
number of dimensionless quantities such as ratios or multipliers are present in the
occupational safety model equations. Where these appear on the right hand side of an
equation they are ignored. Where they appear on the left-hand side of an equation, the
dimensions of the variables on the right hand side are shown to cancel out. As the table
function is a dimensional transformation, then despite often appearing to be
dimensionally inconsistent, the equation is acceptable. The abbreviations for the GOSM
dimensions are shown in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2	 Generic occupational safety model dimension abbreviations
(b) The Accident Reporting Sector
The Accident Reporting Sector provides a simple representation of the accident
reporting and investigation sub-system. The infrastructure of both the influence and
flow diagram is contained in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The sector is driven by one input, the
Accident Rate, and contains one output, the Accident Reports Completed.
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Figure 5.7	 Accident reporting sector flow diagram
148
The Accident Rate is an input to the sector. Accidents occur, and accident reports are
subsequently written as standard procedure. This is a coincident flow (or rate on rate
calculation), and according to High Performance Systems (1994, p.'72) is acceptable, as
accident reports run in parallel to accidents. Depending upon the seriousness of the
accident, an investigation may follow. Accident Reports Completed are outputs of the
sector. They will help in identifying the nature of the hazard contributing to the accident
situation. The rate at which accident reports are completed may be important to the
overall performance of the firm's safety, as backlogging uncompleted reports may lead
to hazards remaining active for longer, thus resulting in further accidents. The
Cumulative Accident Reports may be a good indicator of the performance of the sector
if it is compared directly with Cumulative Accidents. If Cumulative Accidents exceed
Cumulative Accident Reports then the accident reporting and investigation system of a
firm may not be working to its full potential.
High costs are associated with accident reporting and investigation, as often there is a
need to involve many employees in the process. The sector contains the structure that
allows scorekeeping of the Monthly Accident Reporting Cost and Cumulative Accident
Reporting Cost. The sector's equations, numerated parameters and dimensions are
verified in Appendix A.
(c) The Accidents Sector
The Accidents Sector shows the mechanism by which accidents occur. The
infrastructure for accident generation and its consequences is presented as an influence
diagram in Figure 5.8, and in Figure 5.9 for additional clarity as a flow diagram.
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Accidents are generated as a result of hazards and risk coinciding. If both are high then
so too are accidents. Accidents cannot occur unless active hazards are present in the
workplace which have a risk attached to them (Bamber, 1990a). Active hazards can be
present in the workplace in three states: unregulated, intermediately regulated or under
full regulation. These active hazards are sector inputs. A fuller description of hazard
states and their associated affect upon safety is given in Section 5.4. With each of these
sequential hazard states, their contribution to accidents lessens due to their weighting.
For accidents to occur, people must be involved, so the labour force is represented as an
input to the sector. This assists with computation of the Accident Rate, and the
Cumulative Accidents. The average safety KSA of the current labour force is another
input. It determines the risk or likelihood that an active hazard will result in an accident,
that is it governs the way that people work with hazards.
The Accident Incidence is a significant output of the sector. It has a direct impact upon
the safety morale of the employees, in the form of their Perceived Accident Incidence.
Another output is the Accident Rate which necessitates accident reporting and
investigation. Accidents are a very important measure of the safety performance of a
company. They are the most tangible and obvious measure. Despite this, they are a
downstream measure of safety, and should not be taken in isolation to represent safety
performance (HSE, 1991b; Waring, 1996). The sector does allow the monthly and
cumulative scorekeeping of accidents and the costs of safety activities. The sector's
equations, numerated parameters and dimensions are verified in Appendix B.
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(d) The Hazard Processing Sector
The infrastructure of the Hazard Processing Sector provides a generic representation of
the states through which workplace hazards move, the activities which facilitate their
movement, and their associated costs. The full structure of the sector is presented as an
influence diagram in Figure 5.10, and a flow diagram in Figure 5.11 A full listing of the
sector's equations, their description and dimensional verification can be found in
Appendix C.
The key to the behaviour of this sector, and indeed the whole model lies in the hazard
resource loop. Hazards move through a continuous self-renewing life cycle. They lie in
a regulated state where they are inactive, that is they do not have the capacity to cause
an accident. They can move through three active states, unregulated, being
intermediately regulated and being fully regulated, before returning to a regulated state.
The frequency and duration over which hazards move around the loop from active to
inactive is determined by a number of key activities. These are the Accident Reporting
Policy, Safety Monitoring Policy, and two hazard regulation policies. The sector has
Safety KSA and Accident Reports Completed as inputs, and active hazards as outputs.
A measure of how effective the policies contained within the sector can be determined
by analysing the Ratio Between Active and Inactive Hazards (RBAAIH's). A high
value is an indication that the management policies addressing active hazards are not
sufficiently resourced.
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An analogy can be used to explain how the hazards move through the various states.
The hazard can be regarded as a lion. If the lion is locked in the cage, it is inactive, and
does not have the ability to cause harm (Regulated Hazard). Under circumstances where
the KSA of the lion tamer (Average KSA) is lacking, then the likelihood that the cage
door is left open is high (Unsafe Acts). If the cage door is left open then the lion can
escape and it becomes a danger (Unregulated Hazard). The lion tamer will learn that the
lion has escaped through one of two activities. Either they are injured by the lion, that is
be party to an accident and make a quick mental accident report! (Accident Reporting
Policy) or they will be constantly aware of the possibility of an escape and
intermittently check the cage to ensure that the lion is still locked away (Safety
Monitoring Policy). On realising that the lion has escaped, the lion tamer may carry out
a number of protective activities which will both reduce the possibility of being injured,
and force the lion back into the cage. With the help of a whip and a stool the lion can
first be kept at a safer distance (Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy). A reduction in
the threat of injury can quickly ensue (Hazard Under Intermediate Regulation). Then
the lion can be guided using the whip and stool back towards the cage (Hazards Under
Full Regulation). Finally, the lion is forced back into the cage (Full Hazard Regulation
Policy) where once again it no longer has the ability to cause harm (Regulated Hazard).
To summarise the hazard life cycle, Regulated Hazards can become Unregulated
Hazards due to Unsafe Acts. Unsafe Acts depend upon an input to the sector, the
Average KSA of the workforce. Accident reports and/or safety monitoring allows
Unregulated Hazards to be identified, and this facilitates the partial and full regulation
of the active hazard, sending it back into a regulated and inactive state.
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There are many costs associated with dealing with active hazards. This sector contains
the structure which will allow the full extent of the monthly and cumulative costs of
hazard processing to be measured.
The levels in the sector have been initialised to show that the majority of hazards (85%)
are regulated, i.e. inactive. To distribute the hazards evenly over the four hanrd stages
would be far from representative of a range of typical firms. Under the HASAWA of
1974, an employer has a duty of care for the safety of its employees, and under the
MHSWR of 1992, managers must take suitable and sufficient action to mitigate the risk
of injury. If the HSE inspectorate visited a workplace where the majority of hazards
were active then it would be certain that improvement notices at least, and more likely
prohibition notices, would be issued, preventing further work activity, and prosecution
for ignorance of duty of care would follow. It would be rare to find employers who
would be foolhardy to this extent.
(e) The Labour Sector
This sector is very straightforward in structure. Its core is based on a human resource
infrastructure suggested by High Performance Systems (1994, p.90). The infrastructure
is presented as an influence diagram in Figure 5.12 and a flow diagram in Figure 5.13.
The sector shows a simple representation of staff hiring and attrition flows. It facilitates
the turnover of labour in the firm. Goal-seeking behaviour is in operation. When
employees leave the firm, then the labour stock drops, and they are replaced by new
employees.
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The Labour level represents the current size of the workforce. The Target Labour Force
regulates Labour turnover. This is a human resource policy. The Labour size will move
towards the target or desired level through replacing staff Quits with new Hires. A
delay in recruitment is introduced to represent the expected lag between quitters and
their replacements. Natural wastage of labour is built into the sector. This is based on
the average time management expect an employee to be part of the workforce. The
Base Length of Stay or the average duration of employment determines this.
The influence of accidents is added to the labour turnover infrastructure. Accident
Incidence is the only input into the sector. There will be a threshold where the effect of
Accident Incidence begins to drive staff turnover, rather than natural wastage, through
depleted safety morale. This is governed by how the Perceived Accident Incidence, that
is how the employees regard the underlying accident situation. This will determine the
likelihood of them leaving the firm as a result of depleted safety morale. The Quit
Likelihood will influence the Actual Length of Employment of the average employee.
The influence of the labour turnover can have repercussions for the behaviour of safety
in the firm. The labour turnover can be regarded as an output of the sector, directly
affecting the growth, retention and loss of Safety KSA in the firm, and having
repercussions for the performance of safety metrics in the wider model. A full
description of the sector's equations and dimensional analysis can be found in
Appendix D.
(f) The Safety Costs Sector
The Safety Costs Sector contains the structure which allows the whole safety effort of
the firm to be costed for a given month or cumulatively. An influence diagram was not
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thought to add any clarity to the understanding of the sector's structure so it was
precluded. The structure of these calculations is shown as a flow diagram in Figure
5.14. For every hour of safety activity or management policy, or for every accident
there are direct and indirect costs (Stranks, 1994b; HSE, 1991a). These costs are fully
represented in the sector. A full description of the sector's equations and a dimensional
analysis can be found in Appendix E.
(g) The Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude Sector
The infrastructure of the Safety KSA Sector represents the process of employee safety
knowledge, skills and attitude (KSA) acquisition, retention and loss. The sector is set
out as an influence diagram in Figure 5.15 and as a flow diagram in Figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.15	 Safety knowledge, skills and attitude sector influence diagram
The core structure of the sector is based on a generic infrastructure developed by High
Performance Systems (1994, p.92). It exploits the use of two coincident flows (rate on
rate equations) which are used to represent a process which runs in parallel with a
primary process (High Performance Systems, p.72). There are two inputs into the
model, Hires and Quits, and two outputs, Unsafe Acts and Risk.
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The Safety KSA level represents the current KSA possessed by the workforce. It is
driven through two inputs, the KSA that new employees bring to the firm and Learning
of KSA through safety training. The level is diminished as a result of KSA dissipation
or in simple terms, forgetfulness, and also the KSA that employees leaving the firm take
away with them.
The sector inputs and outputs work to balance each other. Hires bring KSA to the
workplace, and quitters remove it. Unfortunately, the employer who assumes that new
will balance out old will be disappointed because Safety KSA grows with both training,
experience and age (Petersen, 1988; Stranks, 1994a).
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The average safety KSA of an employee is essential to the safety performance of the
firm. As mentioned by a number of safety authors, 60% to 95% of accidents are thought
to emanate directly from human error (Perrow, 1984; Killimett, 1991; Krause et al.,
1990; Stanlcs, 1994b). If this human error can be reduced or even ideally removed then
it is suspected that huge dividends in terms of accident statistics and their associated
costs can be reaped. Two outputs, both Unsafe Acts and Risk represent human error.
Unsafe Acts cause employees to work inappropriately with inactive hazards, and Risk
increases the likelihood that an active hazard will result in an accident.
Appropriate structure is present in the sector to represent the monthly and cumulative
costs of safety training. A full description of the sector's equations and a dimensional
analysis can be found in Appendix F.
(h) Summary of the Structure of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
The full structure of the GOSM has been presented as an influence and flow diagram.
The model has been broken down into six sectors. The infrastructures and mechanism
by which each operates have been described in detail. Appendix A to Appendix F
shows the structure of the model attributes and their dimensions to be consistent with
those present in the safety system of a typical employer. Having the boundary of the
model set to keep the structure endogenous to the firm will ensure that future policy
implication tests will allow system behaviour to be generated by the policy decisions of
the user, rather than coming from an external source. Importantly, the model
simulations are under the full control of the user.
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5.6 Analysis of the Behaviour of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
The confidence building tests of Section 5.5 concentrated on the GOSM' s structural
validity. Some tests to further evaluate the validity of the model structure were required.
An analysis of the model's behaviour generated by its structure is achieved through a
group of tests identified by authors as behavioural tests. A number of confidence
building approaches were available such as behaviour reproduction and prediction tests.
These would only be possible in an operational model when real world data were
available. The results of these tests are outlined in Chapters Six and Seven respectively.
Two suitable sets of behavioural tests were available. The first, extreme conditions or
policy tests could be used to determine whether the GOSM would behave reasonably
under extreme conditions or policies (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). If these tests were
passed then the second set of behavioural tests measuring the sensitivity of the model to
a range of parameter changes could be made. The GOSM was parameterised for the
base run to simulate in a state of equilibrium. This would reduce the likelihood of an
unanticipated shift in loop dominance, and also allow the exact effect of each parameter
change to be measured clearly.
(a) Extreme Conditions Testing
Forrester and Senge (1980) suggested that introducing extreme conditions into the
model would help to further determine whether a system dynamics model has a valid
structure. This process consists of testing the model beyond its normal operating limits
to help identify any flaws in the model structure, and also gives the opportunity to
analyse policies which may force the system to operate outside its historical operating
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regions (Moffatt, 1991). Forrester and Senge (1980) suggest that the effects of
minimum and maximum values for a level or combination of levels needed to be tested.
In the case of the generic occupational safety model, as it was not calibrated for any
particular employment sector it was decided to test only the minimum numerical values
for significant state variables or levels, and when appropriate, close off the rates which
governed their values. High values could not be tested in the generic model as these
values could only be ascertained when the model was verified with real world data.
The range of extreme behaviour tests chosen included setting the labour level and target
labour force to near zero and observing the accident incidence. It also consisted of
initialising all the four hazard levels to zero and measuring the accident incidence; and
setting the Safety KSA level and Training Policy to zero and observing the Average
KSA.
Forrester and Senge (1980) also identified extreme policy tests which are concerned
with altering policy statements in an extreme way, running the model and noting the
consequences. The test would be successful if it was believed that the model would
replicate the behaviour of a real system faced with the extreme policy circumstances.
The extreme policy tests conducted on the occupational safety model consisted of
setting all the policies concerned with hazard regulation to zero and noting the accident
incidence. It also involved setting the Base Length of Employment to near zero and
examining the accident incidence; and switching the training policy off and examining
the Average KSA.
163
(b) Extreme Conditions and Policy Test Results
The results of the extreme conditions and policy tests can be found in Tables 5.3 and
5.4 respectively. Note that some parameters were set to near zero, as this would avoid a
division by zero.
Extreme Behaviour Test Parameter(s) Initial
Value
Resulting Model
Behaviour
Does setting the labour force level to Labour 0.01 Accident Incidence runs at
near zero result in near zero accidents? Target Labour Force 0.01 zero throughout simulation.
Does setting all the hazard levels to zero Regulated Hazards 0 Accident Incidence runs at
result in zero accidents? Unregulated Hazards 0 zero throughout simulation.
Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation 0
Hazards Under Full Regulation 0
Does setting the Safety KSA level and Safety KSA 0 Safety KSA runs at zero
Training Policy to zero result in zero Training Policy 0 throughout simulation.
Safety KSA?
Table 5.3
	
Extreme behaviour tests
Extreme Policy Test Parameter(s) Initial
Value
Resulting Model Behaviour
Does setting the Training Policy to zero
result in a drastic increase in accidents
as compared to the base run?
Training Policy '	 • 0 Accident Incidence greatly increases
compared to the base run. Its growth is
logistical in shape.
Does setting the Base Length of
Employment to near zero result in a
drastic increase in accidents as
compared to the base run?
Base Length of Employment 0.01 Accident Incidence drastically
increases compared to the base run,
then temporarily reverses before
reaching equilibrium. The output is
polynomial in shape.
Does setting all the policies concerned Safety Monitoring Policy 0 Accident Incidence greatly increases
directly with hazard regulation to zero Accident Reporting Policy 0 compared to the base run. Its growth is
result in a drastic increase in accidents Intermediate Hazard logistical in shape.
compared to the base run? Regulation Policy 0
Full Hazard Regulation
Policy 0
Table 5.4
	
Extreme policy tests
Both the extreme behaviour and policy tests appear to show plausible model behaviour
given the exaggerated parameter changes made. The test results show that initialising
key levels to zero, and shutting off input rates results in sensible model outputs. The
tests appear to have been passed.
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(c) Parameter Sensitivity
According to Forrester (1969) sensitive parameters are examined in system dynamics
models to see if they affect the validity of proposed policy changes. Whilst many policy
analysts may agree with such a proposition, the vast majority of model builders would
not. Most model builders view parameter sensitivity tests as confirming whether a small
perturbation to a parameter's numerical value results in a significant change in the
model's behaviour. If this happens, then that parameter is identified as a sensitive
parameter. In the GOSM it was sufficient to identify sensitive parameters, and to then
test the plausibility of their impact further in the calibrated model of the host firm.
Two broad tests of sensitivity exist, namely structural and parameter tests (Forrester,
1961; Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Coyle, 1996). In the occupational safety model only
parameter sensitivity tests were performed, although it was acknowledged that there are
certain situations where structural changes have the greatest effect on model behaviour.
As the purpose of the study was to build a generic occupational safety model using
system dynamics and calibrating it to fit a given firm, it was not deemed necessary to
concentrate on testing any behavioural outputs brought about by structural changes to
the model.
Behaviour sensitivity tests are conducted by experimenting with different parameter
values and assessing their effects on behaviour (Forrester and Senge, 1980). It was
necessary to know where the sensitive parameters may lie in the occupational safety
model. The sensitivity tests aimed simply to identify whether the GOSM was sensitive
to certain parameter changes such as training or labour force size, and whether the
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numerical and behavioural changes exhibited by the model would be acceptable in the
system under study.
It is widely known that system dynamics models are insensitive to most parameter
changes, but are sensitive to a few parameters in a model of a system (Tank-Neilson,
1980; Richardson and Pugh, 1981). System behaviour will not be greatly affected by
quite large variations in the values of most parameters, and in these instances it is not so
important that the values assigned to them are highly accurate (Coyle, 1977; Moffatt,
1991).
Three types of parameter were tested for sensitivity: constants, initial values and table
functions. Initial values are simply the values with which all levels in the model are
initialised (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). There was little point in testing all the
parameters in the model. Indeed, all the parameters which were not contained within, or
did not affect any of the feedback structure of the model were discounted from the
sensitivity analysis.
Moffatt (1991) suggested that it is difficult to perform sensitivity tests on non-linear
models especially when a large number of parameters are evident. Coyle (1977)
suggests that it is impractical to run a sensitivity analysis on a trial and error basis
because of the almost limitless possibilities to be simulated. As the objective of the
sensitivity analysis was simply to identify the sensitive parameters rather than to give a
detailed mathematical account of each, a range of easily analysed tests were needed.
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It was important in the design to account for some of the major limitations associated
with parameter sensitivity analysis. 'think did not contain any kind of optimisation
software. This created an immediate practical limitation as the number of manual
changes to the parameters' values could not be extensive, otherwise the time taken to
prepare the tests would become problematic. Only single parameter changes were made
at a time so that each parameter's effect could be assessed. There was a limitation to
this approach as Forrester (1969) had warned, when testing the sensitivity of his Urban
Dynamics model, that one parameter modification could change the sensitivity of the
model to other parameters. This is another reason why the base run was set to simulate
in a state of equilibrium, besides the need to measure the effect of a single parameter
change clearly.
Forrester (1969) suggested that a system dynamics model can be insensitive to some
parameters, but to others the system may show sensitivity of one type but not another.
For example a model may exhibit numerical but not behavioural sensitivity (Richardson
and Pugh, 1981). To counteract this it would be necessary with some of the sensitivity
tests to measure final values of simulation runs as well as behaviour across the whole
run. Measuring a number of output metrics will allow a more representative picture of
model behaviour and performance to emerge than simply using a single metric such as
accident incidence. As mentioned by Waring (1996) and the HSE (1991a) accident rates
are simply a downstream measure of a safety system. More proactive measures such as
hazard states are noted as equally important measures.
Coyle (1978) published the idea of producing a performance index (PI) to measure
system dynamics models. He suggested that a PI could be useful when comparing one
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simulation run with another. A PI is usually a single number summarising the whole
performance of a model run. This allows easy presentation of conclusions and also
gives a uniform comparison of one run with another. It is most useful in the instance
where differences between runs are not greatly evident from examining graphical
output. He also identifies problems with this approach. The main problem is in selecting
the base run, which will have quite an effect on how the other runs perform. The overall
measure can also be dimensionally suspect as using several model outputs will
invariably involve different dimensions. The advantages and disadvantages of Coyle's
method were considered and it was decided that it would be suitable for classifying the
parameters according to sensitivity. A total of six model outputs were selected as
performance metrics, one from each model sector. Each output assumed equal
weighting when used to analyse the overall PI or sensitivity. As the sensitivity
measurements for the set of parameter tests varied, so did the output metrics. A number
of methods were used to assess the parameters. The most common involved comparing
the percentage change in outputs with the percentage change in input, referred to in this
study as gearing ratios. The changes in output were always measured against the base
run for the model. From the separate gearing ratios a grand mean was calculated to
represent a measure of overall sensitivity. The greater the overall gearing ratio the more
sensitive the model to parameter change.
Forrester (1969) offered more advice when examining parameter sensitivity. He
suggested that it is very important to identify the parameters that both affect the system
condition and can be changed or controlled. He also suggested that a sensitive
parameter that cannot be controlled or effectively measured is of no interest unless it
affects the overall policy recommendations. This gives justification to the purpose of
168
the tests, that is to simply identify the sensitive parameters. In the real world calibrated
model, if they affect the model behaviour in a plausible way and can be controlled all
well and good. If they affect the model output and cannot be measured or controlled (in
the case of many table functions) then as long as the calibrated real world model
behaves in a realistic way, then the fact that they are sensitive should be of little
concern.
(d) Constant Parameter Tests
Two types of constant parameter can be found in the occupational safety model. These
are the policy parameters which carry a constant value on any one occasion, and
constants which are invariant throughout the simulation, such as delays and proportions.
Two sets of sensitivity tests were performed on the constants, and three measures of
sensitivity were calculated. The first consisted of a fixed constant modification test,
where a fixed change was made to a constant at the outset of a simulation run, and the
final value of the output noted. The second test involved equilibrium disturbance, and
with two measures of sensitivity: settling time back to equilibrium and maximum
absolute point value achieved. It was the intention of using these tests to obtain an
overall rank for the sensitivity of the constants and determine whether there was some
correlation between the three performances of sensitivity.
A total of twenty constants impact directly on the feedback structure of the occupational
safety model. Of these nineteen were tested for sensitivity. The exception being
'Maximum KSA per Employee' as this was truly invariant and needed to remain set at a
value of five.
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(e) Fixed Constant Modification Parameter Tests
The fixed constant modification sensitivity tests were carried out in order to show the
numerical sensitivity of the model to single parameter changes. The six output metrics,
one from each model sector, were Cumulative Accidents, Average KSA, Average
Length of Employment, Cumulative Accident Reports, RBAAIH (Ratio Between
Active and Inactive Hazards) and Cumulative Safety Costs.
It was decided to test constant values over a wide range. Forrester and Senge (1980)
suggest that a model will be improved in the normal operating regions if any results of
extreme behaviour tests can be incorporated into the model. Richardson and Pugh
(1981) agreed as they stress the need to test whether the behaviour of the model is
plausible under extreme conditions.
The base run for the model was set for a duration of 50 time units (months). At the
finish of the base run the values of the six output metrics were noted. The outputs
brought about by the parameter changes would be measured against the outputs from
the base run to assess sensitivity levels. Table G1 in Appendix G shows these final
values. For each parameter, the test range was plus 100% to minus 100%. In the
instances where division by zero would occur the lower end of the range was set to
minus 99%. Each constant was varied by 25% for each new simulation run. The
percentage change from the base run value was called the 'Adjustment Fraction'.
Therefore, a total of eight sensitivity runs were performed on each constant, producing
48 final value outputs. The final values for all the output metrics are set out in
Appendix G under Tables G2 to G20.
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A unified index was needed to summarise the overall sensitivity of each constant given
that an array of results had been obtained for each one. It was decided to first calculate a
gearing ratio based on percentage changes, as a percentage change is a simple measure
of a system's performance. Absolute values were used to calculate the gearing as the
polarity of the result was of no consequence. Gearing is simply a ratio between what is
put in and what comes out. Gearing was calculated as:
AOutput
Alnput
Where;
(1	 A(New Run Final Value - Base Run Final Value )j =
Base Run Final Value
Alnput = Adjustment Fraction
The magnitude of the gearing is a good indicator of themodel's sensitivity to parameter
change. A total of 48 gearings were collated for each constant tested. These are shown
in Tables G21 to 039 in Appendix G. From these values for each constant a mean
gearing was calculated. The mean gearings are shown in Table 5.5 ranked from most to
least sensitive.
These results show that there a small number of constants which have a significant
effect and conversely a number which have little or no effect. Note that the most
sensitive constants, Base Length of Employment and Training Policy are both policy
parameters, and are also associated with human resources rather than inanimate objects.
Surprisingly, the Safety Monitoring Policy and Staff Adjustment Time showed
themselves to be very insensitive to change. This may have resulted from the
initialisation values used to set the base run, and the fact that only single parameter
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changes were made to the model. These two constants' sensitivities will be re-examined
further in the next chapter where they are involved in the behaviour replication and
prediction tests with the real world calibrated occupational safety model.
Parameter Mean Gearing
Base Length of Employment 4.69
Training Policy 2.53
Training Effectiveness 2.51
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 1.76
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 1.19
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 1.06
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.79
Full Hazard Regulation Time 0.78
Accident Reporting Policy 0.76
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.62
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 0.40
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 0.39
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 0.19
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.04
Accident Reporting Time 0.03
Safety Monitoring Policy 0.01
Learning Delay 0.00
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 0.00
Table 5.5
	
Ranking of constants according to mean fixed constant change gearing
(f) Equilibrium Disturbance Tests
Coyle (1977) proposed the use of a number of tests to validate system dynamics
models. Two in particular appear to be useful for analysing the sensitivity of the
occupational safety model when faced with temporary equilibrium disturbance. The
settling time is a measure of the time for the variable to settle back to equilibrium. This
is what Coyle classifies as a time domain test or behavioural measure. An alternative
indicator of sensitivity may be the maximum value achieved in a simulation run. This is
a straightforward numerical measurement. These two measures were chosen as
complementary measures of parameter sensitivity to equilibrium disturbance. An
appropriate disturbance function needed to be chosen to examine the robustness of the
model to temporary input change. The pulse function was considered but dismissed, as
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it was too instantaneous and not reflective of many real world changes. The step
function was selected for this purpose as it is more representative of real life situations.
A different six model outputs were selected as performance metrics as cumulative
measures could obviously not be used to find settling times. The measures taken from
each model sector were, Accident Incidence, Accident Reports Being Processed, Actual
Length of Employment, Average KSA, Monthly Safety Cost, and Ratio Between Active
and Inactive Hazards (RBA.AIH). The new base run output metrics were noted. Table
040 in Appendix G shows their final values.
(g) Settling Times
Single parameter changes were used to measure sensitivity. A step input with a duration
of ten time steps was introduced into the simulation run, and then stepped back to its
original value. For each parameter the step test range was plus 100% to minus 100%
with the usual proviso that division by zero had to be avoided, and with an 'Adjustment
Fraction' in increments of 25%. The settling time in the simulation for each output
metric was noted after every run. The settling times for all the output metrics are shown
in Appendix G under Tables 041 to 059. The sensitivity measure was simple to arrive
at. The longer the settling time to equilibrium, the more sensitive the parameter. A total
of 48 settling times were collated for each constant. These are shown in Tables 041 to
059 in Appendix G. From these values, a mean settling time for each constant was
calculated. These are shown in Table 5.6 ranked from most to least sensitive. The
results show that the same policy parameter constants as in the fixed constant
modification tests were high up in the sensitivity rankings. As in the previous test, the
Staff Adjustment Time was totally insensitive to change.
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Parameter Mean Settling Time
(months)
Base Length of Employment 172.63
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 51.77
Training Effectiveness 48.23
Training Policy 48.02
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 38.73
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 37.88
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 35.02
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 32.85
Full Ha7ard Regulation Weighting 25.21
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 24.50
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 17.33
Accident Reporting Policy 13.48
Full Hazard Regulation Time 10.85
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 7.60
Safety Monitoring Policy 1.83
Accident Reporting Time 1.19
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.71
Learning Delay 0.00
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00
Table 5.6	 Ranking of constants according to mean settling time
(h) Constant Maximum Absolute Point Values 
The maximum point values for the outputs are shown in Tables G60 to G78. The
maximum absolute point value was read off and used to calculate a gearing ratio. The
gearing ratio was calculated as:
AOutput
AInput
Where;
(I(Maximum Absolute Value - Base Run Value)I
AOutput =
Base Run Value
AInput = Adjustment Fraction
A total of 48 gearings were calculated for each constant. These are shown in Tables
G79 to G97 in Appendix G. From these values a mean gearing for each constant was
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calculated. The higher the gearing, the more sensitive the constant. The results of the
maximum point values are shown in Table 5.7, ranked from most to least sensitive.
Parameter Mean Point Value Gearing
Base Length of Employment 31.48
Accident Reporting Policy 13.48
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 11.10
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 7.31
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 5.70
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 3.03
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 1.97
Training Policy 1.40
Training Effectiveness 1.34
Full Hazard Regulation Time 1.02
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 0.45
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 0.37
Accident Reporting Time 0.22
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 0.13
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.01
Safety Monitoring Policy 0.01
Learning Delay 0.00
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 0.00
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00
Table 5.7	 • Ranking of constants according to mean maximum point value gearing
(i) Summary Analysis of Constant Parameter Tests
Spearman's Rank Correlation coefficient was used to test the level of association
between the constant parameters for the fixed constant changes, settling time and point
value sensitivity rankings. The full methodology, calculations and results are shown in
Section G1 of Appendix G. Table 5.8 summarises the parameter sensitivities. A simple
grand mean sensitivity was calculated from the three performance measures for each
constant.
The grand mean rankings are useful if the constant sensitivities are to be classified
ordinally, but this sensitivity exercise sought to identify sensitive and insensitive
parameters. A classification of the constants according to high, medium or low
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sensitivity would show which of these parameters needed to be set more accurately with
real world data, and also allow the most likely leverage points in the real world
occupational safety system to be identified. Table 5.9 shows an appropriate
classification of sensitivities according to the range of the grand mean rank. As few
parameters in a system dynamics model are sensitive, then only the highest ranking
from the table could be regarded as sensitive.
Parameter
-
Mean
Fixed
Const.
Rank
Mean
Settling
Time
Rank
Mean
Point
Value
Gearing
Rank
Grand
Mean
Rank
Overall
Rank
Order
Accident Reporting Policy 9 12 2 7.67 7
Accident Reporting Time 15 16 13 14.67 14
Base Length of Employment 1 1 .	 1 1.00 1
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 12 6 12 10.00 11
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 4 10 6 6.67 6
Full Hazard Regulation Time 8 13 10 10.33 12
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 10 9 5 8.00 8=
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 6 -	 . 11 7 8.00 8=
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 14 17 15.5 15.50 15
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 7 7 4 6.00 5
Learning Delay 18 18.5 18 18.17 18=
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 18 14 18 16.67 17
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 13 8 14 11.67 13
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 11 5 11 9.00 10
Safety Monitoring Policy 16 15 15.5 15.50 15
Staff Adjustment Time 18 18.5 18 18.17 18=
Training Effectiveness 3 3 9 5.00 4
Training Policy 2 4 8 4.67 3
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 5 2 3 3.33 2
Table 5.8
	 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test summary constant rankings
Forrester (1969) suggested that a sensitive parameter that cannot be controlled, and
often cannot be measured is of no interest unless it affects the selection or use of other
parameters which are employed to improve the system. A total of five such invariant
constants were identified and tested for sensitivity: Unregulated Hazard Regulation
Weighting, Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting, Full Hazard Regulation
Weighting, Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth and Learning Delay. The latter two
176
were insensitive to change and are unlikely to have any great impact on the model's
behaviour. Unregulated Hazard Weighting is the only such invariant constant that
shows a high sensitivity, with the other two hazard weightings being of more moderate
sensitivity. These parameter's weightings will affect the selection and use of policy
parameters. The justification for their level of sensitivity stems from the description of
the hazard life-cycle. In Section 5.5 unregulated hazards are described as the type of
hazards that are most likely to contribute to an accident. As management action is taken
at subsequent stages of the hazard life cycle to reduce the hazard's propensity to cause
harm, it becomes safer. This is in line with the fact that the Unregulated Hazard
Weighting should be more sensitive than the other hazard weightings as that is
representative of the real world. Table 5.9 identifies the sensitivities of all the constants.
Constant Parameter Sensitivity
Accident Reporting Policy
Accident Reporting Time
Base Length of Employment
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost
Full Hazard Regulation Policy
Full Hazard Regulation Time
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting
Learning Delay
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA
Safety Monitoring Policy
Staff Adjustment Time
Training Effectiveness
Training Policy
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting
Medium
Low
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
Medium
Low
High
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
High
High
High
Table 5.9
	 Aggregated ranking of constant parameter sensitivities
Table 5.10 shows only the policy parameter constants, with the top third rankings being
taken as highly sensitive, the middle third as having medium levels of sensitivity and
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the bottom third as having low sensitivity. Base Length of Employment, Training
Effectiveness, Full Hazard Regulation Policy and Training Policy are policies which
should receive the most attention when both testing alternative occupational safety
scenarios and calibrating the occupational safety model with real world data. Of
surprise is the insensitivity of the Safety Monitoring Policy. This may result from the
limitations of performance measurement associated with using a particular base run as
identified by Coyle (1977). Although this parameterisation problem may have reduced
the validity of the results, the overall approach to constant sensitivity measurement
appears to be sound. The results are clear and easy to interpret.
Constant Parameter Sensitivity
Base Length of Employment
Full Hazard Regulation Policy
Training Effectiveness
Training Policy
Accident Reporting Policy
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost
Full Hazard Regulation Time
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA
Accident Reporting Time
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time
Safety Monitoring Policy
Staff Adjustment Time
High
High
High
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Low
Low
Low
Table 5.10
	
Final ranking of policy parameter constants sensitivities
(j) Sensitivity Testing Using Initial Values
The initial value tests involved measuring the robustness of the model against changes
in initial values of levels. Little guidance is to be found in the relevant literature about
this formal sensitivity test of state variables or levels. Indeed no formal method of
initial value sensitivity analysis was found in the literature review. Moffatt (1991)
suggested that initial values should be based on the most accurate data available.
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Richardson and Pugh (1981) simply experiment by varying initial values for levels as a
means to determine whether a parameter is sensitive or insensitive to change.
The purpose of the initial values test was to produce a taxonomy of initial value
sensitivities based on low, medium or high sensitivity. A total of seven levels are
contained within the feedback structure of the model. The initial value sensitivity
testing consisted of single parameter changes, followed by measurements of output
against the base run. As with the previous constant parameter tests, mean gearings were
used to summarise the whole performance of a model run.
Six model outputs were selected as performance metrics, one from each model sector:
Accident Incidence, Accident Reports Being Processed, Actual Length of Employment,
Average KSA, Monthly Safety Cost and RBAAIH. Each one of these assumed equal
importance. A full range of values for each initial value were tested as in previous tests.
The base run for the model was simulated in a state of equilibrium over a duration of 50
time units (months) and the final values were noted. These are evidenced in Table H1 of
Appendix H. The sensitivity of the initial value changes was measured using two
different numerical criteria as previously used in the constant sensitivity tests. The
criteria used were the final output values and the maximum absolute point value. It was
decided to test the effect of initial value changes over a wide range. For each parameter,
the test range was plus and minus 100%, with an 'Adjustment Fraction' of 25%
introduced to the parameter for each run. The final values were noted.
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(k) Initial Value Parameter Modification Final Values
As with the previous final value tests, 48 outputs were produced for each level. The
final values for all the output metrics are set out in Appendix H under Tables H2 to H8.
Again, a gearing ratio was devised. Absolute values were used to compute the gearings.
Gearing was calculated as:
AOutput
AInput
Where;
(I(New Run Final Value - Base Run Final Value)!
=AOutput 
Base Run Final Value
AInput = Adjustment Fraction
The larger the gearing, the higher sensitivity exhibited by the output metrics. Again, a
total of 48 gearings were calculated for each level. These are shown in Tables H9 to
H15 in Appendix H. From these values, a mean gearing for each level was calculated.
The mean gearings for the levels are ranked from most to least sensitive in Table 5.11.
Parameter Mean Initial Value Final Value Output Gearing
Labour 98.98
Safety KSA 44.75
Regulated Hazards 8.98
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00
Hazards under Full Regulation 0.00
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation 0.00
Unregulated Hazards 0.00
Table 5.11
	 Ranking of initial values according to mean final value gearing
The gearings show that only three of the initial values exhibited any sensitivity over the
model's output. Interestingly, the two most sensitive levels are associated with people
rather than actual hazards themselves.
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(1) Initial Value Parameter Maximum Absolute Point Values
The maximum absolute point value was also noted and used to produce a gearing ratio.
Gearing was calculated as:
AOutput
AInput
Where;
(I(Maximum Absolute Value- Base Run Value)I
AOutput =
Base Run Value
AInput = Adjustment Fraction
A total of 48 gearings were collated for each level. These are shown in Tables H16 to
H22. From these values a mean gearing for each constant was computed. Again, the
higher the gearing, the more sensitive the level. The results of the maximum point
values are shown in Table 5.12, ranked from most to least sensitive.
Parameter Mean Initial Value Maximum Point Value Output Gearing
Labour 101.78
Safety KSA 49.75
Regulated Hazards 11.13
Unregulated Hazards 0.18
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.17
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation 0.13
Hazards under Full Regulation • 0.09
Table 5.12	 Ranking of initial values according to mean maximum point value gearing
As with the final values, only three of the initial values exhibited any real sensitivity
over the models output. Interestingly, the two most sensitive levels are associated with
people rather than actual hazards themselves. Labour was the most sensitive parameter.
A variation to the number of employees causes the model to exhibit very high
sensitivity in the instance where the Safety KSA level remained unchanged. The result
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being that as the number of employees decreases markedly, the KSA per employee will
increase massively. This has had the effect of giving an unrealistic change in sensitivity.
Here is a good example of what Forrester (1969) wrote about changes in one parameter
have a drastic effect on the impact of other parameters.
(m) Summary Analysis of Level Initial Value Sensitivity Tests
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient was again used to test the level of association
and its statistical significance. The full methodology, calculations and results are shown
in Section H1 of Appendix H. Table 5.13 is a summary of the parameter sensitivities.
The results show a grand mean sensitivity calculated from the two performance
measures for each level.
Parameter Mean
Initial
Value
Output
Gearing
Rank
Mean Initial
Value Point
Value
Output
Gearing
Rank
Grand
Mean
Rank
Overall
Rank Order
Accident Reports Being Processed
Hazards under Full Regulation
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation
Labour
Regulated Hazards
Safety KSA
Unregulated Hazards
5.5
5.5
5.5
1
3
2
5.5
6
7
6
1
3
2
4
5.75
6.25
5.75
1.00
3.00
2.00
4.75
5=
7
5=
1
3
2
4
Table 5.13
	
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test summary initial value rankings
From the above results the ordinal ranking of the levels sensitivities is clear. Although,
a classification of parameters according to low, medium or high sensitivity is more
useful when both identifying the levels of accuracy needed when initialising the levels,
and in identifying the parameters which have the greatest effect on the GOSM's
behaviour. As before, the top third were taken as being the most sensitive. The full
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classification of all levels is shown in Table 5.14. The initial values for all the levels
contained within the feedback structure of the occupational safety model are under the
control of the modeller. The most sensitive levels are Labour and Safety KSA. These
levels concern the ways in which people carry out their work. These results are in
keeping with the constant parameter tests which showed that employees were the most
sensitive factors. The initial values for hazards were of low to moderate sensitivity and
the actual level of accident reports insensitive. From these results it could be suggested
that the numbers employed and their levels of ability will have more influence over
accidents than the numbers of hazards present in the workplace. Again, the type of base
run selected may inhibit the results.
Initial Value Parameter Sensitivity
Accident Reports Being Processed
Hazards under Full Regulation
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation
Labour
Regulated Hazards
Safety KSA
Unregulated Hazards
Medium/Low
Low
Medium/Low
High
Medium
High
Medium
Table 5.14
	
Aggregated ranking of initial value parameter sensitivity
(n) Table Sensitivity
According to Richardson and Pugh (1981), table functions, as with other parameters,
must be investigated for sensitivity. The effects of reasonable alternative table functions
should be tested in the model. They suggest comparing the behaviour of a model in its
base run with its behaviour in a simulation using an alternative table. It is recommended
to test at first only the extremes of the likely alternatives. If there is no significant
change in the resulting model behaviour, then the conclusion would be that changes to a
particular table function would result in the model being insensitive to that change.
However, if significant changes were found then that may call into question the
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structural formulation of the model, or if there was empirical evidence that suggested a
sensitive causal relationship, then the inclusion of the table could be justified.
In the GOSM all the table functions are based on hypothesised relationships. The basis
for these relationships has been stated clearly in the structural validation of the model.
In order to justify the output of the model as a consequence of some of the hypothesised
relationships, a number of sensitivity tests needed to be performed. Richardson and
Pugh recommend that the sensitivity of table functions should be measured in two
ways, the first to change the slope, and second to change the shape of the table from its
original co-ordinates. These changes will test alternative assumptions about the
structure of the model. The alternative assumptions made about the table functions for
the purpose of the sensitivity tests are described in Appendix I.
A balance had to be struck between spending endless time running simulations and
obtaining a representative sample of output results. There was also the danger that an
unsatisfactory range for the table functions would be tested, so producing misleading
results. The three most sensitive constant parameters as identified in previous tests were
used in order to mitigate the likelihood that the table functions would act as pseudo
constants. In addition, they would put a reasonable limit on the number of simulation
runs necessary to identify table function sensitivity. The three policy parameters used
were Base Length of Employment, Training Policy and Training Effectiveness.
In the first set of tests the slope of the original table was halved. The value of the
chosen parameter was varied over the usual ± 100% range, and the final value was
noted for each of the six outputs: Cumulative Accidents, Average KSA, Actual Length
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of Employment, Cumulative Accident Reports, RBAAIH and Cumulative Safety Costs.
These procedures were then repeated for the other two parameters. In the second set of
tests the shape of the table function was modified and the above procedures were
followed. The whole set of tests were then repeated on the next table. Each test was run
over 50 time periods (months) and it should be noted that only one parameter change
was effected for each test.
The table function settings are recorded in Appendix I in Tables Ii to 16 or, for
additional visual clarity in Graphs Ii to 16, along with the alternative assumptions made
about their slope and shape for the purpose of the sensitivity test. The results of the base
run simulation is shown in Table 17. The full output results are listed for both sets of
tests in Appendix I under Tables 18 to 145.
The results of the sensitivity tests had to be converted into some kind of meaningful
sensitivity measurement. It was decided to compare the percentage change for the new
outputs with those of the base run. Percentage change is calculated as:
(1(New Run - Base Run Value)I)
x100
Base Run Value
The percentage changes in sensitivity brought about by modifications to the table
functions are listed in Appendix I under Tables 146 to 181.
(o) Summary Analysis of Table Function Sensitivity Results
A different approach to classifying the level of sensitivity for table functions was
needed, as table functions are polynomials or collections of parameters as distinct from
constants and initial values which are system parameters. Comparing the rank
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sensitivities for the table functions based on slope and shape changes using Spearman's
Rank Correlation Coefficient is not appropriate because changes in slope cannot be
compared to changes in shape, the difference being too fundamental. The summary
percentage changes in outputs brought about by table function modifications are shown
in Tables 5.15 and 5.16.
Table Function Parameter
•
% Change
Base
Length of
Employ.
% Change
Training
Policy
% Change
Training
Effective.
Grand
Mean %
Change
Accident Repeater
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring
Multiplier
Quit Likelihood
Risk
Unsafe Acts
1.00
1.00
87.00
1.00
14.00
26.00
1.00
1.00
55.00
1.00
13.00
26.00
1.00
1.00
55.00
1.00
13.00
26.00
1.00
1.00
65.67
1.00
13.33
26.00
Table 5.15
	 Grand mean % changes in output metrics resulting from table function slope changes
Table Function Parameter % Change
Base
Length of
Employ.
% Change
Training
Policy
% Change
Training
Effective.
Grand
Mean %
Change
Accident Repeater
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring
Multiplier
Quit Likelihood
Risk
Unsafe Acts
1.00
1.00
81.00
1.00
53.00
15.00
1.00
1.00
45.00
1.00
63.00
19.00
1.00
1.00
44.00
1.00
62.00
19.00
1.00
1.00
56.67
1.00
59.33
17.67
Table 5.16
	
Grand mean % changes in output metrics resulting from table function shape changes
The results in Table 5.15 indicate that only one table is sensitive to slope change
namely the Multiplier, with Unsafe Acts and Risk being moderately sensitive. Table
5.16 shows Risk and Multiplier to be sensitive to table shape change, with Unsafe Acts
being moderately sensitive. Interestingly, the sensitive tables as with the two previous
set of parameter tests are all associated with employees and modifications to the ways
in which people work. These are important to the behaviour of the model.
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The sensitive table functions in the model have been determined. As stated previously,
all the table functions have hypothetical relationships. The causalities and polarities of
each have been suitably justified in the appendices. The next stage of the model
building is to calibrate the model with real world data from a firm. What will be
important, as Coyle (1996) suggests, is to produce the right model behaviour for the
right reasons. It is important to select the correct parameters within the sensitive tables.
However, this selection may not be absolutely criticised and provided that the real
model replicates an actual or plausible behaviour pattern, the parameters are acceptable.
The obvious limitations of this approach to testing table function sensitivity are due to
three possibilities. The first that the results are determined by the base run. The second
is the limited number of changes made to the table parameters. Lastly the possibility
that a wide enough numerical range for each table may not have been tested.
(p) Summary of Parameter Sensitivity Tests
The behavioural sensitivity tests for the three types of parameter: constants, levels and
table functions have been used to discover which parameters have a bearing on the
overall model sensitivity. The tests have identified a number of sensitive parameters.
The range of sensitivities exhibited by the parameters appears to be plausible as they fit
a definite pattern. The study could now concentrate on carefully setting those
parameters which have been shown to be most significant. The policies most likely to
offer the greatest leverage over the safety performance in the host firms are now also
known. This should aid the search for effective policy decisions.
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5.7 Summary of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
Chapter Five has described the building and testing of a quantitative system dynamics
model of occupational safety. The model is generic in nature, and can potentially be
verified with the safety data gathered from any employer. As no similar system
dynamics model has been found to exist, particular effort has been placed on validating
the structure and behaviour of the model. The literature on system dynamics
methodology describes validation in very general terms, although some authors do offer
good specific examples of validation tests. No system dynamics modellers appear to
have detailed a stepwise approach to validation of a model from conception to
completion. This may be why validation is still a rather contentious subject and why
modellers hold to the view that there is no specific set of tests for validating system
dynamics models. Hence, the approach taken to validation, particularly the thorough
parameter sensitivity analysis may have contributed to the development of the system
dynamics methodology. It could be argued that this chapter has over-emphasised the
approach to validation. In response to this assertion, validation is a continuous effort,
both formal and informal, and both implicit and explicit to the model. If the GOSM had
failed to pass any one test then the need to address an earlier stage of the model
development would be paramount. Fortunately, this was not shown to be the case.
Starting with a reference mode of behaviour showing temporal accidents statistics
across the United Kingdom, the organisational boundary of the GOSM and some of the
important variables influencing the reference mode were identified. A causal loop
diagram was constructed to explain the important causal linkages in an occupational
safety system. The inclusion of all parameters and variables was verified using safety
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literature. The overall reinforcing nature of the system suggested that building a
successful quantitative system dynamics model was possible. The structure of the
model has been shown to be a good representation of safety in a real firm both
descriptively and dimensionally. The full model equations and parameters have been
validated. The behavioural tests have identified plausible model outputs given the
extreme nature of the decisions instigated. Also, the sensitivity tests have identified the
sensitive model parameters. The most sensitive parameters are associated with
employment policies, those concerned with staff recruitment, retention and turnover;
and the knowledge, skills and attitude of staff. This also adds to plausibility of the
model (in particular see Chapter Three, Section 3.4 for justification).
In Chapter Five the feasibility of an empirical study has been addressed. A number of
careful measures have been taken to ensure that the model replicates the structure and to
a lesser degree, the behaviour of a real occupational safety system. At this stage of the
study, the main limitation to verifying the plausibility of the model is the absence of
real world data. Chapter Six will address this shortfall. It offers an approach to verifying
the occupational safety model with real world data in order to replicate the safety
behaviour in an employing organisation.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Real World System Dynamics Model of Occupational
Safety
6.1 Introduction to the Real World Calibrated Safety Model
If an operational system dynamics model is to be accepted by employers and managers
of a host firm as a policy analysis tool they will often expect the model to replicate the
past behaviour of the proposed system under study (Lyneis, 1999). They may wish to
compare how well the model-generated behaviour matches the observed behaviour of
the real system (Forrester and Senge, 1980).
Homer (1996) warned about the limitations of gathering insights from an exploratory
model without stopping to evaluate its validity. System dynamics is a scientific
approach to modelling, and as such its models should contain a wide range of empirical
detail about a system based on both data and experience. This would allow the model to
produce predictions with levels of confidence and insights greater than those of an
exploratory model. The generic occupational safety model, being an exploratory one
based on experiential data, can offer an insight into the problem of occupational safety.
Without empirical detail and sufficient calibration it would be difficult to get the
managers of a real organisation to even think about making specific safety policy
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decisions based on these insights. Sterman (1984) suggests that when building
empirically based system dynamics models, parameters should be estimated from below
the level of aggregation of the model. He mentions interviews, engineering data,
surveys and other disaggregate studies that draw on the knowledge of the system's
structure, rather than its aggregate behaviour. This approach will be used throughout
this chapter.
Chapter Six is concerned with model evaluation, as outlined in Phase Five of Roberts et
al's. modelling framework (1983, p.8). It describes the conversion of the generic
occupational safety model (GOSM) from an exploratory model to an empirically based
operational one. This is achieved by using safety data and experience derived from a
host manufacturing firm and by developing a three-year historical representation of the
key behaviour of their safety management system. Two phases in the development of an
empirically validated real world occupational safety model (RWOSM) are described.
The first phase is the more substantial (Sections 6.2 to 6.6), and involves the
measurement and validation of all numerical parameter values in the model. Section 6.2
describes the criteria which a firm would have to fulfil in order to participate in an
empirical test of the safety model The background to the host firm chosen for
developing the real world occupational safety model (RWOSM) with is outlined in
Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 the terms of reference agreed with the managers of the host
firm for the empirical study are outlined. The data requirements for the validation of the
RWOSM are set out in Section 6.5.
191
Section 6.6 is the most substantial in this chapter. The process of validating all the
model parameters and important comparative outputs is described. The level of
objectivity of the parameters determined the process by which numerical values were
arrived at for each parameter. Hard data was collected from the firm's records and more
descriptive data was elicited through direct discussion and a questionnaire survey of
employees. How well these facts and opinions were analysed would determine the ease
with which the model could be parameterised and calibrated to achieve a level of
correspondence between simulated output and historical data. Many of the policies were
found to be dynamic and numerical time-series data played an important role in
achieving a close historical match between model and reality.
The second phase is set out in Section 6.7. It consists of an explanation of how the
RWOSM was calibrated to replicate the past safety behaviour of the host firm by tuning
the less measurable parameters to achieve correspondence between real and simulated
safety. The important outputs of the behaviour replication efforts are outlined and the
possible reasons for such behaviour are discussed. The closeness of fit between
important simulated output and past data from the host firm is then tested. The size of
the error and its composition is assessed to determine whether the correspondence
between model outputs and historical data is acceptable. If these tests were passed this
would allow a more confident safety policy analysis to be conducted with the host firm.
Finally, Section 6.8 is a summary of the process of data elicitation and model
parameterisation within the firm. It also indicates the level of success in replicating
historical safety behaviour using the validated RWOSM.
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6.2 Criteria for Selection of a Host Firm
Information about occupational safety and accident statistics is for many organisations
very sensitive. Many employers do not wish to have their occupational safety records
examined closely by outside parties. If the RWOSM were to be calibrated to replicate a
good historical fit against real safety data, a number of criteria would need to be met for
this partnership to be successful. The host would have to allow sufficient access to
company records and contact with staff. The research would have to guarantee both
compliance with the Data Protection Act, 1984 and respect of staff confidentiality. To
evaluate the appropriateness of such an empirically based occupational safety model,
managers of the firm would need to be interviewed so as to elicit their views of the
model's value.
6.3 Background to the Host Firm
Due to a confidentiality arrangement with the host employer, the identity of the firm
and the full details of its work are not revealed in this thesis. The host firm was
internationally owned and the site where the study took place was the largest of three
manufacturing plants in the United Kingdom. Low and medium density fibreboard was
manufactured from raw timber on site. The firm's products are supplied to most of the
large furniture manufacturers in the UK and many in Europe. A total of 450 people
were employed on the site.
Work activities on the site were of a high-risk nature. As a consequence, health and
safety was afforded a high priority. The health and safety information system in
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operation was highly structured and well documented. Most safety and personnel
records were contained within a computer networked relational database.
It was agreed with the safety managers that to examine safety across the whole of the
firm would be very time-consuming. In the event, it was decided to examine a large
department in the plant, the 'Finishing Department', which had recently bucked the
firm's downward accident trend despite the efforts of safety and production
management. There were two sections, Finishing End One (F1) and Finishing End Two
(F2). The department was responsible for cutting batches of low and medium density
fibreboard to size and sending them for storage. A total of 57 employees worked in both
finishing ends. From an initial tour of the works and inspection of the accident statistics
it was evident that many injuries were lacerations brought about by trips, slips and falls.
Fortunately, these are the types of injury that are relatively easy to prevent at an
affordable price if appropriate remedial action is taken. The most serious danger was
fire, and fire prevention was high on the list of priorities.
6.4 Agreeing on the Criteria for Calibrating the Real World Occupational Safety
Model
One of the objectives of the study was to 'apply the generic workplace safety model to a
real world industrial setting' (see Chapter One, Section 1.3 for full thesis objectives. For
guidance on group model building with clients as an alternative route to developing
system dynamics models (see Vennix 1996,1997). It was hoped that all the extensive
work carried out to develop and subsequently test the validity of the GOSM would be
worthwhile. It was evident that the hurdle to progression of the work lay in convincing
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the firm's managers that the model structure was broadly representative of safety in
their workplace. If this was not to be the case, two options were open. The first was to
seek an alternative host firm, and the second was to modify the structure of the model.
As the GOSM had been deliberately designed in order to represent the broad problem of
occupational safety through the development of a structure common to most employers,
the modeller was confident that the host firm would accept the model as it had been
built.
The Safety managers readily agreed to help calibrate the model. In return, they hoped
its output would fit the past observed safety behaviour. In their eyes, having the
simulation model produce a good historical fit was probably the most important test of
the model's credibility. The extent to which the model would mimic the past behaviour
of safety in the firm would depend on both how representative the model's structure
was of the real safety system and the accuracy of the data collected for model
parameterisation. It was evident that the managers were concerned as much about the
costs of safety as actual accidents. They were interested in seeing how improved safety
policies might both reduce accidents and the cost of operating the workplace safety
system. A model that showed certain desirable safety scenarios could be a useful
bargaining counter when asking for additional resources.
(a) The Time Horizon for Matching the Historical Fit of Model with Reality
The safety records had been fully computerised for more than three years. It was agreed
that a suitable time horizon for the behaviour replication was three years. This is a
sufficiently long period for identifying any underlying trends in the safety system. Most
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of the firm's safety data was documented on a monthly basis, so this remained the time
interval for the simulation.
(b) Setting the Objectives for Model Calibration
The firm supported the study not only by offering access to safety documents but by
forming a small team to assist in collecting both formal and informal data for model
parameterisation. The team consisted of the safety manager, safety officer, fire officer
and Finishing Department manager. For the team to work together efficiently in the
research, a clear set of calibration objectives had to be agreed by all. It was agreed to:
> Examine the generic occupational safety model (GOSM) to ensure that the
necessary structure to replicate the past behaviour of the safety system in the
department was present.
> Ensure that the most accurate informal and formal data be made available. It was
obvious that the inaccurate setting of parameters could lead to errors in the
difference between observed and simulated safety, calling the validity of the whole
real world occupational safety model (RWOSM) into question.
> Arrive at the cost-benefit for alternative choices. A model based on empirically
derived cost centres would help the managers understand where best to allocate
safety efforts. It was agreed that a substantial portion of the model calibration
should involve the costing of both accidents and safety policies. This would allow
the cost-benefit of different scenarios to be understood.
(c) Explaining the Full Model Structure to the Management Team
Building the manager's confidence in the GOSM was achieved through introducing the
basic causal feedback structure of the model first to the team (see Chapter Five, Figure
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5.3). The fact that there were two principal balancing loops and one reinforcing loop
governing the behaviour of the system was explained. The team understood that
accidents were generated by the reinforcing Safety knowledge, skills and attitude
(KSA) feedback loop and controlled by the balancing Proactive and Reactive safety
loops. Once this was understood, the GOSM was introduced.
At first, only the most important system parameters were explained to the group. The
group examined and then raised questions about various equations and policy
parameters. Their queries were satisfied, and the team moved their attention to the
model's simulated outputs.
The group wished to explore the robustness of the model by carrying out a number of
extreme behaviour tests. They decided that the best way to examine the plausibility of
the model was to exaggerate some of the policy decisions. The major model policies
such as safety training were taken to exaggerated highs and lows and the behaviour of a
number of model outputs compared. They were pleased to see that the model output
showed very problematic behaviour when certain policies were shut off. At the other
extreme they noticed that arbitrarily setting policies with high levels of resources only
served to push up the costs of safety to an unsustainable level without showing any
significant improvement in accident rates. The team was introduced to the aspects of the
model structure which were thought to cause the behaviour under study. To connect the
system's behaviour to the underlying structure of the model, frequent reference was
made to the causal loop diagram. After playing out a range of safety scenarios, the team
was convinced that the model's structure was sound and the capture of' a historical
replication of the behaviour of safety in the Finishing Department feasible.
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The modeller was aware that the firm's managers were becoming involved in the model
building process at its half way stage. As a result of them not being involved in
developing the GOSM one could argue that they may have had a far from perfect
understanding of the model's mechanism. On the other hand, just because the team did
not seek changes to any of the model structure does not automatically suggest that they
did not understand essentially how the GOSM's structure and parameterisation
determined its simulated outputs.
6.5 Host Firm Data Requirements
Calibration of the model would require a substantial effort due to the array of model
parameters and their dimensions. For the RWOSM to generate a historical mode of
behaviour, the model parameters would have to be validated accurately using hard data
derived from the firm's database and manual records and more descriptive data
obtained from discussions with managers and survey of employees to validate the softer
parameters.
Before any data could be collected and analysed it was important to identify every
parameter needing numerical validation. These parameters were policies and levels.
Changes to the less easily measured invariant constants and table functions would not
be performed until the detailed calibration stage following the validation of the policies
and levels. The dimensional analysis showed that there were a total of seven different
dimensions contained within the structure of the model. The level of objectivity varied
across all the dimensions. It was decided to categorise the parameters according to their
objectivity, and then to determine the processes by which the data would be captured.
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The categories chosen were objective, where exact values could be collected; semi-
objective, where good estimates of values could be determined; and subjective, which
would cover softer parameters not traditionally measured quantitatively.
The parameter sensitivity tests had highlighted, in rank order, the level of sensitivity
that the GOSM exhibited to single parameter changes. The level of accuracy for which
each parameter would need to be validated was noted. The effort placed in deriving data
for each parameter was to be commensurate to the results of the previous sensitivity
tests performed on the GOSM. A summary of the data needs for the parameters to be
validated are set out in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.
Parameter Objective, Semi-Objective or
Subjective?
Accuracy
Required
Accident Report Cost
Accident Reporting Policy
Accident Reporting Time
Cost per Accident
Full Hazard Regulation Cost
Full Hazard Regulation Policy
Full Hazard Regulation Time
Intermediate Haznrd Regulation Cost
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time
Safety Monitoring Cost
Safety Monitoring Policy
Base Length of Employment
Perceived Accident Incidence
Staff Adjustment Time
Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA
Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA
Safety Training Cost
Training Effectiveness
Training Policy
Training Delay
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Semi-Objective
Objective
Subjective
Semi-Objective
Subjective
Subjective
Subjective
Semi-Objective
Subjective
Objective
Subjective
-
Medium
Low
-
-
High
Medium
-
Medium
Low
-
Low
High
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
-
High
High
Low
Table 6.1
	
Validation needs for policy parameters
Note that in Table 6.1, the required accuracy for the financial policy parameters is not
specified. This is because these constants are not contained within any part of the
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feedback loop structure of the model, and could not previously be tested for sensitivity.
Obviously, the more accurately the parameters are calibrated, the more likely the
RWOSM is to replicate observed behaviour.
Table 6.1 clearly shows that the vast majority of policy parameters are semi-objective in
nature. These could be estimated confidently through discussions with the management
team. The most difficult parameters to set would be those which were both subjective in
nature and required accurate setting. Fortunately, only Training Effectiveness fitted this
bill.
Parameter Objective, Semi-Objective or
Subjective?
Accuracy
Required
Accident Reports Being Processed
Hazards under Full Regulation
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation
Regulated Hazards
Unregulated Hazards
Labour
Safety KSA
Objective
Objective
Objective
Objective
" Objective
Objective
Subjective
Medium/Low
Low
Medium/Low
Medium
Medium
High
High
Table 6.2
	
Validation needs for levels
Table 6.2 shows that all apart from one of the levels which needed to be calibrated is
objective in nature. The only subjective level is Safety KSA, a sensitive parameter
which needs to be accurately set.
As well as setting the parameters, a number of measures of the safety system's past
behaviour or output metrics had to be generated by the model for comparison with
historical data. The two variables needed for comparison were Accident Rate and
Actual Length of Employment.
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6.6 Host Firm Data Collection and Analysis
Data was collected from April 1993 to March 1996, a period of 36 months. Every sector
of the model contained either policy parameters or levels that needed to be validated
with real world data.
(a) Validating the Accident Rate
The Accident Rate represents the number of accidents occurring in a month (see
Appendix B for fuller details). For the purpose of the model this acts as a variable and
as an important performance output. The number of monthly accidents, their severity,
and the resulting number of lost working days were collated for the three-year period.
Tables J1 to J3 in Appendix J show the host firm's monthly injury statistics for the
year's 1993194 to 1995/96. The accident figures are classified according to the
Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations, 1985 as Over-
3-Day, Under-3-Day, and Minor injuries. An Over-3-Day injury causes an employee to
be absent from work for over three days, an Under 3-Day injury for absence of three
days or less, and a minor injury does not cause an employee to be absent. Where
appropriate, the man-days lost for each month are shown.
The monthly accident statistics are prone to a great deal of short-term fluctuation. The
annual figures suggests that there was an upward trend in accidents with 51 injuries in
1993-94, 68 in 1994-95 and 72 in 1995-96. These figures are the observed output of the
firm's safety system. The RWOSM would need to replicate the monthly Accident Rate
if a successful historical match was to be achieved. In addition to being used as a
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historical performance measure of the safety system the figures would help to estimate
the Accident Reporting Policy, Accident Reporting Time and Accidents Reporting
Cost.
\
(b) Validating the Accident Reporting Time
Accident Reporting Time is a policy parameter which represents the amount of time
that it takes to process each accident report (see Appendix A for fuller details). This
parameter is semi-objective in nature and requires estimation. A discussion with the
management team rendered details about who might be typically involved in the
accident reporting process, what their roles were, and most importantly for numerical
validation, the duration of their participation. Tables 34 to 36 outline the findings of
these discussions. The estimates show that total number of man-hours dedicated to
dealing with an Over-3-Day injury was 16.5 hours. For an under-3-Day injury it was
10.5 hours, and for a minor injury it was 1.5 hours. In order to arrive at a measure of the
average Accident Reporting Time, a breakdown of the injury severities is also required.
Table J7 in Appendix J is a summary of the injury statistics in the firm over the three-
year period. The Accident Reporting Time can be calculated as follows.
= (Minor
Time 	 x Hours) + (Under - 3 - day x Hours) + (Over -3-  day x Hours) Accident Report ng 
Total injuries
Where :
Minor = minor injuries
Under - 3 - day = under - 3 - day injuries
Over - 3 - day = Over -3-  day injuries
Hours = Time needed to process accident report
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12
Accident Reporting Time = (99 x1.5) + (18 x 10.5) + (74 x 16.5) 
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= 8hours
The Accident Reporting Time parameter is set at 8 hours.
(c) Validating the Accident Reporting Policy
The Accident Reporting Policy is a parameter representing the man-hours in a month
dedicated to monthly accident reporting (see Appendix A for full details). It is semi-
objective in nature as it is arrived at through estimation. It is a policy parameter which
largely depends upon the Accident Rate. This parameter would vary over time and need
to be set using time-series data. To vary this policy on a time scale of anything less than
one year would not be representative of the real safety system, as business functions
tend only to review their resource needs on an annual basis. Having the Accident
Reporting Policy remaining invariant for twelve-month periods would be a good
representation of the real system. The short-term increases in accidents would create a
situation where temporary backlogs of unprocessed accidents would arise, a trait not
unusual in any firm.
The accident trend was upwards with the figures for the three-years being 51, 68 and 72
accidents respectively. The Accident Reporting Time has been calculated as 8 hours.
From these two sets of data, the Accident Reporting Policy can now be found.
AnnualPolicy
	
accidents x Accident Reporting TimeAnnual Accident Reporting
	 —
Where :
12 = No. of months per annum
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Annual time - series Accident Reporting Policy = 51x 8 68 x 8 72 x 8
12	 12	 12
= 34,45,48
The Accident Reporting Policy parameter is set at 34+STEP(11,13)+STEP(3,25) hours.
(d) Validating the Workplace Hazards
Workplace hazards move between four states (for further details refer to Appendix C).
These are objective in nature as their occurrence can be quantified accurately. The
firm's database contained extensive results of the risk assessments and risk control
measures taken dating back over an eighteen-month period. Although this did not cover
the whole three-year history for which the model would replicate behaviour, the time
over which the records dated back was sufficiently long for the model to arrive at a fair
representation of the assessment and control of workplace hazards. Detailed records of
every workplace hazard were accessible. Hazards were classified according to whether
they were related to the work environment or to specific work activities. The risk
assessment records showed that 102 hazards were present in the workplace at the time
of the study. The 41 relating to specific work activities were quantitatively assessed for
risk. The remainder were environmental hazards such as walkways and lighting and
were qualitatively assessed.
(e) Validating the Initial Hazard Levels
From the risk assessment records an average hazard distribution across the four states
could be produced. Month by month the records were examined and the hazards
categorised according to their present states. This distribution is an average spread of
hazards, and would be used to initialise the hazard values in the model and for historical
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Total Regulated HazardsAverage Regulated Hazards —
Number of Months Available
Total Unregulated Hazards
Average Unregulated Hazards —
Number of Months Available
Number of Months
comparisons against the simulated hazard distribution. Table J8 in Appendix J shows
this distribution over the eighteen-month period. The figures show that at any one time
the vast majority of hazards were in a regulated state. This is what would be expected
for a firm that had a competent occupational safety system. If the opposite had been the
case, the firm's safety system would be out of control. The initial hazard values can be
determined through calculating the average distribution for the hazards. As the hazard
distribution data for the first half of the historical study are not available, it is inevitable
that the initial values set are unlikely to match those of the real historical system too
closely.
1727
18
=96
_ 9
— 18
=0.5
Average Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation — Total Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation
. 79
18
=4.5
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Average Hazards Under Full Regulation — Total Hazards Under Full Regulation
Number of Months
_ 21
— 18
=1
Regulated Hazards is set at 96, Unregulated Hazards at 0.5, Hazards Under
Intermediate Regulation at 4.5, and Hazards Under Full Regulation at 1.
(f) Validating the Hazard Regulation Times
The Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time and Full Hazard Regulation Time represent
the time it takes to regulate a hazard intermediately or fully (see Appendix C for full
details). The policy parameters are semi-objective in nature. Discussions with the
management team produced estimates of the time spent processing each hazard. From
these figures, average times to process intermediate and full hazards were determined.
Table J9 in Appendix J details the results of those discussions. Numerical estimates of
the time afforded to hazard regulation by the line managers, line employees and safety
managers is shown for the 41 quantitatively assessed records. Where no risk control
action was taken, the duration of intermediate and full action taken was zero. From the
estimates of these durations, the average time taken to intermediately and fully regulate
a hazard could be determined. Of the 41 hazards, 27 received intermediate regulation
and 19 full regulation.
Hours spent on intermediate hazard regulation Intermediate HazardRegulation Time =
Number of Ha7ards Acted Upon
57
27
= 2.1
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Full Hazard Regulation Time Hours spent on full hazard regulation
—
Number of Hazards Acted Upon
432
19
=22.7
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time is set at 2.1 hours, and Full Hazard Regulation
Time at 22.7 hours.
(g) Validating the Hazard Regulation Policies
The Intermediate Hazard Regulation and Full Hazard Regulation Policies represent the
man-hours dedicated to intermediate and full hazard regulation in a month (for a full
description see Appendix C). They are semi-objective in nature, as they are arrived at
through estimation. As the hazard data was only available for the previous eighteen-
month period then it seemed plausible to set the policies as invariant for the purpose of
the simulation.
The hazard regulation policies are averages, and can be determined by dividing the total
time spent on hazard regulation by the time over which the hazard data was collected.
Total Time Spent on Intermediate Hazard RegulationIntermediate Hazard Regulation Policy =
Time Period Over Which Hazard Data was Collected
_ 57
— 18
=3.2
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Full Hazard Regulation Policy = 
	
Total Time Spent on Full Hazard Regulation 
Time Period Over Which Hazard Data was Collected
432
18
=24
The Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy is set at 3.2 hours per month, and the Full
Hazard Regulation Policy set at 24 hours per month.
(h) Validating the Safety Monitoring Policy
The Safety Monitoring Policy represents the time in a month dedicated to activities
associated with measuring the performance of the safety system (see Chapter Three,
Sections 3.4 and 3.7 for theoretical background; and Appendix C for a full description
of activities). This parameter is semi-objective in nature. A discussion with the
managers allowed a picture to emerge of the activities associated with safety
monitoring. The managers were queried about the dates on which these activities were
introduced to the safety management system, the number of persons involved in them
and estimates of the time spent. New activities were introduced periodically over the
three-year period. This required the parameter to be set up using time-series data.
Tables J10 to J13 in Appendix J show a summary of the time spent on safety
monitoring activities. The tables show that at the start of the three-year period only
three safety monitoring activities were operated, increasing to six three years later. The
total time dedicated to the policy grew, from only 18 man-hours per month to 50 man-
hours in the space of three years.
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Number of Employees
The Safety Monitoring Policy is set at 18+STEP(23,15)+STEP(2,28)+STEP(7,35)
hours per month.
(i) Validation the Base and Actual Length of Employment
The Base Length of Employment is a parameter which represents the average period
over which a member of staff would be expected to remain employed by the firm
assuming that their safety morale was running at a maximum. The Actual Length of
Employment is a variable. It represents the actual time a person is employed, and is
influenced by the level of safety morale in the workforce (see Appendix D for a full
description of both). In order to calibrate the model to represent the Actual Length of
Employment, the Base Length of Employment needed to be set higher to represent staff
turnover resulting from the accident situation.
Actual Length of Employment is objective in nature and easily quantifiable. The firm's
database contained details of the starting dates for each employee. From these figures,
an average for the Actual Length of Employment could be easily computed. This
parameter is calculated using the figures presented in Table J14 in Appendix J.
Total Months EmployedActual Length of Employment —
5808 +1495
=
42+15
= 128
The Base Length of Employment was arrived at through careful calibration of the Base
Length of Employment. This required some minor changes to the numerical values of
the Base Length of Employment. Although there had been a steadily growing number
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of accidents in the department the figures suggested that the safety system was still far
from being out of control. The assumptions in the model equations are that a moderate
accident rate will only have a small effect on staff turnover. In order to for the model to
replicate an Actual Length of Employment of near to 128 months, the Base Length of
Employment was set to 129 months. This allowed the RWOSM to replicate a good
approximation of the real employment duration.
The Base Length of Employment is set at 129 months.
(j) Validating the Training Policy
The Training Policy is objective in nature and represents the amount of safety training
given to the employees of the Finishing Department (see Appendix F for further
details). The database contained comprehensive records dating back over a number of
years detailing the safety training activities which employees had engaged in. Three
classifications of training existed in the firm. These were on-the-job, in-house and
external. The rich data on training allowed the Training Policy to be set using numerical
time-series data.
The development and delivery of on-the-job training was the responsibility of each
departmental manager and their supervisors. Quite a large portion of their staff
development time was spent delivering intensive safety induction and refresher training.
The refresher training was used to both reaffirm the more formal training and to
maintain and develop a positive attitude towards safe working practices. All these
records were manual and required the Finishing Manager to make good estimates of the
durations of each individual training session that they had delivered over the three-year
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period. The development of training material was the responsibility of the Safety
Department. The safety management did not train the workforce directly but developed
the training material. Managers with specific safety knowledge delivered this training.
Only forklift truck training was identified from the database as in-house. External
training was classified as any training delivered by an outside organisation. This
information was also stored on the database. Six types of training were identified from
records. Four different organisations were used to deliver this training. External training
included first aid, woodworking machine use, chainsaw use, risk assessment, safety
management and fire safety.
A number of different training types, mediums and deliverers have been mentioned.
The volume of data relating to safety training across the Department was substantial.
This data had to be aggregated to put it in a form suitable for parameterisation of the
Training Policy. All types of training contribute towards the development of KSA. It
would be very difficult to assess the individual contribution of a piece of training to the
development of employee's KSA. A time—series reflecting the training given over the
previous three-year period was determined. The man-hours spent on safety training over
the three-year period is presented in Table J15 in Appendix J. This table shows that the
Training Policy did fluctuate somewhat, although the underlying trend was fairly static.
The Training Policy is set up as GRAPH(TIME) (0.00, 7.50), (1.00, 52.5), (2.00, 22.5),
(3.00, 30.0), (4.00, 0.00), (5.00, 7.50), (6.00, 195), (7.00, 15.0), (8.00, 45.0), (9.00,
15.0), (10.0, 15.0), (11.0, 90.0), (12.0, 60.0), (13.0, 150), (14.0, 90.0), (15.0, 52.5),
(16.0, 105), (17.0, 105), (18.0, 143), (19.0, 15.0), (20.0, 30.0), (21.0, 7.50), (22.0, 15.0),
(23.0, 0.00), (24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 113), (26.0, 113), (27.0, 37.5), (28.0, 60.0), (29.0,
37.5), (30.0, 60.0), (31.0, 22.5), (32.0, 22.5), (33.0, 240), (34.0, 22.5), (35.0, 7.5) man-
hours per month.
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(k) Validating the Training Delay
Training Delay represents the time lag between training being delivered and its benefits
becoming evident. This is subjective in nature, and would be very difficult to measure
accurately. There would be obvious differences between individual trainees and the
types of training undertaken. Fortunately, the sensitivity analysis on the GOSM had
indicated that changes in this delay has very little effect over the model's behaviour.
&ranks (1994b) and Wallerstein and Baker (1994) suggest that it can take several
months before a valid evaluation of the impact of safety training can be made. In line
with the literature the arbitrary delay of three months set in the GOSM remained in the
RWOSM.
The Training Delay was set at three months.
(1) Validating the Perceived Accident Incidence
Perceived Accident Incidence represents how the workforce perceives the underlying
accident incidence. The Accident Incidence is smoothed using a third-order smoothing
(see Appendix D for further details). The smoothing time is subjective in nature and
difficult to measure. Fortunately it was identified as very insensitive in the GOSM.
Therefore, the need to accurately validate it was low. The smoothing time of three
months, set in the GOSM was retained as basing the underlying accident perception as
medium term, is not an unreasonable assumption.
Perceived Accident Incidence smooth is set at three months.
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(m) Validating the Staff Adjustment Time
Staff Adjustment Time represents the time it takes to replace staff leaving the firm (for
fuller details see Appendix D). This is semi-objective in nature. In the GOSM this was
set at four months. Sensitivity tests revealed that this parameter was very insensitive, so
attempting to validate this accurately was unnecessary. The management team agreed
that this figure was a good approximation of the recruitment time.
Staff Adjustment Time is set at four months.
(n) Validating the Safety Costs
A total of five cost parameters needed to be numerically validated in the RWOSM.
These were the Accident Report Cost, Cost per Accident, Full Hazard Regulation Cost,
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost, Safety Monitoring Cost and Safety Training
Cost. These parameters differ from the other model parameters in that they do not affect
the feedback structure of the model. This is not to say that they are any the less
important. They are essential for helping arrive at the cost-benefits of alternative
strategies. All are semi-objective in nature and are a mixture of direct and indirect costs
(see Section 3.5 of Chapter Three for fuller details). These costs would be arrived at
through a mixture of hard financial data, estimates provided by the managers and HSE
published statistics. Most of the data used to calculate these financial parameters relate
to the cost of labour.
The management team agreed to divulge the wage rates of the line employees. This
amounted to £311 per week or over a 37.5-hour week, £8.29 per hour. They did not
wish to disclose their own salaries. It was decided to multiply the line employees' wage
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by one and a half to arrive at an estimate of a supervisor's and fire officer's wages
(£12.44 per hour) and by two for a safety or the department manager (£.16.58 per hour).
(o) Validating the Accident Reporting Cost
The Accident Reporting Cost is the man-hour cost of the Accident Reporting Policy
(see Appendix A for fuller details). Material costs are negligible and are not included in
the calculation. Using the accident reporting data from Tables J4 to J6 and wage rates,
the hourly cost of accident reporting can be determined. The time employees are
involved in processing an average accident report is multiplied by relevant wage rates
and then divided by the total hours over which employees are involved in processing
accidents.
Total cost of processing an accident report Accident Reporting Cost =
Total hours spent processing an accident report
Where :
Total cost of processing an accident report = line management time x relevant wage
+ line supervisors time x relevant wage + safety management time x relevant wage
+ line employees time x relevant wage
reporting — (8.5 x 16.50+ (4.25 x12.44)+ (4.75 x 16.50+ (11x 8.29)Hourly cost of accident reporti 
28.5
=12.76
The Accident Reporting Cost is set at £12.76 per hour.
(p) Validating the Intermediate and Full Hazard Regulation Costs
The intermediate and full hazard regulation policies are essentially the same in
composition, with full regulation being more comprehensive. The hazard regulation
costs represent the average man-hour cost of processing hazards (see Appendix C for
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further details). The cost of hazard regulation is split between the labour input and
materials. A reasonable estimate of the labour cost could be arrived at, but the cost of
the materials used to mitigate hazards is not included in these calculations. This has
probably introduced an underestimate of the true cost of hazard regulation. Despite this,
the majority of these costs would be wage-related, and the cost of materials would be
insignificant by comparison.
A discussion with the line management team revealed that the line manager and three
supervisors were involved in both intermediate and full hazard regulation activities. The
line management cost equates to the manager's wage at £16.58 per hour plus the
supervisors' wages at £.12.44 per hour. Using the data from Table J9 and relevant wage
rates, the hourly costs of hazard regulation can be determined.
Total cost of regulation Hourly cost of intermediate hazard regulation —
Time spent on regulation
Where :
Total cost of regulation = safety management time x relevant wage rate +
line management time x relevant wage rate + line employee time x relevant wage rate
.	 x 16.50+ (32 x 13.48)4- (24 x 8.29)Hourly cost of intermediate regulation —
57
= £11.35
Total cost of regulation Hourly cost of full hazard regulation =
	
	
 (£ I hour)
Time spent on regulation
Where :
Total cost of regulation = safety management time x relevant wage rate +
line management time x relevant wage rate + line employee time x relevant wage rate
regulation =	 (13 x16.58)+ (28 x13.48) + (391x 8.29)Hourly cost of full 
432
=E8.87
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The intermediate and full hazard regulation costs are set at £11.35 and £8.87 per hour
respectively.
(q) Validating the Safety Monitoring Cost
The Safety Monitoring Cost represents the average man-hour cost of the Safety
Monitoring Policy (see Appendix C for fuller description). Tables J10 to J13 show the
time spent by different types of employee on safety monitoring activities over the three-
year period. Using this data, and relevant wage rates, the hourly cost of safety
monitoring can be determined.
Total cost of safety monitoring Hourly cost of safety monitoring =
Time spent on safety monitoring
Where :
Total cost of safety monitoring = line management time x relevant wage + line employee x relevant wage +
safety management time x relevant wage + fire officer time x relevant wage
Table 6.3 shows the changes in the total safety monitoring costs for the three-year
period.
Months Safety Monitoring Activities Total Man
Hour Cost (£)
1-15 Fire inspections and Safety committee 12.84
16-28 Fire inspections and Safety committee, Risk assessment, Safety
monitoring
12.57
29-35 Fire inspections and Safety committee, Risk assessment, Safety 12.49
Monitoring, Guard inspections
35-36 Fire inspections and Safety committee, Risk assessment, Safety
monitoring, Guard inspections, Safety tours
12.60
Table 6.3	 Changes to the hourly cost of safety monitoring over the three-year period
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Despite radical changes to the safety monitoring activities, the man-hour cost remained
fixed. The Safety Monitoring Cost can be rounded to £.13 per hour.
(r) Validating the Labour
Labour represents the total number of employees working in the department. At the
start of the three-year period, there were 57 employee in the Finishing Department.
Labour was therefore set at 57.
(s) Validating the Accident Reports Being Processed
Accident Reports Being Processed represents the backlog of accident reports awaiting
attention. For further details see Appendix A. The model was relatively insensitive to
this parameter, therefore as there was only one accident in the first month of the period,
Accident Reports Being Processed was set at 1.
(t) Validating the Safety Training Cost
The Safety Training Cost represents the hourly cost of an aggregation of on-the-job, in-
house and external training. See Appendix F for fuller descriptions. In order to arrive at
a cost for the training, the training would have to be split into on-the-job training as one
cost centre, and in-house and external training as a second cost centre. The on-the-job
training cost is based on wage rates, and the in-house and external training costs based
on wage rate and the fixed cost of training delivery. The average hourly cost of safety
training is determined monthly for the three-year period, then an average is taken to
represent the hourly cost of safety training.
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Hourly cost of in - house and 'external' safety training =
The Finishing Department manager was responsible for administering all on-the-job
training. The training was normally provided by the manager for five employees at a
time, i.e. for every hour of training delivery there are five man-hours of training benefit.
The training cost equates to the manager's wage at £16.58 per hour plus the employees'
wages at £8.29 per hour. This averages out at £11.60 per man-hour. Using the training
data from Table J15 and relevant wage rates, the hourly cost of on-the-job training can
be determined. Table J16 in Appendix J shows the cost of in-house training over the
three-year period.
Hourly cost of on - the - job safety training = Total cost of safety training 
Time spent on safety training
Hourly cost of on - the - job safety training = 11310 
975
=f11.60
In-house and external training was delivered to all employees of the firm, rather than
being arranged purely for the benefit of Finishing Department employees. All training
was delivered in blocks of at least 7.5 hours, as opposed to the short periods of on-the-
job training. The cost of this training is greater than on-the-job training as it includes
both the fixed cost of running the training plus the labour costs of the participants. The
fixed cost per trainee needs to be calculated for each form of training. Using the training
data from Table J15 and relevant wage rates, the hourly cost of a combination of in-
house and external training can be determined. Table J17 in Appendix J shows the cost
of this training over the three-year period.
Total cost of safety training 
Time spent on safety training
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Hourly cost of in - house and external safety training — 16958
1080
= £15.70
The hourly cost of safety training can be found by taking an average cost for on-the-job,
and in-house plus external training.
training = Cost	 of on - the - job training + Cost of in - house and external trainingHourly cost of all trai 
Total time spent on training
Hourly cost of all training = 113 10 + 16958
975 +1080
= £13.75
Safety Training Cost is set at £13.75 per hour.
(u) Validating the Cost per Accident
Cost per Accident represents a number of direct and indirect costs associated with an
accident (see Appendix B for fuller details). To arrive at a final cost, a number of sub-
costs needed to be summed.
Cost per Accident = indemnity insurance + first - aid cost + absenteeism + overtime costs +
damage costs
The indemnity insurance cost is based on the nature of the industry, the numbers of
employees in the firm, and its accident statistics. Due to lack of sufficient detail, the
contribution of the indemnity insurance per accident can only be based on the overall
premium cost, the proportion of the firm's employees working in the Finishing
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Indemnity insurance cost per accident —
Where :
Total firm employees
Department and the accidents occurring in that department. Using the 1995 statistics a
cost can be estimated.
Indemnity contribution
No. of accidents in Finishing department
Finishing department employeesIndemnity insurance cost per accident = Indemnity insurance cost x
57400000x
Indemnity insurance cost per accident =	 450
This figure of E704 insurance cost per accident reflects the high-risk insurers attach to
work in such a hazardous industry as timber and furnishing. A discussion with the line
managers revealed that there were two costs associated with first aid. These were the
labour and materials costs.
First - aid cost = (first - aider's time x wage rate) + material cost
First - aid cost = (0.5 x 8.29) +10
=f14
The wage costs resulting from work absence can be high. Tables J1 to J3 show the lost
man-days resulting from accidents over the three-year period. Using these statistics and
the relevant wage rate, an estimate of the cost of absence resulting from an accident can
be determined.
72
= £704
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Total lost working days x conversion to hours Cost per accident of absence from work =
Total accidents	
x relevant wage cost
Cost per accident of absence from work = 1072 x 7.5 x 8.29
191
= £349
In order to maintain the necessary high volume of production, workers from other shifts
were required to cover for colleagues away from work due to injury. This work was
paid at time and a half. Therefore, if the cost of absence for an injured employee is
£349, then the cost of overtime to cover that employees work is one and a half times
greater at £524.
No figures were available to make a good estimate of the lost production costs. The
HSE (1994b) in their Labour Force Survey, estimated that where a typical injury
accident occurs, the cost of property damage incurred is £45. This seems to be a low
estimate, and it is likely that this is an underestimation of the real cost in this firm.
Despite this, £45 is added onto the cost of every accident to account for this damage.
The Cost per Accident can now be determined.
Cost per Accident = indemnity insurance + first - aid cost + absenteeism + overtime costs +
damage costs
Cost per accident = 704 +14 + 349 + 524 + 45
=1636
This figure only accounts for the injury accidents. Many accidents occur where there is
property damage but no injuries. Therefore, the overall monthly costs the model may
suggest are likely to be an underestimation of the true costs.
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The Cost per Accident is set at £1636.
(v) Validating Parameters Concerned with Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude
Safety KSA is a level which represents the sum of the safety knowledge, skills and
attitude possessed by the workforce. See Appendix F for more detail. It is subjective in
nature and has been identified as a sensitive parameter, so the level of accuracy when
validating the parameter needed to be high. There are a number of policy constants
which dictate the rate of change of this level. See Appendix F for more detail. These are
the Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost, Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA, Ratio
Between Hires and Average KSA, and Training Effectiveness. All are also subjective in
nature, with the first four having exhibiting a medium level of sensitivity and the latter
one a high level in the GOSM tests. The Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost represents the
'forgetfulness' of the workforce, or the proportion of KSA dissipating in a given month.
The Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA and Ratio Between Hires and Average
KSA represent the difference between the KSA of the average employee and that
possessed by those leaving or being recruited to the firm respectively. Training
Effectiveness represents how good the training given to the workforce is.
Validating parameters that were both soft and exhibited medium to high sensitivity
would not be an easy task. Safety KSA is rather amorphous and imprecise, but it is
evident from analysis of literature and the results of GOSM's sensitivity tests that it
plays an important role in generating the dynamics of the safety system. The parameters
associated with Safety KSA need to be set with internally consistent values so as to
allow the model to yield historically observed results. Due to the inevitable error
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introduced in the measurement of these soft factors, some of the final parameter values
would be incrementally set through detailed numerical calibration. A method was
needed to capture a measure of these soft factors that would have an acceptable margin
of error. The easiest way to validate the Safety KSA and related parameters was
through a form of workforce survey. This was the method of data collection chosen for
validation of these parameters.
(w) The Survey Method Used to Measure the Aspects of Safety Knowledge, Skills and
Attitude of the Workforce
A survey is a commonly used method of data collection for research (McCormack and
Hill, 1997). It is used to make inferences about the behaviour, attitudes and opinions of
a population from whom a sample is taken. Survey questionnaires or interview
schedules are used to ask identical questions of often quite large numbers of
individuals. The collective responses to the postal questionnaire or interview questions
are analysed and conclusions drawn. A survey has to be designed so that a reasonably
accurate reflection of a population's views can be gathered. It must be reliable and also
internally valid. A rigorous stepwise approach to the design, dispatch, analysis and
interpretation of a survey was developed, based on an approach offered by McCormack
and Hill. A total of seven stages were followed en route to the final calibration of these
soft parameters.
Step 1 - Understanding the Data Requirements
The general aim of the survey was to elicit facts and opinion about safety knowledge,
skills and attitudes in the Finishing department from its workers. The objectives of the
survey were to ask direct and indirect questions about the nature of safety in the
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Department; ensure that the questions would be easy to understand, inoffensive and
guarantee confidentiality; and capture broad numerical measures of Safety KSA
suitable for statistical analysis.
Step 2 - Data Collection Method
The Finishing Department consisted of 57 employees, of which there were 53 workers,
three supervisors and one manager. Face-to-face interviews were discounted due to the
danger of respondents not answering questions in an anonymous fashion. It was
decided, principally on the basis of this political sensitivity, to use the most basic type
of survey, the self-administered survey. Questionnaires could be distributed to the
workforce and collected without the involvement of an interviewer. If the
questionnaires were left in a prominent place in the rest area, the whole department
would have the opportunity to participate in the survey and to remain anonymous. A
serious disadvantage of this approach lies in the fact that people choose themselves
whether to complete the questionnaire.
Step 3 - Identify an Appropriate Sample
The population of interest was the 53 non-supervisory employees of the Finishing
Department. It was unlikely that all the staff would respond to a self-administered
questionnaire. If the actual response rate to the questionnaire were low, then the survey
would not be entirely random and unlikely to be totally representative of the workforce.
It was acknowledged that some systematic error or bias would be introduced to the
results as a consequence. This was a price worth paying to minimise other introductions
of bias.
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Step 4 - Designing the Questionnaire
The questionnaire is the means by which data is collected. The quality of the findings is
determined by the form in which the questions are presented and the clearness of the
instructions. Two different types of question, behavioural and attitudinal, would be
contained in the survey. Behavioural questions would seek to elicit factual information
about the staff's safety actions and intentions, whilst attitudinal questions would try to
find out what the staff actually thought about safety in the firm. Closed questions were
chosen to limit respondents to a pre-determined selection of alternative answers, thus
avoiding many of the difficulties associated with interpretation of open-ended
questions. Using scaled questions the range of responses could be easily compared and
statistically analysed, as well as offering guidance to the respondents (Gill and Johnson,
1991). A limitation of such questions concerns the use of intervals along the scale
(McCormack and Hill, 1997). Scaled questions introduce two problems. The first
concerns translation of perception into visual representation, and the second concerns
the intervals across the range, which are equally spaced, when this may not be the case
in reality. Despite these limitations this was the chosen question style of the survey.
Both questions and statements would be used to build up the measure of Safety KSA
amongst the workforce. The participants would be asked to ring one answer category in
response to a question, indicating their intensity of attitude or opinion; or indicate their
level of agreement or disagreement with a statement using a Likert scale. The scale for
both the questions and statements was set between one and five. Each point on the scale
was assigned a value, with a one representing a very poor response and five a very
favourable one. A number of questions and statements were similar in nature. This was
a deliberate ploy to ensure the internal consistency of responses. If some questions were
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actually similar in content but received varying responses, then the validity of some of
the survey questions would be queried at the data analysis stage. If the questionnaire
were to reveal clear patterns associated with Safety KSA then the questions would have
to be relevant to the theme, easily answerable, unbiased, relatively short and
unambiguous in style. Longer questions could put off respondents so that they then
failed to complete the questionnaire.
A total of 23 scaled questions were included in the final questionnaire. A well-
sequenced questionnaire encourages all the questions to be completed. It was decided to
keep the safety themes raised in the questionnaire grouped together, for example 'use of
safe systems of work' as a set of questions. As safety in the workplace can be an
emotionally sensitive matter, the questions moved from being more factual at the
beginning of the questionnaire to questions requiring more value judgements towards
the end.
Throughout the survey process, close consultation with the management team
responsible for safety in the Finishing Department was important. The sensitivity of the
subject matter and the possible consequences of asking certain questions of the
workforce may have been unacceptable to the managers. For reasons of courtesy and to
maintain a good working relationship, the proposed workforce questionnaire and a
guide to its aims, potential danger points, relevance and structure was passed to the
managers for inspection. The full outline is presented in Section J1 of Appendix J. The
managers were happy with the questionnaire and gave permission to have it dispatched
to all Finishing Department employees. Due to the limited size of the population, a pilot
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survey was not conducted although the rigorous evaluation of the questionnaire by the
management team may have compensated for this omission.
In the case of self-completion questionnaires, the questionnaire's layout and the clarity
of its instructions may largely determine the response rate. A letter copied on to
University notepaper accompanied the questionnaire. In this letter the purpose of the
overall study was provided, along with an estimate of the time the questionnaire would
take to complete. A confidentiality clause was also offered to appease any political
sensitivity. Clear instructions on exactly how to fill out the questions was provided,
along with an example of how to ring a response to a scaled question. The questions
were well spaced to reduce the perception of complexity in the mind of the respondents.
Step 5 - Data Collection
The response rate to the survey was favourable. A total of 26 staff returned the
completed questionnaire. Unfortunately, two of the questionnaires had to be deemed
void as they were filled in incorrectly. This still left a valid response rate of over 49%,
high for self-administered questionnaires.
Step 6 - Data Processing
The most widely used software package for analysing data collected from a survey is
what is now called Statistical Products and Service Solution (SPSS). Processing the
data using SPSS comprised two main elements. The first was its transfer from the
questionnaire into the computer and the second was identifying statistical relationships
between the answers.
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Based on the accurate answers, an objective inference of the Safety KSA parameter
could be made through calculating a grand mean score for all statistically significant
questions. Validation of values for the four parameters relating to Safety KSA was
achieved by calculating a mean from blocks of responses relating to specific safety
themes within the questionnaire and also to information beyond the survey results.
As all the questions asked used a continuous scale the levels of significance between the
responses indicate strength of relationship. The 10% level of significance was thought
to be a strong enough measure of accuracy between responses. Using SPSS all the
question responses were cross-tabulated and compared against each other and the
correlation coefficients and their levels of significance were computed. The matrix of
results is shown in Section J2 of Appendix J.
Step 7a - Calculation of Safety KSA
The matrix in Section J2 shows that all the questions except three had at least a 10%
level of significance against at least one or more questions when cross-tabulated. The
three that did not were considered not to be valid for the purpose of calculating the
numerical parameter value for Safety KSA as they did not fit the pattern of responses
given. The grand mean score calculated for Safety KSA was 3.75. This represented the
Average KSA for the employees. As there were 57 employees then multiplying the two
numbers together would set the Safety KSA at 213.75. This value is probably less than
it ought to be because managers and supervisors will have a higher individual Safety
KSA than line employees. However, their Safety KSA was not evaluated so the 3.75
value was used for them also.
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Step 7b - Calculation of the Policy Parameters Associated with the Safety KSA
The remaining four policy parameters governing the Safety KSA level could not be
assessed so precisely as they were more difficult to measure using the survey than the
overall Safety KSA. The responses to the questionnaire would simply guide the
calibration of these parameters rather than be used to calculate exact figures. Each will
now be considered in turn.
The Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost is based on the results of the sections of the
questionnaire concerned with the use of safe systems of work and safety awareness
(questions 4 to 9, and 12 and 13). SPSS was used to compute a grand mean score for the
responses to the six related questions. The output averaged out at a high value of 4.0,
suggesting that safe working practices were generally followed. This may indicate that
the attitude to safety was positive and enthusiasm for safe working high. As a result the
dissipation of good work practice brought about by training may be slow. After some
sensitive calibration runs of the model, the parameter was set at 0.02, which indicates
that 2% of Safety KSA is lost through forgetfulness in every month.
Ratio Between Hires and Average Safety KSA is calculated from the section of the
questionnaire related to recruitment (questions 20 to 22). The mean score for the
responses to the three questions was 3.03. Ratio Between Quits and Average Safety
KSA was determined from the section of the questionnaire concerned with staff
wastage (question 23). Unfortunately only one question was related to this attribute.
The mean score arrived at was 3.17. The mean score relating to the quitter's KSA was
higher than that for the hires, but surprisingly by not a great deal. This may result from
an unintended bias where many employees may have claimed their KSA was very high
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when recruited and could go no higher! It was evident though that the paraineterisation
would involve setting the ratios fairly close to one, so as not to distort changes in the
workforce's Safety KSA brought about by staff turnover. After a number of calibration
runs and fine-tuning of the model, the Ratio between Hires and Average KSA was set to
0.85, and Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA was set to 1.01.
Training Effectiveness is a parameter which would be difficult to justify solely on the
evaluation of the trainees, particularly as the employees, not being safety experts may
not be in an appropriate position to measure the training quality accurately. The section
of the questionnaire relating to the use of safety training (questions 10 and 11) was used
to arrive at a mean response for training effectiveness. This was lower than anticipated,
at only 2.96. This prompted an examination of the firm's training documentation. The
records showed clear documentation relating to the nature of the on-the-job, internal
and external training. A sizeable proportion of the training led to recognised health and
safety certificates with competent training organisations such as the Royal Society for
the Prevention of Accidents and a regional college.
Rather than set the Training Effectiveness parameter at only 59% effectiveness, the
proportion was raised after some model calibration to 0.75, representing 75%
effectiveness.
(x) Validating the Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog
Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog is a time constant which represents the
management policy or intention to turn around an accident report in a given time. Data
relating to safety management was collected and analysed on a monthly basis. The
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Safety Committee met on a monthly basis and progress on matters such as the findings
of accident reports were discussed. It is not unreasonable to ensure that accident reports
be turned around in a month.
The Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog is set at one month.
(y) Validating the Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog
Time to Clear Hazard Under Full Regulation Backlog is a time constant which
represents the management policy or intention to turn around or fully regulate a hazard
in a given time. Data relating to hazard regulation was collected and analysed on a
monthly basis. The Safety Committee met on a monthly basis and progress on matters
such as hazard regulation were discussed. It is not unreasonable to ensure that hazards
waiting to be fully regulated be turned around in a month.
The Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog is set at one month.
(z) Validating the Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog
Time to Clear Hazard Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog is a time constant which
represents the management policy or intention to turn around or intermediately regulate
a hazard in a given time. Data relating to hazard regulation was collected and analysed
on a monthly basis. The Safety Committee met on a monthly basis and progress on
matters such as hazard regulation were discussed. It is not unreasonable to ensure that
hazards waiting to be intermediately regulated be turned around in a month.
The Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog is set at one month.
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(aa) Validating the Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards
Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards is a time constant which represents the
management policy or intention to locate an unregulated hazard in a given time. Data
relating to risk assessment exercises and safety tours was collected and analysed on a
monthly basis. The Safety Committee met on a monthly basis and progress on matters
such as how many hazards had become unregulated (unsafe) were discussed. It is not
unreasonable to ensure that unregulated hazards are spotted and earmarked for action
within a month of becoming unregulated.
The Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards is set at one month.
6.7 The Calibrated Real World Occupational Safety Model
Calibration of the real world occupational safety model (RWOSM) was an iterative
process. It consisted of setting all the measured parameters derived from the firm,
running the simulation, and comparing its outputs to those of the actual safety system. It
was a process of adjusting some model parameter values in order to achieve a better
correspondence between simulated and actual historical data. The efforts concentrated
on adjustment to the less easily measurable constants such as Fixed Proportion of
Knowledge Lost, Ratio Between Hires and Average Safety KSA, Ratio Between
Quitters and Average KSA and the hypothetical table functions. A close visual fit was
eventually achieved between the actual and observed accident rate. Also, a reasonable
visual fit between actual and observed hazards was accomplished. These
correspondences would need to be statistically measured to identify whether the sources
of error between observed and actual data and their composition would be acceptable.
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The simulation was calibrated to show the gradual increase in accidents over the three-
year period. More resources had been allocated to dealing with problem hazards,
resulting in an arrest but not reversal in accidents. Time-series data had been used to
reflect these policy changes. The only feasible explanation for the declining
performance of the safety management system was that the Safety KSA of the
workforce had been in decline. This was the reason strongly suspected by managers as
they had been frustrated by the apparent ineptitude of their safety monitoring, hazard
regulation and accident reporting efforts. As a result the model was pararneterised to
reflect a gradual decline in the Safety KSA of the workforce. The full Ithink RWOSM
run time and initialisation equations are listed below and also in Appendix M.
A Full Listing of the Real World Occupational Safety Model Equations (Written in
Ithink ©High Performance Systems Inc.)
Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t) = Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_In - Accident Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Accident_Reports_Being_Processed = 1
Accident Reports_In = Accident_Rate*Proportion_of Accidents_Reported
Accident Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Titne_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident Reporting_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost = Accident Reporting_Policy*Accident Reporting_Cost
Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Accident_Reports =0
Accident_Reports_Completed = M1N(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/
Time_to_Clear Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reporting_Policy/Accident Reporting_Time)
Accident_Reporting_Cost = 13
Accident_Reporting_Policy = 34+STEP(11,13)+STEP(3,25)
Accident_Reporting_Time = 8
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Cumulative_Accidents(t) = Cumulative_Accidents(t - dt) + (Accident Rate) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Accidents = 0
Accident_Rate = Accident Incidence*Labour
Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Accident_Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Accident Cost = 0
233
Monthly_Accident_Cost = Accident Rate*Cost_per Accident
Accidentincidence =
((Unregulated_Hazards/Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Re
gulation/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Full_Hazard_
Regulation_Weighting))*Risk
Cost_per_Accident = 1636
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting =2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1.5
Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1
Risk = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.05), (0.5, 0.049), (1.00, 0.0473), (1.50, 0.0383), (2.00, 0.021), (2.50, 0.017), (3.00, 0.0138),
(3.50, 0.0105), (4.00, 0.007), (4.50, 0.003), (5.00, 0.00)
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulativeintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthlyintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt 	 •
NIT Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 0
Monthly_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate _Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost = Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost
Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation - Hazards_Become_Regulated) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation = 1
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulatio
n,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Time to_Clear Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation,Full_Hazard_R
egulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Identification_Rate - Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation = 4.5
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_toidentify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Intennediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulatio
n,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Regulated_Hazards(t) = Regulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazards_Become_Regulated -
Hazard_Generation_Rate) * dt
INIT Regulated_Hazards =96
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation,Full_Hazard_R
egulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Unregulated_Hazards(t) = Unregulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazard_Generation_Rate -
Identification Rate) * dt
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[NIT Unregulated_Hazards = 0.5
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_toidentify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 9
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 22.7
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 16
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 11
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy =3.2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 2.1
RBAAIH =
(Unregulated_Hazards+Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation+Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation)/Reg
ulated_Hazards
Safety_Monitoring_Cost = 13
Safety_Monitoring_Policy = 18+STEP(23,15)+STEP(2,28)+STEP(7,35)
Accident_Repeater = GRAPH(Accident_Reports_Completed)
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.01), (3.00, 0.02), (4.00, 0.03), (5.00, 0.04), (6.00, 0.055), (7.00, 0.07), (8.00, 0.085),
(9.00, 0.1), (10.0, 0.125), (11.0, 0.165), (12.0, 0.215), (13.0, 0.265), (14.0, 0.32), (15.0, 0.365), (16.0,
0.425), (17.0, 0.49), (18.0, 0.545), (19.0, 0.6), (20.0, 0.68)
Hazardsidentified_from_Safety_Monitoring = GRAPH(Safety_Monitoring_Policy)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.125), (20.0, 0.325), (30.0, 0.575), (40.0, 0.925), (50.0, 1.53), (60.0, 3.15), (70.0,
4.35), (80.0, 4.73), (90.0, 4.93), (100, 5.00)
Unsafe_Acts = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.1), (0.5, 0.099), (1.00, 0.098), (1.50, 0.096), (2.00, 0.089), (2.50, 0.074), (3.00, 0.038), (3.50,
0.022), (4.00, 0.016), (4.50, 0.012), (5.00, 0.009)
Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t) = Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t - dt) + (Quits) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Labour Quits = 0
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Labour(t) = Labour(t - dt) + (Hires - Quits) * dt
[NIT Labour = Target_Labour Force
Hires = ((Target_Labour_Force-Labour)/Staff Adjustment_Time)+Replacing_Attrition
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Actual_Length_of Employment = Base_Length_of Employment*(1-Quit_Likelihood)
Base_Length_of Employment = 129
Perceived_AccidentIncidence = SMTH3(Accident_Incidence,3)
Replacing_Attrition = Quits
Staff Adjustment_Time =4
Target_Labour Force = 57
Quit_Likelihood = GRAPH(Perceived_Accidentincidence)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.001), (0.2, 0.003), (0.3, 0.006), (0.4, 0.014), (0.5, 0.028), (0.6, 0.08), (0.7, 0.0915),
(0.8, 0.096), (0.9, 0.098), (1, 0.1)
Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Safety_Cost) * dt
[NIT Cumulative_Safety_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Cost =
Monthly_Accident_Cost+(Safety_Monitoring_Policy* Safety_Mon itoring_Cost)+(Full_H azard_Regu lad
on Pol icy* Fu ll_Hazard_Regulation_Cost)+(Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Pol icy* Intermediate_Haz
arcl Regulation_Cost)+(Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident_Reporting_Cost)+(Training_Policy*Safet
y_Training_Cost)
Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost) * dt
[NIT Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Train ing_Cost = Train ing_Pol icy* S afety_Training_Cost
Safety_KSA(t) = Safety_KSA(t - dt) + (Learning + Gain_in_KSA - Loss_of KSA -
Dissipation_of KSA) * dt
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1NIT Safety_KSA = 213.75
Learning = DELAY(Multiplier*Discrepancy,3)
Gain_in_KSA = Hires*KSA_per New_Employee
Loss_of KSA = Quits*Loss_per_Exit
Dissipation_of KSA = Safety_KSA*Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost
Average_KSA = Safety_KSA/Labour
Discrepancy = 1-(Safety_KSA/Target_Safety_KSA)
Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost = 0.02
KSA_per New_Employee = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA
Loss_per_Exit = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA
Maximum_KSA_per_Employee = 5
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA = 0.85
Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA = 1.01
Safety_Training_Cost = 14
Target_Safety_KSA = Labour*Maximum_KSA_per_Employee
Time_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_toldentify_Unregulated_Hazards = 1
Training_Effectiveness = 0.75
Training_Policy = GRAPH(TIME) (0.00, 7.50), (1.00, 52.5), (2.00, 22.5), (3.00, 30.0), (4.00, 0.00),
(5.00, 7.50), (6.00, 195), (7.00, 15.0), (8.00, 45.0), (9.00, 15.0), (10.0, 15.0), (11.0, 90.0), (12.0, 60.0),
(13.0,
(21.0,
(29.0,
150),
7.50),
37.5),
(14.0, 90.0),
(22.0, 15.0),
(30.0, 60.0),
(15.0,
(23.0,
(31.0,
52.5),
0.00),
22.5),
(16.0,
(24.0,
(32.0,
105), (17.0, 105),
0.00), (25.0,
22.5), (33.0,
(18.0, 143), (19.0, 15.0), (20.0, 30.0),
113), (26.0, 113), (27.0, 37.5), (28.0, 60.0),
240), (34.0, 22.5), (35.0, 7.5)
Multiplier =
GRAPH((Training_Effectiveness*Training_Policy)* (IF(Safety_KSA<Target_Safety_KSA)THEN(1)EL
SE(0)))
(0.00, 0.00), (50.0, 10.0), (100, 20.0), (150, 30.0), (200, 40.0), (250, 50.0), (300, 60.0), (350, 70.0), (400,
80.0), (450, 90.0), (500, 100)
(a) The Results of the Calibrated Real World Occupational Safety Model
The reasons why the performance of the firm's historical safety system had been less
than desired may be explained through comparing the changes made to safety policies
with the turning points in the behaviour of the principal outputs of the RWOSM. The
resources dedicated to intermediate and full hazard regulation had remained fixed.
Changes were made to the accident reporting, safety monitoring and safety training
policies. As more accidents were occurring, more time had to be dedicated to
processing accident reports. In an effort to assess problematic hazards there had been
increases in safety monitoring. Safety training fluctuated greatly on a month by month
basis but the underlying trend was static, averaging out at 56 man-hours per month.
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As noted, the system had been characterised by a fairly sharp growth in accidents,
followed by a stabilisation. The simulation reflected these changes. Figure 6.1 shows
how the simulation produced a reflection of these changes in the real system. The safety
policies implemented by the mangers had failed to arrest and to reverse the long-term
upward accident trend.
Figure 6.1	 Changes in the accident rate over the three-year period
The close match between the costs of running the safety management system and the
costs of accidents is evident in Figure 6.2. It is evident that most of the safety costs are
attributed to accidents. The firm's managers had made some cost-effective decisions in
the shorter term by increasing efforts to identify hazards but in the longer term it was
evident that the hazard problem was simply pushed into another part of the safety
system.
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Figure 6.2	 Changes in the costs of accidents and running the safety management system over the
three-year period
Figure 6.3 shows the simulated changes in the hazard distribution for the three-year
period. The graph shows that there was a slow decline in the proportion of regulated
hazards. This it is suspected strongly contributed to the accident problem. The short-
term benefits of increased safety monitoring and accident reporting are evident along
with the longer-term increases in hazards under intermediate and full regulation.
Figure 6.4 shows that the cumulative accident output of the model was 197, close to the
observed total of 201. It also reveals that the cost of running safety in the department
was high, averaging over £135,000 per annum.
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Figure 6.3	 Changes in the distribution of hazards over the three-year period
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Figure 6.4	 Cumulative accidents and safety management system costs over the three-year period
Figure 6.5 shows the potential root cause of the safety problem. Average Safety KSA in
the department is seen to be in gradual decline. It is evident from the fluctuations in
Safety KSA that training could have quite a substantial impact upon the performance of
the safety system. There was also a small increase in staff turnover resulting from the
underlying accident rate. This may have had a minimal impact on loss of KSA across
the workforce, but not enough for this to be considered as a strong cause. This is
represented by the decline in the Actual Length of Employment.
Figure 6.5
	 Changes in the average safety knowledge, skills and attitude and actual length of
employment over the three-year period
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(b) Interpretation of the Results of the Calibrated Real World Occupational Safety
Model Using the Basic Causal Loop Diagram of Safety
Using the causal loop diagram of the safety system outlined in Figure 5.4 of Chapter
Five, the performance of the system can be explained. Over the three-year period the
accident rate had risen steadily. The response of the firm was to attempt to arrest this
trend by allocating more and more resources to control of active workplace hazards
through increased safety monitoring, accident reporting and hazard regulation. These
actions are represented in both the proactive and reactive safety loops of Figure 5.4. The
strategy appeared to have been one of controlling the accidents through increasing the
dominance of these loops over the system's behaviour. This strategy had met with
limited success. The accident rate had been arrested, but not reversed. This suggests that
they were not able to offset the influence that the reinforcing Safety KSA loop had over
system behaviour. In fact they had largely ignored the potential leverage points on the
Safety KSA loop that exerted influence over the outputs of the safety system. In an
effort to manage accidents through increased engineering controls and more rigorous
accident reporting and hazard control, they had overlooked the benefits of improved
training and recruitment as a means to help ensure that fewer accidents occurred. If
employees could through training be encouraged to work more safely with hazards then
this may be the answer to reversing the undesirable accident trend and its high
associated financial cost. Thus, shifting the possible loop dominance from the control
loops to the reinforcing Safety KSA loop could be the answer to better safety in the
future. This is a scenario which will be explored in Chapter Seven.
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(c) Measurement of Error and the Composition of Error Between Simulated and
Observed Outputs
Appropriate output metrics generated by the model would have to match those in the
real system. The selected outputs would have to capture the underlying past behaviour
of the real system and be easily measurable. A total of three data sets came to mind.
These were the Accident Rate, Hazards and Actual Length of Employment. As staff
turnover was very low in the department it was decided that comparing the simulated
Actual Length of Employment to the actual would not be necessary. Attention was
focused towards replicating the changes in accidents and hazard states.
(d) The Use of Summary Statistics to Validate the Real World Occupational Safety
Model's Correspondence to Historical Safety Data
Analysis of the historical fit of a model to data is concerned with behaviour
reproduction testing (Sterman, 1984). The test does not seek to compare the
correspondence of simulated and actual data on a point-by-point basis. Rather it
concentrates on the character of the simulated data. It seeks to measure whether the
simulated data exhibit the same modes, phases, amplitudes and variability as the real
data. Calibrating an operational model to gain a good historical fit can be important in
building confidence in the model with a client (Lyneis, 1999). They can be reluctant to
place confidence in the model unless its historical fit is measured by some form of
summary statistics (Sterman, 1984).
Sterman noted that the sum of the squared error over the range of available data is
higher in system dynamics models than regression models between simulated and
actual data. This results from the fact that most single equations are broken by the
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multi-loop, non-linear nature of the model's complex feedback systems. Despite this he
suggests that a system dynamics model may capture the behaviour of a system without
matching the historical data on a point-by-point basis. In fact, the total error may be
large, even if the model matches the relevant mode of behaviour very well. As a result
of this, using the coefficient of determination to measure goodness-of-fit may be
inappropriate for system dynamics models. He suggests an alternative, measuring the
mean squared error (MSE) and root mean squared percentage error (RMSPE) to assess
the goodness of fit between simulated and observed data.
MSE is defined as:
"
_E (S — A ,)2
1=1
where;
n = number of observations (t = 1, n)
S t = Simulated value at time t
A t = Actual value at time t
and RMSPE is defined as:
+[(S — 4)12
n	 A/.1
It important not only to identify the size of error, but also identify its sources. Theil's
inequality statistic is one method by which error can be resolved into systematic and
random portions. Theil's inequality statistic is derived from a decomposition of MSE.
The statistic identifies the proportion of MSE that is attributable to bias (UM), unequal
variance (us ), and unequal covariance (
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A fit between the historically observed and simulated data can be compared to
determine the size of error and its composition using RMSPE and Theil's inequality
statistic. The RMSPE shows a normalised measure of the magnitude of the error, i.e. it
is the proportional difference between the simulated and observed, as a proportion of
the observed, averaged over the time frame. The MSE and inequality statistics shows a
measure of the total error, and where the error breaks down proportionately into bias,
unequal variation and unequal covariation. By dividing each of the components of the
error by the total mean square error, the inequality proportions are derived:
Um =
a _74)2
1
- (S, - A1)2
Us =  
(ss— s A )2 
- (S, —A,)2
,e	 2(1 — r)sss A 
u	 1
- E (S1 — A,)2
As Um + Us + uc =1, SO UM, US , UC reflect the fraction of the MSE due to bias, unequal
variance, and unequal covariance, respectively.
(e) Interpretation of the Error Between Simulated and Observed Accident Rates
Figure 6.6 shows the historical behaviour of accident rates alongside the simulated
version of the same data. The actual accident rate is characterised by short-term
fluctuations. This is of no great surprise, as one would not expect too many accidents to
arise on a monthly basis from a total of 57 departmental employees.
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Simulated versus observed accident rate
As a result of the short-term variability evident in the actual accident rate it is difficult
to visually determine whether the simulated accident rate captures the underlying
behaviour of the actual accident rate. Smoothing out the actual accident rate can provide
an estimate of the underlying accident rate, thus allowing a more meaningful visual
comparison for the data set. Figure 6.7 shows the exponentially smoothed underlying
accident rate alongside the simulated accident rate. The simulated accident rate appears
to match the behaviour of the underlying accident rate.
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Simulated versus underlying accident rate
To visually determine whether the degree of fit is close enough is not sufficient. It is
necessary to measure where the error lies in the comparative data. Measuring the error
and its composition between the underlying accident rate and the simulated accident
rate may be misleading. As a result of smoothing the actual accident rate the data points
are no longer independent. The data set, it could be argued is artificial or contrived. It is
more appropriate to measure where the error lies between the simulated accident rate
and the actual accident rate.
The RMS, RMSPE and error composition can be determined for this data set. The
results of these computations are shown below in Table 6.4. An examination of the
historical fit of the accident rate reveals that the RMSPE is 111%. This is the value of
the average squared difference between observed and simulated and exceeds 100%.
This is a high figure. The error may be due partly to the limited assumptions made in
the model about the causes of the accident pattern. The model was not built and
calibrated to replicate short-term fluctuations in the system. Therefore, for the purpose
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of this model the fact that the RMSPE of the model is high does not necessarily
invalidate the results. Taking a more pessimistic line, it could be suggested that the
model is internally inconsistent or the structure controlling the accident rate is incorrect.
E(SI- il, )2 238.71 ii 5.33 um 0.0021
v (St - 4)2 44.23 ss 1.64 us 0.1209
A,
MSE 6.63 3,4 2.54 uc 0.8770
RMS PE 1.11 r 0.30 Um
 +Us +LIc 1.0000
-s- 5.45
Table 6.4
	
Summary statistics measuring level of correspondence between the simulated and
observed accident rate
Decomposing the error may throw more light on the problem. Although the RMSPE is
111%, less than 1% of the mean squared error is attributable to bias. Only 12% of the
error results from unequal variation, leaving nearly 88% of the error attributable to
unequal covariation. This indicates that there is very little systematic error in the results.
The simulated accident rate tracks the underlying trend almost perfectly, simply
diverging on a point-by-point basis. The fact that the RMSPE is high is of little
consequence and does not compromise the purpose of the model.
(0 Interpretation of Error Between Stochastically Simulated and Observed Accident
Rates
It could be argued that accidents are the function of chance, and that the events which
lead to them are to some extent beyond the control of the firm. The accident causation
models set out in Chapter Four, Section 4.5(a) invalidate this extreme argument. In
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addition, the evidence that the majority of accidents result from human failure, either
attributed to the employee or more often an inadequate management system further
refutes this proposition (Perrow, 1984; Killimett, 1991; Krause et al., 1990; Stranks,
1994b). The remaining minority of accidents result from technical failure or 'Acts of
God'. For the purpose of this model these could be regarded as legitimate stochastic
events as, according to Perrow (1984) these types of accidents can not easily be
anticipated, nor their causes identified until after the event.
System dynamics is a form of deterministic modelling and it is unusual for stochastic
elements to be introduced into the simulation. To show that the structure of the real
world model is robust when noise is introduced it was decided to randomly generate a
portion of the accident rate. This was to test whether the introduction of random
accidents would make any difference to the underlying behaviour of the model. Figure
6.8 shows the effect of adding a series of random numbers between ± 1.36 to the
simulated Accident Rate. The 1.36 value was chosen as it represents the lowest
simulated accident rate in the firm's three-year time-series. It introduces a plausible
random effect without causing the accident rate to fall below zero. This is not simply an
arbitrary randomness but introduces the maximum range of variation.
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Addition of stochastically simulated output versus observed accident rate
Table 6.5 shows that RMS and RMSPE is higher than in the deterministic model, with
the RMSPE at 138%.
E(s, -A,)2 264.95 71 5.33 um 0.0040
v (s, - 4)2 68.13 ss 1.75 us 0.0848
Z-,	 A,
MSE 7.36 SA 2.54- Ue 0.9112
RMSPE 1.38 r 0.25 um +Us + LI 1.0000
S" 5.50
Table 6.5
	
Summary statistics measuring level of correspondence between the added stochastically
simulated output and observed accident rate
This is not surprising, as error has been deliberately introduced into the carefully
calibrated model. Despite this, the majority of the error still lies with unequal
covariation between the two data sets. This suggests that introduction of stochastic
influences on accidents does not overtly change the numerical or behavioural output of
the model.
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An alternative way of interpreting a chance element in the model involves multiplying
the accident rate by a stochastic element. In this case Figure 6.9 shows the effect of
introducing a series of uniformly distributed random numbers between ±2 and
multiplying this by the simulated Accident Rate. This represents a random influence
along a range ± 200% for the simulated Accident Rate in the time series.
Figure 6.9	 Multiplication of stochastically simulated output versus observed accident rate
Table 6.6 shows that RMS and RMSPE is higher than in the deterministic model.
336.26 A 5.33 uTM 0.0005
\--, (s, - A,) 2 97.87 SS 2.16 us 0.0153
Z-,	 A,
MSE 9.34 r	 SA 2.54 -	 uc 0.9841
RMSPE 1.65 r 0.16 Um +Us +tIc 1.0000
E 5.40
Table 6.6
	
Summary statistics measuring level of correspondence between the multiplied
stochastically simulated output and observed accident rate
249
As with the previous example, similar behaviour results from the introduction of
stochastic elements to the model.
These tests show that if random factors are introduced into the simulation to affect the
output of the accident rate, this results in moderate changes to the numerical output of
accidents but not the underlying behaviour. It can be concluded then that with or
without plausible stochastic model inputs the same policy decisions would be taken.
(g) Interpretation of the Error Between Simulated and Observed Hazards
Actual hazard statistics were only available for the last 18 months of the study. This
made it harder to attain a good historical match between simulated and observed
hazards. An examination of the distribution of the records showed several instances of
months where for a particular hazard state the value was zero. Using these figures to
calculate the RMSPE would result in an invalid interpretation, as division by zero
would be apparent. An examination of the records showed that in any one month the
numbers of actual Regulated Hazards was always well above one. Therefore, it was
decided to measure the error between actual and simulated Regulated Hazards. Figure
6.10 shows the historical correspondence. It is evident from a visual examination of the
graph, the error is evident, and appears mostly to lie in the difference between the
means.
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Figure 6.10
	 Simulated versus observed regulated hazards
The RMS, RMSPE and error composition can be determined for the data set. The
results of these computations are shown below in Table 6.7. The RMSPE for the
historical fit was 72%. This is quite a high figure, and confirms the difficulties
experienced in calibration of the model. Decomposing the error will show whether this
error is largely systematic or non-systematic in nature. Seventy-six percent of the mean
squared error is attributable to bias. This unfortunately is high and suggests that there is
a systematic difference between the model and reality. Only 14% of the error resulted
from unequal variation.
E(s, -4)2 497.22 -A- 95.95 um 0.7624
v (s, - At ) 2 5.03 ss 0.54 us 0.1354
L-'	 A,
MSE 27.62 sA 3.17 uo 0.1022
RMSPE 0.72 r -0.54 um
 + us +uc 1.0000
:§ 89.7
Table 6.7
	
Summary statistics measuring level of correspondence between the simulated and
observed regulated hazards
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The fact that the magnitude of the error around the means is low is encouraging. Ten
percent of the error is attributable to unequal covariation. This type of error is
unsystematic. Unfortunately, little of the error lies here.
There are a number of possible reasons why the compositions of the error was less
favourable than that found for the Accident Rate. The error may be due to the
incomplete hazard data set attributable to inaccuracies in the firm's records, the limited
structural assumptions in the model about hazard behaviour and the fact that continuous
data is being compared to discrete data.
Figure 6.10 showed that there was a great deal of short-term variability within the
observed data, a pattern which any system dynamics model would find difficult to
replicate. Again, for the purpose of this model the fact that the RMSPE is quite high
does not necessarily invalidate the results. Despite these potentially gloomy findings,
the simulated Regulated Hazards are able to track the underlying trend adequately, but
not able to capture convergence between the means. Extensive model calibration failed
to capture a close match between the means for actual and simulated hazards but in a
serendipitous way the simulation may actually be nearer to reality than the firm's
records. In Section 3.3 of Chapter Three, the principles of risk control were outlined.
Safe workplace and safe person strategies were described. The workplace strategies
involve engineering controls and development of safe systems of work whereas the safe
person strategies rely on employees working safely with hazards for them to be
successful. A hazard can be perfectly safe if an employee uses the correct working
procedures. For example, in the course of their work, the moment they discard the
personal protective equipment provided for them the hazard becomes active. The means
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by which these hazards are passed around the life cycle may be more discreet than the
documented safety management system suggests. The reality is that more hazards are
active than the safety management anticipate. They may be rendered safe on a more
informal basis through line managers or other employees insisting that colleagues
follow correct work procedures. In reality hazards may be more transient than
suggested in the records, i.e. the simulation may capture reality better than the
documented records.
As a result of this situation it is likely that much of the error between the observed and
simulated hazards lies in the inaccuracies of only collecting formal hazard data,
ignoring the more subtle undocumented elements of the hazard system. Another source
of error may be in the assumptions of the model. Dissagregation of hazards into
different types may have eased the difficulties of replicating hazard behaviour but this
may have been at the expense of model clarity. In conclusion, although the model has
failed to capture a close historical fit, it has still shown the movement of hazards around
the life-cycle. This behaviour is fundamental to functioning of the model. So for the
purposes of this modelling effort the quantity and nature of the error is acceptable.
6.8 Summary of the Real World Occupational Safety Model
The process of selecting a suitable host firm and specifying the terms for validating the
RWOSM with its relevant managers has been discussed. The unhindered access to both
detailed documentation and descriptive information has proved to be important in
accurately parameterising and testing the model. A rigorous and detailed approach to
numerical validation of all model parameters was presented. A large volume of
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dissagregated data was collected and aggregated into a suitable form for setting the
numerical values of the model parameters. Some difficulties arose through having an
incomplete data set but these problems were resolved through making sensible
assumptions about the real safety system.
The iterative process by which the model was calibrated has shown to be successful in
allowing the simulation to replicate the observed past three-year behaviour of both
accidents and hazards. The reasons why the safety system may have behaved in a
certain way are explained using a range of output metrics. Using MSE and Theil's
inequality statistic, the size and nature of the error arising between the observed and
simulated data has been shown to be acceptable.
The purpose of validating the RWOSM and then replicating historical behaviour was
not only to understand why the firm's safety system behaved in a certain way but to
build the manager's confidence in the model as a plausible means of exploring future
safety decisions. It was not the intention to show how certain behaviour could have
been avoided but to arrive at an empirically validated model to show how the
management might act differently in the future to avoid undesirable accidents and costs.
This is analysis of policy and will receive attention in Chapter Seven.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Evaluation of the Uses and Policy Analysis in the Real World
System Dynamics Model of Occupational Safety
7.1 Introduction to Model Evaluation and Policy Analysis
The generic occupational safety model (GOSM) was built and subsequently validated
with real data from a host firm with the intention of developing a means of improving
insights into the real world problems of occupational safety. These insights could be
brought about by learning about the effects of safety decisions or through designing
policies to improve safety system behaviour. Chapter Seven is concerned with model
evaluation, as outlined in Phase Five of the modelling framework of Roberts et al.
(1983, p.8). This chapter seeks to show the level of utility and effectiveness of the real
world occupational safety model (RWOSM) as a policy-making and learning tool. This
relates to the 'policy analysis and model use' phase of Roberts et al. (1983, p.8) system
dynamics modelling framework. A strong measure of its success will lie with whether
the model actually generates new insights or improves existing understanding about the
nature of safety in the firm.
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Section 7.2 of this chapter describes the gathering of opinion on the model's uses from
a group of managers from within the host firm. The views of this group as to the
efficacy of both the RWOSM and its usefulness in developing insights into the running
of an occupational safety management system are outlined. The findings of this
discussion, outlined in Section 7.2, essentially determine whether the research aims and
objectives for the whole study had been met. Section 7.4 is concerned with safety policy
analysis using the simulation. The model is used to replicate some of the alternative
scenarios raised by the management team when they explored the RWOSM's
behaviour. In addition to exploring policies, the final scenario is concerned more with
improving the performance of the RWOSM through designing a mix of policies to
optimise safety costs and accidents. The common thread to the alternative scenario tests
is the search for a set of robust policies that both improve safety system behaviour and
can be feasibly implemented within the safety management system of the firm. In
Section 7.5 the interview fmdings and policy analysis results are drawn together and
summarised.
7.2 The Development and Application of an Interview Method to Capture Client
Opinion of the Real World Occupational Safety Model
A group of managers from within the firm agreed to be interviewed in order to gather
their opinions on the suitability of the RWOSM as a policy-making or pedagogic aid to
understanding occupational safety. An interview framework needed to be developed
that would lead to meaningful insights being gathered as to the uses of the model. The
framework developed was unique to the study although many more standard aspects
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were based on the interview approaches recommended by Easterby-Smith et al. (1991)
and Saunders et al. (1997). The model would be introduced to the interviewees. They
would experiment with the simulation and in a discussion setting, comment on aspects
of its uses within occupational safety management. Before this could be developed the
most suitable interviewing approach needed to be chosen.
(a) Choice of Interview Style
Interviewing is often claimed to be the best method of gathering qualitative information.
Interviews can be highly formal and structured, or very informal and unstructured
conversations. Structured interviews are very standardised and use a set of pre-
determined questions, whereas semi-structured and unstructured interviews tend to be
non-standardised (Saunders et al., 1997). Structured interviews are based on asking a
set of predetermined questions with pre-coded answers. was felt that this would be
too restrictive, limiting the richness of the responses and the range of possible insights.
Unstructured interviews are non-directive, with the direction of the interview partly
determined by the interviewees. The two problems associated with this approach are the
possibility that the general question being asked might ultimately not be answered and,
given the group's limited knowledge and experience of system dynamics modelling, it
could quickly run out of comments.
A semi-structured interview format was chosen for three reasons. This was due to the
ability to pre-set themes for discussion, the opportunity to ask probing questions, and
the freedom where necessary to introduce an acceptable level of bias in to the
discussion. The boundaries of the discussion could be set clearly. These boundaries are
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the educational and policy-making aspects of the RWOSM. Within these boundaries, a
list of themes and questions to be covered could be used to increase the likelihood of
arriving at a meaningful outcome to the discussion. This would allow the general
direction of the interview to be guided by the interviewer whilst allowing, at the same
time, a rich picture about the use of the RWOSM to emerge. Semi-structured interviews
provide an opportunity to probe answers given and allow interviewees to explain and
build on their responses. This it was felt would be necessary to generate relevant and
enriching responses. The fact that a semi-structured interview is based on general
themes allows much of the information to be generated by the interviewees rather than
by the continuous intervention of the interviewer. As a result, the likelihood that the
interviewer implicitly or explicitly introduces bias through leading questions may be
reduced.
(b) The Backgrounds of the Interviewees
The interviewees consisted of three managers from the host firm. None of them were
involved in developing the structure of the model, although one had helped with the
collation of data for it.
The first, and most dominant interviewee, was the safety manager (Safety Professional).
He was a graduate engineer with some twenty years experience in engineering and
occupational safety. He had a strong background in database management systems and
some knowledge of spreadsheet modelling. The second participant was a senior
production line manager (Production Manager) with thirty years' experience. The final
contributor was a recent engineering graduate (Management Trainee) who had been
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with the firm for only a week. The fact that all the interviewees had an engineering
background made them more likely to be receptive to a computer based approach to
exploring safety decisions than others.
The safety manager had overseen the collection of data and had experimented briefly
with the original abstract occupational safety model. He was best able to contribute
thoughts on the appropriateness of the model for policy-making and to offer technical
observations. The production line manager had a strong vested interest in operational
safety as accidents had direct effects upon the running of his department. He would be
able to suggest how the model could be used to push the safety message to employees.
Finally, the graduate trainee was approaching the subject with 'fresh eyes'. He had
studied some occupational safety at university but safety management was largely
unfamiliar to him. The fact that he had not been involved in the running of the firm was
a definite advantage as he could be very objective with his observations.
(c) Introduction of the Real World Occupational Safety Model to the Interviewees
Using a short presentation, the clients were introduced to the concept of system
dynamics. They were taken through the model's conception, construction and operation.
The group was pleased to see that the historical match between the simulation and
observed safety system had been analysed statistically. This appeared to strengthen their
belief in the plausibility of the model. Particular emphasis was placed on facilitating an
understanding of the principal feedback loops working in the model through the
introduction of the causal loop diagram of occupational safety. Once this was
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understood, the group were introduced to the RWOSM. Figure 7.1 shows the interface
of the RWOSM:
Figure 7.1	 The user interface of the real world occupational safety model
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The group was asked to scroll down the computer screen and to read the simulation
model's operating instructions. The historical simulation was then run. They were able
to view a number of simulation outputs representing the behaviour of the safety system
within the Finishing Department over the past three-year period. They were most
interested, as expected, in examining the change in accident numbers and the cost of
running the safety system. The validated model met with the group's approval, as they
were satisfied that the model was representative of past safety performance within the
department.
The simulation was then set up to analyse policy decisions, and their effects on safety
system behaviour for the future three-year period. The group changed from being
passive spectators, to becoming participants, taking control of model decisions. They
were able to follow through the simulation instructions and quickly involved
themselves in model experimentation. Initially they were only introduced to the high-
level simulation interface. This contained six slide bars that represented the most
important policies contained within the model. The participants were given the
opportunity to make policy decisions simply by dragging these bars back and forth to
either switch them on or off or through heightening or lessening their effects. Once they
had understood the means by which policy decisions could be made they were
interested in knowing something about the structure causing the simulation behaviour
that was unfolding. They were introduced to selected parts of the model without over-
burdening them with detail. The clients experimented with the simulation for a period
of nearly one-hour. After that time period they were all satisfied that they had a better
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understanding of the causes of their safety system's behaviour and the RWOSM's
possible uses within the firm.
(d) The Group Interview
Through a semi-structured interview a rich picture of opinion about the model could be
captured from the group of managers. The overall boundary of the discussion would be
constrained by the question 'Is system dynamics modelling of occupational safety more
suitable for learning or policy-making?' The interviewer wanted the framework to
exclude technical debate about the actual operational mechanism of the model so the
words 'learning' and 'policy-making' were accentuated. The first stage of the
interviewing process involved developing a number of possible themes for discussion.
To avoid getting tied up too closely by these themes a 'topic guide' was prepared,
which was an essentially loose structure for questions that could be raised at pertinent
points in the interview (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). This is listed in Table 7.1.
There was a temptation for the interviewer to impose his own reference frame on the
interviewees both with the questions asked and interpretation of answers. There had to
be a play-off between open questions avoiding bias and obtaining the desired
information. The interviewer was careful to ensure that probes were not too much of a
leading kind.
There appeared to be a high level of trust been the interviewer and interviewees and all
agreed to having the interview tape recorded for later transcription. As the interview
involved more than one respondent it was able to take the form of a loosely structured
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steered conversation. The interview was conducted on the 'home ground' of the
interviewees, in one of their conference rooms. This seemed the most suitable venue as
all the data collection for the model had been conducted on the one site and with the
backing of the safety managers there.
Theme Possible Questions
-
General perceptions of the model
.
Is the model more suited as a learning, or policy tool?
How might the simulation model assist your firm?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of the model?
The Effect of the Interface on the Model's Potential
Application
Is the user interface more important on the learning or
policy side, and if so why?
How did you feel about using a flight simulator type
interface?
How	 important are the slide bars	 in	 facilitating
experimentation?
Model Policies and System Behaviour Which policies had the most dominant influence over
the safety system?
How close was	 experiential	 versus	 experimental
outcomes?
Are the fundamental safety system policies in the
model, and, if not, which should be added?
Did the simulation model reveal any new insights, if
so, what were they?
Did the model fit with your intuitions, if so how?
Are there too many or too few policies in the model?
Would you introduce additional policies?
Model Users Would you use the model to enlighten or sell ideas to
people, if so why?
Could the model sell safety to senior managers, if so
how?
How might the model help towards winning extra
resources for safety?
Would the model help with resource allocation, if so
how?
Would specialists use the model for planning and non-
specialists for learning?
Model Optimisation What are the benefits of optimisation?
What are the drawbacks of optimisation?
Who would wish to optimise the model?
Abstract versus Real World Model Which model would be more beneficial, an abstract or
real world one?
Which	 format	 would	 be	 more	 appropriate	 for
learning?
Would an abstract model allow you to explore
policies you would not normally explore, if so how?
Table 7.1
	
Topic guide for interview questions
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The interview was not conducted as a full 'focus group' as it was too strongly guided to
be one although the interviewer acted as much as possible as moderator or facilitator.
The substantial time in presenting the background to the modelling approach and
having the participants explore different scenarios using the simulation model paid real
dividends as it made the respondents feel that they were able to comment on the model
through having an informed view.
The interview method allowed a reasonably unbiased picture of the group's opinion of
the model to emerge. The entire discussion lasted for just over one hour and some
interesting insights into the application of the simulation model and occupational safety
in the wider sense emerged. The interview did uncover relevant information not
anticipated before the discussion. This only served to affirm the choice of interviewing
approach.
7.3 Analysing the Results of the Interview
The whole taped interview was transcribed verbatim so as not to lose any detail. See
Appendix K for full transcribed interview. The structure used to analyse the discussion
had to be derived from the data. This required teasing out themes, patterns and
categories from the discussion. The themes set out in the interview framework were
evident in the first examination of the fully transcribed interview.
The process of analysing the results of the interview was iterative in nature. The mass of
data collected was split into meaningful themes or categories. These categories acted as
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labels which were used to rearrange the data. Sets of interview data relating to the pre-
determined themes of the interview started to emerge. Saunders et al. (1997) suggested
that the next stage of data analysis involve 'unitising' the data. This consisted of
attaching relevant chunks of textual data to the appropriate categories. This was
achieved through labelling the units of data with an appropriate category code in the
margin of the transcript. Some categories were disaggregated when it was apparent that
the large volume of textual data associated with them would be too broad for further
analysis whilst others were aggregated to allow sufficient key themes or patterns to
emerge.
A combination of deductive and inductive analysis of the interview results was used.
The deductive position stemmed from the need to determine whether the simulation
model would be successful for educating people about 'safety and/or helping to guide
decision-making in the field. The inductive analysis arose from the fact that new
insights into the simulation and application of the model had emerged within the
interview. Therefore, the categorisation and analysis of the discussion resulted from a
blend of the two. For example a theme emerged in the interview surrounding the use of
the model to sell safety to senior managers. This had not been fully anticipated prior to
the interview. Thus these responses were analysed inductively.
A number of concepts emerged from the transcribed interview script. Some of these
concepts crossed the boundaries of these themes but with the nature of the findings this
could be expected. Quotations from the discussion have been extracted from the
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transcript and analysed to obtain some meaningful interpretations of the interviewees'
opinions on the real world occupational model (RWOSM).
(a) Initial Client Responses to the Simulation Model
The discussion opened up with the general question:
"Is the occupational safety model a learning or policy tool?" (Interviewer)
This was followed up by the more direct question:
"How might the simulation model assist your company?" (Interviewer)
The initial responses were lengthy and encouraging:
"Well I think it could be used by managers or anyone involved in the field of safety to learn
about causes and effects and what can happen if we change anything in particular, how that
might affect the overall picture.
It would be used to try and explore what the most effective measures would be .
We would follow the path that the model suggested was the best path and monitor the effect to
see if the two were in agreement ...
If successful, then we could use it [the model] to look at the future so that we could set policies
so we weren't stabbing in the dark but initially very much a learning tool and probably less of a
policy-making tool." (Safety Professional)
"I think this can certainly be as in this company . . . a way they can see what it [safety] is going
to cost ...
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It would certainly highlight that it [following the model's policies] would save a lot of injuries
but, at the same time, can save money and that makes good management sense." (Production
Manager)
"I've got a degree of scepticism, especially when looking or basing future policies on those sort
of results. I wonder how it would differ from department to department, where we consider
accidents do occur frequently that are basically unavoidable . . . it looked good, but that would
be my one worry." (Management Trainee)
Here three different views of the model unfold. The safety professional appeared to
have a good educated layman's understanding of how the model worked and of what its
potential and limitations were. He saw the model as suitable for teaching people about
the effects on safety of making different policy-decisions in the first instance, and the
potential to use it to assist with strategic decision-making in the second. He also erred
on the side of caution where he suggested following the policies indicated by the
simulation model whilst monitoring how closely the model outputs fitted the future
results. This was his approach to determining whether the model was plausible or not.
The line manager immediately saw the model in a demonstrational capacity, describing
how you could show people the effects safety decisions have upon accidents and their
requisite costs. This appeared to be a double-edged response, acknowledging the use of
the model to stress accident reduction and cost minimisation.
Lastly, the trainee, being new to the firm and the field of occupational safety could
obviously make lesser of a contribution to the debate. His comments may suggest that
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he took a less holistic view of the model, querying specific results. He may have been
less concerned with the underlying model behaviour and more interested in the model's
ability to predict exact outcomes.
The purpose of the model was then reiterated to the group as a prompt in order to guide
a better understanding of the model. It was made clear that capturing an understanding
of the emergent behaviour of the system, rather than examining the numerical outputs
on a point-by-point basis was of importance.
(b) Discussion of the Principal Model Policies
The group had discovered from experimenting with the model policies that training
appeared to exert the most leverage over both accidents and safety costs. This resulted
in this policy being afforded more attention than others did.
The model had stimulated the group to debate about the role of training and its
effectiveness and they were able to discuss this issue at length. A discussion about
various training approaches ensued. This allowed the group to query the validity of the
model. Questions were raised as to why all the training mediums had been aggregated
into one policy:
"You could decide to spend double the amount of time on training. . . the model doesn't know
how effective that training is. Inappropriate training you would expect it to have a minor effect,
whereas, better targeted training would obviously be more effective. Now it's probably too
much for a model to be able to pick up." (Safety Professional)
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"If we've got a lot of duff [poor] training courses, then really we're only ourselves to blame."
(Production Manager)
The group was reminded that the model was not working at the operational level.
Rather it was strategic, examining wide policy areas:
"You could have broad bands of training, you've got training where you go away on a course
off site or if it's on site you're isolated from your work environment .. .
That would be external training ...
Off-the-job training is a defined course that covers topics and you go back to your job and it
might not change the way you work. On-the-job training should, because you're doing it on-the-
job, change the way you work, and in many cases the effects could be significantly different."
(Safety Professional)
A debate had opened up about the validity of the model. This concerned the aggregation
of internal and external training. An understanding developed of the impact of different
training approaches upon safety behaviour. The group made it clear that to disaggregate
the types of training could reflect real policy more accurately.
This debate could be regarded as an important measure of the group's understanding of
the model because the discussion had gone beyond discussing the emergent system
behaviour and moved on to querying how the actual structure of the model would
improve the simulation's behaviour. The group was trying to find a way to evaluate
their training policy most effectively using the model of their work environment. The
need for the model to replicate accurately the disaggregated training evident in the firm
was very important to the group. Building an accurate representation of safety training
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in their firm seemed to take precedence here over learning about the general effects of
training. In addition to this, the model had been used as a catalyst for a discussion on
the firm's approach to safety training.
(c) The Effect of the Interface on the Model's Application
The group were again asked for their opinions on the model's effectiveness in
enhancing learning and policy-making. The actual interface was brought into the
discussion and its user-friendliness was brought to their attention. They were then
queried about the interface's importance within learning or policy-making situations:
"The problems you would face there are the scepticism. If they're [users] not familiar with
computers or they don't understand modelling ...
They have to be comfortable with the process and understand what it is setting out to achieve . .
. the model has been developed to the stage that you can use sliders and check graphs.
Depending on the audience you're trying to reach that will only reach a certain proportion of
them...
Ideally you want something which will work in an interactive way which that [the model] does.
With someone at a lower level of management or supervisory level you could play with that and
it might be instead of a chart it would show a pile of dead bodies. So that they could visually,
not just on a graph, get an appreciation. . . so taking that [the model] a stage further. .. follow
the same as a flight simulator and keep developing that, if the aim is to develop a package that
can be used for training." (Safety Professional)
The group was asked about the interface for the model acting as a policy tool to assist
with resource allocation;
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"It doesn't need to be pretty to do that, just understandable." (Safety Professional)
The group was able to differentiate between the needs of the user interface for learning,
where it was made clear that the outputs needed to be more visual than graphical, and
the low priority given to aesthetics by the planner. Useful suggestions were made as to
how to improve the learning experience, for example, the dead bodies piling up instead
of a graph unfolding. The slide bars and output graphs close at hand were appreciated.
This suggests that the group was satisfied with the current user interface for ease of
policy experimentation, but as an aid to learning it needed to be more visual.
(d) The Behaviour of the Model
The interviewees were asked whether they were surprised about any of the behaviour of
the simulation output:
"It's interesting to see which ones [policies] affect [the behaviour of the model] and I suppose
we could concentrate on basically the ones which we could influence the most, quickly and
cheaply .. . get as many people involved." (Production Manager)
"Getting over the credibility gap, let's say you've got a group, say we looked at Finishing Ends
One and Two, and you have that group of managers and supervisors, they think the model's
credible, we've reached that point, it would allow them to understand safety." (Safety
Professional)
The safety professional described how he argued often with the production management
group about safety issues and how they complained that they could not fit enough
guards on machines:
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•"Sure, if it should be guarded it should be guarded but to expect that to make a tremendous
inroad into accident rates is false. It's what people do that cause accidents. A blend of on-the-job
and off-the-job training is required .. . it is generally accepted that training has that benefit and
you have a factory where the guarding is not adequate and hardly any accidents and then you
can have the converse, where you can have everything guarded and lots of accidents. The
difference there is the people." (Safety Professional)
Comments were made about the interesting nature of the model's output and the ease
with which policy experimentation could be conducted. The safety professional agreed
that he was aware from experience that training would have a major impact upon safety
and that the model confirmed his opinion. Again, the model had stimulated debate
between managers on how best to run the safety system.
(e) Convincing Senior Management of the Usefulness of the Model
Whether strategies identified in the model could ultimately be pursued would depend on
the safety budget. The senior accountants and board members would set this. Safety
would have to be sold as a cost centre to these people. The group was queried as to their
perceived judgement of senior management's response towards the usefulness of the
model:
"if you've got a group of directors. . . they are not at the technology end. So for a start it's a
computer and they're not entirely familiar with that and then you've got the scepticism about
modelling which would be a concept with which they would, maybe, not be familiar. I think
there would be a point where they would say 'Well very interesting but I'm too busy, go talk to
someone else'. So before you've got over those two hurdles to get the benefits of the model they
might have gone and lost interest. . . they've got to the bullet points [model summary], they
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want to be there, if the bullet points don't confirm their pre-digested thinking, their own
prejudices and beliefs, then you're obviously wrong and they move onto something else."
(Safety Professional)
"But saying that, if the bait's taken with a few bullet points then all of a sudden you find that
they're running very fast to the beat ...
The best place to target is the accounts, accountants." (Production Manager)
"That might be the best place to start. . . general mistrust about computers, no knowledge about
modelling. I think that's where we are, and most companies might be like that." (Safety
Professional)
The group offered a range of opinions on the perception of senior managers. To use the
model in a demonstration capacity seemed to be the opinion of the group. Selling the
concept and the power of the model for safety evaluation would have to be done
carefully, as there appeared to be some doubt about the open-mindedness of the
Directors to computer modelling. This appears to confirm the concern over static
thinking by many companies' Directors. The model has stimulated comments on the
management culture in the firm.
(f) Exploring Alternative Strategies Not Covered by the Model
The group was questioned as to whether they believed that the model's policies covered
the fundamental influences on safety:
"What about incentive schemes? You could have that as an additional policy. If you had a slider
bar, pounds (Vs) per month per employee invested in the safety scheme. Then you've got a cost
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It could have a similar effect to training." (Safety Professional)
This statement from the safety professional strongly suggests that he had a good grasp
of the structure of the model despite having minimal contact with it. He was able to
identify a key input as units per unit per time. He saw the potential of evaluating
strategy by the addition of a viable policy, and identified its dimensions. This was an
observation about how the model might be re-engineered in order to improve policy
evaluation:
"Management competence . . . their competence in safety could be measured and some term
found which you could vary to influence the model . . .
If you've got ignorance on the part of the senior people and an unwillingness to act that would
have massive effects on how your company performs well in any sphere." (Safety Professional)
It was explained that management competence was indirectly included in the model as
the policy decisions would be those taken by managers. This fits with the idea of the
man in the model described in Section 5.4(f) of Chapter Five.
(g) The Model as an Tdutainment Game
The role of the model as an Tdutainmene game was raised and responses were short
but encouraging:
"somebody who is enlightened in safety using it [the model] as a policy tool, whereas, a person
from a more general background using it as an educational or Edutainment tool ?
I think as an Edutainment tool people would be more inclined to play with it [the model] and it's
playing with it you actually learn." (Safety Professional)
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The observation that the longer people played or experimented with the model, the more
they would learn was very astute. This shows that the manager believed in the ability of
the model to help people to learn about safety through teaching themselves.
(h) Optimisation of the Model
Optimisation was an area brought up directly by the group. They were probing to
discover if the model could be optimised, and if so, how?
"Could it be programmed to work out itself what the most effective variables are in the model?"
(Management Trainee)
"An optimising program, would you set the target of minimising all costs?" (Safety
Professional)
It was explained that the model could be optimised manually using the hill-climbing
approach (Coyle, 1996) to identify a policy mix which would minimise costs. It was
also pointed out that optimisation programmes were available with certain system
dynamics packages such as DYSMAP, Vensim and COSMIC.
The question of removal of human interaction by using an optimisation program was
raised by the interviewer. It was suggested that people might not get the opportunity to
explore policies if they were to let the computer make the decisions for them:
"If there was a function you could just switch on and off then you could just use it for both . . .
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Like for somebody who was familiar with the model and believed what it told them . . . he'll
want to run the optimisation won't he ? He won't want to spend hours in front of the keyboard.
But you want the learning course because it might be that the optimisation will have to take
account of the amount of money you have available or the amount of time, so you want to
optimise given that these inputs must be maintained below this level. So what can we do with
the resources we've got ? . . .
"That's an interesting philosophical debate. Do you want to optimise on accidents, which is zero
accidents, or do you optimise on cost and you might not choose zero accidents ?" (Safety
Professional)
Optimisation was seen as useful for policy-making, in fact an interesting discussion
ensued as to whether the objective function of the model should be accident rates or
safety costs. Certainly the group were thinking here purely in policy-making terms.
(i) The Users and Uses of the Simulation Model
One question posed to the group was:
"Would they use the model to enlighten other people?" (Interviewer)
"From top to bottom really" (Production Manager)
"I think there's still work to do on enlightening, because we can still slip back into 'Well I can't
get enough fitters to fit the guards . . . I can't do anything about safety. .
It would be for anybody to come and use it; it would be for learning; once you've achieved that
aim, you could then use it by adding features to mould it into a policy tool, but first of all it must
be a good learning tool" (Safety Professional)
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When queried as to who would use the model and how, the responses were very broad.
The consensus seemed to be that anyone who had an interest in occupational safety
could use the model to develop a better understanding, and then to aid policy-making.
(j) Abstract or 'Real World' Model
The group was asked their opinion on using an abstract model or one validated with
their firm's data:
"It [an abstract model] would still help us to learn and we might discover policies that we would
not normally discover." (Safety Professional)
"If you took it off a really successful firm, like a Japanese leader, something not necessarily in
this industry." (Management Trainee)
"You could switch on the generic model, which is designed to show how safety works for any
company . . . introducing policies and switching them on. If people played with that the next
thing they would want is something they could use for their own situation." (Safety
Professional)
The safety professional had made a very good point about the uses of exploratory
models to discover policies that might not be discovered using an operational model.
Also he suggested the desire of model users to experiment with a model built to reflect
their firm's circumstances. Both these points have been raised by Shubik (1983) where
he compares the merits of real world and abstract gaming models.
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(k) Summary of Discussion Findings
A wide range of views were put forward by the three interviewees, all possessing
varying degrees and types of knowledge of occupational safety and simulation
modelling. The common thread that can be teased out of the discussion is that the model
in its present form was found to be helpful by the clients for understanding how to
control the behaviour of their firm's occupational safety system.
Many of the explicit observations made by the group pointed to the model being more
suitable as a tool for either demonstrating the effects of safety policy, or for helping
people to learn more about their firm's safety systems. There was acknowledgement
that the simulation would still be of value in learning or even policy-making when set in
an abstract context, although there was a greater appreciation of the model in its present
real world form. Much of the underlying discussion pointed towards using the model to
assist with policy evaluation. Suggestions were made concerning the introduction of
other policy parameters into the model.
The results of the policy experiments that the group conducted were certainly pertinent
to the discussion. Training was identified as the model policy able to exert either a
virtuous or vicious effect over the whole system's performance. The model had allowed
the interviewees to appreciate this and much debate had followed as to how training
might best be used.
The group had considered carefully the initial query put forward as to whether to use
the model as a learning or as a policy tool. This allowed the interview to reveal quite a
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rich picture of opinion on the uses of the model to assist the firm with safety, and uses
beyond the firm. A limitation of the model highlighted in the discussion appeared to be
the perception that training in the firm would be better reflected in the RWOSM if its
structure was dissagregated to show the effect of different types of training. The lack of
criticism levelled by the interviewees may show that their exposure to the RWOSM was
too limited, not allowing them to comment adequately on the plausibility of the model's
structure and equations.
7.4 Policy Analysis
Policy analysis helps the model user to understand why a system behaves in a certain
way (Coyle, 1996). Policy experiments with system dynamics models are used to help
design the best possible robust behaviour into the system under study. There are very
many possibilities open to the model user and there is no way of knowing in advance
which will give the best overall performance in the system. The only way to progress is
to experiment with different policies with the intention of designing a scenario which
suggests the best outcome, that is the control of any undesirable behaviour within a
system. Richardson and Pugh (1981) indicated the need to introduce a limitation to
experimentation. They suggested only pursuing feasible real world policy alternatives
which could be implemented as policy options in the real system.
Policy analysis can be conducted through changes to the structure of a model or changes
to the parameters. The structure of the safety model has remained fixed throughout the
study. Therefore the only changes that can be made are to parameter values. These
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changes should help to find better model results. The real world occupational safety
model (RWOSM) contains many parameters making a coherent analysis quite difficult.
To deepen the understanding of why the model behaves as it does requires
experimentation with at least some of the parameters. The results of the detailed
parameter sensitivity analysis conducted on the generic occupational safety model
(GOSM) limits the testing of the model to a smaller range of more sensitive parameters.
In Chapter Five, the parameter sensitivity tests were described. These were performed
in a controlled environment. The tests only involved single parameter changes and were
very formal. In reality, a variety of policy changes may achieve the desired results
better. Therefore, policy experimentation differs only from the parameter sensitivity
analysis in that it involves multiple policy parameter changes.
It is not enough to know that certain policies improve model behaviour. The user needs
to know why that behaviour happens. Otherwise, they will not think about
implementing the policy decisions in the real system. For this to be achieved the model
user must at least understand the principal feedback structure of the model. Also the
user must always be aware of the limitations of policy experimentation. A mix of
policies in a simulation may show a very desirable outcome, but it may be impossible to
translate these changes into the real system. Therefore, the policy parameters must be
kept within clearly achievable bounds.
(a) The Five Policy Analysis Scenarios
The policy analysis is designed to identify safety policies which result in an
improvement both in accident rates and in safety costs. Some of the more sensitive
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policies identified from prior sensitivity tests on the GOSM will be numerically
modified in order to explore, and then to design a better safety management system.
Five scenarios are examined in total. A number of important output metrics are chosen
to allow behavioural and numerical analysis of simulation performance. Also
cumulative totals and final values are noted for accidents and safety costs.
The first four scenarios reflect some of the policy experiments carried out by the firm's
managers when they were introduced to the RWOSM. The last scenario shows the end
result of extensive manual optimisation of the model. The first four scenarios are more
concerned with policy experimentation, with capturing insights into the range of
behaviours that the system is capable of, and the last seeks to design policies through
optimisation to give the best performance to the system.
(b) Scenario One: Business as Usual
The first scenario to be explored is 'business as usual'. This consists of keeping the
policies fixed at the level at which they were in the final month of the historical
simulation with Training Policy being the exception. This policy had fluctuated over the
past three years with no underlying trend and, as a consequence, it was fixed in month
37 at 56 man-hours per month to reflect the average training which had occurred over
the previous three-year period. This scenario is set as the base run for these policy tests,
and alternative scenarios will seek to reduce any undesirable behaviour which the safety
system may exhibit through this simulation. Figure 7.2 shows that if no alternative
action is taken to improve the safety situation over the next three-year period, the
accident situation considerably worsens. Also the knowledge, skill and attitude (KSA)
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firm continues to diminish.
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	 2: Average KSA
	
3: Actual Length of Employment
Months
Figure 7.2	 Changes in scenario one to the accident rate, average knowledge, skills and attitude and
actual length of employment over the three-year period
Figure 7.3 shows the projected transience of the workplace hazards over the next three-
year period. The graph reveals a slow but consistent decline in the numbers of
Regulated Hazards. The reduction in Regulated Hazards causes a considerable
accumulation to arise in Hazards under Full Regulation. Under this scenario,
insufficient resources are being allocated to regulate hazards fully. This growing
backlog waiting to be processed is largely responsible for fuelling the increasing
accident rate.
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Changes in scenario one to the distribution of hazards over the three-year period
Figure 7.4 shows that there is a considerable growth in the costs of both accidents and
the running of the safety management system:
Months
Figure 7.4	 Changes in scenario one to the costs of accidents and running the safety management
system over the three-year period
The firm could surely not sustain this growth in costs. The 'business as usual' scenario
uses a set of policies that fail to arrest and reverse the increases in accident rate or the
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monthly safety costs. The increased backlog of Hazards Under Full Regulation appears
to exacerbate this situation.
(c) Scenario Two: Hazard Regulation
In the 'business as usual' scenario where no policy changes are implemented the
performance of the simulated safety system deteriorates with nearly all outputs
exhibiting undesirable behaviour. The policy makers may see fit to improve the overall
safety system through preventing the accumulations of Hazards Under Intermediate and
Full Regulation. The 'hazard regulation' scenario shows the effect of increasing the
resources committed to the Intermediate and Full Hazard Regulation Policies by 100%
over the base run and keeping all other policies invariant. Figure 7.5 shows numerical
but not behavioural improvements in the simulation outputs compared to the base run:
1: Acddent Rate
	
2: Average KSA
	
3: Actual Length of Employment
Figure 7.5	 Changes in scenario two to the accident rate, average knowledge, skills and attitude
and actual length of employment over the three-year period
The increase in the accident rate is less marked, the loss of KSA by the employees
slows and the decline in average length of employment is slower.
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Figure 7.6 shows that there are numerical but not behavioural improvements to the
distribution of hazards in comparison with the base run. The rate of decrease in
Regulated Hazards is slowed. The extra resources committed to hazard regulation have
ensured that the growth in Hazards Under Full Regulation is largely arrested and that
the accumulation in Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation remains under control.
1: Regulated Hazards	 2: Hazards Under Inter... 	 3: Hazards Under Full R...	 4: Unregulated Hazards
Months
Figure 7.6	 Changes in scenario two to the distribution of hazards over the three-year period
Figure 7.7 shows the rate of increase in accident and safety management system costs is
much slower than the base run although there is no improvement in the behaviour of
these outputs.
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Figure 7.7	 Changes in scenario two to the costs of accidents and running the safety management
system over the three-year period
The 'hazard regulation' scenario arrests the rates of increase in accidents and safety
costs, but fails to reverse these upwards trends. The accrued benefits stem from the
increases in hazard regulation resources slowing the accumulations of Hazards under
Full Regulation.
(d) Scenario Three: Integrated Hazard Control
In the 'hazard regulation' scenario the performance of the safety management system
improved, with lower accidents and safety costs, although the performance metrics in
the system were still deteriorating throughout the simulation. An alternative scenario
may consist not only of allocating more resources to hazard regulation policies but also
increasing the ability to identify more Unregulated Hazards through increases in the
Safety Monitoring and Accident Reporting Policies. The 'integrated hazard control'
scenario shows the effect of increasing resources committed to the Intermediate and
Full Hazard Regulation Policies, and the Safety Monitoring and Accident Reporting
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Policies by 100%, keeping all other policies fixed. Figure 7.8 shows that there were
minimal numerical improvements to the accident rate, KSA of the employees and
average length of employment, but no behavioural improvements compared to the
'hazard control scenario'.
1: Accident Rate	 2: Average KSA
	
3: Actual Length of Employment
Figure 7.8	 Changes in scenario three to the accident rate, average knowledge, skills and attitude
and actual length of employment over the three-year period
•
Figure 7.9 shows that there were minimal numerical improvements but no behavioural
improvements to the transience of hazards in comparison with the 'hazard regulation
scenario'. The growth in accumulations of active hazards has failed to be arrested.
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Figure 7.9	 Changes in scenario three to distribution of hazards over the three-year period
Figure 7.10 shows the cost of running the safety system under this scenario is higher but
the accident costs are similar to the previous one. The gap between safety and accident
costs increases in comparison to the 'hazard control scenario' suggesting that the cost-
benefit of this scenario is poorer.
Figure 7.10	 Changes in scenario three to the costs of accidents and running the safety management
system over the three-year period
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There is little improvement in the accident rate and noticeable increases in the costs of
running safety for the 'integrated hazard control' scenario. It appears to be less viable
than the previous scenario but still better than 'business as usual'.
(e) Scenario Four: Intensive Safety Training
The previous three scenarios have varying success at stemming the increases in accident
rates and safety costs. None succeed in improving the behaviour of these important
performance outputs. The Training Policy had been identified in sensitivity tests with
the GOSM as a policy with the potential to improve the safety system's behaviour. In
the 'intensive safety training' scenario, safety training is increased by 100%. All other
policies remain fixed at their original values. Figure 7.11 shows that there are
considerable numerical and behavioural improvements to the output metrics compared
to the previous scenarios.
1: Accident Rate
	 2: Average KSA
	
3: Actual Length of Employment
Months
Figure 7.11	 Changes in scenario four to the accident rate, average knowledge skills and attitude and
actual length of employment over the three-year period
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There is a large reduction in the accident rate, and increases in the average length of
employment and average KSA. These outputs are logarithmic in shape, with the
improvements lessening throughout the simulation. The increased training appears to
have improved the performance of these output metrics, particularly in the first half of
the simulation.
Figure 7.12 shows that the accumulation of Regulated Hazards increases over time and
the active hazards decline in numbers. The additional safety training increases KSA,
thus improving the way in which employees work with hazards. The result is that more
hazards are able to stay contained in a safe state.
1: Regulated Hazards	 2: Hazards Under Inter...	 3: Hazards Under Full R...	 4: Unregulated Hazards
Figure 7.12	 Changes in scenario four to the distribution of hazards over the three-year period
Figure 7.13 shows a continuous decline in both the costs of accidents and in the running
of the safety management system, with the monthly costs halving by the end of the
simulated period. The gap between accident and safety cost increases gradually
throughout the period possibly for two reasons. The first as the employee KSA
289
NReduction or
2
more than 50% in both accident
/
costs and safety mann( ment system costs
\
1 Proportion of safety costs attributable to am idents consistently declines
2,...,..........ss,__...,1
2	 	
2	 —
1- 	—.
8250.00
72.00
3000.00
37.00 54.50 63 2545 75
1: Monthly Accident Cost
13500.00
2: Monthly Safety Cost
improves the amount of learning per unit of training is lower. The second may result
from falling accident rates reducing costs whilst the cost of training remains a fixed cost
of safety.
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Figure 7.13	 Changes in scenario three to the costs of accidents and running the safety management
system over the three-year period
The 'intensive safety training' scenario suggests that increases to the volumes of
training delivered improves both the numerical and behavioural outputs of the safety
system. Waring (1996) warns that people can have a naïve expectation that training will
produce miraculous changes in employee's behaviour and accident rates will
dramatically fall. In this scenario the increase in the training policy brings about large
improvements in the safety system's performance. This is not to say that the benefits
have been achieved by training alone. Other policies used to control hazards, along with
training, encourage these improvements.
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(f) Scenario Five: Fully Integrated Safety Policies
Optimisation through repeated experimentation can be used with system dynamics
models for policy design (Coyle, 1996). The 'fully integrated safety policies' scenario
seeks to show how, after repeated simulation, a set of dynamic policies can be set which
attempt to use resources more efficiently to bring about reductions in accidents and in
safety costs. An objective function needs to be chosen for model optimisation. This is a
measure of system performance and it is used to guide the optimisation search. It was
decided ultimately to use Monthly Safety Cost as the objective function. The Accident
Rate was not chosen for two reasons. Firstly, employers have a statutory duty under the
HASAWA, 1974 to take 'reasonably practicable' measures to avoid risk and are
allowed to balance costs and benefits. The second is the known association between
spending money on suitable safety policies and on achieving low accident rates. The
optimisation is based on what Coyle called hill-climbing. Through changing the values
of important policies and repeating the simulation runs, there is a possibility that lower
and lower safety costs can be achieved over time. Policy experiments would be
constrained according to the feasibility of implementing these policies in the real safety
system. Without the help of optimisation software a close to optimal result could not be
achieved but a set of policies could be designed which indicate improved system
performance. Training remained high throughout the simulation although it was reduced
as accident rates improved. Also, as the accidents lessened, the intensity with which the
other policies were pursued was lessened, as there was not the same need to use them.
Figure 7.14 shows improved numerical performance against all the previous four
scenarios. In comparison with the 'intensive safety training' scenario, the accident rate
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is considerably reduced as a result of the integrated policy changes. The rate of increase
in the average length of employment and employee KSA is also higher.
1: Accident Rate	 2: Average KSA	 3: Actual Length of Employment
Figure 7.14	 Changes in scenario five to the accident rate, average knowledge, skills and attitude
and actual length of employment over the three-year period
Figure 7.15 shows improved numerical change to the distribution of hazards. More
hazards than previous scenarios are in a regulated state.
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Figure 7.15	 Changes in scenario five to the distribution of hazards over the three-year period
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Figure 7.16 shows a substantial decline in the monthly accident and safety costs. The
behaviour of the outputs is similar to the previous scenario but with improved numerical
results.
Months
Figure 7.16	 Changes in scenario three to the costs of accidents and running the safety management
system over the three-year period
The results of the optimisation scenario have shown that the greatest system
improvements can be brought about by integrated policy changes. The scenario showed
that low accident rates and safety costs could be achieved given prudent policy design.
With reference to the basic causal loop diagram of safety in Figure 5.3 the logic can be
explained. The domination of the safety KSA loop strengthened throughout this
scenario, and as people work more and more safely with hazards, this further reduces
the importance of the policies contained around the proactive and reactive safety loops.
293
(g) Summary of Policy Scenario Tests
The five scenarios appear to suggest that alternative policy mixes have varying degrees
of success in controlling the undesirable behaviour of outputs of the RWOSM. The
analysis and discussion of these scenarios centred on the dynamic behaviour of many
model outputs. It was important not only to know which policy caused changes in
system behaviour but also why these changes came about. Adequate explanations of
model behaviour have been given. It can also be important when assessing the
performance of system dynamics models to measure the final values of simulations.
Table 7.2 shows the cumulative accidents, cumulative safety costs, and final values for
the accident rate and monthly safety costs for the five scenarios. Table 7.3 analyses the
performance of these important metrics for each scenario in comparison to the first
scenario or base run.
Output Metric Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Cumulative Accidents 316 272 268 108 36
Cumulative Safety Costs (£) 613,789 565,533 614,747 302,123 213,320
Final Accident Rate 12.12 8.98 8.72 2.00 0.49
Final Monthly Safety Cost (£) 22,515 17,716 18,841 6,730 807
Table 7.2
	
Comparison of important output metrics in alternative scenarios
Output Metric Scenario 1
% Change
Over Base
Run
Scenario 2
% Change
Over Base
Run
Scenario 3
% Change
Over Base
Run
Scenario 4
% Change
Over Base
Run
Scenario 5
% Change
Over Base
Run
Cumulative Accidents
Cumulative Safety Costs (£)
Final Accident Rate
Final Monthly Safety Cost (£)
0
0
0
0
,
-14
-8
-26
-21
-15
0
-28
-16
-66
-51
-83
-70
-89
-65
-96
-96
Table 7.3
	 Comparison of percentage changes in important output metrics between alternative
scenarios and the base run scenario
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The results in Table 7.3 are encouraging to the policy analyst. All the scenarios where
policy changes are made suggest improved system performance. It is evident that in
scenarios two and three, hazard control alone would not be sufficient to improve the
performance of the safety system substantially. Increased training is shown in scenarios
four and five to be a policy which, if increased greatly, can offer even better accident
and financial performance in the safety system. The results are so encouraging that they
may even lead to the validity of the model being queried. There is a possibility that the
parameters and equations concerned with training, learning and KSA were set up in the
simulation to have too great an influence upon the simulation model's performance
compared to reality. The structural assumptions of the model do allow the benefit of
training to lessen as the employees get nearer to a perfect KSA, but there are no means
of reflecting the employee complacency which may be brought about by over-training.
Despite this criticism of the policy analysis, the changes in system behaviour brought
about by the policy changes and the rank successes of the alternative scenarios certainly
appear to be plausible. The validity of these findings is increased when the outcomes of
the interview are noted. The managers had suggested that training was the policy which
could offer the greatest improvements in the performance of their safety system.
7.5 Summary of the Interview Findings and Scenario Testing
The interview with the firm's managers was certainly constructive. Many opinions
about the uses of the model were offered. Most comments appeared to consist of valid
observations and suggestions. According to the firm's managers, the safety model could
be just as easily used as an aid to understanding the structure and behaviour of
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occupational safety systems as in assisting strategic decision-making. The interviewees
also introduced the idea of using the model in a demonstrative capacity. The model had
acted as a catalyst for debate between the managers on the running of their safety
system. However the lack of criticisms of the model by the interviewees is of concern.
Understandably, in such a short period they had been unable to assimilate many of the
principles of system dynamics modelling, and as a result they were limited in terms of
what they could discuss. Despite this the validity of the interview findings appear to be
acceptable, and one could conclude from the discussion that the group of managers
found the simulation useful for dealing with safety management.
Policy analysis can be very intuitive and exploratory if the intention of the model user is
to experiment with the safety model in order to understand the effects of various policy
decisions. This approach was evident in the first four policy scenarios which were
simulated. On the other hand, system dynamics simulation can be a detailed and
rigorous process if the aim is to design improved policies for implementation in a real
safety environment. This was the case with the final policy scenario. The process of
continuous improvement in the safety system's behaviour was an emergent one, as
learning occurred through simulating each scenario policy improvements could be
made. It is evident from the range of plausible scenarios tested that the firm's managers
can take policy-decisions based on the model outputs which should lead to
improvement in the accident rate and costs of running safety.
In conclusion, the evaluation of the model by the host firm's managers and the range of
policy scenarios presented have highlighted some deficiencies and limitations in the
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safety model's structure and uses. On balance, the evidence suggests that the target of
delivering a useful and robust model for occupational safety learning and decision-
making has been achieved.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusions and Further Research Implications
8.1 Overview of the Study
This study provided a way of modelling occupational safety and accidents using system
dynamics. Literature in the fields of occupational safety, systems thinking and other
harder modelling approaches was investigated. The work has been exploratory as no
other operational safety models appear to have been published. Using academic and
practitioner literature, opinions of experts in the field of safety and personal
assumptions, a generic system dynamics model of an occupational safety system has
been built. It was subsequently tested with data derived from an industrial setting. A
number of alternative empirically-based safety scenarios have been explored and
appropriate policy decisions illustrated. The opinions of users of the model have been
elicited in order to capture an understanding of the potential uses of the simulation as a
pedagogic and decision-making aid.
The material presented in this thesis was divided into eight chapters. Chapter One
introduced the broad parameters of the study. The importance of good occupational
safety practice, the advantages of experimenting with models, and the aims and
objectives of the work were asserted and presented. In Chapter Two the legislation
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surrounding occupational safety management was described, along with recent evidence
on national rates of workplace accidents, and on the legal and financial costs of
accidents. The components of a successful safety management system were outlined in
Chapter Three. In Chapter Four the nature of systems thinking was spelt out and
discussed along with the principles of system dynamics and its applications. Chapter
Five showed how the generic system dynamics model of safety was developed and
validated to represent a fully operational and dynamic safety system. The method of
data collection within the host firm and the subsequent calibration of the model to
represent the past behaviour of its safety system was described in Chapter Six. Chapter
Seven presented the findings of a discussion with some of the host firm's managers on
the use of the model, followed by detailed experimentation with a number of alternative
policy scenarios. This final chapter presents a summary of the completed study and
describes the future research implications.
8.2 Summary of the Development of the Model
The process of building, testing and evaluating the model was based loosely on a
stepwise model building process recommended by Roberts et al. (1981, p.8). The
development of the operational model fell into two parts. The first was the development
of the generic occupational safety model and the second was the validation of the real
world occupational safety model.
(a) Validating the Generic Occupational Safety Model 
The published work on safety management was reviewed. It was found to be very
narrow in scope, prescriptive and systematic in its approach. Systematic approaches to
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safety, as for example recommended by the HSE (1991a) in its publication Successful
Health and Safety Management are valuable sources of information but are conceived
and written in rather compartmentalised and mechanistic ways (Waring, 1996). Most of
the researchers concerned with safety modelling discussed the application of
probabilistic models. These were diagnostic rather than interpretative, and were neither
dynamic nor strategic in nature. Fortunately, a few authors appeared to have taken a
systemic view of occupational safety (Waring, 1990a, 1990b, 1996; Andersen et al.,
1986). The lack of published literature on the application of systems thinking, or more
specifically system dynamics modelling to the evaluation of occupational safety
strategy was turned into an advantage as it offered the opportunity to develop and test a
completely new approach to decision-making in safety management.
The problem of accidents at work was clearly a dynamic one. The accident trend across
a range of industries was shown in Figure 2.1 of Chapter Two. In most cases there was
a clear downward movement in accident rates. A causal loop diagram was developed to
explain the important causal linkages in occupational safety systems. This loop
diagram, shown in Figure 5.3 of Chapter Five, proved to be an excellent vehicle for two
reasons. First, it captured the underlying system structure driving the accident problem,
and second it was used at a later point in the modelling process as an excellent medium
to explain the reasons for the simulated behaviour. The causal loop diagram consisted
of three feedback loops, one reinforcing and two balancing. The overall reinforcing
nature of the diagram suggested that the problem of accidents was one that could be
managed through implementation of alternative policies.
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Using the causal loop diagram and information drawn from more detailed and specific
literature, the full quantitative system dynamics model of an occupational safety system
was constructed. As this was a new application for system dynamics, the model was
subjected to a detailed methodological examination. Great emphasis was placed on
continuous validation in an effort to ensure that the model was internally coherent. A
number of structural validation tests were performed on the model, including structural
verification and dimensional consistency checks for every parameter and equation. A
number of behavioural tests were performed to evaluate the robustness of the model's
structure to the introduction of parameter changes. These consisted of extreme
behaviour tests and a rigorous set of sensitivity tests. It was evident from these
experiments that the model parameters to which the simulation was most sensitive were
associated with employees. This raised the question as to how dominant the reinforcing
Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude loop was over system behaviour.
The structure of the generic model offered the ability for plausible safety behaviour
representative of a real occupational safety system to be generated. In particular, the
range of validation tests showed that one could have a measure of faith in the essential
assumptions behind the model. If an operational system dynamics model were to be
accepted as a good representation of reality then it would need to be tested empirically.
(b) Validating the Real World Occupational Safety Model
The latter half of the modelling effort concentrated on testing the model with real world
data. A detailed case study of accidents at work was undertaken in a medium-sized
manufacturer in Central Scotland. The host firm was unlike many other manufacturers
in that its accident trend had not shown significant improvement in recent years.
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However its safety record was still much better than most in its industrial sector. This
different trend affirmed the importance of the ability of the model to replicate a range of
accident behaviour, and served to justify the rigorous and methodical approaches to
sensitivity testing in the generic model. The purpose of validating the generic model
with empirical data was to test whether the model could be simulated to match the
historically observed outputs of the firm's safety system, then to use the simulation to
identify future improved safety scenarios.
The generic model was translated into a real world model through the parameterisation
of the model with a large volume of hard and descriptive data gathered from the host
firm. Most of the harder data was obtained through the firm's archives, whilst the more
subjective data was elicited from discussions with managers and the survey responses
of line employees. This data was collected below the level of aggregation in the model
and summarised into a suitable form for numerical parameter verification. The real
world model was calibrated to fit the firm through modifications to the less accurately
measured constants and the hypothetical table functions.
The behaviour reproduction test showed that the simulation model produced an
adequate replication of past accidents and distributions of hazards in the firm. This
added greatly to the confidence that the firm's managers placed in the model outputs.
As far as they were concerned this was the most important test of model validation.
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8.3 Uses of the Real World Occupational Safety Model
The real world model was not only built to demonstrate that a system dynamics model
could replicate the behaviour of a historical safety system but as a means of improving
understanding of how policy decisions made in a complex system affect the
performance of workplace safety.
(a) Using the Occupational Safety Model as a Heuristic Teaching Tool or for Policy-.
Making
The discussion with the managers of the host firm led to insights into the potential of
the model as a pedagogic tool in either a generic or real world form. It was suggested
that people who were unfamiliar with safety management could experiment with the
model to learn about the effects that potential safety decisions would have on accidents.
Setting up the model as a gaming tool was seen as important to helping people learn
about safety. Comments were made about people being more inclined to play with the
model in an edutaimnent form, and through playing they would actually learn.
It was evident from the discussion that the managers were particularly interested in
using the model at a lower level for learning, and at a higher level for policy analysis.
They did not offer blind faith in the model but suggested that they were prepared to
follow the policies that the simulation showed to be desirable, while monitoring how
accurately the predictions of behaviour were. They also mentioned that they could put
more resources into the policies which the model suggested exerted the most leverage
over the system's performance. The findings suggested that they had placed enough
confidence in the recommendations of the model.
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The managers raised the idea of using the model in a demonstrative capacity. They saw
the opportunity to interest Company Directors in the importance of safety management.
The model had also served as a catalyst for debate about safety issues within the firm.
Had the model not focused the attention of the managers on the more strategic aspects
of safety management then some of the debate about safety practice in the firm may not
have evolved as far as it did.
(b) Policy Analysis Using the Real World Occupational Safety Model
A range of feasible policy scenarios aimed at improving the future accident situation
and costs of safety in the host firm were explored. The simulation outputs appeared to
be plausible for each scenario tested. The policy tests showed how improvements in
system performance could be brought about by running simulations and then examining
a range of output metrics to understand the changes if any, brought about by alternative
decisions. Clearly the decisions which concerned improvements to employee
knowledge, skills and attitude were shown to improve the accident and financial
performance of the firm's safety system.
8.4 The Main Limitations of the Study
Due to the complexities involved in the operation of a safety management system, there
was the danger of introducing error at every stage of the model building process. The
introduction of error, especially at the earlier stages of any simulation model may set
serious limitations on the credibility and usefulness of a model. This worry gave rise to
the prominence of model validation as a theme throughout the work. Inevitably as with
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any study there are limitations which cannot be fully resolved. This section lists the five
principal limitations to this modelling study.
There may be errors built into the structural assumptions of the model. Important
equations and parameters may have been excluded. A model is a simplification of
reality, and it has to be accepted that not every factor that affects safety can be included
in its structure. Through careful examination of the safety literature the attributes of
safety considered to contribute most strongly to accident behaviour were included in the
generic model. Their inclusion was supported by both structural and parameter
verification tests. The rigorous sensitivity tests sought to further verify the internal
consistency of the model to help identify and remove any structure causing erroneous
model behaviour.
Further errors may have been introduced in the validation and calibration of the real
world model. The ability of the model to replicate past safety behaviour in the host firm
would be partly influenced by the accuracy with which model parameters were
validated numerically. The comprehensive methods of data collection below the level of
model aggregation sought to minimise this error. Despite this, comparing the observed
hazard distribution against the simulated one showed that there was a systematic error
associated with bias. This was attributed to the underestimation of the transience of the
hazard states. This was considered to be acceptable for the purpose of the study because
it did not affect any underlying policy decisions.
There was also the possibility that the process of calibrating the real world model may
have resulted in the Safety Training Policy having more influence over safety
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performance than it has in reality. There is no doubt that it could exert great influence
over the performance of the system. It may have been prudent to introduce an attribute
to the model to represent 'training fatigue', to show the results of over-training.
Another limitation of the work involves the managers of the host firm. They were not
involved in the model building process other than helping with some data collection. A
number of authors such as Richardson and Pugh (1981) and Vennix et al. (1996, 1997)
rightly suggested that insights are more likely to come out of the process of modelling
rather than products of the modelling study. When a client cannot be involved in the
modelling process, the tasks of the modeller is harder, and the likelihood of the results
being implemented is diminished. This possibility has to be accepted as a limitation of
this work.
A final limitation of the model may lie in the fact that the simulation can only suggest
which policies will help, not how those policies should be introduced into a system. The
process of implementing policy recommendations is likely to generate a whole set of
problems.
8.5 Suggestions for Further Research
There is a great deal of scope for further work using the occupational safety model. The
managers of the host firm suggested that the model outputs had confirmed their
suspicions that training was the policy which had the capacity to exert the most
influence over the accident trend. They indicated that they were likely to increase the
level of training within their firm. If the firm did this, it could be revisited to see which
306
policies were adopted, and if they were successfully implemented did the model's
behaviour prediction hold true?
The real world model was tested in only one firm. This does not confirm that the model
can be applied in all workplaces. All it indicates is that it was successfully tested in one.
Further confidence in the model could be built if it was tested for a number of different
workplaces and a range of plausible but different modes of safety behaviour could be
exhibited. It may become evident as the model is calibrated to replicate occupational
safety in different workplaces that some of the structure may need to be overhauled or
even further structure introduced.
As it is the feedback structure of a system dynamics model that tends to be a strong
determinant of its behaviour over time, policy improvement often involves the addition
of new feedback links that represent improved ways of manipulating available
information in the system. This can be achieved through the addition of model structure
to represent policy alternatives rather than simply changing the numerical values of
policy parameters. The occupational safety model's structure was fixed throughout its
testing with the host firm. Given the intention of applying the model to a range of
different types of firm a problem may arise if the present model structure fails to
replicate the behaviour of safety in a particular firm. The limitation may lie in the fact
that the model's structure remains fixed throughout the simulation. Coyle (1996) may
have a clear answer to this. He suggests that in order to experiment more conveniently
with structural options in a system dynamics model the introduction of structural
parameters may be appropriate. A 'binary structural parameter' having a value of zero
or one can allow model behaviour to be tested by switching feedback loop structure on
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and off. Alternatively, using a 'continuous structural parameter' which can have a value
from zero to one can be used to look at the behaviour of the model given
experimentation with different weightings attached to parts of the feedback structure.
Using this approach, 'several occupational safety models' can be stored within one
grand occupational safety model, and the opportunity is at hand to use certain feedback
structure when appropriate for different firms.
The development of optimisation software to support policy analysis and design has
been one of the more substantial developments in the field of system dynamics since its
inception. In Section 7.3f of Chapter Seven, a scenario was examined using manual
optimisation, known as hill climbing. Unfortunately, the Ithink software does not
support optimisation software. There is the potential to translate the occupational safety
simulation model into system dynamics software which has an optimisation facility
(DYSMAP, COSMIC or Vensim) and search for better policies with the aid of
optimisation. It would be interesting to determine whether there would be a significant
difference between the chosen objective functions, i.e. accidents or safety costs using
manual or software facilitated optimisation. These results may add to the debate
amongst system dynamics modellers as to the appropriateness of simulation through
optimisation.
8.6 Summary of the Occupational Safety Modelling Study
With regard to the purpose of the study, the aim and objectives of the study appear to
have been met in full. Knowledge of system dynamics modelling and its applications
has been demonstrated. A model of accidents at work has been produced, calibrated
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carefully and tested with data from a real firm. The model has been able to simulate a
range of alternative future scenarios, which if implemented could reduce accidents at
work and the costs of running a safety management system. The work is exploratory,
and contributes to the body of knowledge surrounding strategic decision-making in
occupational safety management and also to the literature on systems modelling.
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APPENDIX A
Note on the Use of MIN Statements in Model Equations
In system dynamics modelling there are invariably several ways of solving any given
problem. MIN statements should only be used when the logic of the model requires
them and never to cover up strange behaviour (Coyle, 1996). MIN can be used as a
limiting function in an equation. For example the expression MIN(A,B) takes the value
of A or B, whichever is the lesser (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
The MIN function appears in one equation in Appendix A (Accident Reports
Completed) and three equations in Appendix C (Hazard Identification Rate, Hazards
Arrive for Full Regulation and Hazards Become Regulated). The underlying structure
of these four equations is the same and takes the form:
Outflow.KL = MIN(Level.K/Time to Clear Backlog,Indicated Outflow)
The inclusion of the MIN function in the above rate equation prevents the Level
becoming negative under the circumstances where the Indicated Outflow is greater than
the Level/Time to Clear Backlog. Indicated Outflow is a constraint used to impose a
maximum capacity or ceiling on the Outflow or process rate. Using the MIN statement
returns the smaller value among Level/Time to Clear Backlog and Indicated Outflow.
Al
The Time to Clear Backlog is a time constant. Richardson and Pugh (1981, p.142)
suggest that a time constant represents the average lifetime or average dwell time of an
item in a level. In this formulation the dwell time for an item in the Level is represented
by a management's intention to turn around the contents of a level in a given time.
Accident Reporting Sector
Accident Reporting Equations
Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t) = Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_In - Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Accident Reports_Being_Processed = 2.06
Accident_Reports_In = Accident_Rate*Proportion_of Accidents_Reported
Accident Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog,
Accident_Reporting_Policy/Accident Reporting_Time)
Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t -
dt) + (Monthly_Accident Reporting_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident Reporting_Cost =
Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident_Reporting_Cost
Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
[NIT Cumulative_Accident Reports =0
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear Accident_Report Backlog,
Accident_Reporting_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Accident_Reporting_Cost = 100
Accident Reporting_Policy =25
Accident_Reporting_Time = 10
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Time_to_Clear Accident_Report_Backlog = 1
Accident Reports Being Processed
Accident Reports Being Processed is a level. It represents the accidents reports which
are awaiting attention.
A2
Accident Reports Being Processed.K = Accident Reports Being Processed.J (Accident
Reports) + {Accident Reports In.JK (Accident Reports/Month) - Accident Reports
Completed.JK (Accident Reports/Month)} * DT (Month)
Units: Accident Reports
Accident Reports Being Processed = [AR] +(—[AR]AR]) x [T][T]	 [T]
= [AR]
Accident Reports In
Accident Reports In is a rate equation. It is the new additions in the given month to the
accident reports stock. The rate is dependent upon accidents being generated in the
given month. Every time an accident occurs, no matter how minor it should be reported,
as there is a need at least to document it in an accident records log book. In many cases
a full accident report and investigation are needed (Stranks, 1994a).
Accident Reports In.KL = Accident Rate.KL (Accidents/Month) * Proportion of
Accidents Reported (Accident Reports/Accident)
Units: Accident Reports per Month
Accident Reports In = —[A] x [AR][T] [A]
= [AR] x
Accident Reports Completed
Accident Reports Completed is a rate equation. It represents the accident reports
processed in a given month. The rate is dependent upon the minimum of Accident
Reports Being Processed; and time dedicated to accident reporting divided by the time
it takes to process one accident report.
Accident Reports Completed.ICL = MIN{Accident Reports Being Processed.K
(Accident Reports)/Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog (Months), Accident
Reporting Policy (Hours/Month)/Accident Reporting Time (Hours/Accident Report)}
Units: Accident Reports per Month
Accident Reports Completed = .[A1[T]--11	 /[T] [AR]
= [AR] x [T]-1
•
Cumulative Accident Reporting Cost
Cumulative Accident Reporting Cost is a level. It represents the cost to date of the
Accident Reporting Policy.
A3
Cumulative Accident Reporting Cost.K = Cumulative Accident Reporting Cost.J (Vs)
+ Monthly Accident Reporting Cost.JK (Vs/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: L's
[C]Cumulative Accident Reporting Cost = [C] + — x [T][T]
= [C]
Monthly Accident Reporting Cost
Monthly Accident Reporting Cost is a rate. It represents the cost in a given month of the
Accident Reporting Policy. The rate is dependent upon the time dedicated to accident
reporting multiplied by the cost per hour of accident reporting.
Monthly Accident Reporting Cost.KL = Accident Reporting Policy (Hours/Month) *
Accident Reporting Cost (f.'s/Hour)
Units: f.'s per Month
Monthly Acident Reporting Cost = —[T] x —[C]
[T]
= [C] x Erri
Cumulative Accident Reports
Cumulative Accident Reports is a level. It represents the completed accident reports to
date.
Cumulative Accident Reports.K = Cumulative Accident Reports.J (Accident Reports) +
Accident Reports Completed.JK (Accident Reports/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: Accident Reports
Cumulative Accident Reports = [AR] AR] x [T][T]
= [AR]
Accident Reporting Cost
Accident Reporting Cost is a constant. It represents the hourly cost incurred when
processing accident reports.
Accident Reporting Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: f.'s per Hour
A4
Accident Reporting Cost = —[C][T]
= [C] x [TT/
Accident Reporting Policy
Accident Reporting Policy is a constant. It represents the man-hours in a given month
dedicated to accident report writing and accident investigation.
Accident Reporting Policy (Hours/Month)
Units: Hours per Month
.	 [T] .
Accident Reporting Policy = —T] i.e. [Dimensionless][
Accident Reporting Time
Accident Reporting Time is a constant. It represents the time required to process an
accident report.
Accident Reporting Time (Hours/Accident Report)
Units: Hours per Accident Report
[T]Accident Reporting Time -
[AR]
= [T] x [ART/
Proportion of Accidents Reported
Proportion of Accidents Reported is a constant. It represents the proportion of accidents
which are reported to the safety function, as an accident report can only be produced if
the accident is reported.
Proportion of Accidents Reported (Accidents Reports/Accidents)
Units: Accident Reports per Accident
Proportion of Accidents Reported - [AR]
[A]
= [AR] x [A]-1
Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog
Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog is a time constant. It represents the
management policy or intention to turn around an accident report in a given time.
Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog (Months)
A5
Units: Months
Time to Clear Accident Report Backlog = [T]
A6	 '
APPENDIX B
Accidents Sector
Accidents Equations
Cumulative_Accidents(t) = Cumulative_Accidents(t - dt) + (Accident_Rate) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Accidents =0
Accident_Rate = Accident_Incidence*Labour
Cumulative Accident_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly2-i-ccident Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Accident_Cost =0
Monthly_Accident_Cost = Accident_Rate*Cost_per_Accident
Accident_Incidence =
RUnregulated_Hazards/Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under
Intermediate_Regulation/Intermediate Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards Un
der_Full_Regulation/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting))*Risk
Cost_per_Accident = 100
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting =2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1.5
Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1
Risk = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.05), (0.5, 0.049), (1.00, 0.0473), (1.50, 0.0383), (2.00, 0.021), (2.50, 0.017),
(3.00, 0.0138), (3.50, 0.0105), (4.00, 0.007), (4.50, 0.003), (5.00, 0.00)
Cumulative Accidents
Cumulative Accidents is a level. It represents the total accidents occurring to date.
Cumulative Accidents.K = Cumulative Accidents.J (Accidents) + Accident Rate.JK
(Accidents/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: Accidents
B1
Cumulative Accidents = [A] +	 x [T][T]
= [A]
Accident Rate
Accident Rate is a rate. It represents the monthly accident rate. The rate is dependent
upon the Accident Incidence per employee and the size of the Labour force.
Accident Rate.KL = Accident Incidence.K (Accidents/Employee/Month) * Labour.K
(Employees)
Units: Accidents per Month
Accident Rate = (—[A] /[11) x [E][E]
= [A] x [T]-1
Cumulative Accident Cost
Cumulative Accident Cost is a level. It represents the cost of accidents to date.
Cumulative Accident Cost.K = Cumulative Accident Cost.J (Vs) + Monthly Accident
Cost.JK (Es/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: Es
Cumulative Accident Cost = [C] +	 x [T][T]
= [C]
Monthly Accident Cost
Monthly Accident Cost is a rate. It represents the cost of accidents in a given month.
Monthly Accident Cost.KL = Accident Rate.KL (Accidents/Month) Cost per
Accident (Vs/Accident)
Units: L's per Month
Monthly Accident Cost = EA] x [C3
[T] [A]
= [C] x [T]-1
Accident Incidence
Accident Incidence is an auxiliary rate. It represents the monthly accidents per
employee.
B2
For an accident to occur a hazard has to be present, and that hazard must have a risk
attached to it. In order to cause an injury accident an employee must be present. A
rather complicated calculation is required to show how hazards and the associated risks
interact in order to generate an accident.
The hazard moves through a self-renewing life cycle. If the hazard is fully regulated it
is inactive and poses no danger, therefore it can not contribute towards an accident. In
its other three hazard states it is active and has the potential to cause harm. The
probability that it will cause harm lessens as it moves through the unregulated,
intermediately regulated and fully regulated states. In the equation for deriving accident
incidence, weightings are attached to each active hazard state with the effect that the
weighting diminishing as the hazard moves through its life cycle.
There is always a risk associated with an active hazard as the workforce will never
achieve perfect KSA's. Summating the hazards divided by their associated weightings,
then multiplying the sum by the risk will produce a synthetic value which represents the
Accident Incidence per employee.
Accident Incidence Rate.KL = {Hazards Under Full Regulation.K (Hazards) /Full
Hazard Regulation Weighting (Hazard/Hazards/Month)) + {Hazards Under
Intermediate Regulation.K (Hazards)/Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting
(Hazard/Hazards/Month)} + {Unregulated Hazards.K (Hazards)/Unregulated Hazard
Regulation Weighting (Hazard/Hazards/Month)) * Risk (Accidents/Hazard/Employee)
Units: Accidents per Employee per Month
Accident Incidence Rate = [H] x [H] [H] x [H] [H] x EH]) x [A] x I
[H] [T] [H] [T] [H] [T] [H] [E]
= [A] x [Er x [T]-1
Cost per Accident
Cost per Accident is a constant. It represents the cost incurred for every accident. Costs
include:
indemnity insurance;
first-aid treatment;
absence from work; and
property damage.
Cost per Accident (E's/Accident)
Units: L's per Accident
Cost per Accident = EC]
[A]
= [C] x [A]-1
B3
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting is a constant. It represents the contribution that a
hazard presently receiving full regulation will make towards an accident per month.
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting (Hazard/Hazards/Month)
Units: Hazards per Hazard per Month
[H]Full Ha7nrd Regulation Weighting = —/(T]
[H]
= [T]-1
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting is a constant. It represents the contribution
that a hazard presently receiving intermediate regulation will make towards an accident
per month.
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting (Hazard/Hazards/Month)
Units: Hazards per Hazard per Month
[H]Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting = — [T]
= [T]-1
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting
Unregulated Hazard Weighting is a constant. It represents the contribution that an
unregulated hazard will make towards an accident per month.
Unregulated Hazard Weighting (Hazard/Hazards/Month)
Units: Hazards per Hazard per Month
[H]Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting = —/[T]
[Hi
= [T]-1
Risk
Risk is a table function. It represents the likelihood that a hazard will result in an
accident to an employee. It converts active hazards into accidents per employee. It is
dependent upon the Average KSA that employees possess. The structural assumption is
that the relationship is negative and logistical. The x-axis consists of a range between
zero, representing an Average Safety KSA of zero, and five representing a perfect
Average Safety KSA. Risk, on the y-axis is set between zero and 0.1. Preliminary
sensitivity tests showed that if Risk was set beyond the 0.1 maximum then rather
erroneous and exaggerated outputs were experienced in the model's behaviour.
B4	 •
Risk = Table {Average KSA.K}
Units: Accidents per Hazard per Employee
Risk = all[E][H]
= [A] x [H]-1 x [EV
B5
APPENDIX C
Hazard Processing Sector
Hazard Processing Equations
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation Cost =0
Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation Cost
Cumulativeintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulativeintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t .- dt) +
(Monthly_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulativeintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 0
Monthlyintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t dt)
+ (Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost =
Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost
Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation - Hazards_Become_Regulated) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under Full_Regulation = 1.36
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulation/Time to_Clear_Hazards_Underinterm
ediate_Regulation_Backlog,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Haz
ard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulatio
n_Backlog,Full_Hazard_Regulation Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation Time)
Cl
Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulation(t) =
Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulation(t - dt) + (Identification_Rate -
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation) * dt
NIT Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulation = 1.36
Identification_Rate = MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time to_Identify_Unregulated
Hazards,((Accident_Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazardsidentified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation/Time to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Interm
ediate_Regulation_Backlog,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Haz
ard_Regulation_Time)
Regulated_Hazards(t) = Regulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazards_Become_Regulated -
Hazard_Generation Rate) * dt
NIT Regulated_Hazards = 85
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear_Hazards Under_Full_Regulatio
n_Backlog,Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Haznrds*Unsafe_Acts
Unregulated_Hazards(t) = Unregulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazard_Generation_Rate -
Identification_Rate) * dt
NIT Unregulated_Hazards = 1.36
Hazard_Generation Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe Acts
Identification Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_toidentify_Unregulated Hazards,((Accident_Report
s Completed*(1-Accident Repeater))+Hazards_Identified —from_Safety_Monitoring))
F—ull Hazard_Regulation &st = 10
Full—Hazard Regulation—Policy = 15
Full:Hazard:Regulation:Time = 10
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost = 10
Intermediate:Hazard—Regulation:Policy = 5
Interrnediate_Hazard:Regulation Time =2
RBAAIH =
(Unregulated Hazards+Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation+Hazards_Under_Full
Regulation)TRegulated_Hazards
-S-afety_Monitoring_Cost = 10
Safety_Monitoring_Policy =20
Time to_Clear_Hazards_Under Full_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to Clear_Hazards_Under—Intermediate_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time tolIdentify_Unregulated Tiazards = 1
Accident_Repeater = GRAPH(Accident Reports Completed)
(1.00, 0.CTO), (2.00, 0.01), (3.00,0. 2 , (4-.00, 0.03, (5.00, 0.04), (6.00, 0.055), (7.00,
0.07), (8.00, 0.085), (9.00, 0.1), (10.0, 0.125), (11.0, 0.165), (12.0, 0.215), (13.0, 0.265),
(14.0, 0.32), (15.0, 0.365), (16.0, 0.425), (17.0, 0.49), (18.0, 0.545), (19.0, 0.6), (20.0,
0.68)
Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring = GRAPH(Safety_Monitoring_Policy)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.125), (20.0, 0.325), (30.0, 0.575), (40.0, 0.925), (50.0, 1.53), (60.0,
3.15), (70.0, 4.35), (80.0, 4.73), (90.0, 4.93), (100, 5.00)
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Unsafe_Acts = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.1), (0.5, 0.099), (1.00, 0.098), (1.50, 0.096), (2.00, 0.089), (2.50, 0.074), (3.00,
0.038), (3.50, 0.022), (4.00, 0.016), (4.50, 0.012), (5.00, 0.009)
Cumulative Full Hazard Regulation Cost
Cumulative Full Hazard Regulation Cost is a level. It represents the cost to date of the
Full Hazard Regulation Policy.
Cumulative Full Regulation Cost.K = Cumulative Full Regulation Cost.J (Vs) +
Monthly Full Regulation Cost.JK (Vs/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: Vs
Cumulative Full Hazard Regulation Cost = [C] + 	 x [T][T]
= [C]
Monthly Full Hazard Regulation Cost
Monthly Full Hazard Regulation Cost is a rate. It represents the cost of the Full Hazard
Regulation Policy in a given month. The rate is dependent upon the time per month
dedicated to full hazard regulation and the hourly cost of that activity.
Monthly Full Hazard Regulation Cost.KL = Full Hazard Regulation Policy
(Hours/Month) * Full Hazard Regulation Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: Vs per Month
Monthly Full Hazard Regulation Cost = 	 x El[T] [T]
= [C] x [T]-1
Cumulative Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost
Cumulative Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost is a level. It represents the cost to date
of the Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy.
Cumulative Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost.K = Cumulative Intermediate Hazard
Regulation Cost.J (Vs) + Monthly Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost.JK
(Vs/Month) * DT [Month]
Units: Vs
[C]Cumulative Intermediate Regulation Cost = [C] + — x [T][T]
= [C]
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Monthly Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost
Monthly Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost is a rate. It represents the cost of the
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy in a given month. The rate is dependent upon
the time per month dedicated to intermediate hazard regulation and the hourly cost of
that activity.
Monthly Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost.KL = Intermediate Hazard Regulation
Policy (Hours/Month) * Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost (V s/Hour)
Units: L's per Month
Monthly Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost = —[T] x —[C][T] [T]
= [C] x [T]-1
Cumulative Safety Monitoring Cost
The Cumulative Safety Monitoring Cost is a level. It represents the total cost to date of
the Safety Monitoring Policy.
Cumulative Safety Monitoring Cost.K = Cumulative Safety Monitoring Cost.J (Vs) +
{Safety Monitoring Policy (Hours/Month) * Safety Monitoring Cost (Vs/Hour)} * DT
(Month)
Units: L's
Cumulative Safety Monitoring Cost = [C] + —[T] x —[C] x [T]
[1 ] En
= [C]
Monthly Safety Monitoring Cost
Monthly Safety Monitoring Cost is a rate. It represents the cost of the Safety
Monitoring Policy in a given month. The rate is dependent upon the time per month
dedicated to safety monitoring and the hourly cost of that activity.
Monthly Safety Monitoring Cost.KL = Safety Monitoring Policy (Hours/Month) *
Safety Monitoring Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: L's per Month
Monthly Safety Monitoring Cost =111 x —[C]
[1 ] [11
= [C] x [If'
Hazards Under Full Regulation
Hazards Under Full Regulation is a level. It represents active hazards which are
receiving full remedial attention.
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Hazards Under Full Regulation.K = Hazards Under Full Regulation.J (Hazards) +
{Hazards Arrive For Full Regulation.JK (Hazards/Month) - Hazards Become
Regulated.JK (Hazards/Month)) * DT (Month)
Units: Hazards
Hazards Under Full Regulation = [H] +	 — —RI]) x [T][T] [T]
= [H]
Hazards Arrive for Full Regulation
Hazards Arrive for Full Regulation is a rate. It represents the hazards in a given month
which move from receiving intermediate regulation to full regulation. The rate is
dependent upon the minimum of two calculations. The rate will take on the lowest
value of either the hazards being intermediately regulated; or the time per month
dedicated to intermediate hazard regulation divided by the hours it takes to
intermediately regulate a hazard. In effect the rate is governed by the ceiling which
decision-makers may place on intermediate regulation activity. Too high a ceiling will
result in wasted resource allocation. Too low a ceiling will afford an inadequate
allocation of resources leading to a backlog of unprocessed intermediate hazards,
contributing to more workplace accidents.
Hazards Arrive for Full Regulation.KL = MIN{Hazards Under Intermediate
Regulation.K (Hazards)/Time to Clear Hazards Under. Intermediate Regulation Backlog
(Months), Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy (Hours/Month)/Intermediate
Regulation Time (Hours/Hazard))
Units: Hazards
Hazards Arrive for Full Regulation = 	 [11 / [11[T] [T]i [H]
= [H] x [Tr/
Hazards Become Regulated
Hazards Become Regulated is a rate. It represents the number of active hazards in a
given month that are rendered fully safe. The rate is dependent upon the minimum of
two calculations. The rate will take on the lowest value of either the hazards being fully
regulated; or the hours per month dedicated to full hazard regulation divided by the
hours it takes to fully regulate a hazard. In effect the rate is governed by the ceiling
which decision-makers may place on full regulation activity. Too high a ceiling will
result in wasted resource allocation. Too low a ceiling will afford an inadequate
allocation of resources leading to a backlog of unprocessed intermediate hazards
contributing to more workplace accidents.
Hazards Become Regulated.KL = MIN{Hazards Under Full Regulation.K
(Hazards)/Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog (Month), Full Hazard
Regulation Policy (Hours/Month)/Full Regulation Time (Hours/Hazard)}
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Units: Hazards per Month
[11] [T] AT]Hazards Become Regulated _[T] [T]i [H]
= [H] x [T]-1
Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation
Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation is a level. It represents the active hazards which
are receiving intermediate remedial attention.
Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation.K = Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation.J
(Hazards) + {Hazard Identification Rate.JK (Hazards/Month) - Hazards Arrive for Full
Regulation.JK (Hazards/Month)} * DT (Month)
Units: Hazards
([H] [H]Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation = [H] + 	 - — Ix [T][T] [T]
= [H]
Hazard Identification Rate
Hazard Identification Rate is a rate. It represents the unregulated hazards which become
identified as active in a given month. The rate is dependent on the minimum of two
calculations. The rate will take on the lowest value of either the Unregulated Hazards;
or the combination of Accident Reports Completed and Hazards Identified from Safety
Monitoring. In theory, for every accident report completed then an unregulated hazard
becomes identified. In practice there are a finite number of hazards in a workplace. As
more hazards become unregulated and result in accidents, then the likelihood of a
particular unregulated hazard causing multiple accidents increases. This is reflected in
the calculation of the effect of accident report completion on the hazard identification
rate, with the ability of accident reports to identify hazards declining as the stock of
unregulated hazards increases. It is more desirable to identify unregulated hazards
before the accident occurs rather than afterwards. This is reflected in the hazards which
can be identified through safety monitoring. The greater the number of hazards which
can be identified through safety monitoring, the greater the rate of unregulated hazard
identification.
It is unlikely that unregulated hazards can be efficiently identified through either
accident reporting or safety monitoring alone. A synergy can be achieved through both
proactively identifying hazards before the accident happens and clearing up rogue
hazards through accident reporting.
The rate is governed by the ceiling which decision-makers may place on both accident
reporting and safety monitoring activities. Too high a ceiling on both will result in
wasted resource allocation. Too low a ceiling will afford an inadequate allocation of
resources leading to a backlog of unprocessed unregulated hazards contributing to more
workplace accidents.
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Hazard Identification Rate.ICL = MIN{Unregulated Hazards.K (Hazards)/Time to
Identify Unregulated Hazards (Months), Accident Reports Completed.KL (Accident
Reports/Month) * {1 - Accident Repeater.K (Hazards/Accident Report)) + Hazards
Identified from Safety Monitoring (Hazards/Hour)}
Units: Hazards per Month
xHazard Identification Rate =
	
	
[H][H] [AR] [H]
[T] [T] [AR] [T]
= [H] x [T]-'
Regulated Hazards
Regulated Hazards is a level. It represents the hazards which are safely contained in an
inactive state.
Regulated Hazards.K = Regulated Hazards.J (Hazards) + {Become Regulated.JK
(Hazards/Month) - Hazard Generation Rate.JK (Hazards/Month)) * DT (Month)
Units: Hazards
Regulated Hazards = [H] +(—[H] - —[H]j x [T][T] [T]
= [H]
Hazard Generation Rate
Hazard Generation Rate is a rate. It represents the number of hazards which move from
a regulated to an unregulated state in a given month. The rate is dependent upon Unsafe
Acts. As the number of unsafe acts increases then more regulated hazards will move
into an active state. This is represented by multiplying regulated hazards by unsafe acts.
Hazard Generation Rate.KL = Regulated Hazards.K (Hazards) * Unsafe Acts
(Hazards/Hazards/Month)
Units: Hazards per Month
Hazard Generation Rate = [H][T]
= [H] x [T]-I
Unregulated Hazards
Unregulated Hazards is a level. It represents hazards which are in an active state, and
are not receiving remedial attention.
Unregulated Hazards.K = Unregulated Hazards.J (Hazards) + {Hazard Generation
Rate.JK (Hazards/Month) - Hazard Identification Rate.JK (Hazards/Month)} * DT
(Month)
Units: Hazards
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Unregulated Hazards = [H] 	 —xx [T][T] [T]
= [1-1]
Full Hazard Regulation Cost
Full Hazard Regulation Cost is a constant. It represents the average cost per hour of the
Full Hazard Regulation Policy which can consist of one or more of the following
activities:
premises modification;
process re-design;
re-design of system of work;
safety engineering; and
work environment modification.
Full Hazard Regulation Cost (E's/Hour)
Units: L's per Hour
Full Hazard Regulaion Cost = [C] x[Tri
Full Hazard Regulation Policy
Full Hazard Regulation Policy is a constant. It represents the man-hours spent per
month on regulating hazards. It may involve one or more of the following activities:
premises modification;
process re-design;
re-design of system of work;
safety engineering; and
work environment modification (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring 1996).
Full Hazard Regulation Policy (Hours/Month)
Units: Hours per Month
[T] i.e.Full Hazard Regulation Policy = — 
	 [Dimensionless][T]
Full Hazard Regulation Time
Full Hazard Regulation Time is a constant. It represents the time required to be spent on
full regulation activity in order to fully regulate the average hazard.
Full Hazard Regulation Time (Hours/Hazard)
Units: Hours per Hazard
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[T]
Full Hazard Regulation Time = —[H]
= [T] x [H]-/
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost is a constant. It represents the average cost per
hour of the Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy which can involve one or more of
the following activities:
premises modification;
process re-design;
re-design of system of work; and
safety engineering; and
work environment modification (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring 1996).
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: L's per Hour
Intermediate Hazard Regulaion Cost = [C] x [Tv
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy is a constant. It represents the man-hours spent
in a given month intermediately regulating hazards. It may consist of one or more of the
following activities:
premises modification;
safety engineering;
process re-design;
re-design of system of work; and
work environment modification (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring 1996)..
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy (Hours/Month)
Units: Hours per Month
Intermediate Hazard Regulaion Policy = —[11 i.e. [Dimensionless][T]
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time
Intermediate Regulation Time is a constant. It represents the average time required to
regulate an intermediate hazard.
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time (Hours/Hazard)
Units: Hours per Hazard
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Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time = —[T][H]
= [T] x [H]-1
Ratio Between Active and Inactive Hazards
Ratio Between Active and Inactive Hazards is an auxiliary rate. It represents a measure
of the number of Regulated Hazards in the workplace relative to the sum of the
Unregulated Hazards, Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation and Hazards Under Full
Regulation.
RBAAIH.K = {Unregulated Hazards.K (Hazards) + Hazards Under Intermediate
Regulation.K (Hazards) + Hazards Under Full Regulation.K (Hazards))/Regulated
Hazards.K (Hazards)
Units: None
Ratio Between Active and Inactive Hazards = —[H] i.e. [Dimensionless][H]
Safety Monitoring Cost
Safety Monitoring Cost is a constant. It represents the cost per hour of one or more of
the following safety monitoring activities:
fire inspections;
guard inspections;
risk assessments;
safety committee work; and
safety tours.
Safety Monitoring Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: L's per Hour
Safety Monitoring Cost = —[C][T]
= [C] x [T]-1
Safety Monitoring Policy
The Safety Monitoring Policy is a constant. It represents the man-hours spent per month
in measuring and evaluating safety performance. It may involve one or more of the
following activities:
fire inspections;
guard inspections;
risk assessments;
safety committees; and
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safety tours (HSE, 1991a; Stranks, 1994a; Waring 1996).
Safety Monitoring Policy (Hours/Month)
Units: Hours per Month
.	 [T] i.e.Safety Monitoring Policy = — 1 [Dimensionless][T]
Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog
Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog is a time constant. It represents
the management policy or intention to turn around or fully regulate a hazard in a given
time.
Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog (Months)
Units: Months
Time to Clear Hazards Under Full Regulation Backlog = [T]
Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog
Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog is a time constant. It
represents the management policy or intention to turn around or intermediately regulate
a hazard in a given time.
Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog (Months)
Units: Months
Time to Clear Hazards Under Intermediate Regulation Backlog = [T]
Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards
Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards is a time constant. It represents the management
policy or intention to locate an unregulated hazard in a given time.
Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards (Months)
Units: Months
Time to Identify Unregulated Hazards = [T]
Accident Repeater
Accident Repeater is a table function. It represents the likelihood that a repeated
accident will be identified as emanating from the same hazard. It is dependent upon the
number of accident reports completed. The structural assumptions are that the
relationship between accident reports completed and accident repeaters is positive and
exponential. The more accident reports completed, the greater the chance that an
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accident emanates from the same hazard. This is reflected in the shape of the
relationship between the two variables. The relationship is mildly exponential as at the
top end of the range a good number of multiple accidents would result from the same
hazard. The range goes beyond the normal operating region of the model. If one
accident report is completed, then by definition the accident repeater is set at zero to
suggest that the likelihood of one unregulated hazard causing multiple accidents is nil.
The probability of an accident repeater rises in a logistical fashion to a maximum of 20
accident reports where this figure can be regarded as well beyond the normal operating
region of the model.
Accident Repeater = Table {Accident Reports Completed}
Units: Hazards per Accident Report
[H]Accident Repeater — [AR]
= [H] x [ARV
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring -
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring is a table function. It represents the hazards
which can be identified per hour of safety monitoring activity. Hazards identified from
safety monitoring depend upon the time dedicated to safety monitoring activity in a
given month. The structural assumptions are that the relationship between the variables
is logistical and positive. The shape reflects the fact that low safety monitoring activity
will render lower productivity than a moderate level. This is due to economies of scale.
The time it takes for example to arrange a team to conduct a safety tour or attend a
safety committee will be fixed, whatever actions are carried out under each broader
activity. At the maximum end of the scale a law of diminishing returns sets in where the
productivity of the activity declines.
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring = Table{ Safety Monitoring Policy}
Units: Hazards per Hour
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring = [H][T]
= [H] x [T]-1
Unsafe Acts
Unsafe Acts is a table function. It represents the likelihood in a given month that
employees will not work safely with hazards and cause a regulated hazard to move into
an unregulated state. It is dependent upon the average KSA of the employees. Examples
of unsafe acts may be non-compliance with safe systems of work, ignorance of permit-
to-work systems or horseplay (Stranks, 1994a). The structural assumptions are that the
relationship between unsafe acts and average KSA is negative and exponential, as one
would expect unsafe acts to diminish as KSA improves. The x-axis ranges between zero
and five, representing a safety KSA of zero through to five being a perfect KSA. The y-
axis ranges from 0.1 to 0.009. A zero value is not achieved as a small allowance is
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made for 'Acts of God' or technical failure beyond the employee contributing to unsafe
acts. These figures represent the probability that an unsafe act will occur. The highest
value for an unsafe act is 0.1.
Unsafe Acts = Table (Average KSA.K)
Units: Hazards per Hazards per Month
Unsafe Acts =/[T]
[lli
= [T]-1
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APPENDIX D
Labour Sector
Labour Sector Equations
Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t) = Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t - dt) + (Quits) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Labour_Quits =0
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Labour(t) = Labour(t - dt) + (Hires - Quits) * dt
INIT Labour = Target_Labour_Force
Hires = ((Target_Labour_Force-Labour)/Staff Adjustment_Time)+Replacing_Attrition
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length of Employment	 • •
Actual_Length_of Employment = Base_Length_of Employment*(1-Quit_Likelihood)
Base_Length_of Employment = 120
Perceived_Accident_Incidence = SMTH3(Accidentincidence,3)
Replacing Attrition = Quits
Staff Adjustment Time =4
Target_Labour_Force = 100
Quit_Likelihood = GRAPH(Perceived Accidentincidence)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.001), (0.2, 0.003), (0.3, 0.006), (0.4, 0.014), (0.5, 0.028), (0.6,
0.08), (0.7, 0.0915), (0.8, 0.096), (0.9, 0.098), (1, 0.1)
Cumulative Labour Quits
Cumulative Labour Quits is a level. It represents the number of employees that have left
the workforce to date.
Cumulative Labour Quits.K = Cumulative Labour Quitsi (Employees) + Quits.JK
(Employees/Month) * DT (Month)
Units: Employees
Cumulative Labour Quits = [E] + [E] x [T]
[T]
= [E]
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Quits
Quits is a rate. It represents the employees leaving the workforce in a given month. The
rate is dependent upon the size of the workforce divided by the number of months that
the average employee remains with the firm.
Quits.KL = Labour.K (Employees)/Actual Length of Employment.K (Months)
Units: Employees per Month
Quits = E[T]
= [E] x [1]-1
Labour
Labour is a level. It is the current size of the workforce.
Labour.K = Labour.J (Employees) + {Hires.JK (Employees/Month) - Quits.JK
(Employees/Month)} * DT (Month)
Units: Employees
[E] [E] x rilLabour [T] [T]
= [E]
Hires
Hires is a rate. It represents the new recruits joining the workforce in a month. The rate •
is dependent upon the difference between the target or desired labour force size and the
actual labour force size. This is divided by the staff adjustment time, i.e. the time it
takes for the recruitment of new hires. Added to this is the replacement of attrition or
employees who have quit the firm.
Hires.KL = {{Target Labour Force (Employees) - Labour.K (Employees)}/Staff
Adjustment Time (Months)} + Replacing Attrition.KL (Employees/Month)
Units: Employees per Month
[E] — [E] [E]Hires = [T]	 [T]
= [E] x [T]-1
Actual Length of Employment
Actual Length of Employment is an auxiliary rate. It represents the duration of
employment for the average employee. The auxiliary is dependent upon a multiplication
of the Base Length of Employment and the Quit Likelihood. This will represent the
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actual time in months an employee stays with the firm. Accidents to employees reduce
with age and experience (Petersen, 1988).
Actual Length of Employment.K = Base Length of Employment (Months/Employee) *
{1 - Quit Likelihood (Dimensionless)}
Units: Months
Actual Length of Employment = [T]
Base Length of Employment
Base Length of Employment is a constant. It represents the duration of employment in
months that would be expected for the average employee, assuming that their safety
morale is running at 100%.
Base Length of Employment (Months)
Units: Months
Base Length of Employment = [T]
Perceived Accident Incidence
Perceived Accident Incidence is an auxiliary rate. It represents how the workforce
perceive the accidents happening per employee. It is a measure of their safety morale.
The auxiliary is dependent upon the underlying accident incidence smoothed over time
using a third-order smooth. A third-order smoothing is used to remove fluctuations in
the accident incidence. The accident incidence is exponentially weighted over a three
month time period. This may allow employees to build up a representative picture of
the underlying accident incidence. Dissent and morale changes as a result of accidents
may take time to occur. There may be talk in the canteen or it may take time for the
union safety representative to broadcast the accident picture to the workforce.
Concurrently, specific accidents, unless they are of a very serious nature are forgotten
over time and employees will make a mental calculation of the accident incidence over
a relatively recent period.
Perceived Accident Incidence.K = Accident Incidence.K
(Accidents/Employee/Month)/Time over which Accident Incidence is Averaged
(Months)
Units: Accidents per Employee
Perceived Accident Incidence = (I-A-1/[T]) x [T]-1[E]
... [A]
[E]
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Replacing Attrition
Replacing Attrition is an auxiliary rate. It represents the replacement of the quitters with
new hires. The auxiliary is dependent upon how many employees quit the firm in a
given month.
Replace Aftrition.K = Quits.JK (Employees/Month)
Units: Employees per Month
Replace Attrition = EE3[T]
= [E] x [Tfl
Staff Adjustment Time
Staff Adjustment Time is a constant. It represents the delay in months required to
replace employee attrition. The adjustment time is set to four months to include
activities such as advertising posts, interviewing candidates and any induction training
carried out.
Staff Adjustment Time (Months)
Units: Months
Staff Adjustment Time = [T]
Target Labour Force
Target Labour Force is a constant. It represents the desired size of the workforce.
Target Labour Force (Employees)
Units: Employees
Target Labour Force = [E]
Quit Likelihood
Quit Likelihood is a table function. It represents the probability that an employee will
exit the workforce as a result of the Perceived Accident Incidence. The relationship
between the variables is positive and logistic. A logistical curve would be representative
of the position where a low Perceived Accident Incidence would have little impact upon
the desire of employees to quit the firm, whereas a moderate to high Perceived Accident
Incidence would accelerate the desire to quit. As the Perceived Accident Incidence
reaches a very high level the rate of acceleration of quits would slow as only a few die-
hard employees would remain in the firm for any sort of duration. The x-axis ranges on
a scale from zero to one. The y-axis ranges from zero to 0.1. This represents a scenario
beyond the normal operating region of the model. If the Perceived Accident Incidence
is zero then the safety morale is running at 100%. The result is that employees will not
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quit the firm as a result of any accident trend. At the maximum end of the scale, a
Perceived Accident Incidence of one accident per employee per month would be
evident in a safety system that was out of control and failing at every opportunity. The
Quit Likelihood under these circumstances would be 10% of the workforce per month.
Quit Likelihood = Table (Perceived Accident Incidence.K)
Units: Employees per Employees
Quit Likelihood = Dimensionless
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APPENDIX E
Safety Costs Sector
Safety Costs Equations
Cumulative_ Safety_ Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Safety_Cost)
* dt
INIT Cumulative Safety_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Cost =
Monthly_Accident_Cost+(Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost)+(Full_
Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost)+Ontermediate_Hazard_Re
gulation_Policy*Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_CostHAccidentReporting_Policy
*Accident Reporting_Cost)+(Training_Policy*Safety_LTraining_Cost)
Cumulative Safety Cost
Cumulative Safety Cost is a level. It represents the overall cost of safety activity and
accidents to date.
Cumulative Safety Cost.K = Cumulative Safety Cost.J (L's) + Monthly Safety Cost.JK
(L's/Month) * DT (Months)
Units: L's
[C]
Cumulative Safety Cost [C] + — x [T][T]
[C]
Monthly Safety Cost
Monthly Safety Cost is a rate. It represents the overall monthly cost of safety activities
and accidents. The rate is dependent upon the sum of the costs associated with the
following activities:
accident reporting and investigation;
safety monitoring;
intermediate hazard regulation;
El
Safety Cost _[C] [T] x [C]Monthly
	
	
[T] x [C] [T] x [C] [T] x [c] [T] x [C])
[T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T] [T]
=
[C]
[T]
full hazard regulation;
safety training; and in addition
accidents.
Monthly Safety Cost.KL = Monthly Accident Cost.KL (f.'s/Month) + {Safety
Monitoring Policy (Hours/Month) * Safety Monitoring Cost (L's/Hour)} + {Full
Hazard Regulation Policy (Hours/Month) * Full Hazard Regulation Cost (L's/Hour)} +
{Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy (Hours/Month) * Intermediate Hazard
Regulation Cost (L's/Hour)} + {Accident Reporting Policy (Hours/Month) * Accident
Reporting Cost (L's/Hour)} + {Training Policy (Hours/Month) * Safety Training Cost
(f's/Hour)}
Units: L's per Month
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APPENDIX F
Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude Sector
Safety KSA Equations
Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost = Training_Policy*Safety_Training_Cost
Safety_KSA(t) = Safety_KSA(t - dt) + (Learning + Gain_in KSA - Loss_of KSA -
Dissipation_of KSA) * dt
INIT Safety_KSA = 400
Learning = DELAY(Multiplier*Discrepancy,3)
Gain_in_KSA = Hires*KSA_per New Employee
Loss_of KSA = Quits*Loss_per_Ddt
Dissipation_of KSA = Safety_KSA*Fixed_Proportion_of KSA Lost
Average_KSA = Safety_KSA/Labour
Discrepancy = 1-(Safety_KSA/Target Safety_KSA)
Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost = 0.01
KSA_per New_Employee =
Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA
Loss_per_Exit = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between Quitters_and_Average_KSA
Maximum_KSA_per_Employee = 5
Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA = 0.7
Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA = 1.3
Safety_Training_Cost = 10
Target_Safety_KSA = Labour*Maximum_KSA_per_Employee
Training_Effectiveness = 0.75
Training_Policy = 200
Multiplier =
GRAPH((Training_Effectiveness*Training_Policy)*(IF(Safety KSA<Target_Safety_K
SA)THEN(1)ELSE(0)))
(0.00, 0.00), (50.0, 10.0), (100, 20.0), (150, 30.0), (200, 40.0), (250, 50.0), (300, 60.0),
(350, 70.0), (400, 80.0), (450, 90.0), (500, 100)
Fl
Cumulative Safety Training Cost
Cumulative Safety Training Cost is a level. It represents the cost to date of the Safety
Training Policy.
Cumulative Safety Training Cost.K = Cumulative Safety Training Cost.J (Vs) +
Monthly Safety Training Cost.JK (Vs/Month) * DT [Month]
Units: L's
Cumulative Safety Training Cost = [C] + 	 x [T][T]
[C]
Monthly Safety Training Cost
Monthly Safety Training Cost is a rate. It represents the monthly cost of the Safety
Training Policy. The rate is dependent upon the time spent on safety training in a given
month.
Monthly Safety Training Cost.KL = Training Policy (Hours/Month) * Safety Training
Cost (E's/Hour)
Units: L's per Month
[C]Monthly Safety Training Cost = —Ur] x —
[T] [T]
= [C] x [T]]
Safety KSA
Safety KSA is a level. It represents the current safety KSA possessed by the workforce.
Safety KSA.K = Safety KSA.J (KSA) + {Leaming.JK (KSA/Month) + Gain in Safety
KSAJK (KSA/Month) - Loss in KSAJK (KSA/Month) - Dissipation of KSAJK
(KSA/Month} * DT (Months)
Units: KSA
Safety KSA = K + —
[K]( LK][K]+ —[K] — x [T][T] [T]	 [T]	 [T]
=K
Learning
Learning is a rate. It represents the Safety KSA gained by the workforce through
training in a given month. The rate is dependent upon the multiplier multiplied by the
discrepancy between the Target Safety KSA and actual Safety KSA. A delay of 3
months is built into the rate to reflect the delay between learning and application of the
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learning. This allows the training to be converted into Safety KSA. The greater the
multiplier and/or the KSA discrepancy, the greater the learning of KSA by the trainees.
Learning.KL = (Multiplier.K (KSA/Month) * Discrepancy.K (Dimensionless)
Units: KSA per Month
[K]Learning =
[T]
= [K] x [T]-1
Gain in KSA
Gain in KSA is a rate. It represents the Safety KSA brought to the workforce by the
new monthly recruits. The rate is dependent upon the number of new hires in a month
multiplied by the safety KSA that the average hires bring with them to the workplace. It
is appropriate in this case to use a rate on rate calculation as new hires instantaneously
bring some safety KSA to the workplace.
Gain in KSA.ICL = Hires.JK (Employees/Month) * KSA per New Employee
(KSA/Employee)
Units: KSA per Month
Gain in KSA —
[E]
x
 [K]
[T] [E]
= [K] x [Tri
Loss of KSA
Loss of KSA is a rate. It represents the Safety KSA that in a given month quitters take
from the workforce when they leave the firm's employment. The rate is dependent upon
the number of quitters in a month multiplied by the safety KSA that they possess. In
this case it is appropriate to use a rate on rate calculation as quitters will instantaneously
take safety KSA away from the workplace.
Loss in KSA.ICL = Quits.JK (Employees/Month) * Loss per Exit (KSA/Employee)
Units: KSA per Month
[1(1Loss in KSA = [E] x
[T] [E]
= [K] x [T]-1
Dissipation of KSA
Dissipation of KSA is a rate. It represents the Safety KSA lost by the workforce in a
given month. The rate is dependent upon the current level of Safety KSA possessed by
the workforce multiplied by the Safety KSA that is lost over a given month.
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Dissipation of KSA.KL = Safety KSA.K (KSA) * Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost
(KSA/KSA/Month)
Units: KSA per Month
Dissipation of KSA = [K] x —[K] /[T][K]
[K] x [Ti"
Average KSA
Average KSA is an auxiliary rate. It represents the safety KSA possessed by the
average employee. The auxiliary is dependent upon the current level of Safety KSA
divided by the number of employees.
Average KSA.K = Safety KSA.K (KSA)/Labour.K (Employees)
Units: KSA per Employee
Average KSA = [K][E]
= [K] x [Er'
Discrepancy
Discrepancy is an auxiliary rate. It represents the gap between the optimum workforce
safety KSA and the actual Safety KSA of the workforce. It is dependent upon the ratio
between Safety KSA and Target Safety KSA.
Discrepancy.K = 1 — {Safety KSA.K (KSA)/Target Safety KSA (KSA)}
[K]Discrepancy = — . [Dimensionless][K]
Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost
Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost is a constant. It represents the proportion of the
workforce Safety KSA lost per month. Safety KSA is lost over time by employees
(Stranks, 1994a). The constant represents a form of half-life for Safety KSA. This loss
is a good justification for refresher training.
Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost (KSA/KSA/Month)
Units: KSA per KSA per Month
Fixed Proportion of KSA Lost = —NAT][K]
= [Ti"
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KSA per New Employee
KSA per New Employee is an auxiliary rate. It represents the safety KSA that a recruit
brings to the workplace. Any functional person will bring with them to a workplace
some safety KSA. One would assume that they would have picked up a level of safety
KSA through previous employment, education and life experience.
KSA per New Employee.K Average KSA.K (KSA/Employee) * Ratio Between Hires
and Average KSA (Dimensionless)
Units: KSA per Employee
[K]KSA per New Employee = [E]
= [K] x [Er'
Loss per Exit
Loss per Exit is an auxiliary rate. It represents the Safety KSA that the quitter takes
from the workplace. It is dependent upon the safety KSA possessed by the average
employee multiplied by the ratio between the quitters safety KSA and the Average
Safety KSA.
Loss per Exit.K = Average KSA.K (KSA/Employee) * Ratio Between Quitters and
Average KSA.K (Dimensionless)
Units: KSA per Employee
Loss per Exit = [K]
[E]
= [K] x [EP
Maximum KSA per Employee
Maximum KSA per Employee is a constant. It represents the point at which an
employee has perfect safety KSA.
Maximum KSA (KSA/Employee)
Units: KSA per Employee
Maximum KSA = —[K]
[E]
= [K] x
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA is an auxiliary rate. It represents the difference
between the Safety KSA possessed by the average employee and that of the new
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employee. One would expect the Safety KSA of the new employee to be lower than that
possessed by the average employee.
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA (KSA/Employee/KSA/Employee)
Units: None
[K] /[K]Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA = —[E][E]. [Dimensionless]
Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA
Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA is an auxiliary rate. It represents the
difference between the safety KSA possessed by the quitter and that of the average
employee. As employees increase their length of employment, then their safety KSA
increases. One would therefore expect the safety KSA of the quitter to exceed that of
the average employee.
Ratio Between Quitters and Average KSA (KSA/Employee/KSA/Employee)
[K] /[K]Ratio Betwen Quitters and Average KSA = 
]
.e. [Dimensionless]
[E—[E]i
Safety Training Cost
The Safety Training Cost is a constant. It represents the cost per hour of an aggregation
of on-the-job, in-house, and external training.
Safety Training Cost (Vs/Hour)
Units: (£' s/Hour)
[C]Safety Training Cost = —
[T]
= [C] x [T]'
Target Safety KSA
Target Safety KSA is an auxiliary rate. It represents the maximum safety KSA that the
workforce can attain. The auxiliary is dependent upon the size of the labour force
multiplied by the maximum safety KSA attainable by each employee.
Target KSA.K (Employee) = Labour.K * Maximum KSA per Employee
(KSA/Employee)
Units: KSA
F6
[K]Target KSA [E] x —
[E]
[K]
Training Effectiveness
Training Effectiveness is a constant. It represents a measure of how close safety training
is to the maximum achievable. Training Effectiveness is a proportion of maximum
training effectiveness.
Training Effectiveness (Training/Training)
Units: None
[T]-I
Training Effectiveness —	 i.e. [Dimensionless][Tr
Training Policy
Training Policy is a constant. It represents all the direct and indirect man-hours spent by
managers and workers in a given month using on-the-job, in-house, and external
training.
Training Policy (Hours/Month)
Units: Hours per Month
Training Policy = T] i.e. [Dimensionless][T]
Multiplier
Multiplier is an auxiliary rate. It converts the training time given in a month into the
learning of Safety KSA. It is constrained by the gap between the Target Safety KSA
and the actual Safety KSA possessed by the workforce, then multiplied by how
effective the training is.
Multiplier.K = Table {Training Effectiveness (Dimensionless) * Training Policy
(Hours/Month) * {IF {Safety KSA.K (KSA) < Target KSA.K (KSA) THEN{1}
ELSE{0}}}}
Units: KSA per Hour
Multiplier = [K]
[T]
= [K] x [T]-1
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APPENDIX G
Constant Modification Parameter Tests
Metric Base Run
Cumulative Accidents 103
Average KSA 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103
RBAAIH 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314
Table G1
	
Fixed constant base run output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 787 374 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 119 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 0 31 63 94 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 0.77 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 198746 188665 192814 224064 286564 317814 349064 380314
Table G2
	
Accident reporting policy output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 100 83 71 63
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314
Table G3
	
Accident reporting time output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 4999 246 151 119 94 87 83 79
Average KSA 3.97 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 108 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 119 94 88 83 80
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 744866 269597 260075 256901 254362 253727 253274 252934
Table G4
	
Unregulated hazard regulation weighting output
G1
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3350 198 135 114 97 93 90 87
Average KSA 3.97 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 109 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 114 97 93 90 88
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 580038 264836 258488 256372 254679 254256 253954 253727
Table G5
	
Intermediate hazard regulation weighting output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 2466 159 111 95 83 79 77 75
Average KSA 3.99 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 117 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 111 95 83 80 78 76
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 491609 260868 256108 254521 253251 252934 252707 252537
Table G6
	
Full hazard regulation weighting output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 245314 247814 250314 252814 257814 260314 262814 265314
Table G7
	
Safety monitoring policy output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 701 426 152 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 122 103 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 1.30 0.48 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 312640 285765 258903 254689 255939 256564 257189 257814
Table G8
	
Intermediate hazard regulation policy output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 152
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 122
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 260153
Table G9
	
Intermediate hazard regulation time output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 556 431 306 181 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 124 123 103 103 103 103
RBAA1H 1.34 0.74 0.39 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 293114 282495 271880 261266 257189 259064 260939 262814
Table G10
	
Full hazard regulation policy output
G2
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 156 223 271 306
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 123 124 124 124
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12 023 0.32 0.39
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314 255314 255314 255314 260643 267304 272062 275630
Table Gil
	
Full ha7ard regulation time output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 10569 392 153 115 97 92 89 87
Average KSA 0.48 3.34 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 97 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.69 0.32 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1301918 284194 260289 256494 254655 254219 253911 253681
Table G12
	
Base length of employment output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314
Table G13
	
Staff adjustment time output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1771 636 270 145 82 67 56 48
Average KSA 1.87 2.82 3.40 3.76 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 83 68 57 49
RBAAIH 2.67 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 322109 233585 222007 234459 278229 301740 325637 349795
Table G14
	
Training policy output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1771 636 270 145 82 67 56 48
Average KSA 1.87 2.82 3.40 3.76 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 83 68 57 49
RBAAIH 2.67 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 -	 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 422109 308585 272007 259459 253229 251740 250637 249795
Table G15
	
Training effectiveness output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 167 143 124 113 94 84 75 66
Average KSA 3.71 3.78 3.85 3.92 4.08 4.16 4.24 4.33
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 123 122 121 113 94 85 76 67
RBAAIH 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 261710 259283 257399 256345 254355 253414 252494 251599
Table G16
	
Ratio between hires and average knowledge, skills and attitude output
G3
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 43 53 69 85 122 160 209 209
Average KSA 4.65 4.47 4.30 4.15 3.86 3.73 3.61 3.61
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 44 54 69 86 121 123 123 123
RBAAIH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.13
Cumulative Safety Costs 249257 250252 251852 253547 257247 260990 265912 265912
Table G17
	 Ratio between quits and average knowledge, skills and attitude output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 45 56 71 87 121 153 197 245
Average KSA 4.60 4.43 4.28 4.14 3.87 3.75 3.64 3.53
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 46 57 72 87 120 123 123 124
RBAAIH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.16
Cumulative Safety Costs 249502 250612 252108 253681 257095 260286 264729 269547
Table G18
	 Fixed proportion of knowledge, skills and attitude lost output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314
Table G19
	
Learning delay output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 105 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
Average KSA 3.99 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 108 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 105 103 103 103 103 103 103 103
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255508 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314 255314
Table G20
	
Perceived accident incidence smooth output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 6.64 3.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 1.00 0.93 0.78 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 14.40 5.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.22 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Table G21
	
Accident reporting policy gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.39 0.41 0.39
RBAA1H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G22
	
Accident reporting time gearing
04
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 47.53 1.85 0.93 0.62 0.36 0.31 0.26 0.23
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 0.28 0.42 0.61 0.36 0.30 0.26 0.23
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 1.92 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table G23	 Unregulated hazard regulation weighting gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 31.53 1.23 0.62 0.42 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 0.28 0.42 0.41 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.15
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 1.27 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table G24	 Intermediate hazard regulation weighting gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 22.94 0.72 0.16 0.30 0.80 0.46 0.34 0.27
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 0.28 0.15 0.30 0.78 0.45 0.33 0.26
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.93 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01
Table G25	 Full hazard regulation weighting gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
FtBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table G26	 Safety monitoring policy gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 5.81 4.19 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 0.27 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 25.00 11.47 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.22 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table G27	 Intermediate hazard regulation policy gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +SO% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.47
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.19
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Table G28	 Intermediate hazard regulation time gearing
G5
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 4.40 4.25 3.95 3.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 028 0.41 0.79 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 25.80 18.40 13.60 8.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Table G29	 Full hazard regulation policy gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.07 2.33 2.17 1.97
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.77 0.40 0.27 0.21
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.60 7.20 7.20 6.80
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08
Table G30
	
Full hazard regulation time gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 101.61 3.74 0.97 0.46 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.16
Average KSA 0.88 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
Actual Length of Employment 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.21 0.27 0.38 0.45 0.24 0.20 0.18 0.15
RBAAIH 92.80 7.20 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
Cumulative Safety Costs 4.10 0.15 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table G31	 Base length of employment gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G32	 Staff adjustment time gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 16.20 6.90 3.24 1.62 0.80 0.69 0.60 0.53
Average KSA 0.53 0.39 0.30 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.59 0.52
RBAAIH 52.40 19.47 6.40 2.40 0.80 0.40 0.27 0.20
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.26 0.11 0.26 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37
Table G33	 Training policy gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% 4-100%
Cumulative Accidents 16.20 6.90 3.24 1.62 0.80 0.69 0.60 0.53
Average KSA 0.53 0.39 0.30 0.24 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.75 0.78 0.67 0.59 0.52
RBAAIH 52.40 19.47 6.40 2.40 0.80 0.40 0.27 0.20
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.65 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table G34
	
Training effectiveness gearing
06
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.62 0.52 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36
Average KSA 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.19 0.25 0.35 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.35
RBAAIH 1.00 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.20
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table G35
	 Ratio between hires and average knowledge, skills and attitude gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.59 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.76 1.10 1.37 1.03
Average KSA 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.57 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.39 0.26 0.20
RBAAIH 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.00 1.60 2.13 1.60
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.04
Table G36
	
Ratio between quits and average KSA gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.56 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.70 0.97 1.22 1.38
Average KSA 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.55 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.66 0.38 0.26 0.20
RBAAIH 0.20 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.00 1.20 1.87 2.20
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
Table G37
	
Fixed proportion of KSA lost gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G38
	
Learning delay gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction .
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G39
	
Perceived accident incidence smooth gearing
Metric Base Run
Accident Incidence 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98
Average KSA 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5,106.29
RBAAIH 0.05
Table G40
	
Step constant base run output
G7
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 35 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 281 85 22 7 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 47 24 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 50 27 0 0 0 0 0 0
RBAAIH 40 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 641
	
Accident reporting policy settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 5 12 18 22
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G42
	
Accident reporting time settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 2189 59 15 4 2 3 3 3
Actual Length of Employment 18 7 6 5 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 72 10 0 2 15 17 19 20
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 643
	 Unregulated hazard regulation weighting settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 1438 37 8 3 2 2 3 3
Actual Length of Employment 14 7 6 4 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 12 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 68 1 1 4 14 16 17 17
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G44
	
Intermediate hazard regulation weighting settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 1073 26 5 3 2 ' 2 2 2
Actual Length of Employment 11 7 5 4 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 1 1 6 13 15 16 16
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G45
	
Full hazard regulation weighting settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G46
	
Safety monitoring policy settling time
G8
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 45 26 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 283 113 9 0 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 57 38 10 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 60 41 14 11 11 11 11 11
RBAAIH 50 30 1 0 0 0 0 0
Table G47
	 Intermediate hazard regulation policy settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 2
Table G48
	
Intermediate hazard regulation time settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 47 36 42 5 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 279 172 81 17 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 59 48 34 17 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 61 50 37 20 11 11 11 11
RBAAIH 51 40 27 9 0 0 0 0
Table G49 .	 Full hazard regulation policy settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 1 11 18 22
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 12 34 59 81
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 13 23 30 34
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 0 0 0 17 26 33 37
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 5 16 22 27
Table G50
	
Full hazard regulation time settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 137 29 4 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 6212 112 60 49 29 34 37 39
Actual Length of Employment 149 49 38 27 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 69 47 36 25 20 25 27 29
Monthly Safety Cost 151 103 82 81 97 103 105 107
RBAAIH 141 33 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G51
	 Base length of employment settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0
Table G52
	 Staff adjustment time settling time
G9
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 39 29 17 0 0 6 10 12
Accident Reports Being Processed 165 91 68 61 45 52 56 58
Actual Length of Employment 55 51 47 39 0 0 8 11
Average KSA 53 49 44 37 36 42 46 49
Monthly Safety Cost 109 105 101 93 114 120 124 127
RBAAIH 43 32 18 0 0 11 15 17
Table G53
	
Training policy settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 39 29 17 0 0 6 10 12
Accident Reports Being Processed 185 91 68 61 45 52 56 58
Actual Length of Employment 55 51 47 39 0 0 8 II
Average KSA 53 49 44 37 36 42 46 49
Monthly Safety Cost 109 105 101 83 114 120 124 127
RBAAIH 43 32 18 0 0 11 15 17
Table G54
	
Training effectiveness settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
Accident Reports Being Processed 61 58 54 47 33 40 45 48
Actual Length of Employment 40 37 33 26 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 38 35 31 24 23 31 35 38
Monthly Safety Cost 84 91 87 80 101 109 113 116
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7
Table G55
	
Ratio between hires and average knowledge, skills and attitude settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 8 5 0 0 0 5 13 19
Accident Reports Being Processed 54 51 47 39 54 61 65 68
Actual Length of Employment 7 0 0 0 32 39 43 46
Average KSA 45 42 37 30 30 37 41 44
Monthly Safety Cost 123 120 115 108 86 83 97 100
RBAAIH 13 10 6 0 0 0 14 22
Table G56
	
Ratio between quits and average knowledge, skills and attitude settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 7 4 0 0 0 4 11 17
Accident Reports Being Processed 53 50 46 39 53 60 64 67
Actual Length of Employment 6 0 0 0 31 38 43 45
Average KSA 44 41 36 29 29 36 40 43
Monthly Safety Cost 122 119 114 107 85 82 97 99
RBAAIH 13 9 5 0 0 0 11 19
Table G57
	
Fixed proport'on of knowledge, skills and attitude lost settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA	 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RBAAIH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G58
	
Learning delay settling time
G10
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Accident Reports Being Processed 73 0 0 o 0 0 0 0
Actual Length of Employment 107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Average KSA 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Monthly Safety Cost 135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RBAA1H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table G59
	 Perceived accident incidence smooth settling time
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 106.10 34.63 10.19 3.94 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.91 119.95 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 2500 1875 1250 625 625 1250 1875 2500
RBAAIH 0.17 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G60
	 Accident reporting policy point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 0.63 3.96 6.35 8.13
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G61
	
Accident reporting time point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.96 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 947.86 26.36 7.38 2.38 1.87 1.75 1.65 1.59
Actual Length of Employment 108.06 119.94 119.96 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 3.98 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 9636 5392 5202 5106 5087 5075 5065 5059
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G62
	 Unregulated hazard regulation weighting point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.66 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 628.84 16.84 2.22 2.27 1.94 1.85 1.79 1.75
Actual Length of Employment 109.65 119.95 119.97 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.01 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 11483 5297 5170 5127 5097 5085 5079 5075
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G63
	
Intermediate hazard regulation weighting point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.49 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 469.63 12.10 2.80 222 1.97 1.90 1.86 1.82
Actual Length of Employment 116.76 119.96 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 9838 5249 5154 5122 5097 5090 5086 5082
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G64
	
Full hazard regulation weighting point value
Gil
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 4096 4956 5006 5056 5156 5206 5256 5306
RBAA1H 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G65
	
Safety monitoring policy point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 106.69 36.80 2.47 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.91 119.94 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5658 5403 5150 5094 5119 5131 5144 5156
RBAAIH 0.22 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G66
	
Intermediate hazard regulation policy point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.45
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5148
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Table G67
	
Intermediate hazard regulation time point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 100.34 58.16 24.35 3.97 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.93 119.94 119.95 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5539 5419 5300 5181 5144 5181 5129 5256
RBAAIH 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G68
	
Full hazard regulation policy point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.58 8.72 16.81 24.35
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.96 119.96 119.95
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5106 5106 5106 5106 5157 5221 5266 5300
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12
Table G69
	
Full hazard regulation time point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.60 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2652.47 34.15 2.95 2.24 1.96 1.90 1.85 1.82
Actual Length of Employment 1.08 29.99 59.99 89.98 149.97 179.97 209.96 239.95
Average KSA	 . 3.54 3.55 3.84 3.95 4.03 4.05 4.07 4.08
Monthly Safety Cost 15986 5313 5162 5124 5106 5089 5084 5081
RBAA1H 2.21 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G70
	
Base length of employment point value
G12
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G71
	
Staff adjustment time point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Accident Reports Being Processed 53.38 25.28 8.39 2.49 1.71 1.41 1.16 0.93
Actual Length of Employment 119.94 119.95 119.96 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.99
Average KSA 3.44 3.60 3.74 3.88 4.12 4.22 4.32 4.41
Monthly Safety Cost 3106 3606 4106 4606 5606 6106 6606 7106
RBAA1H 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table G72
	
Training policy point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Accident Reports Being Processed 53.38 25.28 8.39 2.49 1.71 1.41 1.16 0.93
Actual Length of Employment 119.94 119.95 119.96 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.99 119.98
Average KSA 3.44 3.60 3.74 3.88 4.12 4.22 4.32 4.41
Monthly Safety Cost 5383 5280 5204 5150 5070 5039 5013 4991
RBAAIH 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table G73
	
Training effectiveness point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Accident Reports Being Processed 3.75 2.60 2.37 2.22 1.92 1.78 1.64 1.50
Actual Length of Employment 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 3.82 3.86 3.91 3.95 4.05 4.09 4.14 4.19
Monthly Safety Cost 5172 5155 5138 5122 5091 5077 5062 5048
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Table G74
	
Ratio between hires and average knowledge, skills and attitude point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.05 1.29 1.54 1.80 2.35 3.30 7.72 14.90
Actual Length of Employment 119.99 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97 119.96 119.96
Average KSA 4.37 4.27 4.18 4.09 3.91 3.83 3.75 3.67
Monthly Safety Cost 5002 5026 5052 5079 5136 5167 5199 5234
RBAAIH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07
Table G75
	
Ratio between quits and average knowledge, skills and attitude point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.12 1.35 1.58 1.82 2.33 2.95 6.42 9.67
Actual Length of Employment 119.99 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.96
Average KSA 4.34 4.25 4.16 4.08 3.92 3.84 3.77 3.69
Monthly Safety Cost 5009 5032 5056 5081 5134 5162 5191 5230
RBAAIH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07
Table G76
	
Fixed proporfon of knowledge, skills and attitude lost point value
G13
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G77
	
Learning delay point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.13 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 108.00 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 3.98 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5113 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
RBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table G78
	
Perceived accident incidence smooth point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 3.00 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 50.50 21.08 7.89 3.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.51 0.84 1.51 3.51 3.51 1.51 0.84 0.51
RBAAIH 2.40 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G79
	
Accident reporting policy point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.78 1.84 2.78 2.95
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G80
	
Accident reporting time point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 47.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 459.13 15.73 5.17 0.62 0.37 0.30 0.27 0.23
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.89 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G81
	
Unregulated hazard regulation weighting point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 32.00 1.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 304.26 9.57 0.16 0.41 0.23 0.20 0.17 0.15
Actual Length of Employment 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 1.25 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G82
	
Intermediate hazard regulation weighting point value gearing
G14
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 23.50 0.67 1.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 1.33 1.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 226.98 6.50 0.72 0.31 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12
Actual Length of Employment 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.93 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G83
	 Full hazard regulation weighting point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.20 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
RBAA1H 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G84
	 Safety monitoring policy point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 3.00 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 50.79 22.49 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 8.50 5.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G85
	 Intermediate hazard regulation policy point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Table G86
	 Intermediate hazard regulation time point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 47.71 36.31 21.64 3.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03
RBAAIH 6.50 8.00 7.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G87
	 Full hazard regulation policy point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100% .
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 1.33 1.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.01 6.47 9.55 10.82
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.50
Table G88
	
Full hazard regulation time point value gearing
G15
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 79.00 1.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 1286.61 20.77 0.86 0.35 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12
Actual Length of Employment 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Average KSA 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
Monthly Safety Cost 2.13 0.05 0.02 '	 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
RBAAIH 108.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G89	 Base length of employment point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 690	 Staff adjustment time point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.50 1.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 24.91 15.03 6.15 0.83 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.55
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
Monthly Safety Cost 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
RBAAIH 2.50 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Table 691	 Training policy point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.50 1.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 24.91 15.03 6.15 0.83 0.68 0.63 0.58 0.55
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
Monthly Safety Cost 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
RBAAIH 2.50 2.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Table 692	 Training effectiveness point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.82 0.35 0.30 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Monthly Safety Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.50
Table 693	 Ratio between hires and average knowledge, skills and attitude point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 1.20 3.66 6.23
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Monthly Safety Cost 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
RBAAIH 0.50 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 1.00
Table G94	 Ratio between quits and average knowledge, skills and attitude point value gearing
016
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.86 2.82 3.69
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Monthly Safety Cost 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
RBAAIH 0.50 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 1.00
Table G95
	
Fixed proport'on of knowledge, skills and attitude lost point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G96
	
Learning delay point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table G97
	
Perceived accident incidence smooth point value gearing
G.1 Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient Calculations
A simple test was required in order to see whether there was a fit or not between the
constant parameters for the fixed constant, settling time and point value sensitivity
rankings. The Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation was chosen, as it measures
whether there is a statistical difference between two sets of ordinal data (Curwin and
Slater, 1991).
The equation for Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient is:
r -1 	 ,
s	 n(n- -1)
6Ed2
G17
Where,
d = the difference in the ranks between each pair of variables
rj = the number of pairs
6 = a constant
= the sum of all the pairs of data
The significance of the correlation results were then measured to determine whether
there was a level of association between the three measures of sensitivity at 99%
significance. As Spearman's Rank measurement can only be used to compare
association between two sets of data, the results of each test were compared against the
other two. If there was a statistically significant relationship between all, then it could
be concluded that the tests suggested similar patterns of sensitivity. The calculations
based on Tables G98 to 0100 indicate the degree of association between ranks, and if
they are statistically significant.
Parameter Mean
Fixed
Constant
Mean
Settling
Time
Mean
Fixed
Constant
Rank
Mean
Settling
Time
Rank
d dz
Accident Reporting Policy 0.76 13.48 9 12 -3.00 9.00
Accident Reporting Time 0.03 1.19 15 16 -1.00 1.00
Base Length of Employment 4.69 172.63 1 1 0.00 0.00
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 0.39 37.88 12 6 6.00 36.00
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 1.76 24.50 4 10 -6.00 36.00
Full Hazard Regulation Time 0.78 10.85 8 13 -5.00 25.00
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.62 25.21 10 9 1.00 1.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 1.06 17.33 6 11 -5.00 25.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.04 0.71 14 17 -3.00 9.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.79 35.02 7 7 0.00 0.00
Learning Delay 0.00 0.00 18 18.5 -0.50 0.25
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 0.00 7.60 18 14 4.00 16.00
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 0.19 32.85 13 8 5.00 25.00
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 0.40 38.73 11 5 6.00 36.00
Safety Monitoring Policy 0.01 1.83 16 15 1.00 1.00
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00 0.00 18 18.5 -0.50 0.25
Training Effectiveness 2.51 48.23 3 3 0.00 0.00
Training Policy 2.53 48.02 2 4 -2.00 4.00
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 1.19 51.77 5 2 3.00 9.00
Sum of d 233.50
Table G98
	
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test for mean fixed constant sensitivity versus
mean settling time sensitivity
G18
E
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient(r) 
	 d2
s ) —1 	
n(n2
 —1)
6E233.50
=1 	 19(192_1)
= 0.7952
The correlation coefficient can be compared to a significance level ro= 0.01. The test
will indicate whether the result is significant on 99% of occasions. The correlation
coefficient needs to equal or exceed the published tabulated value for the result to be
statistically significant (Murdoch and Barnes, 1986).
Ho	 # ro
: In #
To decide whether the null hypothesis is correct v must be found.
v = n— 2
=19 — 2
=17
The correlation coefficient table shows v at a 99% significance level to be 0.5751.
Ir > ro
0.7952 > 0.5751
As the calculated figure is greater than 0.5751, then the null hypothesis may be rejected.
The rank correlation between the mean fixed constant sensitivity and mean settling time
sensitivity has been shown to be statistically significant on 99 out of 100 occasions.
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Parameter Mean
Fixed
Constant
Mean
Point
Value
Gearing
Mean
Fixed
Constant
Rank
Mean
Point
Value
Gearing
Rank
d di
Accident Reporting Policy 0.76 13.48 9 2 7.00 49.00
Accident Reporting Time 0.03 0.22 15 13 2.00 4.00
Base Length of Employment 4.69 31.48 1 1 0.00 0.00
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 0.39 0.37 12 12 0.00 0.00
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 1.76 3.03 4 6 -2.00 4.00
Full Hazard Regulation Time 0.78 1.02 8 10 -2.00 4.00
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.62 5.70 10 5 5.00 25.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 1.06 1.97 6 7 -1.00 1.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.04 0.01 14 15.5 -1.50 2.25
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 0.79 7.31 7 4 3.00 9.00
Learning Delay 0.00 0.00 18 18 0.00 0.00
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 0.00 0.00 18 18 0.00 0.00
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 0.19 0.13 13 14 -1.00 1.00
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 0.40 0.45 11 11 0.00 0.00
Safety Monitoring Policy 0.01 0.01 16 15.5 0.50 0.25
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00 0.00 18 18 0.00 0.00
Training Effectiveness 2.51 1.34 3 9 -6.00 36.00
Training Policy 2.53 1.40 2 8 -6.00 36.00
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 1.19 11.10 5 3 2.00 4.00
Sum of d2 175.50
Table G99
	 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test for mean fixed constant sensitivity versus
mean point value sensitivity
6Ed2
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient(r) = 1 	 2
n(n -1)
6E175.50
=1 	
19(192 -1)
= 0.8461
The correlation coefficient can be compared to a significance level ro = 0.01. The test
will indicate whether the result is significant on 99% of occasions. The correlation
coefficient needs to equal or exceed the published tabulated value for the result to be
statistically significant (Murdoch and Barnes, 1986).
Ho : In # 1'0
111 :Irl # ri
To decide whether the null hypothesis is correct v must be found.
G20
v = n - 2
=19 - 2
=17
The correlation coefficient table shows v at a 99% significance level to be 0.5751.
H>1.0
0.8461> 0.5751
As the calculated figure is greater than 0.5751, then the null hypothesis may be rejected.
The rank correlation between the mean fixed constant sensitivity and mean point value
sensitivity has been shown to be statistically significant on 99 out of 100 occasions.
Parameter Mean
Settling
Time
Mean
Point
Value
Gearing
Mean
Settling
Time
Rank
Mean
Point
Value
Gearing
Rank
d dz
Accident Reporting Policy 13.48 13.48 12 2 10.00 100.00
Accident Reporting Time 1.19 0.22 16 13 3.00 9.00
Base Length of Employment 172.63 31.48 1 1 0.00 0.00
Fixed Proportion of Knowledge Lost 37.88 0.37 6 12 -6.00 36.00
Full Hazard Regulation Policy 24.50 3.03 10 6 4.00 16.00
Full Hazard Regulation Time 10.85 1.02 13 10 3.00 9.00
Full Hazard Regulation Weighting 25.21 5.70 9 5 4.00 16.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Policy 17.33 1.97 11 7 4.00 16.00
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time 0.71 0.01 17 15.5 1.50 2.25
Intermediate Hazard Regulation Weighting 35.02 7.31 7 4 3.00 9.00
Learning Delay 0.00 0.00 18.5 18 0.50 0.25
Perceived Accident Incidence Smooth 7.60 0.00 14 18 -4.00 16.00
Ratio Between Hires and Average KSA 32.85 0.13 8 14 -6.00 36.00
Ratio Between Quits and Average KSA 38.73 0.45 5 11 -6.00 36.00
Safety Monitoring Policy 1.83 0.01 15 15.5 -0.50 0.25
Staff Adjustment Time 0.00 0.00 18.5 18 0.50 0.25
Training Effectiveness 48.23 1.34 3 9 -6.00 36.00
Training Policy 48.02 1.40 4 8 -4.00 16.00
Unregulated Hazard Regulation Weighting 51.77 11.10 2 3 -1.00 1.00
Sum of di 355.00
Table G100
	
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test for mean settling time sensitiv'ty versus
mean point value sensitivity
021
ESpearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient(r3 ) =1 6 d 2
n(n 2
 —1)
6E355.00
=1 19(192_i)
= 0.6886
The correlation coefficient can be compared to a significance level ro= 0.01. The test
will indicate whether the result is significant on 99% of occasions. The correlation
coefficient needs to equal or exceed the published tabulated value for the result to be
statistically significant (Murdoch and Barnes, 1986).
	
1/0 :	 ro
	
J r !: 	#
To decide whether the null hypothesis is correct v must be found.
v = n— 2
=19 — 2
=17
The correlation coefficient table shows v at a 99% significance level to be 0.5751.
Id >1.0
0.6886 > 0.5751
As the calculated figure is greater than 0.5751, then the null hypothesis may be rejected.
The rank correlation between the mean fixed constant sensitivity and mean point value
sensitivity has been shown to be statistically significant on 99 out of 100 occasions.
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APPENDIX H
Initial Value Parameter Tests
Metric Base Run
Accident Incidence 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98
Average KSA 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5,106.29
RBAA1H 0.05
Table Hi
	
Initial values base run output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Average KSA 1700.50 1112.45 496.75 48.72 2.03 1.96 1.79 3.88
Actual Length of Employment 119.89 119.91 119.95 119.97	 , 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 3.96 3.97 3.98 3.99 4.01 4.03 4.07 4.17
RBAAIH 5803 5591 5283 5110 5103 5096 5080 5155
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09
Table H2
	
Safety knowledge, skills and attitude output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.30
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.93 1.05 142.30 762.96 2342.22 4269.30
Actual Length of Employment 120.00 120.00 119.97 119.98 119.95 119.89 119.65 119.13
Cumulative Accident Reports 188.68 7.55 4.45 4.21 3.80 3.60 3.40 3.22
RBAAIH 4900 4900 4991 5005 5378 6276 8268 10991
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.58 0.98
Table H3
	
Labour output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14
Average KSA 0.11 0.59 1.08 1.57 30.76 100.10 169.80 264.77
Actual Length of Employment 120.00 119.99 119.99 119.98 119.95 119.92 119.88 119.80
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 4911 4959 5008 5057 5304 5614 5925 6271
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.27
Table H4
	
Regulated hazards output
HI
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.09
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAA1H 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5109
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H5
	
Unregulated hazards output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.09
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5109
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H6
	
Hazards under intermediate regulation output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.09
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5109
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H7
	
Hazards under full regulation output
Metric Adjustment, Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H8
	
Accident reports being processed output
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3.54 3.33 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Average KSA 832.81 718.70 480.28 90.60 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.88
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
FtBAAIH 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Cumulative Safety Costs 6.06 5.07 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80
Table 119
	
Safety knowledge, skills and attitude output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.19 0.30
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.93 1.05 142.30 762.96 2342.22 4269.30
Actual Length of Employment 120.00 120.00 119.97 119.98 119.95 119.89 119.65 119.13
Cumulative Accident Reports 188.68 7.55 4.45 4.21 3.80 3.60 3.40 3.22
RBAAIH 4900 4900 4991 5005 5378 6276 8268 10991
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.58 0.98
Table H10
	
Labour output gearing
H2
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.01 0.67 1.00 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.33 6.00
Average KSA 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 55.73 95.18 108.57 127.53
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.23
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.20 4.40 4.27 4.40
Table H11	 Regulated hazards output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.09
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5109
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H12
	
Unregulated hazards output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.03 2.04 2.05 2.05 2.07 2.08 2.09 2.09
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
FtBAAIH 5103 5104 5105 5106 5107 5108 5109 5109
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H13	 Hazards under intermediate regulation output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table H14
	
Hazards under full regulation output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Average KSA 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Cumulative Accident Reports 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
RBAAIH 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H15
	
Accident reports being processed output gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.10 0.63 0.34 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 1705.50 1112.45 496.75 56.08 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 108.01 112.94 119.01 119.91 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00
Average KSA 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00
Monthly Safety Cost 15929 11160 8301 5656 4900 4900 4900 4900
RBAAIH 1.08 0.90 0.53 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.19
Table H16
	
Safety knowledge, skills and attitude point value
H3
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.43 058
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 142.30 762.96 2342.22 4269.30
Actual Length of Employment 120.00 120.00 120.00 120.00 119.92 119.61 118.09 113.58
Average KSA 400.00 16.00 8.00 5.33 3.20 2.67 2.29 2.00
Monthly Safety Cost 4900 4900 4900 4900 5738 8069 12470 16464
RBAAIH 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.35 0.66 1.01
Table H17
	
Labour point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.14
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.11 0.59 1.08 1.57 30.76 100.10 169.80 264.77
Actual Length of Employment 120.00 119.99 119.99 119.98 119.95 119.92 119.88 119.80
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 4911 4959 5008 5057 5306 5621 5936 6286
RBAA1H 4.80 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.27
Table H18
	
Regulated hazards point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.01 1.33 1.00 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.33 6.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 55.73 95.18 108.57 127.53
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.23
RBAAIH 95.96 3.73 2.00 0.80 3.20 4.40 4.27 4.40
Table H19
	
Unregulated hazards point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.69 1.78 1.87 1.97 2.16 2.26 2.38 2.49
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.97
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5043 5059 5074 5090 5122 5138 5154 5170
RBAA1H 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Table H20
	
Hazards under intermediate regulation point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.86 1.91 1.96 2.01 2.13 2.23 2.33 2.44
Actual Length of Employment 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.97 119.97 119.97 119.97
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5059 5071 5082 5094 5118 5130 5142 5154
RBAAIH 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Table H21
	
Hazards under full regulation point value
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%_
Accident Incidence 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.52 1.03 1.54 2.58 3.09 3.60 4.12
Actual Length of Employment 119.97 119.97 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98 119.98
Average KSA 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Monthly Safety Cost 5119 5111 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106
FtBAAIH 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Table H22
	
Accident reports being processed point value
H4
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 54.55 40.67 32.00 12.00 4.00 2.00 1.33 1.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 835.27 718.70 480.28 104.89 3.50 2.00 1.33 1.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Monthly Safety Cost 2.14 1.58 1.25 0.43 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.04
RBAAIH 20.81 22.67 19.20 8.00 1.60 1.60 2.67 2.80
Table 1123
	 Safety knowledge, skills and attitude point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.00 1.33 2.00 4.00 10.00 19.00 27.33 28.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.00 1.33 2.00 3.98 272.31 738.74 1514.67 2071.48
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05
Average KSA 99.00 4.00 2.00 1.33 0.80 0.67 0.57 0.50
Monthly Safety Cost 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.49 1.16 1.92 2.22
RBAAIH 4.60 6.13 6.00 1.60 6.40 12.00 16.27 19.20
Table H24
	
Labour point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 1.01 1.33 1.00 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.33 6.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 55.73 95.18 108.57 127.53
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.23
RBAAIH 95.96 3.73 2.00 0.80 3.20 4.40 4.27 4.40
Table H25
	
Regulated hazards point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.51 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 028 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.38
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
RBAAIH 0.40 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.20
Table 1126
	
Unregulated hazards point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.51. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.21
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 0.40 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.20
Table H27
	
Hazards under intermediate regulation point value gearing
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
RBAAIH 0.40 0.27 0.40 0.80 0.00 0.40 0.27 0.20
Table H28
	
Ha7ards under full regulation point value gearing
H5
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Accident Incidence 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Accident Reports Being Processed 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Monthly Safety Cost 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table H29
	
Accident reports being processed point value gearing
H.1 Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient Calculations
Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation was used in order to see whether there was a
statistically significant association between the initial value parameters for the fixed
initial value and point value sensitivity rankings. Table H30, and the calculations which
follow indicate the level of association between ranks, and whether these are
statistically significant.
Parameter Mean Mean Mean Mean d d2
Initial Initial Initial Initial
Value Value Value Value
Output Point Output Point
Gearing Value Gearing Value
Gearing Rank Gearing
Rank
Accident Reports Being Processed 0.00 0.17 5.5 6 -0.50 0.25
Hazards under Full Regulation 0.00 0.09 5.5 7 -1.50 2.25
Hazards under Intermediate Regulation 0.00 0.13 5.5 6 -0.50 0.25
Labour 98.98 101.78 1 1 0.00 0.00
Regulated Hazards 8.98 11.13 3 3 0.00 0.00
Safety KSA 44.75 49.75 2 2 0.00 0.00
Unregulated Hazards 0.00 0.18 5.5 4 1.50 2.25
Sum of dz 5.00
Table H30
	
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient test for mean fixed constant sensitivity versus
mean settling time sensitivity
d 2
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient(r) =1 
	
n(n 2 -1)
6E 5 
= 1
7(7 2 -
= 0.9107
H6
The correlation coefficient can be compared to a significance level r, = 0.01. The test
will indicate whether the result is significant on 99% of occasions. The correlation
coefficient needs to equal or exceed the published tabulated value for the result to be
statistically significant (Murdoch and Barnes, 1986).
Ho : Id  ro
H1 :Irl # ri
To decide whether the null hypothesis is correct v must be found.
v = n — 2
= 7 — 2
=5
The correlation coefficient table shows v at a 99% significance level to be 0.8745.
Id > ro
0.9107 > 0.8745
As the calculated figure is greater than 0.8745, then the null hypothesis may be rejected.
The rank correlation between the mean fixed constant sensitivity and mean settling time
sensitivity has been shown to be statistically significant on 99 out of 100 occasions.
H7
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APPENDIX I
Table Function Parameter Tests
Accident Repeater Table Parameters
Accident Reports Completed Accident Repeater Original Accident Repeater Slope Accident Repeater Shape
1 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.010 0.005 0.036
3 0.020 0.010 0.072
4 0.030 0.015 0.107
5 0.040 0.020 0.143
6 0.055 0.028 0.179
7 0.070 0.035 0.215
8 0.085 .	 0.043 0.251
9 0.100 0.050 0.286
10 0.125 0.063 0.322
11 0.165 0.083 0.358
12 0.215 0.108 0.394
13 0.265 0.133 0.429
14 0.320 0.160 0.465
15 0.365 0.183 0.501
16 0.425 0.213 0.537
17 0.490 0.245 0.573
18 0.545 0.273 0.608
19 0.600 0.300 0.644
20 0.680 0.340 0.680
Table Ii
	
Alternative accident repeater table function parameters
Figure II	 Alternative accident repeater table function parameters
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Safety Monitoring Policy
The original Accident Repeater table is both positive and exponential in shape (see
Appendix C for full details). This appears to be the most plausible set of table
parameters. Halving the rate of change of Accident Repeater is an alternative
assumption that should not necessarily be discounted. The original slope may have
overestimated the rate at which accident report numbers leading to accident repeaters.
The only other plausible relationship is a linear one, although the justification given for
the original table largely discounts this possibility.
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring Table Parameters
Safety Monitoring Policy Original Slope Shape
0 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.125 0.063 1.750
20 0.325 0.163 2.750
30 0.575 0.288 3.500
40 0.925 0.463 4.000
50 1.530 0.770 4.250
60 3.150 1.575 4.450
70
80
4.350
4.730
.	 , 2.175
2.365
4.650
4.800
90 4.930 2.465 4.930
100 5.000 2.500 5.000
Table 12
	
Alternative hazards identified from safety monitoring table function parameters
Figure 12	 Alternative hazards identified from safety monitoring table function parameters
The original Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring table is both positive and
logistical in shape (see Appendix C for full details). This appears to be the most
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plausible set of table parameters. Halving the rate of change of Hazards Identified from
Safety Monitoring is an alternative assumption that should not necessarily be
discounted. The original slope may suggest that the Safety Monitoring Policy is better
at identifying active hazards than it is in reality. An alternative assumption about the
shape of the table function is a logarithmic relationship. The hazards which can be
identified from safety monitoring may in reality show a fast rate of change at the lower
range of activity, and this rate gradually slowing off as more safety monitoring is
carried out.
Multiplier Table Parameters
Multiplier Original Slope Shape
0 0.0 0.0 0.0
50 10.0 5.0 4.0
100 20.0 10.0 8.5
150 30.0 15.0 15.5
200 40.0 20.0 24.5
250 50.0 25.0 39.5
300 60.0 30.0 78.5
350 70.0 35.0 89.5
400 80.0 40.0 94.0
450 90.0 45.0 98.5
500 100.0 50.0 100.0
Table 13
	
Alternative multiplier table function parameters
Figure 13	 Alternative multiplier table function parameters
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Perceived Accident Incidence
The original Multiplier table is both positive and linear in shape (see Appendix F for
full details). This appears to be the most plausible set of table parameters as the
Multiplier simply acts to convert the dimensions from Safety Training into Learning.
Halving the rate of change of Hamds Identified from Safety Monitoring is an
alternative assumption that should not necessarily be discounted. The original slope
may suggest that Safety Training Policy is better at identifying active hazards than it is
in reality. An alternative assumption about the shape of the table function is a logistical
relationship. Although, given the role of the table function in the model, this is unlikely
to be appropriate.
Quit Likelihood Table Parameters
Quit Likelihood Original Slope Shape
0.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.1 0.001 0.001 0.027
0.2 0.003 0.002 0.050
0.3 0.006 0.003 0.066
0.4 0.014 0.007 0.078
0.5 0.028 0.014 0.085
0.6 0.080 0.040 0.090
0.7 0.092 0.046 0.094
0.8 0.096 0.048 0.097
0.9 0.098 0.049 0.099
1.0 0.100 0.050 0.100
Table 14
	
Alternative quit likelihood table function parameters
Figure 14	 Alternative quit likelihood table function parameters
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The original Quit Likelihood table is both positive and logistical in shape (see
Appendix D for full details). This appears to be the most plausible set of table
parameters. Halving the rate of change for Quit Likelihood is an alternative assumption
that should not necessarily be discounted. The original slope may suggest that in reality,
staff turn over too quickly given changes in the Perceived Accident Incidence. An
alternative assumption about the shape of the table function is a logarithmic
relationship. This may be plausible in certain occupations, but it is unlikely that at the
lower ranges of the Perceived Accident Incidence that staff would quit employment so
readily.
Risk Table Parameters
Risk Original Slope Shape
0.0 0.050 0.025 0.050
0.5
1.0
0.049
0.047
.	 , 0.025
0.024
0.049
0.048
1.5 0.044 0.022 0.047
2.0 0.036 0.018 0.046
2.5 0.015 0.008 0.044
3.0 0.008 0.004 0.042
3.5 0.004 0.002 0.039
4.0 0.002 0.001 0.030
4.5 0.001 0.000 0.015
5.0 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 15
	
Alternative risk table function parameters
Figure 15	 Alternative risk table function parameters
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The original Risk table is both negative and logistical in shape (see Appendix B for full
details). This appears to be the most plausible set of table parameters. Halving the rate
of change for Risk is an alternative assumption that may be appropriate. The original
slope may facilitate an over-representation of Risk. An alternative assumption about the
shape of the table function is a logarithmic relationship. This is not so plausible, as the
shape indicates little change in Risk across most of the range of Average KSA until the
right of the scale is reached.
Unsafe Acts Table Parameters
Unsafe Act Original Slope Shape
0.0 0.100 0.050 0.100
0.5 0.099 0.050 0.070
1.0 0.098 0.049 0.055
1.5 0.096 0.048 0.040
2.0 0.089 0.045 0.030
2.5 0.074 0.037 0.022
3.0 0.038 0.019 0.018
3.5 0.022 0.011 0.015
4.0 0.016 0.008 0.012
4.5 0.012 0.006 0.010
5.0 0.009 0.005 0.009
Table 16
	
Alternative unsafe acts table function parameters
Figure 16	 Alternative unsafe acts table function parameters
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The original Unsafe Acts table is both negative and logistical in shape (see Appendix C
for full details). These appears to be the most plausible set of table parameters. Halving
the rate of change for Unsafe Acts is an alternative assumption that may be appropriate
as the original table may have overestimated the likelihood of Unsafe Acts, given a
level of KSA. An alternative assumption about the shape of the table function is an
exponential relationship. This is not so plausible, as the shape suggests that Unsafe Acts
drop off quickly at the lower end of the KSA range.
Metric Base Run
Cumulative Accidents 103
Average KSA 4.00
Actual Length of Employment 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 103
RBAAIH 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 255314
Table 17
	
Original table function output
Original Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 10569 392 153 115 97 92 89 87
Average KSA 0.48 3.34 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 97 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.69 0.32 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1301918 284194 260289 256494 254655 254219 253911 253681
Table 18
	
Base length of employment output for original table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1771 636 270 145 82 67 56 48
Average KSA 1.87 2.82 3.40 3.76 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 83 68 57 49
RBAAIH 2.67 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 322109 233585 222007 234459 278229 301740 325637 349795
Table 19
	
Training policy output for original table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1771 636 270 145 82 67 56 48
Average KSA 1.87 2.82 3.40 3.76 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 83 68 57 49
RBAAIH • 2.67 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 422109 308585 272007 259459 253229 251740 250637 249795
Table 110
	
Training effectiveness output for original table function
Accident Repeater Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11299 365 154 115 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.48 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 96 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1374949 281487 260385 256541 254629 254176 253856 253616
Table 111
	
Base length of employment output for slope changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1799 613 262 147	 • 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.87 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 324922 231271 221212 234672 278147 301604 325464 349596
Table 112
	
Training policy output for slope changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1724 613 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.92 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.50 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 417352 306271 271212 259672 253147 251604 250464 249596
Table 113
	
Training effectiveness output for slope changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99%	 -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11843	 365 154 115 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.48	 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1	 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125	 124 123 115 96 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53	 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs	 _ 1429336	 281487 260385 256541 254629 254176 253856 253616
Table 114
	
Base length of employment output for shape changed accident repeater table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 623 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.87 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 335220 232344 221212 234672 278147 301604 325464 349596
Table 115
	
Training policy output for shape changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 623 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.87 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 435220 307344 271212 259672 253147 251604 250464 249596
Table 116
	
Training effectiveness output for shape changed accident repeater table function
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11215 365 154 110 .	 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.48 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 96 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1366512 281487 260385 256541 254629 254176 253856 253616
Table 117
	
Base length of employment output for slope changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1784 613 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.87 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 '	 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 323447 231271 221212 234672 278147 301604 325464 349596
Table 118
	
Training policy output for slope changed hazards identified from safety monitoring
table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1784 613 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.87 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 423447 306271 271212 259672 253147 251604 250464 249596
Table 119
	
Training effectiveness output for slope changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 8858 365 154 115 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.48 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 96 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1130815 281487 260385 256541 254629 254176 253856 253616
Table 120
	
Base length of employment output for shape changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1559 613 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.88 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 300880 231271 221212 234672 278147 301604 325464 349596
Table 121
	
Training policy output for shape changed hazards identified from safety monitoring
table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1559 613 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.88 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 400880 306271 271212 259672 253147 251604 250464 249596
Table 122
	
Training effectiveness output for shape changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
Multiplier Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11982 1534 495 333 229 211 200 191
Average KSA 0.25 2.51 3.06 3.27 3.46 3.51 3.55 3.57
Actual Length of Employment 1 27 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 124 124 123 123 123 123
RBAA1H 4.56 1.88 0.51 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.13
Cumulative Safety Costs 1443184 398428 294517 278308 267861 266141 264994 264143
Table 123
	
Base length of employment output for slope changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 1155 623 401 192 147 118 103
Average KSA 1.87 2.4 2.81 3.13 3.59 3.76 3.89 4
Actual Length of Employment 108 110 119 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 124 124 123 122 118 103
RBAA1H. 2.6 1.7 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Cumulative Safety Costs 335220 285546 257344 260106 289249 309672 331825 355314
Table 124
	
Training policy output for slope changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 1155 623 401 192 147 117 103
Average KSA 1.87 2.4 2.81 3.13 3.59 3.76 3.9 4
Actual Length of Employment 108 109.98 119.22 119.71 119.93 119.96 119.97 119.98
Cumulative Accident Reports 123.95 123.87 123.76 123.62 123.07 122.34 116.76 103.14
RBAAIH 2.57 1.66 0.78 0.41 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.05
Cumulative Safety Costs 435220 360546 307344 285106 264249 259672 256714 255314
Table 125
	 Training effectiveness output for slope changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11977 1455 473 315 219 203 192 184
Average KSA 0.26 2.55 3.09 3.3 3.49 3.54 3.57 3.6
Actual Length of Employment I 27 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 124 124 123 123 123 123
RBAAIH 4.56 1.75 0.48 0.28 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12
Cumulative Safety Costs 1442702 390460 292349 276525 266931 265338 264218 263388
Table 126
	 Base length of employment output for shape changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 1290 769 448 149 97 59 37
Average KSA 1.87 2.3 2.68 3.05 3.75 4.05 4.34 4.56
Actual Length of Employment 108 109 118 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 124 124 122 97 60 39
RBAAIH 2.57 1.85 1.02 0.47 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 335220 298959 271925 264767 284940 304658 325918 348720
Table 127
	
Training policy output for shape changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1902 1290 769 448 149 97 59 37
Average KSA 1.87 2.3 2.68 3.05 3.75 4.05 4.34 4.56
Actual Length of Employment 108 109 118 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 124 124 122 97 60 39
RBAAIH 2.57 1.85 1.02 0.47 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 435220 373959 321925 289767 259940 254658 250918 248720
Table 128
	 Training effectiveness output for shape changed multiplier table function
Quit Likelihood Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11829 366 154 115 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.50 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 96 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1427935 281556 260394 256543 254630 254177 253856 253617
Table 129
	
Base length of employment output for slope changed quit likelihood table function
Ill
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1898 624 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.88 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 114 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 334818 232412 221226 234677 278148 301604 325464 349597
Table 129
	
Training policy output for slope changed quit likelihood table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1898 624 262 147 81 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.88 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 114 119 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAAIH 2.57 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 434818 307412 271226 259677 253148 251604 250464 249597
- Table 130
	
Training effectiveness output for slope changed quit likelihood table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11846 374 155 116 96 92 89 86
Average KSA 0.48 3.31 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 29 59 89 149 179 209 239
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 124 123 115 97 92 89 87
RBAAIH 4.53 0.32 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1429593 282422 260495 256571 254643 254187 253865 253624
Table 131
	
Base length of employment output for shape changed quit likelihood table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% 4-75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1925 633 264 147 82 66 55 46
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.38 3.75 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 112 117 119 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 47
RBAA1H 2.59 0.8 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 337478 233309 221408 234734 278160 301612 325470 349601
Table 132
	
Training policy output for shape changed quit likelihood table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1925 633 264 147 82 66 55 55
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.38 3.75 4.17 4.28 4.37 4.37
Actual Length of Employment 108 112 117 119 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 124 124 123 122 82 67 56 56
RBAAIH 2.59 0.8 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 437478 308309 271408 259734 253160 251612 250470 250470
Table 133
	
Training effectiveness output for shape changed quit likelihood table function
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Risk Table Function Tests
- Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 23687 758 315 233 193 184 177 172
Average KSA 0.48 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 2613705 320797 276529 268297 264258 263353 262712 262234
Table 134
	
Base length of employment output for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3835 1273 545 300 163 132 109 92
Average KSA 1.86 2.8 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 110 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 109 92
RBAAIH 2.58 0.78 0.21 0.08 0.04 i 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 528476 297251 249518 250007 286296 308208 330928 354193
Table 135
	
Training policy output for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3835 1273 545 300 163 132 109 92
Average KSA 1.86 2.8 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 110 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 109 92
RBAAIH 2.58 0.78 0.21 0.08 .	 '0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 628476 372251 299518 275007 261296 258208 255928 254193
Table 136
	
Training effectiveness output for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 11869 1294 615 482 415 398 385 376
Average KSA 0.48 3.33 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 29 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
RBAAIH 4.53 0.31 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 1431922 374390 306492 293197 286533 284763 283507 282570
Table 137
	
Base length of employment output for shape changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 4546 1939 969 590 357 297 252 217
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 108 119 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
RBAAIH 2.59 0.79 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 599620 363943 291916 278958 305734 324666 345169 366733
Table 138
	
Training policy output for shape changed risk table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 4546 1939 969 590 357 297 252 217
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 108 119 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
RBAAIH 2.59 0.79 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Cumulative Safety Costs 699620 438943 341916 303958 280734 274666 270169 266733
Table 139
	
Training effectiveness output for shape changed risk table function
Unsafe Acts Table Function Tests
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 15575 1339 600 414 305 286 273 264
Average KSA 0.48 3.32 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09	 ' 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 29 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
RBAAIH 10.74 1.49 0.73 0.57 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.41
Cumulative Safety Costs 1802549 378914 305044 286394 275492 273572 272293 271391
Table 140
	 Base length of employment output for slope changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3439 1866 980 566 247 192 153 127
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.39 3.76 .	 , 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 109 119 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 116
RBAAIH 8.67 3.17 1.15 0.71 0.4 0.34 0.29 0.26
Cumulative Safety Costs 488912 356580 293022 276615 294717 314187 335279 357685
Table 141
	
Training policy output for slope changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 3439 1866 980 566 247 192 153 127
Average KSA 1.86 2.79 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 108 109 119 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 116
RBAAIH 8.67 3.17 1.15 0.71 0.4 0.34 0.29 0.26
Cumulative Safety Costs 588912 431580 343022 301615 269717 264187 260279 257685
Table 142
	
Training effectiveness output for slope changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 8986 153 103 87 74 71 69 67
Average KSA 0.48 3.34 3.75 3.91 4.05 4.09 4.12 4.14
Actual Length of Employment 1 30 60 90 150 180 210 240
Cumulative Accident Reports 125 122 103 87 75 72 70 68
RBAAIH 2.66 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03
Cumulative Safety Costs 1143578 260256 255347 253713 252436 252121 251897 251729
Table 143
	
Base length of employment output for shape changed unsafe acts table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 396 188 134 101 64 53 45 38
Average KSA 1.89 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 122 121 118 101 65 54 46 39
RBAAIH 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Cumulative Safety Costs 184565 188833 208404 230100 276398 300293 324458 348808
Table 144
	
Training policy output for shape changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 396 188 134 101 64 53 45 38
Average KSA 1.89 2.81 3.39 3.76 4.17 4.29 4.37 4.44
Actual Length of Employment 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Cumulative Accident Reports 122 121 118 101 65 54 46 39
RBAAIH 0.25 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Cumulative Safety Costs 384565 263833 258404 255100 251398 250293 249458 248808
Table 145
	 Training effectiveness output for shape changed unsafe acts table function
Accident Repeater Table Function Tests Percentage Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .	 , 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 146
	
Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed accident repeater
table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02	 . 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 147
	 Training policy percentage change for slope changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 148
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed accident repeater table
function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 149
	 Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed accident repeater
table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 150
	 Training policy percentage change for shape changed accident repeater table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 151
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for shape thanged accident repeater table
function
Hazards Identified from Safety Monitoring Table Function Tests Percentage
Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 152
	 Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed hazards identified
from safety monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAA1H 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 153
	 Training policy percentage change for slope changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 154
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed hazards identified from
safety monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 155
	
Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed hazards identified
from safety monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 •	 • 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 156
	
Training policy percentage change for shape changed hazards identified from safety
monitoring table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 157
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for shape changed hazards identified from
safety monitoring table function
Multiplier Table Function Tests Percentage Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.13 2.91 2.24 1.90 1.36 1.30 1.25 1.20
Average KSA 0.48 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.27 0.34 0.38 0.41
RBAAIH 0.03 4.88 5.38 5.20 2.40 2.00 1.60 2.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.11 0.40 0.13 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
Table 158
	
Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed multiplier table
function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.82 1.31 1.77 1.35 1.19 1.11 1.15
Average KSA 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.80 1.07 1.10
RBAA1H 0.04 1.13 2.71 4.13 2.25 1.00 0.25 0.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table 159
	
Training policy percentage change for slope changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.82 1.31 1.77 1.35 1.19 1.09 1.15
Average KSA 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.10
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.48 0.80 1.05 1.10
RBAAIH 0.04 1.13 2.71 4.13 2.25 1.00 0.25 0.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table 160
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.13 2.71 2.09 1.74 1.26 1.21 1.16 1.11
Average KSA 0.46 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.27 0.34 0.38 0.41
RBAAIH 0.03 4.47 5.00 4.60 2.00 1.80 1.60 2.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.11 0.37 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
Table 161
	 Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed multiplier table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 1.03 1.85 2.09 0.82 0.44 0.06 0.23
Average KSA 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.03
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.42 0.06 0.21
RBAAIH 0.04 1.37 3.86 4.88 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.28 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 162
	
Training policy percentage change for shape changed multiplier table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 1.03 1.85 2.09 0.82 0.44 0.06 0.23
Average KSA 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.03
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.42 0.06 0.21
RBAAIH 0.04 1.37 3.86 4.88 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 163
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for shape changed multiplier table function
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Quit Likelihood Table Function Tests Percentage Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 164
	
Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed quit likelihood table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
•
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 165
	
Training policy percentage change for slope changed quit likelihood table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 .	 ' 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 166
	
Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed quit likelihood table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Average KSA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RBAAIH 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 167
	
Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed quit likelihood table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 168
	
Training policy percentage change for shape changed quit likelihood table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.14
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.14
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
Table 169
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for shape changed quit likelihood table
function
Risk Table Function Tests Percentage Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.24 0.93 1.06 1.03 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
Average KSA 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.44
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 1.01 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Table 170
	 Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.17 1.00 1.02 1.07 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 .	 ,	 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.84 0.92 0.89
RBAAIH 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.64 0.27 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Table 171
	 Training policy percentage change for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.17 1.00 1.02 1.07 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 -	 0.84 0.92 0.89
RBAAIH 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.49 0.21 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Table 172
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.12 2.30 3.02 3.19 3.28 3.32 3.33 3.32
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.29 0.36 0.40 0.44
RBAAIH 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.10 0.32 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11
Table 173
	 Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed risk table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.57 2.05 2.59 3.07 3.36 3.43 3.49 3.53
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.84 1.19 1.55
RBAA1H 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.86 0.56 0.31 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.05
Table 174
	 Training policy percentage change for shape changed risk table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 1.57 2.05 2.59 3.07 3.36 3.43 3.49 3.53
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.50 0.84 1.19 1.55
RBAAIH 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.66 0.42 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07
Table 175
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for shape changed risk table function
Unsafe Acts Table Function Tests Percentage Changes
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.47 2.42 2.92 2.60 2.14 2.11 2.07 2.03
Average KSA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.28 0.35 0.40 0.43
RBAAIH 1.29 3.66 8.13 10.40 8.20 7.80 7.40 9.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.38 0.33 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Table 176
	 Base length of employment percentage change for slope changed unsafe acts table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.94 1.93 2.63 2.90 2.01 1.86 1.73 1.64
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.83 1.18 1.36
RBAAIH 2.25 3.06 4.48 7.88 9.00 7.50 6.25 5.50
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.52 0.53 0.32 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02
Table 177
	 Training policy percentage change for slope changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.94 1.93 2.63 2.90 2.01 1.86 1.73 1.64
Average KSA 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.83 1.18 1.36
RBAAIH 2.25 3.06 4.48 7.88 9.00 7.50 6.25 5.50
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.40 0.40 0.26 0.16 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03
Table 178
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for slope changed unsafe acts table function
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Metric Adjustment Fraction
-99% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.15 0.61 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Average KSA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.00 0.02 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22
RBAAIH 0.43 0.84 0.50 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.40 0.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Table 179
	 Base length of employment percentage change for shape changed unsafe acts table
function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
.
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.78 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
RBAAIH 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.43 0.19 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 180
	 Training policy percentage change for shape changed unsafe acts table function
Metric Adjustment Fraction
-100% -75% -50% -25% +25% +50% +75% +100%
Cumulative Accidents 0.78 0.70 0.50 0.30 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21
Average KSA 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Actual Length of Employment 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cumulative Accident Reports 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.19
RBAAIH 0.91 0.91 0.76 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Cumulative Safety Costs 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Table 181
	 Training effectiveness percentage change for shape changed unsafe acts table function
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APPENDIX J
Data Collated for Parameterisation of the Real World
Occupational Safety Model
Month Over 3
Day
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
3 Days or
Less
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
Total Lost
Time
(days)
Minor
Injuries
-
Total
Accident
Injuries
,
Apr. 1 7
,
7 1
May 4 25 2 3 28 6
Jun. 2 2
Jul. 3 28 2 4 32 1 6
Aug. 3 52 '	 52 3 6
Sep. 3 36 36 3 6
Oct. 2 9 1 2 11 1 4
Nov. 3 44 44 1 4
Dec. 2 6 6 1 3
Jan. 3 3
Feb. 3 16 1 1 17 2 6
Mar. 3 21 1 1 22 4
Totals 25 238 9 17 255 17 _. 51
Table Jl	 Accident and lost time statistics 1993-94
Month Over 3
Day
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
3 Days or
Less
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
Total Lost
Time
(days)
Minor
Injuries
Total
Accident
Injuries
Apr. 0 0 0 0
,
0 2 2
May 1 5 1 0.5 5.5 8 10
Jun. 3 18.5 0 0 18.5 6 9
Jul. 1 5 0 0 5 2 3
Aug. 2 9 0 0 9 3 5
Sep. 7 161 0 0 161 1 8
Oct. 1 6 0 0 6 8 9
Nov. 0 0 2 5 5 3 5
Dec. 3 24 1 2 26 4 8
Jan. 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Feb. 1 15 0 0 15 2 3
Mar. 1 64 1 0 65 2 4
Totals 20 307.5 5 7.5 316 43 68
Table J2
	
Accident and lost time statistics 1994-95
J1
Month Over 3
Day
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
3 Days or
Less
Injuries
Lost Time
(days)
Total Lost
Time
(days)
Minor
Injuries
Total
Accident
Injuries
Apr. 3 21 ' 21 6 9
May 2 11 1 2 13 3 6
Jun. 5 208 208 2 7
Jul. 1 5 5 3 4
Aug. 2 33 33 2 4
Sep. 5 79 1 3 82 2 8
Oct. 1 4 4 1 2
Nov. 6 105 1 2 107 5 12
Dec. 2 8 8 4 6
Jan. 1 2 2 3 4
Feb. 1 19 19 5 6
Mar.
 1 3 4
Totals 29 493 4 9 502 39 72
Table J3	 Accident and lost time statistics 1995-96
Employee Type Employee Description of Duties/Use
of Time
Hours involved in
accident reporting
Line Management Finishing End Manager Investigation and
Paperwork
5
Shift Supervisors Investigation 2
Safety
Management
Safety Manager Investigation and
Paperwork
3
Operative Safety Representative Investigation 3
Any Injured Party Investigation/Recipient of
Medical Attention
2
Any Witness Investigation 1
Any First Aider Dispensing First Aid
Treatment
0.5
Total 16.5
Table J4	 Average accident reporting and investigation for an over-3-day injury
Employee Type Employee Description of Duties/Use
of Time
Hours involved in
accident reporting
Line Management Finishing End Manager Investigation and
Paperwork
3
•
Shift Supervisors Investigation 2
Safety Management Safety Manager Investigation and
Paperwork
1.5
Operative Safety Representative Investigation 2
Any Injured Party Investigation/Recipient of
Medical Attention
1
Any Witness Investigation 0.5
Any First Aider Dispensing First Aid
Treatment
0.5
Total 10.5
Table J5	 Average accident reporting and investigation for an under-3-day injury
J2
Employee Type Employee Description of Duties/Use
of Time
Hours involved in
accident reporting
Line Management Finishing End Manager Paperwork 0.5
Shift Supervisors Paperwork 0.25
Safety Management Safety Manager Paperwork 0.25
Operative Safety Representative N/A 0
Any Injured Party Recipient of Medical
Attention
0.25
Any Witness N/A 0
Any First Aider Dispensing First Aid
Treatment
0.25
Total 1.5
Table J6
	
Average accident reporting and investigation for a minor injury
Injury Types April 1993 —
March 1994
April 1994 —
March 1995
April 1995 —
March 1996
April 1993 —
March 1996
Minor 17 43 39 99
Under 3 day 9 5 4 18
Over 3 day 25 20 29 74
Total Injuries 51 68 72 191
Table J7	 Injury statistics over the three-year period
Month Regulated
Hazards
Unregulated
Hazards
Hazards Under
Intermediate
Regulation
Hazards Under
Full regulation
19 96 4 2
20 99 3
21 99 3
22 93 1 7 1
23 92 5 5
24 91 4 6 1
25 93 7 2
26 93 2 7
27 92 9 1
28 93 6 3
29 97 5
30 97 1 4
31 101 1
32 100 2 •
33 100 2
34 99 3
35 97 4 1
36 95 2 4 1
Totals 1727 9 79 21
Table J8	 Distribution of hazards over the eighteen-month period
J3
Hazard
Number
Intermediate Hazard Regulation —
Duration (man-hours)
Full Hazard Regulation — Duration
(man-hours)
Line
Mgmt.
Line
Employee
S
Safety
Managers
Total
Duration
(hours)
Line
Mgmt.
Line
Employee
s
Safety
Managers
Total
Duration
(hours)
1 0.25 1
_
k 1.25 1 1
2 0.25 1 1.25 0
3 0.25 1 1.25 1 4 5
4 1 3 4 0
5 3 3 3 3
6 0 0
7 0 0
8 0.5 0.5 0
9 0 0
10 1 1 1 45 2 48
11 1 1 2 1 1
12 1 1 1 8 9
13 2 2 0
14 1 1 0
15 1 2 3 1 2 3
16 2 2 2 30 1 33
17 2 2 4 1 30 1 32
18 1 1 2 0
19 2 2 2 60 2 64
20 1 1 2 1 4 5
21 0 0
22 1 1 2 0
23 0 0
24 1 1 2 0
25 0 0
26 0 0
27 0 0
28 2 2 4 2 40 2 44
29 0 0
30 2 2 4 1 20 1 22
31 1 1 2 2 16 18
32 0.5 0.5 •	 . 0
33 0 4 4
34 0 0
35 1 1 2 0.5 5 5.5
36 2 2 4 1 30 1 32
37 0 0
38 1 1	 . 2 0.5 16 1 17.5
39 0 0
40 0 2 80 2 84
41 0.25 1 1.25 0
Total 32 24 1 57 28 391 13 432
Table J9	 Time taken to intermediately and fully regulate workplace hazards over the eighteen-
month period
Title No. of
Persons
Guard
Inspection
(man-hrs)
Fire
Inspections
(man-hrs)
Risk
Assessment
(man-hrs)
Safety
Tours
(man-hrs)
Safety
Committees
(man-hrs)
Safety Time
(man-hrs)
Line 5 - 1 - - 2 3
Management
Line 3 - 1 - - 2 3
Employees
Safety 2 - 2 - - 2 4
Managers
Fire 1 - 8 - - - 8
Officer
Total Safety - 12 - - 6 18
Time
(man-hrs)
Table J10	 Time dedicated to the safety monitoring policy (April 1993-June 1994)
J4
Title No. of
Persons
Guard
Inspection
(man-hrs)
Fire
Inspections
(man-hrs)
Risk
Assessment
s
(man-hrs)
Safety
Tours
(man-hrs)
Safety
Committees
(man-hrs)
Safety
Time
(man-hrs)
Line 5 - 1 10 - 2 13
Management
Line 3 - 1 8 - 2 11
Employees
Safety 2 - 2 2 - 5 9
Managers
Fire 1 - 8 - - - 8
Officer
Total Safety - - 12 20 - 9 41
Time
(man-hrs)
Table J11	 Time dedicated to the safety monitoring policy (July 1994-July 1995)
Title No. of
Persons
Guard
Inspection
(man-hrs)
Fire
Inspections
(man-hrs)
Risk
Assessment
a
(man-hrs)
Safety
Tours
(man-hrs)
Safety
Committees
(man-hrs)
Safety
Time
(man-hrs)
Line 5 1 1 10 - 2 14
Management
Line 3 1 1 8 - 2 12
Employees
Safety 2 - 2 2 - 5 9
Managers
Fire 1 - 8 - - - 8
Officer
Total Safety - 2 12 20 - 9 43
Time
(man-hrs)
Table J12	 Time dedicated to the Safety Monitoring Policy (August 1995-February 1996)
Title -	 No. of
Persons
Guard
Inspection
(man-hrs)
Fire
Inspections
(man-hrs)
Risk
Assessment
s
(man-hrs)
Safety
Tours
(man-hrs)
Safety
Committees
(man-hrs)
Safety
Time
(man-hrs)
Line 5 1 1 10 2 2 ' 16
Management
Line 3 1 1 8 2 2 14
Employees
Safety 2 - 2 2 2 6 12
Managers
Fire 1 - 8 - - - 8
Officer
Total Safety - 2 12 20 6 10 50
Time
(man-hrs)
_
Table J13	 Time dedicated to the safety monitoring policy (March 1996-Present)
J5
Finishing End 1 Finishing End 2
Employment Starting
Date
Months in the Job Employment Starting
Date
Months in the Job
Feb. 1978 217 May 1979 202
Mar. 1978 216 Jul. 1979 200
Mar. 1978 216 Mar. 1980 192
Mar. 1978 216 Jul. 1986 117
Mar. 1978 216 Oct. 1987 102
Mar. 1978 216 Sep. 1988 90
Mar. 1978 216 Apr. 1989 83
Mar. 1978 216 Jun. 1989 81
Aug. 1978 211 Oct. 1989 78
Nov. 1978 208 Apr. 1990 71
Jul. 1980 189 Jun. 1990 69
Mar. 1981 180 Nov. 1990 64
Jun. 1981 177 May 1991 58
Jun. 1981 177 May 1991 58
Oct. 1981 174 Sep. 1993 30
Jun. 1981 171
Aug. 1982 163
Nov. 1982 160
Nov. 1982 160
Nov. 1982 160
Oct. 1983 151
Aug. 1984 139
Apr. 1985 131
May. 1986 118
Jun. 1986 117 •
Jun. 1986 117
Mar. 1988 96 .
Apr. 1988 95
May 1988 94
Jul. 1988 92
Jul. 1988 91
Sep. 1988 90
Jun. 1989 81
Jun. 1989 81
Oct. 1989 77
May 1990 70
May 1990 70
Jun. 1990 69
Jul. 1990 68
Oct. 1991 55
Feb. 1994 25
May 1994 22
Total Months 5808 1495
Table J14	 Employment durations for all Finishing Department staff
J6
Month In-House and External
Training (man-hours)
On-the-Job Training
(man-hours)
Monthly Training
(man-hours)
0 7.5 7.5
2 0 52.5 52.5
3 0 22.5 22.5
4 0 30 30
5 0 0 0
6 0 7.5 7.5
7 195 0 195
8 0 15 15
9 45 0 45
10 0 15 15
11 0 15 15
12 0 90 90
13 0 60 60
14 120 30 150
15 30 60 90
16 37.5 15 52.5
17 82.5 22.5 105
18 67.5 37.5 105
19 112.5 30 142.5
20 15 0 15
21 30 0 30
22 0 7.5 7.5
23 0 15 15
24 0 0 0
25 0 0 0
26 90 22.5 112.5
27 52.5 60 112.5
28 0 •	 • 37.5 37.5
29 60 0 60
30 15 22.5 37.5
31 • 60 0 60
32 15 7.5 22.5
33 0 22.5 22.5
34 0 240 240
35 0 22.5 22.5
36 0 7.5 7.5
Total Training 1065 975 2040
(man-hours)
Table J15	 Safety training time over the three-year period
J7
Month Hours of Training
(man-hrs)
Cost of Training (Vs)
1 7.5 87
2 52.5 609
3 22.5 261
4 30 348
5 0 0
6 7.5 87
7 0 0
8 15 174
9 0 0
10 15 174
11 15 174
12 90 1044
13 60 696
14 30 348
15 60 696
16 15 174
17 22.5 261
18 37.5 435
19 30 348
20 0 0
21 0 0
22 7.5 87
23 15 174
24 0 0
25 0 0
26 22.5 261
27 60 696
28 37.5 .	 .	 435
29 0 0
30 22.5 261
31 0 0
32 7.5 87
33 22.5 261
34 240 2784
35 22.5 261
36 7.5 87
Totals 975 11310
Table J16	 Monthly costs of on-the-job training
Month Training Form Training Provider Man
Hours of
Training
Cost of
Training
Delivery
(Vs)
Wage
Costs
(Vs)
Cost of
Training
(Vs)
7 First aid refresher course RoSPA 22.5 146 187 333
Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 37.5 353 311 664
Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
135 890 1119 2009
9 First aid refresher course RoSPA 15 98 124 222
Fire team training Central Region Fire 30 122 249 371
Brigade
14 Lift truck training In-house 22.5 93 187 280
Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
75 494 622 1116
Fire team training Central Region Fire 22.5 92 187 279
Brigade
15 Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 15 141 124 265
Fire team training Central Region Fire 15 61 124 185
Brigade
16 Lift truck training In-house 15 62 124 186
Safety Management Development RoSPA 15 147 124 271
Certificate
Fire team training Central Region Fire 7.5 31 62 93
Brigade
17 Lift truck training In-house 7.5 31 62 93
Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
22.5 148 187 335
Risk Assessment Training RoSPA 22.5 264 187 451
Safety Management Development RoSPA 30 294 248 542
Certificate
18 Lift truck training In-house 7.5 31 62 93
Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
22.5 148 187 335
Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 37.5 353 311 664
19 Lift truck training In-house 15 62 124 186
Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
37.5 247 311 558
Risk Assessment Training RoSPA 30 352 248 600
Fire team training Central Region Fire 30 122 248 370
Brigade
20 Risk Assessment Training RoSPA 30 352 248 600
21 Risk Assessment Training RoSPA 30 352 248 600
25 Safety awareness of woodworking
machines
Local Education
Institution
37.5 247 311 558
26 Lift truck training In-house 7.5 31 62 93
Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 30 282 248 530
Risk Assessment Training RoSPA 30 352 248 600
Fire team training Central Region Fire 22.5 92 187 279
Brigade
27 Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 45 423 373 796
Fire team training Central Region Fire 7.5 31 62 93
Brigade
29 Lift truck training In-house 15 62 '	 124 186
Safety in the use of chainsaws Safety consultant 45 423 373 796
30 Lift truck training In-house 7.5 31 62 93
Fire team training Central Region Fire 7.5 31 62 93
Brigade
31 First aid refresher course RoSPA 30 122 248 370
Safety Management Development RoSPA 30 294 248 542
Certificate
32 Safety Management Development RoSPA 7.5 73 62 135
Certificate
Fire team training Central Region Fire 7.5 31 62 93
Brigade
Totals 1080 16958
Table J17	 Monthly costs of in-house and external training
J9
J1 Draft Workforce Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude Survey
(a) Aims:
1. To measure a number of facets of safety knowledge, skills and attitude, both
knowledge and skills possessed by the workforce and knowledge and skills actually
used by employees using a survey based upon a structured questionnaire.
2. To sample as many respondents as possible from the 57 employed in the Finishing
Department.
3. To test the statistical significance of the survey data so as to determine whether there
is a close enough fit between the data to allow it to represent the level of safety KSA
for the department under observation.
4. To calculate an overall average safety KSA using values derived from the use of
scaled questions in the questionnaire.
5. To use this data to initialise the Safety KSA level in the system dynamics safety
model.
(b) Danger Points to Watch Out For
It is necessary to:-
1. reveal the purpose of the research to the respondents in a way that will promote their
co-operation without biasing their responses;
2. be clear and concise;
3. be devoid of jargon, esoteric language or ambiguity;
4. allow the respondents to answer questions from their own knowledge;
5. be non-leading and devoid of bias; and
6. ensure that respondents do not find the wording of questions offensive or
embarrassing.
(c) Relevance
1. Is the survey relevant and accurate enough to measure the safety KSA of shopfloor
employees ?
2. Will it be answered honestly ?
3. Will the questions be understood ?
(d) The Questionnaire Structure
For clarity in the construction of the questionnaire it has been broken down into a
number of sections. Each section has a role to play in supplying information to the
safety knowledge picture. The information which is sought from the respondents is
described briefly at the onset of each section under the 'Aim'.
The questionnaire is fully structured. A Likert scale using a range of 1-5 is used to log
the responses for every survey question. The greater the number the greater the
contribution of the answer to the overall safety knowledge level.
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(e) The Survey of Shopfloor Safety Knowledge, Skills and Attitude
There are 23 questions below, in 8 sections.
(i) Reporting Procedures
Aim: To discover how aware employees are of their legal duty to report and benefit
from reporting accidents and dangerous hazards.
Q1 If it arises, how often do you or a work colleague report a workplace danger, no
matter how insignificant it appears to be, to a manager or supervisor?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 Sometimes	 Always or
almost never	 nearly always
Q2 When would you or a work colleague report potentially dangerous working
conditions to a manager or supervisor, no matter how unimportant they might
appear to be at the time?
1
	 2
	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 After it	 Immediately
almost never	 worsens
Q3	 In the event of an accident occurring how clear are your instructions on the
accident reporting procedure that you are expected to follow?
1	 2	 3
	 4
	 5
Very unclear	 Quite clear in	 Very clear
some ways, not
in others
(ii) Use of Safe Systems of Work
Aim: To discover whether employees actually use safe systems of work (if they are in
place), including formalised work procedures and use of personal protective equipment.
Q4	 How often do you use personal protective equipment (protective gloves,
overalls, goggles, etc.) which are made available to you when technically they
should be used?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 As often as not	 Always or
almost never	 nearly always
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Q5 How often do you see other staff using the personal protective equipment
(protective gloves, overalls, goggles, etc.) which are made available to them
when they are meant to be used?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 As often as not	 Always or
almost never	 nearly always
Q6 How clear are your procedures for safe working?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Not at all	 Fairly clear
	 Very clear
Q7 How often do you follow the procedures for safe working?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 As often as not	 Always or
almost never	 nearly always
Q8 How often do you see other employees following safe work procedures?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never or	 As often as not	 Always or
almost never	 nearly always
Q9 How often do you or your colleagues take short cuts with your work at the
expense of safety (e.g. to speed up production or because it is normal to work
in such a way)?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Very often	 As often as not	 Never or
almost never
(iii) Use of Safety Training
Aim: To explore how useful safety training is for shopfloor employees.
Q10 How often do you have safety training?
1	 2	 3
	 4	 5
Never	 Sometimes
	 Very Often
If you have never had any please go to Question 12 after circling 1 for this question.
Q11 How much has the safety training that you have received increased your
understanding of safety, dangers, and safety procedures?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Not at all	 Quite Useful	 Very Useful
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(iv) Safety Awareness
Aim: To determine how aware employees believe they are about workplace safety.
Q12 How aware of your workplace hazards and risks of injury are you?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Unaware	 Partly aware	 Very aware
Q13 How aware of workplace hazards and their risk to injury do you think other
staff are?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Unaware
	
Partly Aware
	
Very Aware
(v) Opinions of Managers' and Supervisors' Safety Knowledge
Aim: To get a measure of how aware employees think that their managers and
supervisors are about safety matters.
Q14 How knowledgeable about workplace safety matters do you think your
managers and supervisors are?
1
	
2
	
3
	
4
	
5
Not at all
	
Fairly	 Very
(vi) Safe Behaviour
Aim: To discover the regularity with which unsafe acts are committed.
Q15 How often do you take risks in order to complete a task?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Very often	 As often as not
	
Never
Q16 How often have you noticed other staff take risks with their work?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Very often	 As often as not
	
Never
Q17 How often have you noticed unsafe behaviour at work where it is possible it
could lead to injury at the time, or later?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Very often	 As often as not
	
Never
(vii) Decision Making
Aim: To discover how involved staff are in decision-making about workplace safety.
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Q18 How often are you or your immediate work colleagues involved in discussions
or decision-making about safety at work?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Never	 As often as not	 Frequently
Q19 How well do you consider your safety interests to be represented within your
company's structure (e.g. is there an elected safety representative or a union
safety representative) ?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Not at all	 Moderately	 Strongly
(viii) Recruitment
Aim: To estimate the level of safety knowledge the typical recruit brings to the
organisation.
Q20 How knowledgeable are you of safety in your workplace now compared to when
you joined the company?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
The Same
	
Slightly More	 Much more
Q21 How knowledgeable do you think new recruits are on safety compared to
yourself?
1	 2	 3
	
4
	
5
Less	 The Same	 More
Q22 How do you think your knowledge of safety has developed since joining the
company?
1	 2	 3	 4	 5
Not at all	 Moderately	 Extensively
(ix) Natural Staff Wastage
Aim: To estimate the amount of safety knowledge the typical leaver takes away from
the organisation.
Q23 How knowledgeable do you think colleagues leaving the company were about
safety compared to you at the time they left?
1	 2	 3
	
4
	
5
Less	 The Same	 More
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J2 Matrix Showing Level of Significance and Correlation Between Responses
Question Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
Q1 1 0.2919 0.1215 0.2109 0.3455 0.1538
P=. P= .166 P= .572 P= .323 P= .098 P= .473
Q2 0.2919 1 0.3057 0.0209 0.0777 0.2536
P=.166 P=. P=.146 P=.923 P=.718 P=.232
Q3 0.1215 0.3057 1 -0.051 -0.1436 0.1611
P=.572 P=.146 P=. P=.813 P= .503 P=.452
Q4 0.2109 0.0209 -0.051 1 0.1127 0.1996
P= .323 P= .923 P= .813 P=. P= .600 P= .350
Q5 0.3455 0.0777 -0.1436 0.1127 1 0.3066
P= .098 P= .718 P= .503 P= .600 P=. P= .145
Q6 0.1538 0.2536 0.1611 0.1996 0.3066 1
P= .473 P= .232 P= .452 P= .350 P= .145 P=.
Q7 0.4148 0.1069 0.0067 0.3185 0.1373 0.3485
P= .044 P= .619 P= .975 P= .129 P= .522 P= .095
Q8 -0.0492 0.1178 -0.14 0.1859 0.1978 0.7728
P=.819 P=.583 P=.514 p=,.385 P=.354 P=.000
Q9 0.4636 0.0098 0.008 0.3793 -0.2087 0.0869
P=.023 P=.964 P=.971 P=.068 P=.328 P=.686
Q10 0.3641 -0.176 -0.286 0.4009 0.1205 0.1867
P= .080 P= .411 P= .175 P= .052 P= .575 P= .382
Q11 0.4786 0.0868 0.026 0.3226 0.1771 0.3573
P=.018 P=.687 P=.904 P=.124 P=.408 P=.086
Q12 0.0224 0.2022 -0.1174 -0.0658 -0.0222 -0.2467
P=.917 P=.343 P=.585 P=.760 P=.918 P=.245
Q13 0.0836 -0.049 0.1831 -0.1116 0.3294 0.0508
P=.698 P=.820 P=.392 P=.604 P=.116 P=.813
Q14 0.3342 0.0538 0.175 0 0.1935 0.5229
P=.111 P=.803 P=.413 P=1.000 P=.365 P=.009
Q15 0.3593 0.1117 -0.1168 0.4001 0.0615 0.1364
P= .085 P= .603 P= .587 P= .053 P= .775 P= .525
Q16 0.3326 0.0265 -0.1677 0.2049 -0.2704 -0.0948
P= .112 P= .902 P= .433 P= .337 P= .201 P= .659
Q17 0.2885 0.1891 0.1325 -0.104 -0.0519 0.1715
P=.172 P=.376 P=.537 P=.629 P=.810 P=.423
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Q18 0.1622 -0.0836 0.000 0.2857 0.2254 0.84
P= .449 P= .698 P=1.000 P= .176 P= .290 P= .696
Q19 0.2913 0.2599 0.1643 0.1974 0.0667 0.4209
P=.167 P=.220 P=.443 P=.355 P=.757 P=.041
Q20 0.4037 0.1649 0.2578 0.2601 0.1466 0.1211
P= .050 P= .441 P= .224 P= .220 P= .494 P= .573
Q21 0.0057 -0.0222 0.006 0.0169 -0.4084 0.0359
P= .979 P= .918 P= .978 P= .938 P= .048 P= .868
Q22 0.5947 0.2823 0.413 0.1286 0.1802 0.3932
P= .002 P= .181 P= .045 P= .549 P= .399 P= .057
Q23 0.1195 0.2773 0.0751 -0.0702 0.087 0.4077
P=.578 P=.190 P=.727 P=.745 P=.686 P=.048
Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12
Q1 0.4148 -0.0492 0.4636 0.3641 0.4786 0.0224
P=.044 P=.819 P=.023 P=.080 P=.018 P=.917
Q2 0.1069 0.1178 0.0098 -0.176 0.0868 0.2022
P=.619 P= .583 P=.964 P=.411 P=.687 P=.343
Q3 0.0067 -0.14 0.008 -0.286 0.026 -0.1174
P= .975 P= .514 P= .971 P=.175 P= .904 P= .585
Q4 0.3185 0.1859 0.3793 0.4009 0.3226 -0.0658
P=.129 P=.385 P=.068 P=.052 P=.124 P=.760
Q5 0.1373 0.1978 -0.2087 0.1205 0.1771 -0.0222
P= .522 P= .354 P= .328 P= .575 P= .408 P= .918
Q6 0.3485 0.7728 0.0869 0.1867 0.3573 -0.2467
P= .095 P= .000 P= .686 P= .382 P= .086 P= .245
Q7 1 0.2789 0.512 0.3505 0.4272 -0.2847
P= . P= .187 P= .011 P= .093 P= .037 P= .177
Q8 0.2789 1 0.1903 0.1642 0.188 -0.2283
P= .187 P=. P= .373 P= .443 P= .379 P= .283
Q9 0.512 0.1903 1 0.3339 0.2617 -0.185
P= .011 P=.373 P=. P=.111 P=.217 P=.387
Q10 0.3505 0.1642 0.3339 1 0.7983 0.1385
P= .093 P= .443 P= .111 P=. P= .000 P= .519
Q11 0.4272 0.188 0.2617 0.7983 1 0.3307
P=.037 P=.379 P=.217 P=.000 P=. P=.114
Q12 -0.2847 -0.2283 -0.185 0.1385 0.3307 1
P=.177 P=.283 P=.387 P=.519 P=.114 P=.
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Q13 0.0849 0.1 -0.0801 -0.24 0.0699 0.0617
P= .693 P= .642 P= .710 P= .259 P= .746 P= .775
Q14 0.5146 0.4166 0.1915 0.4445 0.5985 -0.1271
P= .010 P= .043 P= .370 P= .030 P= .002 P= .554
Q15 0.6153 0.1577 0.4771 0.4848 0.4213 -0.0503
P= .001 P=.462 P=.018 P=.016 P=.040 P=.816
Q16 0.1122 0.1168 0.578 0.2932 0.1906 0.0167
P=.602 P=.587 P=.003 P=.164 P=.372 P=.938
Q17 0.0916 0.2212 0.1555 0.1112 0.131 -0.1848
P= .670 13--- .299 P= .468 P= .605 P= .542 P= .387
Q18 0.2623 0.0826 0.0892 0.2673 0.229 0.1974
P= .216 P=.701 P=.678 P=.207 P=.282 P=.355
Q19 0.5436 0.4565 0.3699 0.4154 0.5896 0.1818
P= .006 P= .025 P= .075 P= .044 P= .002 P= .395
Q20 0.2843 0.1128 0.149 0.4056 0.5748 -0.1198
P=.178 P=.600 P=.487 P=.049 P=.003 P=.577
Q21 0.0155 -0.0609 -0.0342 0.3468 0.345 0.0699
P= .943 P= .777 P= .874 P= .097 P= .099 P= .746
Q22 0.5423 0.0877 0.3014 0.2579 0.6306 -0.0762
P= .006 P= .684 P= .152 P= .224 P= .001 P= .724
Q23 0.2669 0.4971 0.2083 0.0328 0.1585 0.097
P= .207 P= .013 P= .329 P= .879 P= .459 P= .652
Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18
Q1 0.0836 0.3342 0.3593 0.3326 0.2885 0.1622
P= .698 P=.111 P=.085 P=.112 P=.172 P=.449
Q2 -0.049 0.0538 0.1117 0.0265 0.1891 -0.0836
P= .820 P= .803 P= .603 P= .902 P= .376 P= .698
Q3 0.1831 0.175 -0.1168 -0.1677 0.1325 0
P= .392 P=.413 P=.587 P=.433 P=.537 P=1.000
Q4 -0.1116 0 0.4001 0.2049 -0.104 0.2857
P= .604 P=1.000 P= .053 P= .337 P= .629 P= .176
Q5 0.3294 0.1935 0.0615 -0.2704 -0.0519 0.2254
P=.116 P=.365 P=.775 P=.201 P=.810 P=.290
Q6 0.0508 0.5229 0.1364 -0.0948 0.1715 0.084
P= .813 P= .009 P= .525 P= .659 P= .423 P= .696
Q7 0.0849 0.5146 0.6153 0.1122 0.0916 0.2623
P= .693 P= .010 P= .001 P= .602 P= .670 P= .216
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Q8 0.1 0.4166 0.1577 0.1168 0.2212 0.0826
P= .642 P= .043 P= .462 P= .587 P= .299 P= .701
Q9 -0.0801 0.1915 0.4771 0.578 0.1555 0.0892
P=.710 P=.370 P=.018 P=.003 P=.468 P=.678
Q10 -0.24 0.4445 0.4848 0.2932 0.1112 0.2673
P= .259 P= .030 P= .016 P= .164 P= .605 P= .207
Q11 0.0699 0.5985 0.4213 0.1906 0.131 0.229
P= .746 P= .002 P= .040 P= .372 P= .542 P= .282
Q12 0.0617 -0.1271 -0.0503 0.0167 -0.1848 0.1974
P= .775 P= .554 P= .816 P= .938 P= .387 P= .355
Q13 1 0.2968 0.2897 0.0772 0.2622 0.2008
P=. P=.159 P=.170 P=.720 P=.216 P=.347
Q14 0.2968 1 0.4917 0.207 0.4464 0.2146
P=.159 P=. P=.015 N.332 P=.029 P=.314
Q15 0.2897 0.4917 1 0.4696 0.261 0.4001
P=.170 P=.015 P=. P=.021 P=.218 P=.053
Q16 0.0772 0.207 0.4696 1 0.6307 0.3858
P= .720 P= .332 P= .021 P=. P= .001 P= .063
Q17 0.2622 0.4464 0.261 0.6307 1 0.3269
P=.216 P=.029 P=.218 1.001 P=. P=.119
Q18 0.2008 0.2146 0.4001 0.3858 0.3269 1
P=.347 P=.314 P=.053 P=.063 P=.119 P=.
Q19 0.2774 0.6354 0.5025 0.4497 0.4722 0.6251
P= .189 P= .001 P= .012 P= .027 P= .020 P= .001
Q20 0.1219 0.4466 0.2428 0.2122 0.478 0.0578
P= .570 P= .029 P= .253 P= .320 P= .018 P= .788
Q21 -0.2816 0.0145 -0.0129 0.2147 0.0543 0
P= .182 P= .947 P= .952 P= .314 P= .801 P=1.000
Q22 0.353 0.5679 0.379 0.2001 0.2466 0.147
P= .091 P= .004 P= .068 P= .349 P= .245 P= .493
Q23 0.1863 0.5724 0.2144 0.3494 0.4745 0.386
P= .383 P= .003 P= .314 P= .094 P= .019 P= .062
Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23
Q1 0.2913 0.4037 0.0057 0.5947 0.1195
P=.167 P=.050 P=.979 P=.002 P=.578
Q2 0.2599 0.1649 -0.0222 0.2823 0.2773
P=.220 P=.441 P=.918 P=.181 P=.190
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Q3 0.1643 0.2578 0.006 0.413 0.0751
P= .443 P= .224 P= .978 P= .045 P= .727
Q4 0.1974 0.2601 0.0169 0.1286 -0.0702
P= .355 P= .220 P= .938 P= .549 P= .745
Q5 0.0667 0.1466 -0.4084 0.1802 0.087
P= .757 P= .494 P= .048 P= .399 P= .686
Q6 0.4209 0.1211 0.0359 0.3932 0.4077
P= .041 P= .573 P= .868 P= .057 P= .048
Q7 0.5436 0.2843 0.0155 0.5423 0.2669
P= .006 P= .178 P= .943 P= .006 P= .207
Q8 0.4565 0.1128 -0.0609 0.0877 0.4971
P= .025 P= .600 P= .777 P= .684 P= .013
Q9 0.3699 0.149 -0.0342 0.3014 0.2083
P= .075 P= .487 P= .874 P= .152 P= .329
Q10 0.4154 0.4056 0.3468 0.2579 0.0328
P= .044 P= .049 P= .097 P= .224 P= .879
Q11 0.5896 0.5748 0.345 0.6306 0.1585
P= .002 P= .003 P= .099 P= .001 P= .459
Q12 0.1818 -0.1198 0.0699 -0.0762 0.097
P= .395 P= .577 P= .746 ..724P= P= .652
Q13 0.2774 0.1219 -0.2816 0.353 0.1863
P= .189 P=.570 P=.182 P=.091 P=.383
Q14 0.6354 0.4466 0.0145 0.5679 0.5724
P= .001 P= .029 P= .947 P= .004 P= .003
Q15 0.5025 0.2428 -0.0129 0.379 0.2144
P= .012 P= .253 P= .952 P= .068 P= .314
Q16 0.4497 0.2122 0.2147 0.2001 0.3494
P= .027 P= .320 P= .314 P= .349 P= .094
Q17 0.4722 0.478 0.0543 0.2466 0.4745
P=.020 P=.018 P=.801 P=.245 P=.019
Q18 0.6251 0.0578 0 0.147 0.386
P= .001 P= .788 P=1.000 P= .493 P= .062
Q19 1 0.3195 0.163 0.5332 0.7273
P=. P=.128 P=.447 P=.007 P=.000
Q20 0.3195 1 0.0921 0.4796 0.0852
P=.128 P=. P=.669 P=.018 P=.692
Q21 0.163 0.0921 1 0.2276 -0.2401
P= .447 P= .669 P=. P= .285 P= .258
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Q22 0.5332 0.4796 0.2276 1 0.1896
P= .007 P=.018 P=.285 P=. P=.375
Q23 0.7273 0.0852 -0.2401 0.1896 1
P= .000 P= .692 P= .258 P= .375 P=.
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APPENDIX K
The Occupational Safety Model: More Suitable for Learning
or for Policy-Making? A Group Discussion
Interviewer: The occupational safety model, learning or policy tool? The first
question if I can open up the focus group is how might the
simulation model assist your company?
Respondent 1: Well I think it could be used by managers or anyone involved in the
field of safety to learn what cause and effects, and what can happen if
we change our approach to anything in particular, how that might
affect the overall picture, and I suppose that it would be used then to
try and explore what the most effective measures would be, and then
obviously we would if we were to continue with that approach we
would follow the path that the model said was the best path and
monitor the effect to see if the two were in agreement, yes? That
would build up to the point where if successful then we could use it
to take, look at the future so that we could set policies so we weren't
stabbing in the dark, but initially very much a learning tool and
probably less of a policy making tool.
Respondent 2: I think, you know, for this company or any new company, you know,
we would have difficulties getting the culture changed as we had. I
think you were here long enough to know that we were along time in
getting to grips with what we wanted to do, and I think this can
certainly be as in this company or any other company that is really
going into health and safety fresh in a big way they can see initially
how much, you know, what its going to cost, but the costs will
probably not be overtaken immediately by results; but eventually it
will be and, thereafter, you would be on a downward, you know,
flight path with, you know, obviously continuing courses in health
and safety training and equipment, whatever, but it would be a lot
less than in the initial period, but it would also let any new company,
not new company, anybody really starting out it would certainly
highlight that it would save a lot of injuries, but at the same time can
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Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
save money and makes good management sense.
Well HM, I've seen a few model packages like that and I must admit
I've got a degree of scepticism, especially when looking or basing
future policies on them, those sort of results. I would wonder how it
would differ from department to department, bin, where we consider
areas where accidents do occur frequently that are basically
unavoidable, you know, whether that's because of its outdoors and
wet weather, and people are liable to slip no matter what, bin, but
again yes, it looked good, and that, yes, that would be my one worry.
Yes, that's a very good point about the shortcoming of this type of
model, it can't be everything to all. You can capture an understanding
of the behaviour of the system, rather than examining the size of the
numbers. We are more interested in letting you examine the shapes of
the graphical outputs rather than looking on a point-by-point basis at
the numbers.
Yes, I think the thing that maybe the model, I not sure how it would
help or work. For instance, you could decide to spend double the
amount of time on training, but their is training, effective training and
more effective training and yet the model doesn't know how effective
that is the training is, inappropriate training you would expect it to
have a minor effect, whereas, better targeted training would
obviously be more effective. Now it's probably too much for a model
to be able to pick that up.
Would that not be down to the model?
Yes.
The assumption of what you take, or what people say they take from
a training course
but it would be
If we've got a lot of duff training courses and then really were only
ourselves to blame.
Yes, but if you've got the case where you actually said that the
supervisors are given the job of training the men for a certain length
of time each month, yes, and that's better controlled in one area than
the other, you know, better targeted, or you find that in one area
although you planned to do it wasn't actually being achieved and a
lot of time was being wasted
OK
Respondent 1: Sort of real world things.
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Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Interviewer: So we can see that as a problem with the model, but to evaluate the
effectiveness of every single piece of training and trying to build that
into the model adds a whole lot more complexities, and the fact that if
you're concentrating very much at the operational level, this model
being a high level planning tool you'd be missing the point of the
model to demonstrate
Respondent 1: the effect, yes
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
the overall effect of policies. How training as a whole has an effect,
how accident reporting as whole has an effect, and so on. It would
detract from the learning experience if we were bogged down with
keeping drilling down to the construction level of the model,
changing every single type of training each time you wanted to
simulate?
No, but you could maybe have broad bands of training, you've got
training where you go away on a course off site, or if it's on site
you're isolated from your work environment.
Fine.
A bit of theory, a few videos, whatever, might come out with a
qualification. That would be, hm, external training.
Yes, I've got the three levels of training in the model, the external,
the in-house and the on-the-job, I just aggregated them together.
Well I think that each one of them is markedly different.
Right OK.
Certainly.
, The results?
Hm, no I think its approach, not each one of them, in-house and
external are basically off-the-job and on-the-job training.
Yes.
Off-the-job training is a defined course that covers topics, and you go
back to your job and it might not change the way you work. On-the-
job training should actually, hm, because you're doing it on-the-job it
should change the way you work, and in many cases the effects I
think could be significantly different.
So this is a validation issue you are raising?
Yes.
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Interviewer: To validate this model to represent what happens or could happen in
your workplace. So can we move back to how the actual model itself,
given that it has been verified in a reasonable way, how might it be
able to assist your company, you think initially as a learning tool
and later to build policies or would you use it to train people?
Respondent 1: I think we could do yes. The problems you would face there are the
scepticism. If they're are not familiar with computers or they don't
understand modelling, hm, you've got to sit them down, but they
have to be comfortable with the process and understand what it is
setting out to achieve, and in that respect I suppose that the model has
been developed to the stage that you can use sliders and check
graphs. Depending on the audience you're trying to reach that will
only reach a certain proportion of them. I don't know if there are
different ways of doing it.
Interviewer:
	
So as far as computer modelling goes the user interface is very
important on the learning side, not so much on the policy side?
Respondent 1: On the learning side, yes?
Interviewer:
	 Yes, for learning without those slide bars would it be quite
difficult for people to get bitten by the modelling bug?
Respondent 1: Yes, I mean ideally you would want something which would work in
an interactive way which that does, but it would be further down
playing the game, where someone at a lower level of management,
supervisory level, you could sit them down and say play with that and
it might be instead of a chart it would show you a pile of dead bodies.
So that they could visually, not just on a graph but get an
appreciation, something that if I wind that up an operator died,
whatever, so taking that a stage further.
Interviewer:	 Flight simulator type of interface?
Respondent 1: Yes, hm. all our training packages, I'm trying to think of one as an
example, follow the same as a flight simulator and keep developing
that I think. If the aim is to develop a package that can be used for
training, yes.
Interviewer:	 I see, but as a policy tool to assist you in deciding where to allocate
your resources.
Respondent 1: Yes it doesn't need to be pretty to do that, it just needs to be
understandable you know.
Interviewer:	 So were you surprised about any of the behaviour of the
simulation output?
Respondent 2: Its interesting to see which one's affect, and I suppose we could
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concentrate on basically the ones in which we could influence most,
you know, quickly, cheaply and involve, get as many people as
possible involved which would offer as quicker end result.
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 3:
Respondent 2:
With something like that and getting over the credibility gap right,
and let's say you've got a group, say we looked at departments one
and two and you have that management group, supervisors,
managers, departmental managers, hm, they think the models
credible, we've reached that point, then it would allow them to
understand. I mean we've had debates about, hm, we don't improve
on safety as quickly as we would like because we can't fit enough
guards on the platforms and stuff like that, and I'm coming from the
point of view that you don't need to spend all this money on guards
and platforms, sure if it should be guarded then it should be guarded,
but to expect that to make a tremendous inroad into accident rates is
false. It's what people do that cause accidents. How do you influence
that, and obviously training them on-the-job as opposed to sending
them away on courses, although a blend is probably what's required,
and then making sure that that is supervised, so they don't go back to
what they were doing before.
So this was an intuition you had? You suspected that training
would be able to exert a lot of leverage over accident rates and
the associated costs?
Yes, there is no substitute for knowing what you're doing.
So experientially you've come to that conclusion?
Yes.
Does the model back up your hypothesis?
Yes, it was probably based, my hypothesis on a proportion of the
reading that you've done to build the model in the first place. Which
is there's a lot of work that has been done on looking at its effects, so
yes, it seems to be one of those things which is generally accepted
that training has that benefit, and you can have a factory where the
guarding is not adequate and hardly any accidents, and then you can
have the converse where you can have everything guarded and lots of
accidents. The difference there is the people.
I was looking with Ally at the accident reports and I mean probably
about ninety percent are for such minor things. You know its nothing
really to do with what's guarding it, it's basically the attitude of the
worker is "I can do this job better out the door". I mean, I know
elders in the past who never wore a helmet simply because the job
they can do it better without, you know.
Do you?
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Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 3: Oh yes, there's a lot of attitude you know.
Respondent 2:
Respondent 2
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
I think we've lost a lot of those attitudes nowadays. One, we keep
pushing them on. OK, the first time it may take longer because you
have to do it in a safe manner, but if you work at it long enough I'm
sure you'll end up coming up with a method that's quicker and
probably safer than what your initial changes were. Although they are
accepting that now, and I think this has all come from training. I think
the initial problem with the training aspect was to get them to accept
responsibility. It was always someone else's responsibility, the health
and safety officer, his job to sort this out. I mean it all, it took a long
while and it's dead and buried, and people now know who is
responsible and who they are responsible, you know, how many
people are responsible for.
So you sort of enlightened
I certainly would have, I think in the early days could have helped
that process.
Would you use the model to enlighten people, or bring training to
their attention?
From top to bottom really.
Yes, I think there's still work to do on enlightening, because we can
still slip back into "Well I can't get enough fitters to fit the guards or
manufacture the guards I need, therefore, I can't do anything about
safety". There's still some of that left, yes.
Not as much as before, I think a lot have changed their policies in
terms of risk assessment (line managers and supervisors) even though
they do them and can't finish them because they have no hardware.
They're now more interested in the ones that cause most accidents
where they have lost days, and which are reasonable policy
statements to implement.
Did the model help you appreciate an understanding of the
propensity of the costs arising from the safety system as a whole?
People have always discussed it, but didn't always agree with it, you
know, "Do you have to spend money on health and safety in terms of
payback", never mind in terms of injury, although just financial
payback is that there are large rewards.
I think part of the problem would be, hm, getting the people at the top
to sit down for long enough to appreciate the model and overcome
the scepticism, and then look at the cost. That is a major problem, and
I don't know whether we would achieve that.
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Interviewer: So to demonstrate a point you could possibly use that model and
maybe the senior management would be interested in the
financial
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Yes, sure they would
Outputs of that model?
They would but I don't know if you would, bin,
Capture them for long enough?
Yes, I don't know given that, and I can't say that this is universal,
because I don't know what our senior boots are like, but, bin, if
you've got a group of directors, they'll tend to be, forty would be
young, you know. They are not at the technology end. Some of them
have not really kept up. So for a start it's a computer and they're not
entirely familiar with that. If letters need typed somebody else does
that. They may use it for certain things. So technology is not as
familiar as for people who are younger, and then you've got the
scepticism about modelling which would be a concept which they
would maybe not be familiar with, hm, and I think there would be a
point where they would tend to cut off and just say "Well very
interesting but I'm too busy, go and talk to someone else". So before
you've got over those two hurdles to get to the benefits of the model
they might have gone and lost interest To get their attention it needs
to be less than fifteen minutes.
Are we bringing a new angle in, so we've got learning, we've got
policy evaluation and demonstration
Demonstration, yes.
Trying to sell a point rather than trying to teach them?
They would not have sat through your presentation. They'd have
wanted to cut to, you know, what's the point? In theory, I'm not
saying in practice all the time, in theory they want to, you need to hit
them with what they call the bullet points, where are you headed?
Although I've not sat in a lot of meetings, and maybe you can
confirm that or correct me here. What I feel is that they've got to the
bullet points, they want to be there, if the bullet points don't confirm
their pre-digested thinking, their own prejudices and beliefs, then
you're obviously wrong and they move onto something else.
But saying that if the bait's taken
The bait's taken
with a few bullet points then all of a sudden you find that their
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Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
running very fast to the beat and
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
So there is a technique there.
So if you win their confidence with this type of model that could
have a real cascade effect in the way that resources are placed,
and target safety as a cost centre, and you could maybe obtain
more resources?
The best place to target is the Accounts, accountants
Yes, yes
Because that's where their interest is.
That might be the place to start. Certainly, then you're into the
robustness of the model and not in terms of how well validated it has
been, but in the middle of the demonstration is it going to hiccup. For
a valid reason, which any reasonable person would allow you to dig
yourself out of, but that would be "Look it doesn't even work", you
know, general mistrust about computers, no knowledge about
modelling, yes and that's the kind of group, as I say I'm sure a lot of
companies are vastly different, but I think that's where we are, and
most companies might be like that. But we've got Andy here; he's up
amongst these guys.
What?
So yes, the aim is to sell to that group.
Right, OK. They could possibly use it as a tool amongst others to
assess where they're going put resources?
Yes, they're more likely to, if they believed it you could get them
running with it, hm, they might hand it to someone else to do the
analysis. What about when it comes to senior people, would they be
inclined to say that "If the model works in this area (departments one
and two) will it work in others?" I don't know. Well there are
systems, I don't think there's, its like governments trying to model
economies is it?
No this is a micro model.
Yes, it's a micro model, yes. It would be one of the things that might
convince them, might be to point out the distinction. Nobody has yet
successfully modelled economies, yes? You know we control interest
rates and that's about as much as we can do I think. Although lots of
people have tried to do, bin, maybe you could say that this is a
discrete system, and there will be external factors which would just
smash the model, yes. Like if the, you know, some factors that, what
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Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
happens if drugs suddenly started being taken up? We'd have to
introduce something for that into the model.
Interviewer:	 Yes, you could do, we could change the shape of the risk function.
Respondent 1: I was thinking of some force majeure that would sort of negate a lot
of things.
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 3:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
We could build something like that into the model, but I think it
would only require initialising the variables differently, rather than
introducing new ones. Do you think there were about the right
amount of variables in the model? It wasn't crowded out by
introducing too many policies, or were their too many policies?
No, I think you could distinguish, an attempt to distinguish between
off and on-the-job training. I didn't think anything else was missing,
or needed to be added.
So you're meaning three slider bars for training?
Well two, off and on.
Just off and on, yes
On the slider bars maybe a button that you press to give you a full
explanation of what you're actually changing.
Right, that's still got to be done and will be done at the latter stages.
It's just a case of putting all the bells and whistles onto the model.
OK.
That's quite possible. If we introduced more policies into the
model what sort of dangers do you think that would have on
understanding the model, the effect of policies on its behaviour?
If you understood what was there already if you added more policies
I couldn't see that being a big problem.
Yes, I mean they would have to be different though. I mean you've
got proactive, reactive.
I think its geared to three to ten year periods you know, things are
going to change, you know, technology wise and methodology as
well.
Would there not be a danger that too many policy options would
distract the user away from the principal policy areas, and the
user would start to lose an understanding of the effects of the
main policies?
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Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1: I see what you mean, hm, well if there were too many slider bars then
we wouldn't know what was doing what wouldn't we? I think if the
policies were kept mainstream then things don't get too complicated.
I mean, most of those policy sliders aggregate a number of decisions
don't they? Yes they do.
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Do you think that the policies cover the fundamental influences
on safety?
Yes, what about incentive schemes?
Right, that could be built into the model and be tied in a cause-effect
with morale and accident rates, but that's a good one for the future.
I mean there's incentive communication which could be part of
training, certainly incentive, because you can't buy safety. You
actually don't buy safety, what you do is you either force people not
to report things.
You can buy results.
You can buy results, yes, or you do if the incentive is such that by
taking that risk I could lose my extra day off, I'm not going to take
that risk. So that people make a choice, there is a direct correlation
between what they do and what they get.
So you think this model would give an output, you would look at
the behaviour given implementation of a safety incentive scheme?
Yes, you could have that as an additional policy.
Could you see how that might latch onto the model, these
variables, these additional policies?
Yes.
Could they fit fairly easily into the model we've got. ?
Yes, if you had a slider bar, pounds (E's) per month per employee
invested in the incentive scheme. Then you've got a cost and
depending, there will be, we haven't introduced the incentive scheme
so you can't get the data, but they do produce results.
Are they legal?
Yes, they're quite legal.
Do you think the model could be modified, to put in some
hypothetical figures, some guestimates and see what the knock on
effect on its behaviour, as opposed to looking at the hard
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numbers?
Respondent 1: Yes, yes
Interviewer:
	 On a point-by-point month-by-month basis?
Respondent 1: I think it's, hm, to the individual employee it could have depending
how it was done of course several effects, one is it could, you take a
cynical view they're just paying us not to report things, and so you
have to structure it so you don't force that out. I've heard of people
like, I think its Shell, they ask for their contractors to report what's
happening and they've got strong incentives. What they do is they
analyse the reports and there's the well established pyramid, you
know where you've fatalities at the top, and it'd be fine but you're,
hm, pyramids like missing the base and you'd be lucky enough not to
have a fatality. They'd say, "Well they're fiddling the figures", and
the incentives and rewards you're expecting to get aren't coming your
way. So they can force you to be honest.
Interviewer: So providing that we have this external knowledge, hm, of others
experiences, got hold of from the literature or other practitioners,
trainers, we can then build these effects into the model, and so
given that, do you think that that model could give a good
representation of what could happen if we introduced this
completely new policy of incentives?
Respondent 1: It could have a similar effect to training. You know the real world
provisos, providing you do it in an ethical and sensible manner, but I
think it could have a significant effect, if you don't do it ethically or
sensibly then that would be short-term until you had the serious
accident.
Interviewer: Moving now back round to the model as a policy tool, possibly to
the idea of somebody who is very enlightened in safety using it as
a policy tool
Respondent 1: Yes.
Interviewer:
	 Whereas a person from a more general background using it as an
educational or as an edutainment tool?
Respondent 1: Yes, I think as an edutainment tool people would be more inclined to
play with it, and its by playing with it you actually learn.
Respondent 3: Could it be programmed to work out itself what are the most effective
variables in the model? Whereas you're keeping the fifty-seven
employees, is that realistic say over five years, you know?
Interviewer:
	
No, that's why we can change the levels of labour and measure the
effects given those changes.
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Respondent 3:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Could you give like a range?
An optimising program, like you would set the target of minimising
all costs, you know, total costs?
You don't need to analyse them, just.
To optimise, yes I've optimised manually; it's not perfect. Now there
are three system dynamics packages on the market, one has actually
got software able to optimise models, and as you've said, hm, you
can reach an optimum blend of policies, it'll just keep calibrating
over hundred's of runs until it comes up with the answer.
It's one of those things to truly optimise it, there are more runs than
there are atoms in the universe.
That's right, but what you can do is get pretty close.
Do you think that might be of detriment to the human's
interaction with the model? Do you think the benefits that you
might accrue from optimisation software would be offset by the
fact that people aren't learning about policies or are not
discovering policy effects for themselves, they're letting the
computer make the decisions for them?
If there was a function you could just switch on and off then you
could just use it for both.
Right.
Like for somebody who was familiar with the model and believed
what it told them, em, well the model's accurate, that guys using it,
then yes, he'll want to run the optimisation won't he? He won't want
to spend hours in front of a keyboard.
That's exactly how one of the packages on the market can work.
But you want the learning course, the learning tool, because it might
be that the optimisation will have to take account of the amount of
money you have available or the amount of time, so you want to
optimise given that these inputs must be maintained below this level.
So want can we do with the resources we've got?
Yes that's exactly what is reflected in the model, it is showing given
the resources that the company have, how best to optimise. What we
didn't really see was the exaggerated impact of throwing money at
the problem. So what you actually would find is you're trying to over
optimise, running all the policies at one-hundred percent. The
additional benefits that you accrue in the accident system are
absolutely minimal or none at all, so you find that the safety costs are
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Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
rising, so we've got that costs curve upwardly sloping, that's
something you can visually digest.
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Yes, because the optimisation we want to, well we don't want to
optimise, that's an interesting philosophical debate. Do you want to
optimise on accidents, which is zero accidents, or do you optimise on
cost and you might not choose zero accidents? But philosophically
you're always aiming to achieve zero accidents. Yes, that'd be
interesting. Look at those companies that have zero accidents.
See how much it costs.
Yes, see how much it costs. I suppose once you've got there, the cost
of staying there might not be that costly.
Do you think that the model showed that in the short-term safety
appears not to be so profitable?
Do you mean that by increasing training then there was an immediate
cost, but the benefit didn't come through? Yes, I can understand that.
There is a small time lag.
Yes, I know that's how the model's built.
What?
The model's built to put a time lag in, where you spend money and
you get the benefits later.
Let's concentrate on the shortfalls of this model, I know a few have
been mentioned, but I think we should re-iterate them now for clarity.
What are the fundamental weaknesses of this model as a policy,
learning or demonstration tool?
Again, you could say that the less employees the less chance of an
accident, again that's not really accurate though, but would that be
built into the model as well? The model accepts it, say there's only
fifty-five people in, there could be a lack of cover somewhere, which
may result in an accident, or another example say there's a flu
epidemic and eight people are off from a shift.
That's very good. No that hasn't been included in the model, but it's
a very relevant point. A flu epidemic could have over a few weeks
period a very negative effect on accident rates, as people are trying to
cover for others. Although, I'm trying to reduce the level of
complexity of the model, that would be an interesting shock to bring
into the model in the future.
So the scenario really would all depend on how experienced the fifty-
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Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
seven men are, because in the layout we're talking about if we had
eight or more people missing then you wouldn't be able to operate as
fifty-seven men.
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
And the model doesn't show that?
You'd only be able to operate part of the plant, and if you have a
wide blend of experience it doesn't matter which part's of the plant
you operate you'd still have sufficient skills maybe only to work on a,
with enough training they should be able still to work in a safe
manner. I don't know really how much, lun, effect it would have.
Anyway, in department's one and two there's quite a high incidence
of accidents. It wasn't a low accident area was it?
No, no it was higher than the company average, yes. So you're
actually saying here that we could maybe see this as a strength
that we can still demonstrate about the effect of training upon the
model's behaviour, and allowing people to move safely between
tasks?
What about the length of service that should determine the amount of
quality and amount of skill and training received?
The staff turnover is included in the model as well as the average
length of employment. It shows that as turnover increases then
knowledge is lost.
Having more flexible people should offset a sudden burst of
absenteeism.
So there are two sides to this argument.
We are a company who do not shut for holidays. There's always
cross-training for holiday cover, we run right through so, or we would
shut down a machine completely.
What were the three areas?
Well the total credibility needs to be sold hard I think, and its
possibly one thing if you were giving a presentation, you wouldn't
want to spend much time on.
Getting people straight down to playing with the model rather than
That's right.
Giving the presentation.
If you had a document to say that this model is ninety-five percent
credible, no matter where you operate it then you can get on with the
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Respondent 1:
business of telling them exactly, showing them the results so, you
know, I think, how you get that across I don't know. I mean the one
sample we've got is it reflective totally in this company? I don't
know how that works or how that is built into the model. I mean
there's other areas with maybe less people where their accidents are
almost zero. Arthur's point about putting the model across to people
who haven't really got a lot of time to listen to half an hour of
justification on its credibility, just get that point across quickly, then
move across onto the main issues, the bullet points.
You can always completely ignore, and say this model allows you to
see the effect of different policies on, lun, safety and costs related to
safety.
Interviewer:
	 That's a weakness and a strength as far as senior management
are concerned?
Respondent 1: Yes, you could say that they would question you, and you might get
bogged down with questions, whereas, if they don't have it you might
introduce it if they do question it. The need for information would be
driven by them then, and it would be the quickest route into getting
them to use the model. "How do you work that out?", and then that
point, it's a point of interest, rather than you trying to tell them before
you show them the model that it's going to work, it's going to be the
right thing.
Interviewer:
	 OK.
Respondent 2: I have to say that I didn't think about the points that the others
brought up in a negative form, and from the beginning just accept that
you are here for a purpose, and I accepted the credibility of the whole
model from the start.
Interviewer:
	 Are you trusting of the model builder?
Respondent 2: It makes things easier, because it's something you want to use
immediately without, well later on you might say well it's not quite
accurate on this one aspect, we've put in millions of pounds (Vs)
worth of training and it hasn't really affected it as much as the model
showed, but I mean through time you'd find out the trend anyway
wouldn't you?
Interviewer:	 You'd fmd out whether training brought accident rates down and if so
by how much.
Respondent 2: Yes, you'd see the difference and the effect.
Interviewer:
	 You might not get the exact numerical measures but would be able to
measure the patterns that emerge.
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Respondent 1: Yes, so we made the point about the interface about that approach
being user friendly, what other points were you homing in on?
Interviewer:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 2:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
The sort of variables selected; do you think that we've mentioned
all of the important ones, apart from the safety incentive scheme
and the absenteeism?
What about any of the auditing, I'm talking about with insurance
health and safety?
External audits? Yes, we have liability insurance, we have to. That's
starting to bring in the wider aspects.
That's in the costs, that's been built into the safety costs. The cost is
four-hundred and fifty thousand pounds (£.'s) for four-hundred and
fifty employees; those were the figures for 1996. Stuart has given me
those figures. He told me the premium is set on a linear scale, so if
you have zero accidents your indemnity fees are very, very small, so
it worked out at nearly two-hundred pounds (Vs) an accident just on
insurance.
I mean that's proper that we're spending on that.
It's all the life stuff isn't it.
We have to sell a lot of board to make money.
If we can start to wind the discussion down as I think we've covered
all the points now and it's been very enriching. I've learnt a lot about
the potential for the model, the pitfalls of the model applied within a
real company. So the question is, is it a learning tool, a policy tool,
or both, and if it's both which side do thing it leans towards in
this particular company? Just in a few words I think.
In a few words I think, hm, to succeed as a policy tool it has to first
succeed as a learning tool. If it isn't in the first place a learning tool
then it will never be a policy tool. It's not either, or it's one then the
other.
One then the other?
Yes.
People within the group would use the tool for different reasons?
Yes, but you know it would be for anybody to come and use it, it
would be for learning, once you've achieved that aim, you could then
use it by adding features to mould it into a policy tool, but first of all
it must be a good learning tool.
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Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Interviewer:
Respondent 3:
Interviewer:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Respondent 1:
Just one more question to tag on the end. We're actually modelling a
real company, your company. An abstract model I think can only
purely be used to teach people. I think a real model can both be used
for learning and policy. Do you see that as more useful to you, a
model of your own environment, or do you think that you would
bring in bias, or would it allow you to explore policies that you
wouldn't normally explore in your own work environment?
You mean if we had an abstract model that brought in all possible
policies?
That didn't necessarily reflect what was happening in your company.
It would still help us to learn and we might discover policies that we
would not normally consider.
Right.
If you took it off a really successful firm, like a Japanese leader,
something not necessarily in this industry, like you know.
Well what about if you wanted to be really sophisticated you could
switch on the generic model, which is the one which is designed to
show how safety works for any company, and introduces all the
possible policies, and switch them on. I think if you had that model.
which was just like the average company, and people played with that
the next thing they would want is something they could use for their
own situation. So maybe we'll skip a stage and the question I'd ask
back is, you know, never mind what policies we'd like to see on it,
what policies should be on it that we don't know about?
Good point, I think all the three facets of safety, i.e. accident
reporting, safety monitoring and safety learning are covered in the
model. I don't have any new fundamental policies to offer you that
you weren't aware of already. Anybody got anything further to add?
Management competence affects safety performance, which I
suppose management competence affects every sphere of business,
but their competence in safety could be measured and some, hm, term
found which you could vary to influence the model.
Yes, to enhance the model, a fundamental enhancement.
Disharmonies between management, you know, conflict arises and
lends a belief quite a lot within companies, that type of variable could
be incorporated as well?
Yes, well I always say, well we're sort of entering another field
because the, one of the things which is normally stressed is the
direction from the top of the company. If they are not really
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interested. In fact if you look at the guidance we get from the HSE.
Did you check out HSG65?
Interviewer:	 'Successful Health and Safety Management', the booklet?
Respondent 1: Leadership's a key factor in there, which I suppose that the model's
aimed at leadership that, it's aimed at people who want to lead health
and safety effectively.
Respondent 3: It's for them to use it isn't it?
Respondent 1: I know that wasn't expressed very well but.
Interviewer: We should have built senior management's understanding of safety
into the model, and the leverage that they can exert over this system
is very, very important, because we measured the workforce's safety
understanding and how they work, but it may well have been more
difficult to measure senior management. Although how you set the
policies, the amount of resources allowed would be directly
attributable to the safety budget that management allow. So in effect
management's commitment and understanding would be reflected in
the allocation of resources to safety. The maximum limits of each
safety resource.
Respondent 1: Yes, if you've got ignorance on the part of the senior people and an
unwillingness to act that would have massive effects on how your
company performs, well in any sphere. Do you want to come in
Andy?
Respondent 2: No, I think we said all we can.
Interviewer:	 Thanks a lot for your time, and I hope the model has been of interest
to you and will help you with your decision making in the future.
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APPENDIX L
A Full Listing of the Generic Occupational Safety Model
Equations (Written in 'think ©High Performance Systems)
Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t) = Accident Reports_Being_Processed(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reportsin - Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Accident_Reports_Being_Processed = 2.06
Accident_Reports_In = Accident_Rate*Proportion_of Accidents_Reported
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Tirne_to_Clear Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Repbrting_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost) * dt
!NIT Cumulative_Accident Reporting_Cost =0
Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost = Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident Reporting_Cost
Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Reports =0
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear_Accident Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Accident_Reporting_Cost = 100
Accident_Reporting_Policy =25
Accident_Reporting_Time = 10
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Cumulative_Accidents(t) = Cumulative_Accidents(t - dt) + (Accident_Rate) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accidents = 0
Accident_Rate = Accident_Incidence*Labour
Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Accident_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident_Cost = Accident_Rate*Cost_per_Accident
Accident_Incidence =
((Unregulated_Hazards/Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Underintermediate_Re
gulation/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Full_Hazard_
Regulation_Weighting))*Risk
Cost_per_Accident = 100
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting =2
LI
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1.5
Unregulated_Hamd_Regulation_Weighting = 1
Risk = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.05), (0.5, 0.049), (1.00, 0.0473), (1.50, 0.0383), (2.00, 0.021), (2.50, 0.017), (3.00, 0.0138),
(3.50, 0.0105), (4.00, 0.007), (4.50, 0.003), (5.00, 0.00)
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthlyintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
[NIT Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate Hazard Regulation Cost
Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost =0
Month ly_Safety_Mon itoring_Cost = Safety_Monitoring_Pol icy* Safety_Monitoring_Cost
Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation - Hazards_Become_Regulated) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation = 1.36
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulatio
n_Backlog,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under Full_Regulation_Backlog,Full_
Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation(t) = Hamds_Under_Intermediate_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Identification_Rate - Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation = 1.36
Identification_Rate =
M IN(Unregu lated_Hazard s/Tim e_to_Identify_Unregu lated_Hazards,((Acc i dent_Reports_Completed *(-
Accident Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under Regulation_Backlog,Int
ermediate_Hazard_Regulation Policy/Intermediate Hazard Regulation Time)
Regulated_Hazards(t) = Regulated Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazards_Become_Regulated -
Hazard_Generation_Rate) * dt
INIT Regulated_Hazards = 85
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog,Full_
Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Unregulated_Hazards(t) = Unregulated Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazard_Generation_Rate -
Identification_Rate) * dt
INIT Unregulated_Hazards = 1.36
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_toidentify_Unregulated_Hazards,RAccident_Reports_Completed*( I-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identifiedfrom_Safety_Monitoring))
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 10
L2
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 15
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 10
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 10
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 5
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time =2
RBAAIH =
(Unregulated_Hazards+Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation+Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation)/Reg
ulated_Hazards
Safety_Monitoring_Cost = 10
Safety_Monitoring_Policy =20
Accident_Repeater = GRAPH(Accident Reports_Completed)
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.01), (3.00, 0.02), (4.00, 0.03), (5.00, 0.04), (6.00, 0.055), (7.00, 0.07), (8.00, 0.085),
(9.00, 0.1), (10.0, 0.125), (11.0, 0.165), (12.0, 0.215), (13.0, 0.265), (14.0, 0.32), (15.0, 0.365), (16.0,
0.425), (17.0, 0.49), (18.0, 0.545), (19.0, 0.6), (20.0, 0.68)
Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring = GRAPH(Safety_Monitoring_Policy)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.125), (20.0, 0.325), (30.0, 0.575), (40.0, 0.925), (50.0, 1.53), (60.0, 3.15), (70.0,
4.35), (80.0, 4.73), (90.0, 4.93), (100, 5.00)
Unsafe_Acts = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.1), (0.5, 0.099), (1.00, 0.098), (1.50, 0.096), (2.00, 0.089), (2.50, 0.074), (3.00, 0.038), (3.50,
0.022), (4.00, 0.016), (4.50, 0.012), (5.00, 0.009)
Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t) = Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t - dt) + (Quits) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Labour_Quits = 0
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Labour(t) = Labour(t - dt) + (Hires - Quits) * dt
INIT Labour = Target_Labour_Force
Hires = ((Target_Labour_Force-Labour)/Staff Adjustment_Time)+Replacing_Attrition
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Actual_Length_of Employment = Base_Length_of Employment*(1-Quit_Likelihood)
Base_Length_of Employment = 120
Perceived_Accident_Incidence = SMTH3(Accident_Incidence,3)
Replacing_Attrition = Quits
Staff Adjustment_Time =4
Target_Labour Force = 100
Quit_Likelihood = GRAPH(Perceived_Accidentincidence)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.001), (0.2, 0.003), (0.3, 0.006), (0.4, 0.014), (0.5, 0.028), (0.6, 0.08), (0.7, 0.0915),
(0.8, 0.096), (0.9, 0.098), (1, 0.1)
Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Safety_Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Safety_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Cost =
Monthly_Accident_Cost+(Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost)+(Full_Hazard_Regulati
on_Pol icy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost)+(Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate_Haz
ard_Regulation_Cost)+(Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident Reporting_Cost)+(Training_Policy*Safet
y_Training_Cost)
Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost = Training_Policy*Safety_Training_Cost
Safety_KSA(t) = Safety_KSA(t - dt) + (Learning + Gain_in_KSA - Loss_of KSA -
Dissipation_of KSA) * dt
NIT Safety_KSA = 400
Learning = DELAY(Multiplier*Discrepancy,3)
Gain_in_KSA = Hires*KSA_per New_Employee
Loss_of KSA = Quits*Loss_per_Exit
Dissipation_of KSA = Safety_KSA*Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost
Average_KSA = Safety_KSA/Labour
L3
Discrepancy = 1-(Safety_KSA/Target_Safety_KSA)
Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost = 0.01
KSA_per_New_Employee = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA
Loss_per_Exit = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA
Maximum_KSA_per_Employee =5
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA = 0.7
Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA = 1.3
Safety_Training_Cost = 10
Target_Safety_KSA = Labour*Maximum_KSA_per_Employee
Time_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Identify_Unregulated-Hazards = 1
Training_Effectiveness = 0.75
Training_Policy = 200
Multiplier =
GRAPH((Training_Effectiveness*Training_Policy)* (IF(Safety_KSA<Target_Safety_KSA)THEN(1)EL
SE(0)))
(0.00, 0.00), (50.0, 10.0), (100, 20.0), (150, 30.0), (200, 40.0), (250, 50.0), (300, 60.0), (350, 70.0), (400,
80.0), (450, 90.0), (500, 100)
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APPENDIX M
A Full Listing of the Real World Occupational Safety Model
Equations (Written in Ithink ©High Performance Systems)
Accident_Reports_Being_Processed(t) = Accident Reports_Being_Processed(t - dt) +
(Accident Reports_In - Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Accrdent_Rep orts Being_Processed = 1
Accident_Reports_In =—Accident_Rate*Proportion_of Accidents_Reported
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear_Accident_Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Cumulative_Accident_Reporting_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident Reporting_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident Reporting_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident_Reporting_Cost = Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident_Reporting_Cost
Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Reports(t - dt) +
(Accident_Reports_Completed) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Reports =0
Accident_Reports_Completed =
MIN(Accident_Reports_Being_Processed/Time_to_Clear_Accident Report_Backlog,Accident_Reportin
g_Policy/Accident_Reporting_Time)
Accident_Reporting_Cost = 13
Accident_Reporting_Policy = 34+STEP(11,13)+STEP(3,25)
Accident_Reporting_Time = 8
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Cumulative_Accidents(t) = Cumulative_Accidents(t - dt) + (Accident_Rate) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accidents =0
Accident_Rate = Accidentincidence*Labour
Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Accident_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Accident_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Accident_Cost = 0
Monthly_Accident_Cost = Accident_Rate*Cost_per_Accident
Accidentincidence =
((Unregulated_Hazards/Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under Intermediate_Re
gulationantennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting)+(Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation/Full_Hazard
Regulation_Weighting))*Risk
Cost_per_Accident = 1636
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting =2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1.5
M1
Unregulated_Hazard_Regulation_Weighting = 1
Risk = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.05), (0.5, 0.049), (1.00, 0.0473), (1.50, 0.0383), (2.00, 0.021), (2.50, 0.017), (3.00, 0.0138),
(3.50, 0.0105), (4.00, 0.007), (4.50, 0.003), (5.00, 0.00)
Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) = Cwnulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthly_Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulativeintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t) =
Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =0
Monthlyintermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost =
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost
Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Monitoring_Cost =0
Monthly_Safety_Monitoring_Cost = Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost
Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Full_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation - Hazards_Become_Regulated) * dt
[NIT Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation = 1
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intennediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulatio
n,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation,Full_Hazard_R
egulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation(t) = Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation(t - dt) +
(Identification_Rate - Hazards_Arrive_for Full_Regulation) * dt
INIT Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation = 4.5
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_toidentify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident_Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Hazards_Arrive_for_Full_Regulation =
MIN(Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Underintermediate_Regulatio
n,Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy/Intennediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time)
Regulated_Hazards(t) = Regulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazards_Become_Regulated -
Hazard_Generation_Rate) * dt
INIT Regulated_Hazards = 96
Hazards_Become_Regulated =
MIN(Hazards_Under Full_Regulation/Time_to_Clear Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation,Full_Hazard_R
egulation_Policy/Full_Hazard_ReguIation_Time)
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Unregulated_Hazards(t) = Unregulated_Hazards(t - dt) + (Hazard_Generation_Rate -
Identification_Rate) * dt
[NIT Unregulated_Hazards = 0.5
Hazard_Generation_Rate = Regulated_Hazards*Unsafe_Acts
Identification_Rate =
MIN(Unregulated_Hazards/Time_to_Identify_Unregulated_Hazards,((Accident_Reports_Completed*(1-
Accident_Repeater))+Hazards_Identified_from_Safety_Monitoring))
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 9
Full_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 22.7
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Full_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 16
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Cost = 11
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy = 3.2
Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Time = 2.1
RBAAIH =
(Unregulated_Hazards+Hazards_Under Intermediate_Regulation+Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation)/Reg
ulated_Hazards
Safety_Monitoring_Cost = 13
Safety_Mon itoring_Pol icy = I 8+STEP(23,15)+STEP(2,28)+STEP(7,35)
Accident_Repeater = GRAPH(Accident_Reports_Completed)
(1.00, 0.00), (2.00, 0.01), (3.00, 0.02), (4.00, 0.03), (5.00, 0.04), (6.00, 0.055), (7.00, 0.07), (8.00, 0.085),
(9.00, 0.1), (10.0, 0.125), (11.0, 0.165), (12.0, 0.215), (13.0, 0.265), (14.0, 0.32), (15.0, 0.365), (16.0,
0.425), (17.0, 0.49), (18.0, 0.545), (19.0, 0.6), (20.0, 0.68)
Hazardsidentified_from_Safety_Monitoring = GRAPH(Safety_Monitoring_Policy)
(0.00, 0.00), (10.0, 0.125), (20.0, 0.325), (30.0, 0.575), (40.0, 0.925), (50.0, 1.53), (60.0, 3.15), (70.0,
4.35), (80.0, 4.73), (90.0, 4.93), (100, 5.00)
Unsafe_Acts = GRAPH(Average_KSA)
(0.00, 0.1), (0.5, 0.099), (1.00, 0.098), (1.50, 0.096), (2.00, 0.089), (2.50, 0.074), (3.00, 0.038), (3.50,
0.022), (4.00, 0.016), (4.50, 0.012), (5.00, 0.009)
Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t) = Cumulative_Labour_Quits(t - dt) + (Quits) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Labour Quits =0
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Labour(t) = Labour(t - dt) + (Hires - Quits) * dt
'NIT Labour = Target_Labour Force
Hires = ((Target_Labour Force-LabouryStaff Adjustment Time)+Replacing_Attrition
Quits = Labour/Actual_Length_of Employment
Actual_Length_of Employment = Base_Length_of Employment*(1-Quit_Likelihood)
Base_Length_of Employment = 129
Perceived_Accident_Incidence = SMTH3(Accident_Incidence,3)
Replacing_Attrition = Quits
Staff Adjustment_Time =4
Target_Labour Force =57
Quit_Likelihood = GRAPH(Perceived Accident Incidence)
(0.00, 0.00), (0.1, 0.001), (0.2, 0.003), (0.3, 0.006), (0.4, 0.014), (0.5, 0.028), (0.6, 0.08), (0.7, 0.0915),
(0.8, 0.096), (0.9, 0.098), (1, 0.1)
Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety_Cost(t - dt) + (Monthly_Safety_Cost) * dt
INIT Cumulative_Safety_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Cost =
Monthly_Accident_Cost+(Safety_Monitoring_Policy*Safety_Monitoring_Cost)+(Full_Hazard_Regulati
on_Policy*Full_Hazard_Regulation_Cost)+(Intermediate_Hazard_Regulation_Policy*Intennediate_Haz
ard_Regulation_Cost)+(Accident_Reporting_Policy*Accident Reporting_Cost)+(Training_Policy*Safet
y_Training_Cost)
Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost(t) = Cumulative_Safety Training_Cost(t - dt) +
(Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost) * dt
NIT Cumulative_Safety_Training_Cost = 0
Monthly_Safety_Training_Cost = Training_Policy*Safety Training_Cost
Safety_KSA(t) = Safety_KSA(t - dt) + (Learning + Gain_in_KSA - Loss_of KSA -
Dissipation_of KSA) * dt
NIT Safety_KSA = 213.75
Learning = DELAY(Multiplier*Discrepancy,3)
Gain_in KSA = Hires*KSA_per New Employee
Loss_of—KSA = Quits*Loss_per—Exit
Dissipation of KSA = Safety_lak*Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost
Average_K-§A = Safety_KSA/Labour
Discrepancy = I -(Safety_KSA/Target Safety_KSA)
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Fixed_Proportion_of KSA_Lost = 0.02
KSA_per_New_Employee = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA
Loss_per_Exit = Average_KSA*Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA
Maximum_KSA_per_Employee =5
Proportion_of Accidents_Reported = 1
Ratio_Between_Hires_and_Average_KSA = 0.85
Ratio_Between_Quitters_and_Average_KSA = 1.01
Safety_Training_Cost = 14
Target Safety_KSA = Labour*Maximum_KSA_per Employee
Time_to_Clear Accident_Report_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Full_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_to_Clear_Hazards_Under_Intermediate_Regulation_Backlog = 1
Time_toidentify_Unregulated_Hazards = 1
Training_Effectiveness = 0.75
Training_Policy = GRAPH(TIME) (0.00, 7.50), (1.00, 52.5), (2.00, 22.5), (3.00, 30.0), (4.00, 0.00),
(5.00, 7.50), (6.00, 195), (7.00, 15.0), (8.00, 45.0), (9.00, 15.0), (10.0, 15.0), (11.0, 90.0), (12.0, 60.0),
(13.0, 150), (14.0, 90.0), (15.0, 52.5), (16.0, 105), (17.0, 105), (18.0, 143), (19.0, 15.0), (20.0, 30.0),
(21.0, 7.50), (22.0, 15.0), (23.0, 0.00), (24.0, 0.00), (25.0, 113), (26.0, 113), (27.0, 37.5), (28.0, 60.0),
(29.0, 37.5), (30.0, 60.0), (31.0, 22.5), (32.0, 22.5), (33.0, 240), (34.0, 22.5), (35.0, 7.5)
Multiplier =
GRAPHaTraining_Effectiveness*Training_Policyr (IF(Safety_KSA<Target_Safety_KSA)THEN(1)EL
SE(0)))
(0.00, 0.00), (50.0, 10.0), (100, 20.0), (150, 30.0), (200, 40.0), (250, 50.0), (300, 60.0), (350, 70.0), (400,
80.0), (450, 90.0), (500, 100)
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